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Abstract 
 
In 2013, Edward Snowden provided journalists with copies of classified documents 
detailing the operations of the National Security Agency of the United States and its 
allies; in particular, the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters. Snowden 
explained that he hoped to set the conditions for a new technical literacy that would 
alter understandings of the relationship between digital communications and law. 
This thesis asks whether or not law is capable of repaying Snowden’s faith. To that 
end, it offers a media-theoretical genealogy of the interception of communication in 
the UK. Interception is presented as an effect of different sets of technical operations, 
mediated and processed by communication devices and networks. The thesis traces 
interception techniques: from their beginnings in the General Post Office; in their 
evolution through the operations of technical media; to their reappearance in the 
operations of digital media that constitute the internet. The authorisation of 
interception, meanwhile, has always depended upon legal techniques mediated by 
interception warrants. A genealogy of the interception warrant is presented through 
an archival study of the distinctly different practices of document production that 
manufactured and programmed warrants in different media epochs; from the 
medieval Chancery and paper bureaucracies of state institutions to the graphical user 
interface, which mediates between interception techniques and law today. Finally, the 
thesis addresses the function of legislation as it in turn addresses warrants and 
interception techniques. Law and legislation, it is argued, are incapable of 
constraining technical operations of interception because, like interception, law is 
already an effect of media-technical operations. The law operates not by controlling 
interception, but by processing it, assigning meaning to it, and protecting the secrecy 
of ongoing interception operations.  
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Technical literacy    
… we need to think of it in terms of literacy, because technology is a new system 
of communication, it’s a new set of symbols that people have to intuitively 
understand. It’s like something that you learn … just like how you learn to 
write letters in school. You’ve learned to use computers and how they interact, 
how they communicate. And technical literacy in our society is a rare and 
precious resource.1 
In June 2013, The Guardian newspaper began publishing a series of articles based on 
documents provided by former intelligence contractor Edward Snowden. Similar 
reports soon appeared in other news outlets in the United States and Germany. All 
concerned the capabilities and activities of the National Security Agency of the United 
States (NSA) and allied organisations, particularly the United Kingdom’s Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), in relation to the interception and 
exploitation of data derived from digital communication systems on a planetary scale.  
 
Snowden’s aim was to generate the conditions for a new technical literacy that would 
ultimately encode personal privacy and governmental accountability into law. The 
problem, as he saw it, was that all critical decisions regarding the agencies and their 
operations were taken in secret by senior civil servants, who because they “have been 
around longer than the furniture… feel [the agencies] can be trusted” to act in the 
public interest without public knowledge of their operations.2 Bypassing these 
ineffective oversight regimes and organisational chains of command, he sought to 
provide citizens and legislatures with the material that would change the frame of 
reference regarding the relationship between law, governmental power and 
communication media. The first step towards improving the law regarding the 
                                                
1 Alan Rusbridger and Ewen MacAskill, ‘Edward Snowden Interview - the Edited Transcript’, The Guardian, 18 
July 2014, sec. World news, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-
whistleblower-interview-transcript. 
2 Ibid. 
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collection and use of information, as Snowden saw it, was to improve technical 
literacy so that people would better understand how digital media devices and 
networks are complicit in enabling governments to collect and analyse private data. 
Once they realised this, the public would demand changes to the law to make such 
powers accountable and transparent. 
 
Hence he distributed the cache of documents he downloaded from NSA servers to 
journalists and news organisations in several countries, creating a network of mass 
media sources that could not be dismantled by targeting what network engineers call 
a SPOF, that is, a ‘single point of failure’.3 This did not discourage GCHQ from 
sending technicians to the offices of The Guardian to preside over the physical 
destruction of hard drives containing copies of the leaked materials in a demonstrative 
mode of governmental file erasure,4 nor did it stop the police from detaining one 
journalist’s partner under counter-terrorism laws in order to search his computer as 
he transited Heathrow airport.5  
 
During the following three years, the news organisations that reported on the 
programs and systems described in the cache provided by Snowden published the 
relevant supporting documents their articles were based on. The material they have 
selected and published from the cache of documents came to constitute what we shall 
refer to as the ‘Snowden archive’.6 The documents are redacted where they mention 
names of officials or individual targets, mirroring the blacked-out aesthetic of many 
                                                
3 Ibid. 
4 Luke Harding, ‘Footage Released of Guardian Editors Destroying Snowden Hard Drives’, The Guardian, 31 
January 2014, sec. UK news, http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/31/footage-released-guardian-
editors-snowden-hard-drives-gchq. 
5 Subsequently his detention was ruled unlawful, Owen Bowcott, ‘Terrorism Act Incompatible with Human 
Rights, Court Rules in David Miranda Case’, The Guardian, 19 January 2016, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/terrorism-act-incompatible-with-human-rights-court-rules-in-
david-miranda-case. 
6 There are several online databases that collect and index published documents, such as the collaboration 
between the Courage Foundation and Transparency Toolkit, ‘Snowden Doc Search’, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/, accessed 8 July 2017. 
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officially disclosed government materials. The Snowden archive teaches us about 
technical communication systems and legal oversight mechanisms, not people.  
 
In technical terms, there was much to learn. For instance, a GCHQ system codenamed 
Tempora provides access to over two hundred international fibre optic cables, 
intercepted where they come ashore at relay points in Britain and Oman. In 2012, data 
from up to forty-six cables could be actively processed at once, each providing ten 
gigabytes of data per second, and plans were in place to grow those figures. Tempora 
grants GCHQ access to a significant proportion of global internet traffic, automatically 
analysed and processed into a searchable form. The semantic content of intercepted 
material is stored for three days, and the ‘metadata’ – the computer-generated data 
that enables digital communication to occur – is stored for thirty days.7 The NSA and 
other state agencies in the ‘Five-Eyes’ alliance (comprising the US, UK, Canada, New 
Zealand, Australia) also conduct this type of ‘upstream’ data collection at selected 
sites around the world. Each partner provides access to the data to the others, forming 
a global network of cable interception points and satellite receiving stations. 
Developing access to communication systems is an ongoing “iterative process” that 
aims to  
discover, anticipate, and/or enhance exploitation of current and emerging 
foreign communications and non-communications systems… [creating a] 
growing network of discovery networks.8 
 
Directly accessing data streams is not the only option. Computers and computer 
networks are targeted with software ‘implants’ that exfiltrate data over the internet. 
By ‘hacking’ into networks belonging to commercial companies, such as SIM card 
manufacturers and telecommunications providers, GCHQ have effectively turned 
                                                
7 Figures correct as of May 2012. See, ‘Tempora - GCWiki Entry’, Snowden Doc Search, 21 May 2012, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/TEMPORA2014-06-18nsadocs. 
8 SID today (NSA newsletter), ‘SIGINT Development: A Network of Discovery Networks’, Snowden Doc Search, 
11 June 2003, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SIGINTDevelopmentANetworkofDiscoveryNetworks2016-05-
16nsadocs. 
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other networks into appendages of its own.9 Such ‘network exploitation’ operations 
constituted straightforward criminal offences under English law: at the time that they 
were exposed, the law criminalising interference with computers contained no 
exemptions for government agencies. Parliament quickly moved to amend the 
Computer Misuse Act, inserting a clause that prohibits interference, except where it 
has been “authorised”.10   
 
We learned that the NSA and GCHQ collect ‘bulk’ datasets containing personal data 
and communication records relating to millions of citizens collected from around the 
world, including on their own populations, in order to analyse the content for patterns 
of potential interest.11 Using such datasets, experiments attempting to train machine-
learning systems to automatically recognise changing patterns of movement and 
communication began, with the ambition of implementing computer systems that 
automatically select which data will be of interest to intelligence analysts and filter 
out everything else.12 Global internet platforms like Google, Apple, Microsoft and 
Yahoo were secretly collaborating with the NSA by providing direct access to their 
servers, in obedience to broadly-drafted warrants, under a program called Prism.13 At 
the same time, the NSA was secretly targeting those same companies’ inter-datacentre 
communication links in order to collect yet more data in unencrypted form.14  
                                                
9 Ryan Gallagher, ‘The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco’, The Intercept, 
accessed 16 October 2016, https://theintercept.com/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/; Jeremy 
Scahill, ‘Gemalto Doesn’t Know What It Doesn’t Know’, The Intercept, 25 February 2015, 
https://theintercept.com/2015/02/25/gemalto-doesnt-know-doesnt-know/. 
10 Section 10, ‘Serious Crime Act 2015’, accessed 28 January 2017, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/44/enacted; see also, ‘After Legal Claim Filed against 
GCHQ Hacking, UK Government Rewrite Law to Permit GCHQ Hacking’, Privacy International, 15 May 2015, 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/584. 
11 See David Anderson, ‘A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers Review’ (Stationery Office, 
2015). 
12 ‘HIMR Data Mining Research GCHQ Problem Book’, Snowden Doc Search, 20 September 2011, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/HIMRDataMiningResearchProblemBook2016-02-02nsadocs. 
13 Glenn Greenwald, No Place to Hide (New York: Macmillan US, 2014), 108–9. 
14 Barton Gellman and Ashkan Soltani, ‘NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google Data Centers Worldwide, 
Snowden Documents Say’, Washington Post, 30 October 2013, sec. National Security, 
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According to cyber security expert Susan Landau, the most startling revelation of all 
was that the NSA had compromised the functions of a random-bit generator called 
Dual EC-DRBG. The software had been awarded a security certificate by the US 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This certificate served to 
confirm that the US government had confirmed that the software met established 
cryptographic standards.15 As a result of the NSA’s attack, the values produced by the 
random-bit generator were not truly random. A DRBG program works by generating 
a set of values derived algorithmically from an initial random ‘seed’ value. The ‘seed’ 
is a random because it depends on taking a momentary measurement of the physical 
state of the computer’s hardware at the moment the program is executed. The 
measurement observes various factors that are changeable and contingent within the 
physical apparatus itself. It is a snapshot of an entropic state of part of the material 
universe, and therefore, as predicted by quantum theory, cannot be determined before 
or after the fact of measurement by any set of predictable, programmable operations.16 
 
Once compromised, all cryptographic codes generated by the software could be 
decrypted by the NSA, which alone knew that the values were not truly random. The 
NSA knew the true range of possible values within which the key code must lie. The 
difference between a secure cryptographic key and a compromised one, in this 
context, is measured by the probability of successfully guessing the key. As Landau 
explains, this compromised the security of all communication systems that depend on 
the assumption that their data is securely encrypted through the affected software. By 
                                                
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-
worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
15 Susan Landau, ‘Highlights from Making Sense of Snowden, Part II: What’s Significant in the NSA Revelations’, 
IEEE Security Privacy 12, no. 1 (January 2014): 63; see also Susan Landau, ‘Making Sense from Snowden: 
What’s Significant in the NSA Surveillance Revelations’, IEEE Security Privacy 11, no. 4 (July 2013): 54–63; 
Whitfield Diffie and Susan Landau, Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption, Updated 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007). 
16 See Elaine Barker and John Kelsey, ‘Recommendation for Random Number Generation Using Deterministic 
Random Bit Generators’ (Computer Security Resource Center, 2012), 13–15, 
https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-90a/archive/2012-01-23. 
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attacking a random-bit generator, the NSA attacked the material foundations of digital 
security.  
 
For Landau, this damaged trust in the government agencies charged with approving 
technical standards, and demonstrated that the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), responsible for authorising and ‘overseeing’ the agency’s operations, 
did not understand the full repercussions of the authority it had granted.17 But we 
ought to consider the implications of the relationship between technical media and 
political trust in this scenario. Trust is required in relation to the randomness of 
cryptographic key values precisely because no human can determine the value for 
themselves, nor observe how the value was actually generated. As the operations of 
digital media are humanly imperceptible, society depends upon trust generated in 
how the operations of digital media are represented – in this case, as technical 
standards. Put the other way around, trust and security in digital communications 
ultimately depend on semantic devices, like certificated standards, which stand in for 
our inability to observe the operations of computer hardware. If one cannot take for 
granted that encryption keys are as random as they are claimed to be, then the risks 
of communication are suddenly and imperceptibly multiplied.  
 
Snowden’s revelations confirmed what has long been known to computer 
programmers but hidden from ‘users’. Ever since commercial computers were created 
for the mass market, a distinction has been drawn between what users perceive to be 
taking place and what the machine is really doing. Users are assigned certain levels of 
access to the machine’s programming, and permitted operations are typically 
represented by a ‘graphical user interface’ (GUI), and the user is encouraged to take 
control of the operations that have been designed for them. All possible operations 
have thus been determined in advance by the configuration of hardware and root 
programming that form the basic processing architecture of the machine. Thus, the 
conditions have long been in place for computers to do more things than what their 
users can perceive or control. Users enjoy a prescribed degree of choice, insofar as a 
                                                
17 Landau, ‘Highlights from Making Sense of Snowden, Part II’, 63. 
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device is used as intended by the proprietors of the intellectual property represented 
in the hardware and code. But this is very different from the full range of operations 
that are possible with a digital computer. Anyone who has the expertise or permission 
to access the higher commands of a computer can therefore “set conditions for 
communication that its users cannot even perceive”.18 
1.2 Stating the law   
While the American Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court attracted condemnation 
and legal challenges in the United States in the aftermath of Snowden’s revelations,19 
in the UK, there was no such judicial target of ire. All applications for warrants to 
authorise interception activities of the police, intelligence agencies, and other 
government bodies are approved by government ministers. The official title is 
‘Secretary of State’. A judicial body called the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) can 
review post facto claims of unlawful use of interception powers, but does not make 
decisions about authorisation. As of the time of the first Snowden publications in 2013, 
the IPT had never ruled against the intelligence services.20  
 
A brief chronological overview of the ‘official version’ of legal history of interception 
power in the UK helps set the scene. It can be divided into three broad periods: the 
secret use of the royal prerogative, legislative obfuscation, and, since 2016, a contested 
notion of legislative transparency.  
1.2.1 Prerogative 1590-1985 
One could reasonably begin with what may be the first attempt to rule on the general 
status of written communication in England: Elizabeth I’s proclamation of 1590 
                                                
18 Cornelia Vismann and Markus Krajewski, ‘Computer Juridisms’, Grey Room 29 (2008): 96.  
19 Rainey Reitman, ‘3 Years Later, the Snowden Leaks Have Changed How the World Sees NSA Surveillance’, 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, 5 June 2016, https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/3-years-later-snowden-
leaks-have-changed-how-world-sees-nsa-surveillance. 
20 See Ewen MacAskill et al., ‘GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications’, 
The Guardian, 21 June 2013, sec. UK news, https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-
world-communications-nsa; under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, a group of ‘Judicial Commissioners’ will 
be created to review authorisations by ministers before they are implemented, but they will not take any primary 
decisions.  
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prohibiting all but the Royal Messengers from carrying letters in or out of the realm. 
In 1635, the Royal Messengers were opened to the general public by proclamation of 
Charles Stuart. The newly formed ‘Letter Office’ held a monopoly over carrying all 
letters.  
 
The first statute establishing the General Post Office (GPO) was passed in 1657, during 
the ‘Long Parliament’ of the ‘Interregnum’, that is, England’s brief period without a 
monarch. The legislation expressly stated in its preamble that a prime reason for 
monopoly was to obtain intelligence about ‘plots’ against the Commonwealth. 
Although all law made during the interregnum was formally abolished on the 
Restoration of the Crown in 1660, the administration of the Post Office as stipulated 
in the Act was maintained by proclamation.  
 
A statute of 1710 was the first to stipulate that no one could lawfully open or delay 
letters unless they did so under a warrant signed by a Secretary of State. Intercepted 
material was used for intelligence, but it was also presented as evidence in the 
prosecution of several treason cases. However, since 1795, intercepted material has 
not been ordinarily entered as evidence in criminal prosecutions in the UK. It appears 
to have been used in ‘special commissions’ regarding labour unrest in the nineteenth 
century, and a British national was convicted under the Official Secrets Act for aiding 
German spies in London prior to the First World War on the basis of intercepted 
letters, but as a matter of policy, the information gained from intercepting 
communication has remained a secret source of intelligence in its procurement and 
use.21  
 
In the mid-nineteenth century, the question of legality was addressed clearly for the 
first time. In 1844, a political scandal involving the interception of letters of an Italian 
refugee, Giuseppe Mazzini. A parliamentary Secret Committee was convened to 
examine the legality of the practice, concluding that a power existed under the royal 
prerogative. Domestic interception practices continued within Britain, but the secret 
                                                
21 Under section 17 of RIPA 2000, no interception evidence can be used in legal proceedings, subject to limited 
exceptions. 
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branch of the Post Office that intercepted foreign diplomatic letters was disbanded 
following the Mazzini scandal.  
 
The Telegraph Act 1868 created a state monopoly over telegraphy, placing it under 
control of the GPO. Legislation stipulated that no one could disclose the contents of a 
telegram from the Post Office save under the authority of a warrant. The Official 
Secrets Act 1920 required all commercial telegraph companies in the UK to grant the 
government access to their telegrams if ordered to do so, and to keep all such orders 
secret. Under this provision, all international telegrams were collected and analysed 
on a permanent basis.  
 
The GPO issued licenses allowing private companies to establish telephone networks 
in Britain. Unlike letters and telegrams, telephone calls had no legal protection from 
interference. Existing private telephone networks were nationalised in 1910 under the 
GPO. Telephone interception, also known as ‘line-tapping’, was performed without 
the use of warrants until 1937, when they were created as a matter of policy. A scandal 
concerning telephone tapping led to the Birkett Report of October 1957. The report 
described broadly the procedures and processes in place for telephone interception. It 
agreed with the findings of the Secret Committee of 1844, in that it found that the legal 
grounds for intercepting letters and telegrams lay in the royal prerogative and that 
legislation on the Post Office had implicitly recognised this power; but the report 
expressed some doubt as to whether the prerogative could apply to new technologies 
like the telephone in the absence of legislation. The prerogative is regarded as a 
‘residue’ of the pre-revolutionary model of monarchical sovereignty. Legal theory 
regarding the British constitution developed so as to exclude the creation of any new 
prerogative powers. New administrative powers could only come from Parliament, 
or the common law. Telephone tapping, which had never been considered by 
Parliamentary legislation or by judges, was on unsteady legal ground.  
 
The legal lacuna regarding the interception of telephone calls and communication in 
general continued until 1978, when a police telephone ‘tap’ was accidentally revealed 
in court during a routine criminal prosecution. The target, a man named James 
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Malone, argued that the practice was illegal and took the police to court. In a 
controversial judgment, the High Court ruled that, as there was nothing in law that 
expressly prevented the police or GPO from tapping telephones, they were free to do 
so.   
 
Malone took his case to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which 
ruled that the absence of any legislative basis for interception meant the United 
Kingdom was in violation of article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Article 8, amongst other things, guarantees the right to privacy. The Court held that 
where privacy is interfered with by a public authority, it must be on the basis of 
publicly available law. Under the Convention, privacy is a qualified human right, 
meaning that any interference must be only what is necessary in order to achieve a 
legitimate aim, involve measures that are proportionate to that legitimate aim, and 
there must be some ‘effective’ means of obtaining judicial remedy for any unlawful 
breach of these conditions. The crucial point in relation to the normativity of allowing 
states to exercise inherently secret powers concerns ‘foreseeability’. Intercepting 
communication for police and security purposes must be conducted in secrecy to be 
effective, and the law recognises this: individual cases need not be disclosed in any 
specific sense in order to be lawful. But the law must give the public the capacity to 
‘foresee’ the circumstances in which their privacy might be lawfully infringed upon 
as a result of secret interception practices. Legislation serves this function, and the 
degree of detail required of legislation in order to make things ‘foreseeable’ is then the 
second-order question to consider.  
 
In 1985, having anticipated this outcome, the UK government proposed legislation. 
The Interception of Communications Act 1985 was passed by Parliament, ending the 
era of prerogative power and beginning the second phase; that of legislative 
obfuscation.  
1.2.2 Obfuscation 1985 - 2016 
The Interception of Communication Act 1985 (IoCA) and the subsequent Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) were carefully drafted to satisfy the 
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requirements of human rights law while keeping the substance, extent, and 
techniques of interception powers ambiguous. They established a legislative source of 
power for interception warrants, ending the theoretical reliance on the powers 
inherent in the royal prerogative, but they did so using clauses that seem deliberately 
difficult to understand.  
 
The Interception of Communication Act 1985 was the first in a series of legislative acts 
that brought the intelligence and domestic security services of the UK onto a public 
legislative footing. Although popular culture, whistle-blowers, defectors, and 
unofficial historians had long fuelled the mystique of the British secret services – the 
Security Service (domestic security, known as MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service 
(foreign espionage, known as MI6), and GCHQ – their activities had generally been 
theorised by government lawyers as emanations of the royal prerogative for the 
purposes of the law. Legislation was presented as bringing them ‘in from the cold’.22  
 
RIPA replaced the Interception of Communications Act 1985, updating it for the era 
of digital communications. For instance, it introduced a concept of ‘communications 
data’, differentiated from ‘content’. Broadly speaking, this captures the difference 
between digital ‘metadata’, produced in the transmission and processing of digital 
data, and the semantic data delivered to human users. RIPA was a much longer piece 
of legislation than the minimalist and obscure IoCA; it is notoriously difficult to 
understand. Its high degree of abstraction served to ensure it was ‘technology-
neutral’, in that it established general rules applicable across different forms of digital 
media. Nonetheless, it appears to have been drafted in such a manner that its effects 
when implemented cannot be discerned from the text.23  
                                                
22 The most comprehensive analysis of the legislation passed during this period is that of Laurence Lustgarten 
and Ian Leigh, In From the Cold: National Security and Parliamentary Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1994). 
23 Sir David Omand, who was involved in the drafting of RIPA, has alluded to it being deliberately ‘obfuscatory’ 
at public events. However, the former legal director of GCHQ has stated that the capacities it authorises were 
obvious to anyone who read it closely, see ‘Former GCHQ Legal Director: Journalists’ Communications Not 
Considered in RIPA Drafting’, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, accessed 25 September 2017, 
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1.2.3 Transparency   
The Snowden disclosures described capacities and activities that seemed to go beyond 
what was permissible under the terms of RIPA 2000. A number of legal challenges 
were brought before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) by NGOs concerned 
with privacy and human rights issues.  
 
In order to review matters that are considered official secrets, the IPT adopts a unique 
procedure. It first determines a hypothetical factual scenario that mirrors the alleged 
unlawful activities that it has been asked to adjudicate. Using these hypothetical 
‘assumed facts’, which concern some violations of law or human rights, it considers 
legal arguments and arrives at a determination of the correct interpretation of the law, 
which is publicly promulgated. The Tribunal then conducts ‘closed’ hearings with the 
government’s lawyers alone, excluding the public, the press, and the complainants, in 
order to determine whether or not the law has in fact been violated.  
 
Over a series of hearings between 2014 and 2016, the meaning that GCHQ and the 
government assigned to RIPA and other legislation was elucidated. The UK 
government, realising that many GCHQ practices described in the published 
Snowden documents were not described at all in publicly-available law, began to 
issue information, variously described as ‘codes’, ‘arrangements’ and ‘guidelines’. 
These documents acknowledged previously secret activities, such as hacking into 
computer networks, obtaining and processing bulk data sets, and sharing intercepted 
data with foreign governments. Where the published law and secondary documents 
could be read compatibly with assumed facts, however abstractly, the Tribunal found 
that the assumed facts would indeed constitute lawful operations. But where no legal 
provision could be found to cover the hypothetical activity, the Tribunal ruled against 
the government on the basis that any such activities (if carried out in fact, not fiction) 
would have been legally unforeseeable infringements of article 8. However, in those 
rare instances, it simultaneously ruled that disclosures of governmental documents 
                                                
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2015-02-09/former-gchq-legal-director-journalists-
communications-not-considered-in-ripa-drafting. 
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during the course of proceedings had served to make the activities foreseeable, 
remedying the illegality.   
 
Having decided that RIPA was no longer ‘fit for purpose’, new legislation was 
proposed in November 2015.24 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 passed into law in 
November 2016. It is supposedly ‘world-leading’ legislation.25 It explicitly lists the 
categories of operations that it permits, and provides details of procedures for making 
warrants and other modes of authorisations in relation to those operations. However, 
many privacy campaigners, technologists, and journalists regard it as a repressive 
law.26 Amongst their complaints they regard the law as problematically maintaining 
official secrecy in relation to all authorised operations even when they have ended, 
and criticise the persistence of the Secretary of State’s political control over 
‘investigatory’ powers, rather than allowing for judicial authorisation. Moreover, the 
Act does not curtail or outlaw any of the activities described in the Snowden archive. 
On the contrary, it maintains them and expands them, creating a new power allowing 
the government to compel technology companies in the UK to secretly compromise 
their hardware or software security standards – returning us to the question of 
technical media standards.27  
                                                
24 ‘Draft Investigatory Powers Bill’, CM 9152 (2015), 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powe
rs_Bill.pdf. 
25 According to the current Home Secretary, see, Matt Burgess, ‘What Is the IP Act and How Will It Affect You?’, 
WIRED UK, accessed 19 September 2017, http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ip-bill-law-details-passed. 
26 ‘UK Parliament Passes Most Extreme Surveillance Law in UK History’, Privacy International, accessed 19 
September 2017, https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/1005; Sophie Armour, ‘Liberty Gets Go-Ahead to 
Challenge Snoopers’ Charter in the High Court’, Liberty Human Rights, 30 June 2016, https://www.liberty-
human-rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/liberty-gets-go-ahead-challenge-
snoopers%E2%80%99-charter-high-court. 
27 ‘Open Rights Group - Home Office Consultation: Investigatory Powers (Technical Capability) Regulations 
2017’, Open Rights Group, accessed 23 May 2017, https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/home-
office-consultation:-investigatory-powers-(technical-capability)-regulations-2017. 
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1.3 The question of surveillance  
This brief survey of legally-defined interception powers in Britain points to an origin 
point for organised, state-based interception sometime around the seventeenth 
century. This comports with various histories of political power that identify that 
period with the emergence of modern systems of thought and modern techniques of 
political power. One of the central themes often associated with the period is the birth 
of surveillance powers, particularly in Michel Foucault’s genealogy of power and 
knowledge. Surveillance offers a useful departure point for situating the legal history 
of interception in a wider theoretical context.  
 
Surveillance lies at the heart of Foucault’s genealogy of modern governmental power. 
Practices of organised observation were central to the development of the forms of 
knowledge that differentiate modernity from pre-modernity. In Foucault’s account, 
modern human science began with practices of surveillance exercised within 
‘disciplinary’ institutions; the enclosed places where the living bodies of prisoners, 
pupils, labourers, the sick, the mad, and the needy were confined and placed under 
observation. Putting life under observation allowed behavioural knowledge to be 
gathered, new categories to be defined, and ‘normalising’ disciplinary processes 
developed. Such knowledge took effect through specific techniques and practices that 
were intensively applied to the bodies and minds of confined subjects.28  
 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault treats Jeremy Bentham’s 1795 proposal for a new 
type of prison called the panopticon as a diagrammatic form of the disciplinary 
institution. For Bentham, the panopticon was not merely an idea for a prison; it was 
to be adopted as a model for thinking about the governance of society in general. If 
the population felt themselves to be under observation, then they would discipline 
themselves without the need for physical intervention by adapting their behaviours 
to meet whatever normative criteria they assumed were being used to observe and 
evaluate them. In the panopticon, surveillance is presented as a generalised system 
for both changing subjects and measuring the change. It could be materialised in any 
                                                
28 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Penguin, 1991). 
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number of diverse settings, in order to achieve different functions. Bentham suggested 
schools, asylums, hospitals, and factories, but the ‘diagram’ can easily be identified 
elsewhere, not least in the ubiquitous technologies of observation that exist in the 
twenty-first century. In this broad sense, modern government was founded upon 
techniques of surveillance and measurement.  
 
In Foucault’s genealogy, the knowledge produced in disciplinary institutions 
migrated and coalesced into organised disciplines. Governmental knowledge and 
practices – or ‘governmentality’ – came about through the management of complex 
techniques of power that were applied to the population as a whole, based on the 
notion of ‘political economy’. The nascent social and human sciences were developed 
in order to determine the correct order of things and to achieve that order. 
Governmentality manifested itself clearly in the discourse of ‘security’, through which 
the permanent institutions of administrative state took shape.29 Knowledge came to 
be applied institutionally, not just on individuals. Practiced on paper and in files, it 
developed diverse aims and strategies, and over the course of the eighteenth century 
its institutional manifestations greatly intensified their operations. 
 
Part of the originality of Foucault’s account is that it excludes the notion of an 
oppressive state, which was how the absolutist governments of the eighteenth century 
had typically been viewed in liberal historiographical terms. It further excludes any 
sense of political economy as a driving force in history, as the standard Marxist 
account assumes. For Foucault, the very concept of state repression was itself 
something that needed to be explained. How did it become possible to speak of 
‘repressive’ forms of political power? How did political economy come to be 
considered a science? Existing historical accounts were themselves effects of the kinds 
of knowledge-production that had to be explained. Foucault shows that the discourse 
of repressive forms of political power first emerged in the revolutionary discourse of 
the late eighteenth century, and the historical philosophies of the nineteenth century, 
when repression was assumed to have ended. Political history became possible only 
                                                
29 Michel Foucault, ‘Governmentality’, in Power, by James D. Faubion, trans. Robert Hurley & Ors., vol. 3, 
Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984 (London: Penguin, 2002), 219–22. 
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once the notion of the ‘State’ had precipitated as a description of a universal model or 
structure of political power. Only then could one write the history of a given state’s 
particular development, as if the entity of ‘state’ had recently crystallised and existed 
in the present moment but had a long history. The very possibility of speaking about 
the form of such a trans-historical ‘state’ is in itself the precipitate of two particular 
“grids of intelligibility” that overlapped at the point at which both history and 
philosophy sought to enquire about the “agent of the universal”.30 The state, in short, 
is the outcome of transformations in power and knowledge that had been developed 
not through historical forces, but in localised sites of disciplinary power.  
 
Throughout Foucault’s genealogical research, power is always productive, never 
repressive – which is not to say it is normatively ‘good’, or that it generates no 
resistance. Productivity and resistance go hand in hand. Similarly, the development 
of governmentality is expressly differentiated in Foucault’s work from accounts of 
government ruled by law. Although governmental strategies are expressed in legal 
instruments, elsewhere one finds other statements and arguments that explain how 
and why the law came to be used as an instrument towards certain ends. The law does 
not determine the techniques used in its execution, nor does it have the capacity to 
evaluate the outcomes of its application. Foucault is describing a mode of government 
that permeates and actively defines all areas of life. The ‘biopolitical’ mode of power 
includes ‘law’ as one amongst other strategic options at its disposal.  
 
Legal rights, which posit a relationship between a sovereign source of political power 
and individual rights-bearing subjects, are themselves outcomes of other processes. 
Individual rights expressed in opposition to state security provide a discursive vehicle 
with which to calibrate the application of different governing techniques. They 
articulate very real struggles, but these struggles are multiple and diverse, and have 
very little in common with each other in terms of the specific question of application. 
Hence, while an immigration lawyer and a family lawyer might share an office and 
an interest in human rights law, they must operate according to vastly different sets 
                                                
30 Michel Foucault, Society Must Be Defended, trans. David Macey (London: Penguin, 2003), 228, 237. 
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of knowledge and specialisation. Biopolitical governmentality regards ‘freedom’ as 
both a regulator and resource of very different practices. ‘Freedom’ is a term for many 
things. Hence nineteenth century liberalism 
is not acceptance of freedom; it proposes to manufacture it constantly, to arouse 
it and produce it, with, of course [the system] of constraints and the problems 
of cost raised by this production.31 
Strategies of ‘security’ are also diverse; they manage the diverse production of 
freedoms. Governmentality is not repressive or historical, rather it is the art of 
maintaining production. This means managing contingencies by taking action to 
influence the action of others. Rather than a direct application of force, or confinement, 
or physical punishment, governmental strategies encourage and manage choices with 
the overarching aim of keeping the future both open and free of danger.32 Everything 
governmental involves risks: markets, healthcare, education, agriculture, 
communication, and the continuation of government itself. Sir David Omand, a 
former Director of GCHQ, perfectly illustrates this when he writes,   
National security today should be defined as a state of trust on the part of the 
citizen that the risks to everyday life, whether from man-made threats or 
impersonal hazards, are being adequately managed to the extent that there is 
confidence that normal life can continue.33  
The concept of national security can have no specific legal limitations simply because 
everyone is included in governmental grids of knowledge production. Agencies like 
GCHQ are institutionalised forms of contemporary modes of knowledge production.   
 
                                                
31 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, ed. Arnold I. Davidson, trans. Graham Burchell (Basingstoke; New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 65. 
32 Ibid., 65–66; Alain Pottage, ‘Power as an Art of Contingency: Luhmann, Deleuze, Foucault’, Economy and 
Society 27, no. 1 (1998): 1–27. 
33 David Omand, Securing the State (London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012), 9; similarly, the head of the 
Security Service (MI5), addressing a parliamentary committee following the Snowden disclosures, stated, “The 
suggestion that what we do is somehow compromising freedom and democracy - of course we believe the 
opposite to be the case", ‘We Defend Freedom - UK Spy Chiefs’, BBC News, 7 November 2013, sec. UK 
Politics, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24847399. 
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Surveillance, then, is a general form by which government apprehends and manages 
risks concerning the subjects that it works on, rather than simply the act of recording 
or observing individuals against their will. If the fundamental problem for modern 
society’s systems of understanding lies in folding the risks of the future into the 
operations of the present, then ‘surveillance’, as such, is ubiquitous.  
1.3.1 Control society  
Foucault’s work shifts attention away from law and the state towards more diffuse 
notions of power and knowledge. One productive direction of enquiry has focused on 
the relationship between subjectivities and technology. Building on Foucault’s 
foundation, Deleuze pointed out in 1990 that digital technology and the decline of 
heavy industry in western societies were transforming the ways that power operated 
on individuals, and how individuals operated on themselves. The old institutions 
which were the sites of disciplinary subject-formation – which had provided targets 
for resistance, like schools, psychiatric hospitals, prisons and factories – have been 
supplanted or augmented by diffuse, distributed modes of control that lack any single 
locus. Under such conditions, subjects also lack a single locus. Contemporary subjects 
distribute their competencies through overlapping networks and relationships, 
passing through various diffuse control points at which identities are checked and 
ordered. Labour, for instance, is no longer defined by skills so much as by time. Money 
and commodities are determined by financial economies that are not determined by 
the production and exchange of commodities. Institutions are no longer physically 
bound to buildings, but rather take effect through diffuse channels of 
communication.34 
 
Deleuze’s diagram of contemporary power works when thinking about modern 
surveillance technologies, particularly the deterritorialised, motivational, attention-
hungry and ubiquitous systems of mobile information technology. Commercial, 
governmental, and security agencies use ‘big’ data to differentiate and regulate 
subjects, to encourage some behaviours and prohibit others, and encourages a new 
kind of economic freedom that turns bodies into reservoirs of mobile labour, tapped 
                                                
34 Gilles Deleuze, ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’, October 59 (1992): 3–7. 
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into as and when required.35 Theorists who build on the Deleuzian model of ‘control 
society’ assume that the panoptic gaze is outmoded now that surveillance is 
institutionally decentralised and energised by subjects’ constant, enthusiastic 
observation of themselves.  
 
The classic text in this regard delineates the concept of the ‘surveillant assemblage’, 
which 
… operates by abstracting human bodies from their territorial settings and 
separating them into a series of discrete flows. These flows are then 
reassembled into distinct ‘data doubles’ which can be scrutinized and targeted 
for intervention.36  
The Snowden archive confirms that much of the surveillance material produced by 
intercepting or attacking digital networks is essentially parasitic on such sources. The 
state institutions that produce intelligence from these resources do not own or operate 
the media that generate data, they use legal instruments to secure access to it. The 
notion of ‘control society’ has been deployed in several studies concerned directly or 
indirectly with surveillance.37 It has inspired neologisms in the field of surveillance 
studies, many with minimal conceptual difference, such as ‘dataveillance’, 
                                                
35 Nick Couldry and Alison Powell, ‘Big Data from the Bottom Up’, Big Data & Society 1, no. 2 (2014). 
36 Kevin D. Haggerty and Richard V. Ericson, ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’, British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 
(2000): 605–22. 
37 Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000), 197–98, 329–
32, 384 For Hardt and Negri, sovereignty is expressed in coding, which distributes dispositifs via networks of 
capital; Deleuze’s paper is the departure point for Galloway’s thesis on protocols, Alexander R. Galloway, 
Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006), 4–6; also see 
David Lyon, ‘Everyday Surveillance: Personal Data and Social Classifications’, Information, Communication & 
Society 5, no. 2 (January 2002): 254; Louise Amoore deploys the concept in examining how data analytics are 
used in diverse ‘risk’ calculations, tracking individuals and ordering interventions, and in no sense enclosed 
within institutions Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2013), 91; Mireille Hildebrandt extracts the concept of ‘dividuals’ in her account of 
Deleuzian theory, see Mireille Hildebrandt, ‘Profile Transparency by Design?’, in Privacy, Due Process and the 
Computational Turn, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries (London, New York: Routledge, 2013), 226; for 
a legal perspective on privacy rights see Julie E. Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the 
Play of Everyday Practice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), chap. 6. 
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‘sousveillance’, and ‘coveillance’.38 Academic models for naming various forms of so-
called ‘participatory’ surveillance proliferate.  
 
Such approaches run the risk of diminishing the specificity of surveillance practices 
that they take as their object. Some have the figure of the human lurking behind them, 
an implicit faith in some ‘lifeworld’ that needs to be recovered and protected.39 This is 
not surprising, as the figure of the autonomous individual has long been the central 
figure in discourses that predate the emergence of the modern state. In relation to law 
and normativity, the figure of the individual continues to occupy the highest symbolic 
position. It is an organising principle that is both difficult and undesirable to do away 
with. But it lacks explanatory power.40 
 
Snowden’s call for technical literacy can, however, be taken as a provocation in 
another direction. It may be productive to materialise ‘surveillance’ by not assuming 
it in advance. Instead, we return to the specific techniques that produce it in the first 
place. Rather than drawing increasingly remote connections between subjects and the 
‘data’ that is produced about them, we turn to media.  
1.3.2 Media theory  
In order to read and write, one must learn the techniques required to coordinate paper, 
pen, eye, and text according to the protocols of text-production. From the perspective 
                                                
38 Couldry and Powell, ‘Big Data From the Bottom Up’; Karl Palmås, ‘Inauthentically Intense: Coveillance and 
Consumer Culture among Speedsurfers’, Surveillance & Society 13, no. 3/4 (2015): 487–496; Vian Bakir, 
Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-Building Struggles (Farnham, Surrey: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013); Randy Lippert and David Wood, ‘The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, 
Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities’, Surveillance & Society 9, no. 3 (2012): 257–262. 
39 Christian Fuchs criticises the use of abstractions, and at the same time argues for a return to Habermas, 
Adorno and Marx, which does not necessarily escape the problem, see Christian Fuchs, ‘Surveillance and 
Critical Theory’, Media and Communication 3, no. 2 (30 September 2015): 6–9; Christian Fuchs, Critical Theory 
of Communication: New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in the Age of the 
Internet (London: University of Westminster Press, 2016). 
40 W. T. Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1997), 213–20. 
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of this basic observation, any suggestion of ‘technical literacy’ appears paradoxical, 
because literacy is already technical. It is a consequence of technical operations.   
 
As Foucault’s genealogy of power shows, law has never referred to technical 
governmental operations directly. Rather, it abstractly describes different practices, 
outcomes, decision-making procedures, and modes of knowledge in legal terms. 
Media, however, operate differently. They do not simply operate within culture or 
context, they generate the possibility of culture and context. Media establish the 
conditions upon which things can be communicated. Media are not tools of subjective 
will, but the condition of possibility that enables the idea of subjective will to be 
applied to different processes and techniques.  
 
The point can be elaborated in Friedrich Kittler’s discussion of Foucault’s 
archaeological method. Before his genealogical work on the dispositifs of political 
power, Foucault’s work took discrete epochs and explored their epistemic conditions 
of possibility. The ‘archaeology’ of knowledge meant situating texts, documents, and 
other statements within the regime of discourse that made them sayable in a given 
era. Foucault focused not on the content of texts and the validity of the ideas they 
presented, but their facticity, treating them as ‘monuments’ whose very existence was 
the thing that needed to be explained. Foucault the archaeologist does not interpret 
meaning, discuss allegorical lessons, identify authorial intentions, desires, or find the 
‘truth’ behind a statement. He does not seek to arrange ideas in a progressive history 
such that one can appear to lead inexorably to the next.41 Instead he seeks the material 
residue of a particular order of discourse that made particular statements possible. 
This he called an episteme, that is, “something like a world-view, a slice of history 
common to all branches of knowledge”.42  
 
The description of any given épistème is necessarily partial and non-exhaustive. It is 
not a complete recovery of all the techniques and all the attitudes or limitations that 
                                                
41 Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith, 2nd edition (London, New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 155–56. 
42 Ibid., 211. 
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existed. It does not assess whether or not a particular form of knowledge was true or 
false, but asks what made it possible to think it was true. And it rejects utterly the 
suggestion that knowledge or legitimacy were ever originally founded on some 
transcendental act or substance: everything emerges from processes.43 Hence one can 
identify the regularity of linguistically identical or logically equivalent statements 
over time, and identify moments where functionally comparable statements change 
across different networks of meaning; networks which Foucault sometimes names 
dispositifs. In short, archaeology is about identifying how things became visible, doable, 
thinkable, but not why.  
 
For Kittler, Foucault’s ‘archives’ were primarily libraries. This implicitly “designates 
a historical a priori of written sentences… [Hence] Foucault’s research did not 
progress much beyond 1850.”44 Foucault overlooked the fact that the networks of 
information transfer that enabled the discursive knowledge regimes he studied were 
conditioned by the use of paper media and textual forms of storage. His studies did 
not account for the transformations in knowledge and power that followed the shift 
away from textual modes of communication to technical modes, when data replaced 
sentences and transmission and calculation became automated. Writing is the residue 
of particular techniques performed in a particular dispositif, or, in Kittler’s term, 
discourse network,45 that is, “the network of technologies and institutions that allow a 
given culture to select, store and process relevant data”.46 This means that shifts in 
media technologies present epistemological separations between different media-
defined epochs.  
1.3.3 From text to technics 
“Media determine our situation”, according to the preface to Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter, which is to say that media actualise the epistemological horizon against 
                                                
43 Ibid., 74–75. 
44 Friedrich A. Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 369. 
45 Geoffrey Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, (Cambridge: Polity, 2013), 59. 
46 Kittler, Discourse Networks 1800/1900, 369. 
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which the world is revealed to knowledge.47 To understand how discourse changed 
after 1850, one must foreground the medial a priori, the changing technical conditions, 
switches and relays, circuits, hardware, software, and standard routines that define 
and activate technical media. Kittler began by re-reading literature and philosophy as 
a text-based machine that processed information. World history thereby became the 
history of communication media systems, which made the epistemological 
assumptions of idealist philosophers redundant in three ways. The three critical 
differences derive from the abstract technical functions of information systems as 
described Claude Shannon and Warren Weaver’s mathematical theory of information 
systems: transmission, storage, and processing.48  
 
First, the discourse networks of written communication that had relied on pen and 
paper gave way to new storage technologies. Whereas writing required that all 
information “pass through the bottleneck of the signifier”,49 the electrical, mechanical, 
and chemical technical media that defined the early twentieth century responded to 
real physical information and stored it in analogue imprints. Film stored light in a 
form that permitted cinema to emerge as the imaginary reconstruction of 
continuously moving optics, changing how perception was perceived; gramophones 
captured the meaningless noise that is the reality of sound,  noise upon which 
meaning is inscribed as a psychological operation; and typewriters transformed 
writing from fluid continuous handwritten script connected to the immediacy of voice 
and the soul into discrete mechanical selections, punched out from a finite order of 
interchangeable symbols. Second, new technical transmission systems were developed 
that required the translation of information into discrete coded formats, and thereby 
remade the notion of ‘true’ knowledge into a calculable physical form called 
‘information’, distinguishable from whatever meaning is assigned to it. Third, the 
coding required to transfer information ultimately led to the emergence of 
                                                
47 The ‘revealing’ appears in direct reference to Heidegger in Kittler’s later works, see Friedrich Kittler, ‘Towards 
an Ontology of Media’, Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 2–3 (1 March 2009): 23–31. 
48 Claude E. Shannon, ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’, The Bell System Technical Journal 27, no. 
July (1948): 379–423. 
49 Friedrich A. Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young (Stanford: Stanford 
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programmable computers, which could simulate the operations of all media systems 
by making it possible to process information – and therefore knowledge – as discrete 
binary digital differences, thereby making it physically possible for digital media to 
simulate any other medium or network or, indeed, any human. Thus ended the era of 
“so-called Man”.50  
 
In order to apply Kittler’s method, three steps are required. First, all communication 
systems are considered as information transfer systems. Information, therefore, is not 
understood phenomenologically but rather materially. There is a data source, but data 
has no inherent meaning; as such, it is not observer-dependent. It generates 
information, which is the physical measure of the capacity for surprise, that is, the 
mathematical ratio between novelty and redundancy in a transmission. What matters 
is the reproduction of information at the destination, overcoming any noise generated 
by interference in the material transmission channel. Communication, then, is simply 
the physical transmission of commands in an information system.51  
 
The second step is to de-anthropomorphise everything. Kittler’s universe is 
ontologically grounded in discrete states of information and entropy. People – ‘so-
called Man’ – have no say. They can act as ‘senders’ when they act as an interface 
between data and a channel, such as when a person writes a letter or keys out a Morse 
code telegram. But this is not a ‘human’ operation, it is a technique determined by the 
medium in question. Subjects are materially defined by how they interface with 
particular technical media and functionally reduced to addressees of the commands 
of information systems. In other words, the subject’s function is to process commands, 
i.e., to process information. The human mind, for instance, is simply the effect of an 
organic information processor, nothing more. The only significance of individuals for 
                                                
50 Ibid., 243. 
51 Friedrich Kittler, Optical Media, trans. Anthony Enns (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), 46; Bernhard Siegert, ‘Media 
After Media’, in Media After Kittler, ed. Eleni Ikoniadou and Scott Wilson (London, New York: Rowman & 
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Kittler is that they process information and thereby enable the further transmission 
and processing of information.52  
 
The third step: convert all physical elements into information storage devices. All 
physical materials are reducible to storage media, viewed as data points in networks 
of information exchange.  
[As] data give rise to the operation of recording, addresses give rise to the 
operation of transmission, and commands give rise to the operations of processing, 
every system of communication that consists of these three operations can be 
analysed as a system of information.53 
Kittler’s radically de-anthropomorphised framework enables him to read the latent 
impact of changes in the technical conditions produced by media, captured in 
engineering terms as standards, into the literature, art, and culture of Euro-American 
modernity.  
 
What are media? Media are anything that perform these three operations. 
1.3.4 The end of media   
The Snowden revelations may have realised one of Kittler’s more apocalyptic 
prophecies. In 1990, Kittler wrote:  
0.1 percent of all telecommunications on this planet are absorbed by the NSA’s 
artificial intelligence. What then happens with them, no one knows. As a rule, 
orders for secrecy are lifted only after thirty years. Perhaps they will no longer 
be necessary at all three decades from now. The Word that was in the Beginning 
is vanishing into computer data banks... When all that is said by the inhabitants 
of the earth has disintegrated into bits, Alan Turing’s Universal Discrete 
Machine will be perfected.54 
                                                
52 Kittler, Optical Media, 43–46. 
53 Siegert, ‘Media After Media’, 83–84. 
54 Friedrich A. Kittler, ‘The Artificial Intelligence of World War: Alan Turing’, in The Truth of the Technological 
World, trans. Erik Butler (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013), 194. 
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Computer technology has been subject to state secrecy since it was invented.55 The 
cutting edge of computational power has always been reserved for cryptological 
work. Now that the internet has connected so many subjects – human and non-human 
–  and has exponentially increased the volume of information being processed, the 
Snowden disclosures of 2013 confirmed what many had already suspected: the default 
assumption today should be that communication operations are all potentially 
intercepted, and that as media evolve in complexity, they expand the volume of 
information they process. Today, digital media are designed to constantly reveal more 
about users than users know about themselves. In 1990, Kittler knew that the NSA 
had, by then, 
intercepted telephony, telegraphy, and microwaves… its computers have 
deciphered messages that are potentially coded, scrambled, and so on, stored 
the transmissions automatically, and trawled through them (just as 
automatically) for suspicious keywords.56 
Today, the NSA and its allied partner agencies are actively and aggressively 
expanding the scope of their interception, storage, and analysis of world 
communications, adopting a general strategy of “boundlessness”.57 In combination, 
the effect is that all users, and therefore all subjects of communication, are potentially 
enmeshed within the NSA/GCHQ databases that are processing ‘real-time’ analyses 
of as much data as can be usefully processed.  
 
Perhaps the thing that makes Kittler’s work so compelling, so controversial, and so 
unrepeatable is his dedication to the implications. For Kittler, the critical step in the 
evolution of media was the final step, the realisation of the digital computer. It is most 
frequently discussed in his work by reference to Alan Turing’s universal discrete 
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machine, as described hypothetically in a paper written in 1936.58 Turing proposed a 
hypothetical machine that could perform a set of discrete read/write/erase operations 
according to a programmable set of instructions. The machine would be able to cycle 
through all possible computational operations in order to demonstrate that there are 
natural numbers that cannot be algorithmically computed. In proposing a solution to 
an abstract problem in mathematical logic, Turing simultaneously demonstrated a 
mechanism that could digitally compute everything that can be computed. In turn, 
this formed the basis for the realisation of programmable computers, beginning with 
Colossus, which was used to decode German cryptographic systems in the Second 
World War.  
 
For Kittler, in his more radical texts, Turing’s thought experiment put the writing on 
the wall (so to speak) for media. It demonstrated that data processing bypassed text, 
bypassed authorship, and bypassed government, existing as “unreadable series of 
numbers circulating between networked computers.”59 If all media do is offer an 
interface for the discrete operations of physical data processing, then anything that a 
physical medium can do can be done by the universal discrete machine. It is the 
medium that can become all others, and it therefore supersedes them. Its operations 
make all other media redundant except as simulated interfaces that append humans 
to their operations.  
Much like impoverished aristocrats who now work as tourist guides on their 
former estates, media are no longer located at the crucial intersection of 
physical processes and the human sensory apparatus; they have been moved 
to the margin of the digital machine in order to allow humans some access to 
this self-contained numerical universe.60 
Moreover, if all that defines a ‘subject’ is the capacity to process information, then 
computers are subjects just as humans are. The capacity to decide on how to articulate 
a particular process is what counts. 
                                                
58 Alan Mathison Turing, ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem’, Journal 
of Math 58, no. 345–363 (1936): 5. 
59 Kittler, Gramophone, Film, Typewriter, xxxix. 
60 Winthrop-Young, Kittler and the Media, 75. 
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The consequence for the analysis of power systems—the vast task bequeathed 
to us by Foucault—is twofold. For one, one should no longer seek to 
understand power, as conventionally happens, as a function of so-called 
society; instead, and conversely, one should seek to reconstruct sociology from 
chip design [Chiparchitekturen] up.61 
Kittler’s point is not that media predetermine everything that happens in human 
society. He is not a techno-determinist. Rather, media predetermine the conditions of 
human perception, including subjective self-perception. The human-machine 
interfaces that we interact with each day are imaginary simplifications of real 
operations that are beyond the limits of human cognitive processing. Human 
subjectivity is conditioned by media standards, which determine the inputs available 
to the mind. The only tasks left for humans in the digital age involve processing 
information into machine-readable form, using coding languages and software that 
exist only to assist this interface process, and to hide the computational processes 
behind other human/machine interfaces.62 Once information processing power is 
located within silicon media, no one can ‘observe’ it at all, but must rely on lines of 
code language, or a graphical user interface that simulates a ‘desktop’. The locus of 
power is contained wholly within the media themselves. And this, inevitably, presents 
problems for any theory of society.   
1.3.5 Cultural techniques  
As a methodological framework, Kittler’s theory has limitations, not least the distance 
it takes from any attempt to account for social developments in an empirical manner. 
Kittler’s self-conscious style results in occasionally incorrect or one-dimensional 
statements concerning history, politics, and gender. These problems seem to stem 
from his professed disinterest in the role of observation and meaning in relation to 
‘successful’ communication, even though those issues were never eliminated from 
mathematical information theory quite as completely as Kittler would have us 
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believe.63 According to Gumbrecht, Kittler himself eventually found his “cold 
diagnosis” to be “intolerably burdensome”.64 Most importantly, by declaring society 
redundant, it threatens to close down precisely what was originally so provocative 
about the concept of a discourse network. As Geoffrey Winthrop-Young puts it, 
Kittler’s apocalyptic certainty “smacks far less of technologized Foucault than of an 
updated Hegel; it is a hidden grand narrative.”65  
 
For Siegert, Kittler’s media-ontology that displaces observation amounts to a way of 
thinking about “operative ontologies”. This implies a mode of enquiry which  
asks for the concrete ontic operations and practices that produce first of all 
ontological distinctions—among many others also those between image and 
picture or figure and ground or active and passive or message and medium, 
subject and object, man and animal and so on. These ontic operations are called 
cultural techniques.66 
Presented by Siegert in terms borrowed from Actor-Network Theory, cultural 
techniques address “the objectity of the objects”. This way, media can be placed “at 
the core of entities formerly known as objects and humans and which are now much 
better addressed as processes of assemblage”.67 As Vismann puts it, cultural 
techniques “describe what media do, what they produce, and what kinds of actions 
they prompt.”68 
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In one sense, this was Kittler’s project all along. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter “collects, 
comments upon, and relays passages and texts that show how the novelty of 
technological media inscribed itself into the old paper of books.”69 Kittler may have 
regarded literature as defunct, but his aim was to explain how media had made it so. 
The point is not to describe what media are but to show what they do.70 Kittler’s legacy 
is in placing the singular materiality of technology at the centre of things, as the means 
of apprehending all that can be apprehended.71   
 
Applied to ‘interception’, it becomes nothing more than the execution of a ‘conditional 
jump’, i.e., an IF-THEN logical step. For Kittler, this is the ultimate definition of 
subjectivity, whether human or machine: a subject is simply that which can respond 
to conditional commands.72 The medium processes information by assigning 
information to channels, but IF there is an interception selector identified, THEN the 
data concerned is transferred into an interception process, where it is copied and 
transmitted onwards for further processing. The question then turns to the medium 
that executes the ‘conditional jump’. Kittler, drawing a parallel with Carl Schmitt’s 
observation that in a bureaucracy, sovereign power is hidden in corridors and locked 
offices – “power amounts to its conditions of access”, described the architecture of 
modern computers as if the computer were a state.73 As in a bureaucracy, the power 
to make certain IF-THEN commands is located at sites of privileged access. Computer 
architecture prevents ordinary users from accessing the protected levels of root 
command code, hence ordinary users are never sovereign in respect of their machines. 
If media sovereignty is defined by unconditional access to information processing, 
then sovereignty must be located at the point where all processing decisions are 
possible and all information is made visible. Those points, in any medium, are where 
interception of that medium can occur. 
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1.4 Method, structure, and sources  
This thesis elucidates the nexus between interception techniques and law. In focusing 
upon interception, we specifically exclude other surveillance techniques related to the 
interception of communication, such as hidden microphones, aerial, satellite, and 
drone reconnaissance, CCTV, telephotography, the use of hidden tracking devices, 
and so on. Similarly, the purposive uses of intercepted data are mostly excluded and 
discussed only to the extent that they inform particular technical developments. In 
practice, military, governmental, and police intelligence services combine information 
derived from multiple sources, but that is beyond the scope of this investigation.74 
This methodological choice is by no means intended to exhaust the notion of 
‘surveillance’; rather, it is intended to suspend it.  
 
The history of modern communications surveillance is itself an effect of ascription that 
covers a wide range of practices. Interception techniques gain their continuity from 
particular ways of defining certain operations of media. As operations, they 
operationalise capacities of media to transmit, store, and process information. That 
they can be repeated and replicated gives them continuity, and this makes possible 
the historiographical claim that governmental surveillance has ‘continued’ since the 
seventeenth century, despite radically different media. From the point of view of 
techniques, such claims of historical continuity are themselves manifestations of 
historiographical techniques, which assemble textual media into chronological order 
and produce a particular grid of temporal intelligibility. They are no more ‘real’ than 
other technical approaches to information.  
 
The focus on ‘techniques’ is not made with reference to human subjects performing 
interception, but to the ways that media determine the possibility of processing 
information in transit between two symbolic poles, the sender(s) and receiver(s). 
Interception techniques are independent of individual actors, and this independence 
is precisely what makes them reproducible across time and space. As Vismann has it, 
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focusing on media and the cultural techniques rather than on human subjects and 
wilful agency means: 
One must therefore draw a distinction between persons, who de jure act 
autonomously, and cultural techniques, which de facto determine the entire 
course of action. To inquire about cultural techniques is not to ask about 
feasibility, success, chances and risks of certain innovations and inventions in 
the domain of the subject. Instead, it is to ask about the self-management or 
auto-praxis [Eigenpraxis] of media and things, which determines the scope of 
the subject’s field of action.75 
This vision of the self-management of communication media claims that media 
arrange and condition the basic tasks of ordering time, space, and information that, in 
combination, are described as the interception of communication. For instance, in the 
postal age the delay between communication being transmitted and intelligence being 
produced was an order of days, in digital environments it is a matter of seconds. In 
both scenarios, however, interception occurs in the time defined by operations of 
transmission and operations of delivery. Media function to establish different 
“notions of duration, assign origins, and secure the future”.76 Humans and non-
humans are equally capable of performing media-technical operations, the point is 
that they do so only according to the conditions of the medium.  
 
As an operationally secret practice, interception has always been deliberately 
subjected to obscurantism and censorship. The law itself has been involved in this 
process. Because of this, this research work is constrained in large part by the 
contingent archival traces, secondary sources, and contemporary materials that are 
available. This necessarily entails a forensic approach, assembling heterodox materials 
in order to produce a genealogy of a dispositif of interfaced systems and the ways they 
have interfaced: interception and law.  
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1.4.1 The question  
The thesis takes Snowden’s statement as its point of departure: can technical literacy 
produce laws that control interception? The thesis is arranged as follows: 
1.4.2 Chapter two: Letter interception in the postal epoch  
We begin with the emergence of personalised letter-writing as the medial 
precondition for the discourse networks that mark out an epochal shift between the 
medieval and modern. The form of medieval letter production is contrasted with the 
forms that emerged in the early modern period. To master the techniques of letter 
production was to enter into written discourse, transforming subjects into senders and 
receivers of correspondence, and attributing to them a new dimension of epistolary 
subjectivity. Postal networks can be read as manifestations of political power 
structures, and in this respect the formation of the Post Office can be linked to the shift 
from a medieval society defined by overarching sovereign unity, to a society centred 
on the modern political subject, whose discourse must be disciplined and made 
subject to inspection under new regimes of disciplinary power.  
 
Foucault’s broadly-defined genealogy of power as it evolved from disciplinary 
institutions to biopolitical governmentality is used as a methodological 
infrastructure.77 Interception first takes on organised forms under conditions of civil 
war, gaining information on plotters at home and enemies abroad. It was performed 
by a small group of men who derived their resources from the labour performed by 
postal workers, who themselves were placed under constant disciplinary supervision 
in order to perform the sorting operations required to produce and maintain an 
ordered flow of letters through the office.  This way the Post Office generated 
connections between all senders and all receivers, providing an observable media-
technical infrastructure for the development of discourse networks.  
 
In the eighteenth century, the Post Office expanded the scope and intensity of its 
operations. Interception practices became professionally organised within the Post 
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Office, but the surveillance of senders and receivers extended also into the duties of 
ordinary postal workers. Interception was an integral part of the larger machinery of 
governmental knowledge-production, which was in general ordered and channelled 
by the Post Office.  
 
In the nineteenth century, interception became less of an organisationally secret 
activity and more of a formally secret policy. The Post Office was reorganised in a 
manner that converted it from a corrupt and economically dysfunctional extension of 
political power into a self-regulating machine that responded only to its own logical 
procedures, which were most clearly manifested through reconfigurations of postage 
and addressing systems. Once postal operations were differentiated from the explicit 
exercise of political power, interception could no longer be considered an inherent 
reason for the Post Office’s existence. New normative justifications and procedures 
were required for the practice to continue, manifesting the calculus of ‘liberty’ and 
‘security’ that Foucault identified with ‘biopower’ in the nineteenth century. A secret 
parliamentary report prepared in 1844 offers the earliest history of letter interception 
in England, provides details of its administrative context, and at the same time stands 
as a monument to the changing governmental practices of the period. Only then did 
it become important to discuss how records were assessed and stored, and how 
recorded procedural practices had to be indexed to normative ends.  
 
We end with a brief account of interception in the twentieth century, with a focus on 
the techniques that emerged during conditions of war. Of the few available accounts 
of professionalised letter interception, they tend to highlight the detection – or 
attempted detection – of non-discursive media hidden within letters, rather than 
straightforward text-based letters themselves. Interceptors were required to seek out 
technical storage media designed to disguise themselves as ordinary letters, 
anticipating and evading interception. The letter itself was a ruse, a simulation of a 
discursive form, designed as camouflage for technical media that could carry both 
discursive and non-discursive forms of information to their addressees. 
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In each of these eras, interception remained centred upon reconfigurations of the same 
privileged location: the sorting-room.  
 
In addition to Foucault’s genealogy of power, this chapter is theoretically indebted to 
Bernhard Siegert’s media genealogy of postal systems.78 In terms of empirical 
resources, the chapter draws primarily from secondary historiographical sources. As 
the thesis demonstrates, there are relatively few documents associated with 
interception practices that have survived today. The vast majority were apparently 
destroyed, partially because archiving did not emerge as an organised governmental 
practice until the nineteenth century, and partly in order to eliminate traces of events 
and practices that were inherently secret. The Royal Mail Archive, which holds 
meticulously catalogued records demonstrating the financial and administrative 
history of the Post Office, contains no information whatsoever on the interception of 
communication. However, there are a number of historical works on the history of the 
Post Office, the history of state intelligence in Britain, the history of the Civil War, the 
Interregnum and Restoration governments, and the history of the offices of the British 
state that have made it possible to present outlines both of interception practices and 
of the procedures through which they were directed. These have been invaluable, 
especially as the author does not have the specialised skills required to discern the 
handwritten scripts used by letter writers of the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries. The historical works relied on here turned the records that survive into 
objects in the service of historical ends; here, those works are turned back towards the 
media that they implicitly revolved around.79  
1.4.3 Chapter three: Interception and technical media  
This chapter identifies how ‘interception’ was articulated in different media 
environments, and how media in turn were developed as a result of escalations caused 
by the problem of ‘interception’. The first medium considered is the domestic 
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telegraphic network and the form of the telegram. The Imperial deep-sea international 
cable network, by contrast, was designed and operated to ensure security against 
interception. While both modes of cable transmission were valued for their 
transmission speeds, practices of ‘interception’ did not focus on the means of 
transmission – with at least one notable exception – so much as on the telegrams that 
were produced in order to store information as it was transferred between paper and 
technical media.  
 
Telephonic interception, commonly known as ‘tapping’, is similar to telegraphic 
interception in that it did not begin in earnest until the advent of reliable recording 
systems in the late 1930s. One might ‘tap’ the line, but the critical device required to 
derive useful data from telephonic interception was a tape recorder. 
 
‘Wireless’ technology, or radio, was understood initially in terms of its differences to 
cable technology. The capacity to ‘broadcast’ was adopted for other purposes – 
entertainment – only once it was clear that there was no way to control the reception 
of transmissions. At that point, ‘interception’ was defined abstractly within a set of 
protocols developed in order to enable international co-operation on the ‘airwaves’. 
Attempts to limit reception, however, led to the realisation of new techniques of 
interception based around identifying the location and source of transmissions, rather 
than the content of messages. From that point on, the territorial understanding of the 
earth’s surface was transformed by radio direction finding. Many air and sea 
confrontations of the Second World War revolved around this principle. Radio 
direction finding guided night bombers to their targets and, conversely, intercepted 
transmissions risked betraying the positions of ships and submarines.  
 
The inability to determine who received radio transmissions prompted escalations in 
cryptographic techniques. For centuries, cryptography was done on paper. In the 
1930s, new mechanical machines were devised that transformed discrete letters into 
code values based on the variable arrangement of a set of mechanical wheels. The 
famous Enigma machine had 159 quintillion possible combinatory settings, and the 
settings were changed each day. Under Alan Turing’s guidance, the first electronic 
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computer was built in order to process possible cryptographic key settings, and crack 
the code anew each day.  
 
Computer cryptographic research dominated the post-war period, when the problem 
of intercepting communication became less focused on securing the medium itself and 
more about the capacity of processing media. Computers were devised to decrypt and 
process vast amounts of intercepted material. In order to link supercomputers with 
field computers, the NSA implemented a digital packet-switching network using the 
TCP/IP protocol, prefiguring the internet and putting it to work on processing 
intercepted data almost from its inception.  
 
In each instance, the position of sender, receiver, and interceptor depends on the 
operations of the medium. Interceptors occupy the privileged position where they can 
survey and determine the whole operation of the medium. The power to determine 
who occupies that position is, in turn, the function of the symbolic governmental 
authority to intercept communication.  
 
For this chapter, secondary sources regarding intelligence agencies, cryptographic 
techniques, and histories of technical communication systems have been consulted. 
Kittler’s own work discusses the interception of communication at several points, 
which has been instructive. This chapter also draws on a large amount of unpublished 
archival material, much of which does not appear to have been referenced in 
publication prior to this research. In this respect, the National Archives hold a number 
of recently declassified Home Office and Security Service files dealing with the 
interception of communication, either directly or obliquely, particularly during the 
nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. They are relatively few 
in number, but rich in detail. Much of the material presented in chapters three, four, 
and five is drawn from those sources.  
 
Technical details about communication systems and the security concerns they 
generated were found in the British Telecom Archive, conveniently located on the site 
of the original Holborn telephone exchange, just yards from the London School of 
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Economics. BT inherited all archival materials pertaining to electrical and technical 
communication media from the Royal Mail Archive when British Telecom was 
separated from the Post Office and sold off. A former engineer working as an archivist 
was particularly generous in explaining the techniques that may have been used to 
implement telephone line interception. The BT Archive, surprisingly, contains a file 
with details of an interception operation carried out in 1870 against striking 
telegraphers by tapping the telegraph lines themselves. This incident appears in no 
history of interception or the Post Office that has been consulted for this project.  
 
In terms of computer technology, the NSA has recently declassified selected articles 
from the NSA Technical Journal and published them online. The articles help to 
explain the development of computers, their application to interception practices, and 
the implementation of Platform, the first NSA packet-switched network. Finally, the 
materials that have been published from the cache of material provided by Edward 
Snowden, referred to in this thesis as the ‘Snowden archive’, helped set the scene. 
1.4.4 Chapter four: Issuing warrants   
The second half of the thesis presents a genealogy of the legal and administrative 
techniques through which interception is made into a governmental capacity. 
Interception is independent of the law in its operations and effects, because it is 
determined by media operations, not legal rules. Yet media are indifferent to the 
meaning of their operations. ‘Interception’ and ‘delivery’ of information are, 
technically speaking, identical outcomes of different selections made during 
information sorting procedures. What makes ‘interception’ nameable as such, and 
thus symbolically differentiates it from delivery, depends upon the processing 
operations of warrants, which operationalise different media in a different register.  
 
The brief historical legal account is as follows: since at least 1710, Secretaries of State 
have been understood to have the power to order the interception of communication 
according to warrants. The warrant symbolises a valid decision, made according to 
law. It thereby acts as an instrument for the will of the Secretary, who symbolically 
represents the agencies formally under her command. However, the legal-historical 
 47 
perspective does not account for the function of warrants within the administrative 
apparatus of government. What remains to be explained is how such a history can be 
told in the first place.  
 
As Murphy explains, the figure of the autonomous willing subject has long been 
enthroned at the heart of epistemological conceptions of the social world.80 Nowhere 
is this more forcefully inscribed than in the law, which can lay claim to being ‘the 
oldest social science’.81 Nonetheless, law functions by ordering information. It is an 
effect of media-technical operations. The law itself is media-based and must be 
analysed as such. In order to ask whether or not the law can ‘regulate’ digital media, 
one must first understand the law’s own information processing operations. To do so 
is antithetical to the law’s self-description, which is why law’s media – files, 
documents, warrants, and writs – are unable to directly enter into legal consideration, 
except as evidence. As Vismann puts it,  
In the eyes of the law, the relation of mediation becomes a question of 
attribution… The category of personal subjecthood is the object of an act of 
assignation, and that act, in its turn, is itself a technique, one that occupies a 
central place in our legally defined culture.82  
Therefore, we suspend the effects that warrants supposedly had in terms of expressing 
political will or regulating the application of interception power, and instead look at 
the media-technical conditions that indicate what exactly warrants do, how they have 
been made, and the protocological networks in which they are deemed to be effective. 
The genealogical excavation of the interception warrant ends at the moment that they 
enter into consideration of the legal system itself, which occurred in 1979. 
 
The empirical resources for this chapter are drawing primarily from the National 
Archives. Other material is drawn from historical studies of the history of medieval 
administration in Britain, the function of medieval seals and documents, and 
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historiographical accounts of bureaucracies of the British state. The theoretical matrix 
is indebted to theoretical studies made of legal and administrative systems by Tim 
Murphy, Markus Krajewski, and Cornelia Vismann. 
1.4.5 Chapter five: Secrecy, publicity, and legislation   
If the warrant is produced by a logic that is administrative, rather than legally 
performative, then what of law? This chapter picks up where chapter four ends, with 
a warrant coming before a court, demanding an account of itself. The process by which 
the interception warrant was explained illustrates the difference between 
administrative and legal reasoning. Law works with documents and files in order to 
assign things to categories and to transfer rights and obligations. Interception occupies 
a particularly unusual place in the legal history of the UK, however, because for 
around three hundred years it was practiced secretly, deliberately avoiding any 
adjudication by the law.  
 
This chapter begins with an account of how the law processed the question of 
interception when it was finally required to do so in 1979. It develops an account of 
secrecy and law, via Niklas Luhmann’s theoretical treatment of the mass media. There 
are theoretical rules prescribed by Luhmann’s epistemological framework which do 
not perfectly align with a theory of cultural techniques and media.83 However, there 
are enough affinities to enable a productive conversation to emerge; particularly when 
one considers the media-technical making of systems theory itself.84  
 
The chapter shows that the shift to legislation that followed the disclosure of a warrant 
before the law was not a ‘progressive’ victory for the ‘rule of law’, nor was it based on 
the finding in the European Court of Human Rights that the UK was in violation of 
the Article 8 right to privacy. The problem was in how to produce a set of protocols 
for the legal processing of warrants that would achieve other ends: first, the 
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imperative to preserve the secrecy of the administration of interception operations in 
the future; second, to design procedures to ensure that all future legal questions 
regarding warrants are foreclosed in advance. Legislation was required in order to 
give a second-order account that secret files are kept in good order, and to thereby 
prevent any unauthorised transfers of information into the public domain. Legislation 
is thus indexed to the dissemination of information, as performed by the mass media, 
which has been translated into legal standards of ‘foreseeability’ where the question 
of secrecy is concerned.  
 
We then review recent legal developments in the Investigatory Powers Tribunal – the 
semi-secret Tribunal that deals with interception powers – and the formulation of the 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016, drawing on the insights developed in relation to law, 
secrecy, and publicity.   
1.4.6 Chapter six: Silicon Sovereignty  
The thesis concludes not with a recapitulation of points made throughout, but rather 
with a return to Snowden’s archive, specifically to an analysis of the operational 
interface used by GCHQ to organise and direct the interception of communication in 
the online environment. Material drawn from the Snowden archive shows how the 
protocological recipes of legislation are enacted through the form of the digital 
interface, which determines in advance the legality of all permissible operations.  
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2. Letter Interception in the Postal Epoch 
2.1 Introduction: power relays    
The historian of media, Harold Innis, demonstrated that empires can be described 
through the media and structures of their communication systems. On this account, 
an empire is an imaginary unity based on shared symbolic references to a hierarchical 
power structure that are disseminated across a given territorial space. The experience 
of empire is not the same for all of its subjects. Acceptance, rejection, the degree of 
confusion, or of cohesion experienced by subjects across imperial spaces are stratified, 
and entirely contingent. What they all share in common is some mode of distributing 
imperial messages, which shapes the medial substrate of the empire as it imposes one 
culture over others, and which constitutes the archaeological residue that fallen 
empires leave behind. Any history of imperial media is necessarily reflexive, since the 
objects of analysis are also the condition of the possibility of analysis: “the means of 
appraisal are influenced by the media, and indeed the fact of appraisal seems to be 
peculiar to certain types of media.”85 Hence the surviving archives and archaeological 
traces of empires are always the material remains of imperial delivery systems that 
defined imperial territorial space, and which constituted the empire by permitting 
commands to traverse that space.  
 
What is missing from the archive, then, is all the communication that went 
undelivered, either because delivery failed or because it was impossible to send, and 
all that was destroyed on reading, which remains historically unknowable. The 
positivity of an archive is constituted by the preserved deposits of completed 
communication, and thus presupposes the circulation of messages that the postal 
historian wishes to examine. Descriptions of postal operations are always secondary 
accounts, which in themselves had to be delivered. In short, one can never observe the 
failure of communication, or its conditions, but only the residue of its success. With 
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these preconditions in mind, Innis nonetheless demonstrates the structural affinity 
between forms of imperial power and the forms of postal systems.86 
 
Writing a history of interception, which involves manipulating missives while they 
are in the process of delivery is, in this sense, a history of a practice without traces. 
Interception – the ‘taking-between’87 – is only possible in the intermediate phase 
between sending and delivering. For the reader and writer of correspondence, it 
occurs within the excluded middle, the medium that facilitates correspondence in the 
first place. Interceptors, if they do the job well, must facilitate a smooth delivery, 
which is the best way to guarantee the ongoing success and security of their practice. 
But, as it is with Serres’s figure of the parasite,88 the transmission medium both 
determines and feeds upon the relationship that it appears merely to enable. 
Interceptors left records, stored copies of ciphers and letters, and provided some 
account of their activities, which have been picked up by historians interested in postal 
systems, bureaucrats, and intelligence services. Their work is a function of the delivery 
system itself, which preceded and determined the configuration of the ‘sender’ and 
‘receiver’. 
 
This chapter tries to reconstruct letter interception techniques as they were practiced 
in Britain, or more precisely, England, across four centuries. The postal systems of 
Europe were initially established to maintain the transmission of sovereign 
correspondence and to raise profits from the inexorably growing traffic in mail during 
the early modern age. The growth in postal traffic not only delivered letters; it 
delivered addressability, which is the precondition of entering into postal 
correspondence. The possibility of entering into correspondence created new 
networks of knowledge extending beyond the horizon of one’s locality, presenting a 
radically new horizon of possibility for communicating across space and time. In this 
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sense, it was the condition of entering modern history, which was written by reference 
to collections of letters.  
 
2.1.1 The meaning of letters 
A typical letter of the seventeenth century was composed on one side of a sheet of 
paper using ink and a stylus. Paper was expensive, so writers tended to fill up the 
available surface as best as possible, using script of different sizes and writing in 
different directions in order to fill up the margins and corners of pages with text. 
However, the way that one formed the writing on the page depended on the status of 
one’s interlocutor and the purpose of the letter. Form could communicate as much as 
content, and the nobility, for whom the cost of paper was no object, arranged their text 
more elegantly. To historians, scripts and layouts indicate class, skill, and the intended 
impression the letter was to make. Content was stilted and “filled with compliments”. 
One had to enter into the epistolary conventions of the letter, which in the seventeenth 
century was a heavily inflected version of the ars dictaminis, in order to learn to become 
a letter-writer. Each decision of what to write and how to write it required reflection 
upon what it would be taken to mean.89 Learning to write letters was to learn to 
become an author, and required reflexively assessing one’s authorship.90 
 
Once the writer had finished the letter he added date, location and his signature. The 
letter was sprinkled with sand mixed with gum to prevent the ink spreading. The 
writer was required to make folds in the paper to bring the edges towards one another. 
To seal up a letter, it was folded so as to hide its content and thus make it private. The 
addressee’s name and address (a name and a town, or a name and a government 
office), were written on the blank space on the back, then the folded letter was sealed 
with melted wax and impressed with the sender’s personal seal, which confirmed 
authorship. The ‘social moment’, as Whyman puts it, occurred when the writer gave 
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the letter to a postman. This comprised the basic procedures of letter writing during 
the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.91  
 
To master the techniques of letter production was, and is, to enter into written 
discourse, which transformed subjects otherwise lost to historical record into senders 
and receivers of correspondence, who left traces of themselves. Even today, to 
encounter a seventeenth-century letter in an archive is to attribute to its writer a sense 
of a shared internal dimension. This symbolic effect is generated by the reading and 
writing techniques that together define epistolary subjectivity. Friedrich Kittler’s 
essay Authorship and Love illustrates the role these techniques of reading and writing 
played in transforming understandings of subjectivity. The essay compares two 
accounts of the nexus between love and text, one from the High Middle Ages, the 
other from the eighteenth century.92  
 
In Dante’s Divina Commedia (1321), in the second circle of the Inferno reserved for “the 
bodies of the lustful”,93 we meet Francesca and Paolo, who were condemned when 
they read aloud together the Lancelot romance, kissing one another at the moment 
that Lancelot kisses Arthur’s wife. For Kittler, the act of reading aloud manifested the 
power that the medieval book had over bodies. Reading was a compelled action 
produced by the text. Its compulsion pushed the two together in lust, and condemned 
them to death.  
 
Against Dante, Kittler juxtaposes Goethe’s Sorrows of Young Werther (1774). This 
epistolary novel takes the form of an exchange of letters between Werther and his love, 
Lotte. In their letters, they write of souls and of words and glances exchanged. Their 
bodies never meet. Their desire is neither forbidden or punishable; in Foucault’s 
terms, the clerical law that condemned the bodies of Francesca and Paolo was replaced 
by the norm, which indexed desire to a managed economy of sexuality. What unites 
Werther and Lotte is a shared love for the texts of the poet Kloppstock, which they 
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interpret for one another in their letters. Together they seek to understand what the 
“Creator-like creator meant with them”.94 But Kloppstock’s meaning is inaccessible, 
just as their bodies and true intentions are to one another. This is the condition of 
engaging in epistolary correspondence: 
Werther and Lotte’s eyes do the same thing while reading as while exchanging 
gazes: they are always-already beyond the corporeality of the letter and the 
corporeality of the Other, searching for a soul, a meaning, an idea... The 
silently-read and internally comprehended books, those which no longer 
inscribe bodies or provoke desire, instead make writers or authors out of the 
readers themselves.95 
Desire is aimed beyond the letter at the authorial intention behind it, but this intention 
is always a projection of the reader’s own desire. Kittler concludes that authorship 
emerges only when “the two discursive practices of reading and writing were fully 
coupled to one another”. Authorship is “founded upon the deception inherent in 
reading one’s own writing and writing one’s own reading.”96  
 
As the poet John Donne (d. 1631) put it, “this writing of letters, when it is with any 
seriousness, is a kind of ecstasy, and a departure and secession and suspension of the 
souls, which doth communicate itself to two bodies”.97 The minds of writer and reader 
can never connect, but one can self-actualise in relation to another through techniques 
of reading and writing. Unlike medieval scribes, who simply copied texts that carried 
their own authority in a chain of unbroken substitutions, the modern letter writer is 
always already a reader of their own texts, and writing that is to be read by another is 
always also a form of self-observation. One anticipates the other reading what one is 
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about to write, and in that moment, one considers how it might be written or 
understood otherwise.98  
 
Letters were not only inter-personal in a romantic sense. The distinction between 
public and private communication became a settled axiom of social contractarian 
theories of government, an axiom that letters materialised. According to Michel de 
Servan, a French lawyer and essayist of the ‘Republic of Letters’, letters constituted 
private property belonging to both the sender and receiver. Private letters require 
writers to feel free in their thoughts. Correspondence is only valuable when free-
flowing thought and tentative, half-formed ideas can be suggested and developed 
securely. The medium of the letter fixes fleeting thoughts, even if the author 
immediately abandons them, thus letters tie authors to a persona created by certain 
ideas. As they are then delivered out of the author’s control, they are potentially risky 
objects. But the meaning of a letter is always co-constituted and therefore belongs 
neither to sender or receiver. Both must be bound to keep it private, hence 
correspondence should be legally recognised as property.99 Servan also published an 
open letter to the cabinet noir, where letters were intercepted. Acknowledging it 
publicly, let along criticising it, was dangerous. Servan argued that all sealed letters 
were inviolate. Interception is ultimately good for nothing, he argued; not even the 
state, because it diminishes the confidence that the public can place in their rulers and 
the freedom of thought they can exercise in letters.100 By the end of the eighteenth 
century, correspondence had become so central to social operations that the content 
ascribed by readers to letters was articulated as an object of intellectual property. 
 
We begin by briefly tracing the pre-history of the modern letter and the pre-history of 
the modern postal system, in order to clearly delineate the connection between 
modern postal systems and the possibility of interception.  
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2.1.2 Medieval letters 
According to M.T. Clanchy, the idea that the medieval age was marked by blanket 
illiteracy and ignorance until the dawn of the humanist Renaissance in Italy is a myth, 
propaganda promoted by humanists taking advantage of their economic success to 
create a self-aggrandizing hegemonic history of literacy. Literacy, in the sense of the 
ability to read text, was far more widespread than humanist propaganda suggested. 
The humanist account dominated, however, because reading was far more widely 
practiced than writing, and thus left few traces. Reading was not confined only to 
educated segments of society: children often learned to read with their mothers, 
primarily in order to recite prayers aloud. Reading compelled the body into practices 
that were realised in common with others, rather than a solitary, silent practice.101 Yet 
the way that texts were actualised, and the meaning that they generated, were radically 
different to the techniques and forms that define the modern reading-and-writing 
subject. Crucially, readers were not writers, and the texts they read were not supposed 
to represent the interior experiences of others.  
 
Most medieval documents were generated by scribes, who were institutionalised in 
chanceries, universities, and monasteries. Their documents were not intended to be 
transmitted but rather to form records. In this sense, they were addressed to posterity. 
Records of the first formal missives – primarily writs issued by Chancery –  appear in 
England from around the thirteenth century. Typically, they were brief modes of 
command.102  
 
Scribes composed documents in the classical ‘dictaminal’ form, which rose to 
prominence in England as the ars dictaminis in the twelfth century.103 Such 
compositions were in no sense personal or confidential. ‘Authority’, or auctores, was 
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attributed to text itself rather than any to individual compositor. No conscious will 
was supposed to lie behind it. As no extra-textual authority was ascribed to the text, 
there was no ‘true’ interpretation to discern. An author, or auctore, was “simply one 
whose writings are full of ‘authorities’”,104 and a well-trained ‘author’ was a skilled 
reader who could speak fluently from memory, because he knew the authorities so 
well that it was as if he had “transformed the many nectars of the reading-flowers in 
one’s memorial store-house into a single honey.”105 Such ‘authors' did not physically 
write their texts. They dictated aloud to scribes, who recorded what they said. Scribes 
often lacked the ability to read in any authoritative manner. They were “no more than 
a medium between the speaker or hearer and the document.”106 Writing was not a 
mechanism for producing novelty, difference, or originality, but rather for ensuring 
successful repetition of a fixed and unitary set of laws. For Carruthers, this 
engendered a particular relationship with time. Medieval scholarship, in contrast to 
modern, is marked by “an utter indifference to the pastness of the past, to its 
uniqueness and integrity”.107 Medieval omnitemporality arose through the literate 
techniques of memoria, “by means of which texts of past authors are constantly related 
in and through present minds”.108  
 
One precondition for the emergence of personalised and informal writing was the 
development of European papermaking. It prompted a commercial revolution that 
enabled written communication to find new purposes outside the formal spaces of 
rhetorical repetition. The first European paper mill, at Fabriano, began producing 
paper around 1268. From there, paper and its production techniques spread into the 
towns and cities of Europe. Compared to the animal skins used for vellum or the reeds 
used for papyrus, paper was cheaper and easier to manufacture, and the product was 
lighter, versatile, and it could be folded. It allowed more people to send and receive 
more messages. Its cheapness engendered disposability, which enabled transience; 
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messages could either be stored or destroyed on reading and thus enfolded secrets. 
Add wax, and suddenly information could be committed to writing with a sense of 
security.  
 
After paper, universities displaced rural monasteries as centres of learning and their 
monopoly over knowledge diminished, as did the symbolic importance of expensive 
parchment.109 Commercial bills were exchanged, accounting books were drawn up; 
paper set the conditions for an expansion of credit. Local vernaculars and languages 
were used to index writing to speech, freeing writing from ecclesiastical Latin. 
Printing meant that books were no longer the preserve of those who could afford 
scribal copies and, of course, new translations of the bible were illicitly circulated.110 
The meeting of movable type with paper produced a copying machine that turned 
books into mass-produced storage media. 
 
Yet when uneducated people wrote letters during the late medieval period, they did 
not seek to relate events to one another, or discuss their internal thoughts. Surviving 
examples are almost exclusively devoted to noting the circulation of money and 
commodities. There was no commonly-shared vernacular form of writing generally 
available for self-expression. Non-clerical letter-writers in the fifteenth and sixteenth 
centuries would often copy the format and content of their letters directly from royal 
missives, which emanated from the Chancery and thus bore the ossified remnants of 
the dictamen format. Such letters were short, concerned one topic and one topic only, 
and were either injunctive (you must do this…) or supplicatory (I beseech you…).111 
More flexible than the strict scribal copyists of the monasteries, they were nonetheless 
extremely constrained in what they communicated because they afforded no 
opportunity for exposition:  
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The “narrative” turns into a grotesquely drawn out “whereas” clause of the 
normal royal missive, except that no “therefore” clause resolves it. Rhetorically, 
it is just one long preamble, a head without a torso.112   
Latin, the medieval language of written discourse, was simply too formal for a mode 
self-expression that mirrored individual discourse. Eventually, writers  
realized without being told that the ars dictaminis was misaligned with both 
their social and professional needs, and they hence allowed it to trail off quietly 
into a byway of public administration.113  
 
Around the fifteenth century, modern English replaced Latin and French as the 
language used in Chancery documents. At this point, scholars note a marked 
diminution of the use of ars dictaminis for royal missives.114 As lawyers, judges, and 
Secretaries of State increasingly replaced the administrative functions of Chancery, 
the royal missive format itself began to drop away during the sixteenth century. 
Transmitted documents required replies, and had to be stored in files, which required 
filing techniques and gave rise to the administrative foundation of the state.115 
Through letters and their replies, the possibilities of writing expanded in scope and 
form.116 Yet away from the narrow and inherently political realm of kings, emperors, 
ambassadors, and courtiers, personalised correspondence did not motivate people to 
write letters. It appears that for around a century the English lacked any vernacular 
form in which to exchange private letters.117 Instead, they sent each other bills. 
2.1.3 Medieval networks 
Modern postal systems emerged alongside modern authorship. In medieval Europe, 
the constitution of messenger services reflected feudal society’s segmented and 
overlapping sources of authority. Charlemagne (d.814) established three main postal 
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routes in the Holy Roman Empire, through Italy, Germany and Spain,118 but during 
the three centuries that followed no organised imperial postal system existed in 
Europe, reflecting the absence of any one centralised source of political authority. 
Only the church employed couriers, and paid them well.119 Relatively few people 
travelled. Those who did, such as merchants, troubadours, pilgrims and friars, could 
be haphazardly entrusted with carrying messages, giving rise to the etymological root 
of ‘mail’, after ‘male’, a laced-up leather travelling bag. But any kind of long-distance 
delivery mission was a dangerous assignment.  
 
When organised communication networks re-emerged in Europe, they worked on 
segmented lines. Networks can be distinguished by the specific type of 
communication they carried. Religious orders communicated with houses of the same 
order via a corps of nuntii, often making their way across the entire territory of 
Europe.120 Merchant guilds established their own commercial communication 
services, such as the Hansa merchants, and the Butchers of southern Germany (later 
confirmed as a state postal organisation by a patent granted in 1597).121 University 
postal systems began in Bologna around 1158; soon they were replicated in Naples, 
Salamanca, and Bourges.122 The universities recruited trusted nuncio volantes primarily 
in order to ensure that student’s fees were paid and the money carried securely back 
from their families. The messengers enjoyed all the privileges of members of the 
University and were treated as clerici when they travelled, meaning they enjoyed the 
same freedoms and protections that guaranteed ecclesiastical safe conduct and 
exempted them from feudal tolls. The petits messagers system of Paris came to be used 
for other purposes until it was suppressed during the French Revolution.123  
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Modern postal networks in Europe originated in the messenger services of medieval 
kings. In England, the Anglo-Saxon and Norman curia regis comprised the King’s 
Court, the Exchequer, and the Chancery. Until around the end of the fifteenth century, 
the Chancery was the secretariat, the source of authentic documents in the nascent 
bureaucracy of England.124 Chancery clerks were educated in rhetorical forms of 
writing in monasteries and universities, often elsewhere in Europe.125 There was no 
question of privacy or confidentiality in what they produced.126 The security of royal 
documents depended upon the King’s Messengers. They were members of the royal 
household, paid from the Exchequer, and bound to their role by oaths.127 Known as 
nuncii et cursores, they were “intimately connected with the person of the 
sovereign”.128 The King’s Messengers carried letters abroad to other courts, called 
together local assemblies in the shires, carried proclamations of new laws about the 
kingdom, summoned the nobility to appear before the monarch, distributed papal 
decrees, and carried out other administrative tasks, but their main occupation was 
tethering the Chancery and Exchequer to the Court as it moved around the country.129  
2.1.4 Establishing posts 
The first set of permanent postal relays in England was established in 1482 to facilitate 
war against Scotland. Each relay was positioned twenty miles apart on the road north. 
This made Edward IV the first English King to direct a war away from the 
battlefield.130 As princes increasingly came to rely on postal relays for the transmission 
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of secret information in order to secure the interior of the territorial kingdom, they 
also found that foreign networks had to be disrupted in their attempts to infiltrate the 
territory.131 The emergence of the territorial state coincided with the settling of regular 
posts.  
 
Elizabeth I declared a legal monopoly over letter carrying in 1590. The proclamation 
called on “all Mayors, Bailiffs, etc. … to make diligent search for all Mails, etc. … 
coming into or going out of the Realm with packets of Letters.”132 Merchant postal 
guilds, known as the Stranger’s Posts and the Company of Merchant Adventurers,133 
were expelled from London in 1591 as the Crown sought to consolidate control.134 The 
Master of the Posts began to take an administrative interest in issuing orders to 
postmasters across the realm.135 In 1633, Thomas Witherings was appointed as the first 
holder of a new office; that of Postmaster General. He was tasked with turned the 
Messengers from an expense to a source of revenue.136 In 1635, the Letter Office was 
formally opened for public use by royal proclamation.  
2.2 Seventeenth century: the birth of interception  
Becoming an author of letters requires technical skill. As Luhmann puts it, 
“individuality = self-reference”.137 To succeed, self-reference depends on recognition. 
An author cannot autonomously decide on what a letter is, as the form must pre-exist 
the writer to be recognised as self-referential. Only by developing one’s media-
technical skill can one learn to add personal inflections within the form. At that point, 
letters transform subjects into senders and receivers, granting to each confirmation of 
their will and ideas.  
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The political changes associated with the rise of individual opinions, and the 
emergence of publicly mediated debates about politics, science, law, religion, art, and 
so on, depended first and foremost on the adoption of the techniques required to enter 
epistolary communication. In England, the consequences manifested in the Civil War 
(1642-51), which in turn led to the English Revolution, the execution of King Charles 
I, and a period of would-be republican rule under Oliver Cromwell during the so-
called Interregnum (1649-1660).138 As Foucault puts it, what was at stake was not so 
much the ideas that people defended in their writing as a deeper conflict; a conflict 
over conduct itself. The reasons why things should be as they were and the means 
through which things could be apprehended took on different orientations.139 
 
During the Civil War, letters were frequently captured and published as evidence of 
whatever position the publishers wished to attribute to them. In 1644, James Howell, 
in an open letter that was published anonymously, bemoaned the “barbarism” of the 
“interception” and opening of letters. It had, he wrote,  
quite bereft all ingenious Spirits of that correspondency and sweet 
communication of fancy, which hath been always esteemed the best fuel of 
affection, and the very marrow of friendship.140  
He was not addressing himself to state interception as such, but to a generalised 
condition of the times. Under conditions of civil war the risk of interception of letters 
was generalised, to the extent that it was extremely risky to indulge in the pleasures 
of correspondence. One’s private thoughts were at risk.  
 
Controlling letters was a political objective. By 1641, the year before the Civil War 
began, there were two Postmasters General; one for the Royalists and one for the 
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Parliamentarians. Each nominally controlled the posts in their faction’s territory.141 In 
practice, this meant most local postmasters were dismissed and the system, such as it 
was, disintegrated. Anyone stopped on the roads was searched for letters. Those 
letters that were discovered by Parliamentary forces were sent to a Committee of the 
Lords in London for inspection. Intercepted Royalist letters were frequently read 
aloud in Parliament, sometimes for their intelligence value, other times merely to 
confirm their existence so that Parliament would vote to approve reward payments to 
the soldiers who had found them.142  
 
Captured letters were frequently published as propaganda, transforming them into 
matters for public consumption.143 Yet even over enemy correspondence, moral 
distinctions were made as to what should remain private. On capturing a packet of 
Royalist correspondence in 1642, for instance, one writer’s letter to his parents was 
forwarded to them unopened. Letters addressed to women were, generally, 
forwarded intact. The privacy of intercepted letters addressed to Charles’s wife, 
Queen Henrietta Maria, was respected at first, until one letter was found addressed to 
her from Lord George Digby, Charles’s Secretary of State. The Commons elected to 
open it, the House of Lords abstained.144  
 
The King himself became perhaps the most dramatic example of the nexus between 
secrecy, interception, and publication. On 14th June 1645, the Royalist army was 
defeated at the battle of Naseby. Charles escaped, but his ‘cabinet’ of personal papers 
was captured. Charles, like most letter writers of his class during the period, used 
codes and ciphers to try to protect the meaning of his letters in case they were 
intercepted or captured. But his cabinet contained all his cipher keys, the plain text 
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drafts of letters previously sent, and deciphered versions of all the letters he had 
received and kept. Parliament put the letters on display at Westminster to prove their 
authenticity, then translated and transcribed them for publication as The King’s Cabinet 
Opened. The introductory gloss pointed to the ‘cabbalistical’ ciphers, mobilising the 
general aura of mysticism ascribed to coded writing.145 The book was intended to 
symbolise the exposure and overthrow of mythical arcana imperii.146 
2.2.1 Monopolising a mode of visibility 
Establishing a post-revolutionary monopoly over the transmission of letters, packets, 
and newsletters required violently seizing and suppressing other channels of 
correspondence. In 1649, the new Postmaster General for the Commonwealth 
government, Edmund Prideaux, found himself in competition with the Common 
Council of London, which had established a cheaper postal system during the Civil 
War. Prideaux slashed his prices and sent his men to attack the London messengers. 
They killed at least one man, raided the Council’s offices, and stole their letters.147 
Private initiatives were similarly suppressed in Bury, Dover, Norwich, and Thetford. 
The state’s monopoly was deeply unpopular amongst merchants, evidenced by 
records of printed pamphlets demanding the freedom to carry letters, for reasons of 
efficiency and principle.148   
 
In 1654, Cromwell issued an Ordinance to legally establish the General Post Office 
and set postage prices. In 1657 Parliament confirmed the Ordinance in legislation.149 
The preamble to the 1657 Act for ‘Settling the Post’ states that it is commercially 
necessary, but also 
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to discover and prevent many wicked designs, which have been and are daily 
contrived against the peace and welfare of the Commonwealth, the intelligence 
whereof cannot well be communicated except by letters of escript.150  
According to Vismann, legislative preambles “tell a story that law does not and cannot 
contain”.151 They separate rules from their legislative history to establish a simple 
story about the state of the world into which the law must intervene. The general 
intelligence circulating in correspondence was held to contain traces of plots and 
conspiracies. The function of the General Post Office was to manage the flow of 
discourse. Letters were to be secured, protected, and taxed, and at the same time 
placed under surveillance.  
 
Late in life, Samuel Morland, the polymath, inventor and the first master-technician 
of letter interception, wrote a short essay entitled Of Intelligence, in which he said, 
A skilful Prince ought to make watch towers of his General Post Office of all 
his kingdoms and there to place such careful Sentinels as that, by their gaze 
and diligence, he may have a constant view of all of any moment throughout 
the universe: but more especially of the various tempers of his own subjects, 
and of the first ferments of all factions, without which it is morally impossible 
for him long to sit on his throne...152 
On this view, interception in the late seventeenth century was a necessity, required in 
order to anticipate and therefore control the plans of treacherous rebels at home and 
enemy princes abroad. Morland was known to exaggerate his skills and 
accomplishments, but on this topic, he wrote from experience.153 He spent years 
opening letters, identifying and thwarting rebellious plans, subverting trust amongst 
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enemies by interfering in their correspondence, and enhancing his reputation in the 
process.  
 
What is most interesting about this text is the description of the Post Office as a 
window into the private thoughts of subjects, offering the capacity to map out the 
factional groups and political connections they form. During the Civil War, 
intercepted enemy letters were used for propaganda purposes,154 but Morland is 
describing a practice that in itself must remain secret and undetected. The unique 
visibility he attributed to the Post Office presupposes a certain type of information 
latent within it, ready to be unveiled within the flow of letters: the thoughts of their 
writers. This order of visibility had to be monopolised, both to control access to the 
power it produced, and to deny that power to others. 
 
That letter interception became a set of organised procedures demonstrates the power 
attributed to the knowledge that they promised to reveal. Interception was born as a 
response to a new form of political subjectivity generated not individually, but in 
correspondence with others. Letters materialised the discourse they had effected and 
made it visible. As Murphy explains, subjects of the feudal order were conceived of in 
terms provided by the common law’s particular construction of subjectivity. Murphy 
calls this the “juridical soul”, a concept based on an analogical relationship between 
interiority and exteriority: “God is to the world so the king is to his kingdom so the 
soul is to the man”.155 Government, such as it was, worked on the assumption that an 
oath taken publicly and before God could provide the “measure of a man”, 
presupposing “at one and the same time ‘whole-hearted’ commitment, self-subjection, 
and the threat of punishment by the higher power”.156 This marks out the counter-
factual model through which society apprehended itself as a unity, bonded together 
by oaths and loyalty.  
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Under the Post Office, by contrast, letters are marked by their capacity to differentiate 
individuals within society; to access representations of the inner life of the individual; 
to understand his alliances and friends; and, in particular, to anticipate his plans. This 
made him governable according to the broader dynamics of the moment by assigning 
to him categories of political opinion, intentions, beliefs and states of mind; in short, 
understanding him through a set of tactics and strategies that were not determined by 
the law. Letters gave access to the private domain that they constituted. The 
authorship-effect letters engendered made them worth intercepting. The ascription of 
authorship to a text is always a functional categorisation process, and a statement only 
has salience within a particular regime of discourse, “separating one from the other, 
defining their form, and characterizing their mode of existence”.157 A letter could only 
be intercepted if it was selected, and as such, something interesting had to be 
anticipated. Through interception, the author’s words were extracted from a network 
of private correspondence that assigned to them one meaning, and were animated 
instead within a regime of suspicion, anticipation, inspection, and investigation, 
indexed to the distinctions that shaped the political épistème of the period. 
2.2.2 Interception techniques  
During the ‘Interregnum’ period of Commonwealth rule which followed the Civil 
War in England, between the execution of Charles I and the coronation of his son 
Charles II (1649-1660), Samuel Morland and Isaac Dorislaus intercepted letters at the 
Post Office and reported their findings to John Thurloe, Cromwell’s Secretary of 
State.158 An account of their activities was later provided by John Wildman, a fellow 
republican who attempted to enter the service of the monarchy after the Restoration 
(1660), and towards that end wrote an account of Thurloe’s intelligence system. He 
claimed that each post night, at about eleven o’clock, Dorislaus had 
the letters brought and laid before him, to open any as he should see good, and 
close them up again, and there he remained in that room, usually till about 
three or four in the morning, which was the usual time of shutting up the mail. 
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And in process of time the said Dorislaus had got such knowledge of all hands 
and seals, that scarcely could a letter be brought him but he knew the hand that 
wrote it.159 
Samuel Morland joined him after midnight if “a rising was near”.160 They were 
primarily concerned with overseas diplomatic correspondence and inland letters 
addressed to ministers and known plotters. Sometimes certain routes were selected to 
search through; for instance, one account explained that he “looked over the Paris bag 
for the state letters.”161 But on the whole, Wildman recounted, Dorislaus operated 
from a written list of named targets supplied by Thurloe. The list, as Vismann 
emphasises, is a form of purely functional writing and the departure point for all 
written administrative culture.162 
Lists do not communicate, they control transfer operations… Lists sort and 
engender circulations.163 
That the primal technique of list-making appears on the scene at the beginning of 
organised interception practices is mundane, but in a sense, that is an effect of the 
efficiency of administrative techniques. They fade into the background.  
 
Lists demand execution. In executing the list, Dorislaus lacked dexterity. He is said to 
have melted sealing wax with a heated knife in order to open and close the letter while 
trying to keep intact the original stamped seal.164 This crude method left visible traces. 
Morland, on the other hand, was an adept. Not for him a heated knife. He took 
impressions of seals, probably with plaster, made forgeries with which to replace 
them, then simply removed the original wax. He had a talent for remembering and 
reproducing the handwriting of others, and was able to recognise on sight the 
handwriting and seals of regular targets. As most letters were simply addressed to a 
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name in a post town, and names alone can easily be disguised, his knowledge of 
scripts was vital. Under the Restoration government he built copying machines that 
wet the ink on a letter and took an impression of the text without leaving a trace.165  
 
The number of targeted correspondents was relatively small, as was the overall 
volume of correspondence. Many targets were famous men in society, such as the 
Royalist noblemen of the Sealed Knot conspiracy during the Interregnum. Morland 
uncovered the plot, observed their plans and paranoia, and then inserted forged 
correspondence that insinuated that they had all betrayed one another.166 
Correspondence was to him a medium that could manipulate minds, given patience 
and observation.  
 
Interception of seventeenth century letters was a highly personalised affair. The 
individual produced by the addressing of letters served as the reference point for both 
interception and the tactical interventions that it afforded. Yet it was not a great secret. 
The practice was so intensely applied that knowledge of it circulated widely, which 
Wildman felt served “to discourage conspirators from using such a reliable means of 
transmission of communication, for fear of the regime gaining the insight”.167 
Accordingly, foreign ambassadors took steps to avoid the Post Office, or delayed 
submitting letters until the last possible moment to minimise interception time.168 In 
the city of London, illegal postal networks sprang up between opponents of the 
regime. Secret agents were recruited to ingratiate themselves with plotting sects and 
then volunteer for the dangerous job of carrying their letters. The agent would secretly 
open and mark any letters of interest, then allow himself to be seized by a King’s 
Messenger, who took away the letters.  
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Thurloe’s papers, preserved in the British Library, contain many examples of 
intercepted letters and deciphered copies, including an intercepted letter from Charles 
II, sent from France while in exile, the red seal broken.169 Apocryphally, Thurloe 
survived the Restoration, when many republicans were executed, on account of a 
‘black book’ full of the secret treasonous thoughts he had collected from the letters of 
supposedly loyal subjects of the King. The mere possibility of its existence was enough 
to guarantee his safety.170  
 
The Restoration government also spied on and bribed opponents to ensure access to 
conspirators’ letters.171 Morland, untroubled by any political conviction, continued to 
conduct interception in the Post Office. The Restoration government made the most 
of his services. Meanwhile, the Post Office began printing intelligence reports, which 
it distributed in exchange for information. Domestic and foreign informers whose 
intelligence flowed into the Post Office reported on local unrest, foreign shipping 
news, trade movements, and military developments abroad. In exchange, informants 
received selections of intelligence in the government’s official newsletter, The London 
Gazette, that they could put to their own uses. A discourse network emerged based on 
an economy of shared secret information too valuable to disseminate – except in 
exchange for more secret information. 
2.2.3 Cryptographia  
Given the generally risky conditions of entrusting correspondence to the roads, ‘secret 
writing’ was popular amongst seventeenth century letter writers. The Post Office was 
widely known throughout the seventeenth century to function as an instrument for 
spying on correspondence. Plays and prose of the time describe posted letters as a 
“disguised tightly folded form of communication”, and society itself as being “thick 
with informers … skilled in creating crafty letters, and unpicking and inventing 
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codes”.172 Popular treatises on devising and using cipher systems were published as 
early as the sixteenth century.173 The Reverend Dr John Wallis, professor of geometry 
at Oxford and co-founder of the Royal Society, wrote of cryptographia, a term he coined 
in 1641,174 that, “there is scarce a Person of Quality, but is more or less acquainted with 
it”.175 He was employed as the principal codebreaker for both the Interregnum and 
the Restoration governments, eventually becoming chaplain to Charles II.176  
 
There are three sets of techniques that can disguise the meaning of text without 
mechanical or computational methods. Technical steganography conceals the 
presence of the secret message by physically disguising it within other media. Such 
media include ‘invisible’ ink (milk with onion juice is an ancient formula), or writing 
within folds of paper, or caching letters in hidden compartments of other objects. The 
second technique, linguistic steganography, hides the text of a message by embedding 
it sequentially within a larger text. The intended reader extracts the distributed letters 
of the hidden message from the larger text by applying the algorithm according to 
which it is embedded, for instance, read the third letter of the fourth word of every 
fourth line.177 Alternatively, significant code words or phrases might signify certain 
pre-agreed meanings.178 The third alternative is encryption. If steganography aims at 
avoiding recognition, encryption expects it and attempts to defy it.179 Coded or 
ciphered text is overtly recognisable as such; an ars occulte scribendi intended to be 
comprehensible only to one who holds the encryption ‘key’.180 The security of 
cryptographic key systems is a paramount secret; conversely, so too are the 
cryptanalytic methods used to attack them. 
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The codes that Wallis solved for both the Interregnum and Restoration governments 
were mostly nomenclator codebook systems and monalphabetic transformation 
systems.181 A nomenclator codebook is simply a list of words with a list of 
corresponding codewords or numbers listed next to it. The code elements should 
ideally be disarrayed so as not to correspond in any way to the alphabetic order of the 
plaintext. Frequently they were arranged according to the alphabetic order of the 
words they encoded, so that one correctly-guessed codeword can help unravel the 
others, placing them all in alphabetical order in relation to the first guess. Eventually 
irregular tables were introduced, and some that contained nulls, which are decoy code 
terms inserted into a text, having no corresponding meaning.182  
 
A monalphabetic transformation system, also known as a ‘Vigenère system’, 
translates the common alphabet into an alternative alphabet via a key of random 
letters, usually based on an easily remembered phrase from a poem, song, or prayer. 
Each letter in the code alphabet corresponds directly to a letter in the plain alphabet 
and the original message is transcribed accordingly.183 Letter frequencies provide 
grounds for educated guesses as to the signified letters used in monalphabetic 
transformation systems.  
 
The cultural techniques of encrypting information in paper and ink based media could 
be defeated by inverting the techniques using the same media. Storing and processing 
semantic forms of writing into other written forms was solved by storing and 
processing samples, until the possible transformation algorithms had been narrowed 
to a small range of possible solutions, within which a guess led to the plain text. 
Codebreakers therefore built archives of intercepted letters. Wallis’s papers contain 
meticulously ordered transformation keys describing the codes and nomenclator 
systems that he solved, accompanied by annotated examples of deciphered letters. Yet 
many Royalist writers whose letters were intercepted did not believe that cryptology 
                                                
181 Kahn, Codebreakers, 168. 
182 Ibid., 161. 
183 Potter, Secret Rites and Secret Writing, 40. 
 74 
– the study and breaking of codes – was possible. When a packet of letters was seized 
on the road in 1658, they thought themselves safe on account of their codes.184 
2.2.4 Settling the posts 
The Post Office overlaid its operations on existing mail roads, and the maintenance of 
a post by a Postmaster was often a secondary function of another business, such as an 
innkeeper. What mattered was a place on the road where correspondence could be 
reliably sent or collected to or from elsewhere for a fee. The governmental problem 
was bringing these regional operations into the formal accounts of the General Post 
Office. It was conceived of as a primarily financial problem. The aim was to make sure 
that the profit made from organising the carriage of mails went to the Post Office itself 
rather than the postmasters.185   The monopoly, such as it was, was conceived of not 
as the physical transmission of letters, but in terms of who received the money letters 
generated.  
 
After the Restoration, the Secretary of State, Lord Arlington, and his deputy, Sir 
Joseph Williamson, set about intensifying the operations of the Post Office to ensure 
mail was channelled through the Office, and thereby made available for inspection 
and taxation.186 Some sense of the tactics and strategies used to give effect to the 
monopoly are captured in a 1682 report by the Master of Ordinances, Thomas 
Gardiner. Gardiner provided a detailed account of the postal routines of the day. The 
Post Office had been re-established in Lombard Street after the original site and its 
staff were displaced, first by the plague in 1665, and then by the Great Fire of London 
in 1666.187  
 
Gardiner’s account gives a sense of the “political anatomy of detail”, in Foucault’s 
formulation, by which the Post Office generated, expanded, and refined its 
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competencies.188 At bottom, the Post Office worked through techniques that attributed 
personae (as addressees) to things (their letters), and at the same time attributed 
monetary value to its own operations (as postage). In order to discipline discourse, to 
observe the thoughts of the population, to achieve a monopoly over the flow of 
correspondence throughout the territory, and to secure postage as revenue, the Post 
Office first had to discipline the bodies and minds of its staff.  
 
This account is important because it reveals the operations by which the Post Office 
produced and sustained an organised flow of traffic in mail. It accounts for the 
development and consolidation of the techniques of transmission upon which the 
development of interception depended for its basic resources.  
2.2.5 In the office 
The function of an office, at a minimum, is to process information. In this sense, an 
office instantiates a set of procedures that can be realised anywhere that information 
“is received, recorded, arranged and given out.”189 In order to convert individual 
letters into a flow of discourse, the Post Office of the late seventeenth century operated 
in an enclosed, segmented, and disciplined space. Bodies, furniture, scales, pre-
printed dockets, and accounting books were used to ensure that paper and postage 
circulated along fixed circuits, converting the unsorted bags of material and money 
that came into the office into an ordered outward flow of taxed letters and postage 
revenue. Everything that mattered was counted, inspected, and put into order via pre-
printed forms and ledgers, ready to record and compile postal statistics. 
 
Early on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, inbound letters arrived in the Inland 
Office early in the morning from each of the six mail roads. The roads were named 
according to either their termination point or cardinal direction: Chester, West, Bristol, 
North, Yarmouth, and Kent. All six roads terminated at ports. Work in the Post Office 
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was divided according to functional needs. There were clerks, responsible for 
processing the post (eight in total); window men, who received letters at a counter 
from the London public and placed them into one of six large drawing boxes, one for 
each road; sorters, who arranged letters into bags for delivery; letter carriers, who took 
letters out to be delivered in town; a stamper of letters; porters for carrying bags of 
mail and parcels; and return men for dealing with dead letters, i.e. undelivered letters. 
Other than the clerks, these were functional roles rather than fixed positions: 
individual workers could do several different jobs in a weekly cycle. Bodies were 
individualised not according to the needs of the order of work.190 The professional 
roles in the Office, however, were fixed: the accountant, treasurer, and comptroller 
(who symbolised “the authority and Person of the Chief Governors”) organised and 
supervised operations in order “to influence the whole body through all 
circumstances of their duty”.  
 
Everything was arranged to ensure that workers could not collaborate with each other 
or with postmasters in the countryside to defraud the Office of revenue. Clerks were 
randomly assigned incoming mail bags to process, and the prices, numbers, and 
weights of the tallies they arrived at were checked by the accountant against paper 
bills supplied to him from each postmaster to ensure they matched. Sorters rearranged 
letters into delivery bags according to their onward destination. Until the nineteenth 
century, most letters were paid for on delivery. That was so as to guarantee that letters 
did not simply go missing after payment. Postage was calculated on each item 
separately, according to the total distance it had travelled along the post roads. All 
unpaid letters in a bag were stamped with the date on the sealed side and the cost was 
converted into a charge against the letter carriers, to be recouped as they made 
deliveries, or against the postmaster of the destination post town, to be recouped as 
letters were collected and paid for. Porters guarded the sorting rooms so no one could 
enter or leave until the work was done. Colloquially known as ‘bellmen’ because of 
the bells they rang to attract attention on their walks, letter carriers followed the same 
routes each day, “in a constant manner, still beginning and ending in the same place”, 
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then settling their bills “without more trouble to the Office”. Return men disciplined 
the letter carriers by making checks on any letters they returned undelivered to the 
Office.  
 
Outbound post was processed overnight on Tuesdays, Thursdays, and Saturdays. 
Receivers brought in bags from fixed walks through the suburbs of Westminster, 
Charing Cross, Pall Mall, Covent Garden, and from the Inns of Court. They too 
separated their letters according to whether they were paid or unpaid, calculated the 
anticipated postage charges for the unpaid letters, and ensured the correct sums of 
cash were handed over for prepaid letters. Each had a unique personal stamp to mark 
each letter he handed in. At midnight, the Office gates were closed to prevent any 
further letters being handed in. The timed order of the day was rigidly enforced in 
order “to keep the Clerks in continual action”. Occasionally, “little offices abroad… 
bring a glut of Letters at that unreasonable time, most prejudicial to us”. The priority 
was to ensure the efficient and orderly processing of outbound mail.  
 
Clerks were again randomly assigned a different road on each night shift to prevent 
secret arrangements with postmasters. The sorting desks had pigeonholes for each of 
the towns of the roads in sequential order, this way, the territory of the postal network 
was represented in the furnishing and fittings of the office. A bill to each town’s 
postmaster on a pre-printed form was attached to their bag. Post boys took the bags 
out on horseback to the first posts on the roads.  
 
The precise connection between mail sorting and interception at the time is unclear; it 
is not mentioned in Gardiner’s report. While diplomatic post would have been sent in 
identifiable packets for each particular embassy and, therefore, would have been 
easily spotted, it seems likely that a list of names was copied and distributed to each 
of the clerks, who were the only members of staff to inspect each letter individually as 
they sorted the mail.  
 
What matters is that interception was an inflection on sorting operations. Sorting was 
the moment that converted unsorted data into clear transmission channels. This 
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necessarily required inspection of each letter. To function within the Post Office 
delivery system all that was required of a letter was a name and an address, usually 
based on a London neighbourhood or on the nearest postmaster’s location outside the 
city. But the sorting process was an opportunity to observe more, to make other 
selections according to seal, signature, handwriting, or other material differences that 
might mark a letter out for selection and interception. Hence the sorting space was a 
secret space, guarded at all times during operations, symbolically separating the 
material operations of the postal system from the outside world.  
2.2.6 Stamp and deliver  
Postmasters were effectively innkeepers who agreed to make horses and food 
available for the relay riders of the Royal Mail.191 What mattered here were the 
techniques for recording the presence of a letter in the system. Only when a letter had 
entered the mailbag and had been recorded in the postmaster’s pre-printed 
accounting book could it be counted as taxable by the Post Office, and only when it 
physically reached London was it formally processed, by reference to the recorded 
lists of letters received. Postmasters could therefore secretly profit from ‘bye-letters’, 
which reached their destinations somewhere along the road and thus never passed 
through the central Inland Office in London. It was easy, they simply didn’t enter bye-
letters in their accounting books. All that was required, presumably, was a different 
bag, a different notebook, or perhaps no book at all. What was not recorded for the 
Post Office was invisible to the Post Office. In this sense, the Post Office was primarily 
experienced as a form of taxation on a system that could just as well get along without 
the need for central organisation. To underline the point, Gardiner, in his 1682 report, 
suggested that ‘riding surveyors’ could perhaps police this by travelling the roads 
making unannounced inspections. There was nothing useful about this suggestion 
beyond the extraction of tax.  
 
In Gardiner’s report of 1682, postal problems were presented in financial terms, but 
they represented implicitly the inaccessible flow of discourse that could not be sorted, 
inspected, taxed, or intercepted. Gardiner’s solutions to postal revenue problems offer 
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an indication of the logic of the Office at the time. He proposed surveillance tactics be 
applied, not only within the Office but across the territory generally. Yet other tactics 
emerged instead. Postmasters were on the whole underpaid and frequently incurred 
losses, which did not encourage them to send any profits they made onward to 
London. One successful tactic was to send them copies of the government’s 
newsletter, the London Gazette, which they could sell for a penny in their towns. The 
newspaper soon became so successful that some postmasters were eventually paid 
only in Gazettes. Clerks, in turn, were awarded franking privileges over newspapers – 
that is, they were granted the right to send newspapers through the post free of charge. 
Clerks soon came to supplement their low salaries by buying newspapers in bulk from 
publishers in London and selling them on to postmasters at a profit, who in turn sold 
them to their customers and to local taverns and coffeehouses in their towns. 
Newspapers became intractably coupled to the economy of the postal communication 
network. Demand for news effectively subsidised the efficient transmission of mail.  
 
Within London, a different model emerged to challenge the Post Office’s aim of 
monopolising discourse. The ‘penny post’ was a decentralised network based in the 
City of London, established in 1679 by William Dockwra and backed by the Whigs, 
the opposition parliamentary party who opposed absolute monarchical rule. Letters 
were sent and received in around one hundred and eighty different shops and 
coffeehouses in the City via several small sorting offices. In exchange for a penny, the 
letter was stamped on sending (using the world’s first stamps) and delivered. There 
were no unpaid letters, so no need to register sent letters in a book or calculate prices 
on delivery. Anonymity went hand-in-hand with efficiency. Dockwra’s network very 
quickly turned a large profit, while the General Post Office incurred losses.192  
 
The penny post disseminated an unregistered flow of information, news, and political 
agitation throughout London.193 It was subversive not because of what it transmitted, 
but because it could not be inspected. The Duke of York, who held the postal 
monopoly, brought an action for infringement of the royal prerogative and the 
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network’s admirable profits were incorporated into the General Post Office in 1692.194 
The operations, however, continued as before, assisting the cheap circulation of a 
disorderly flow of information through eighteenth-century London. 
2.3 Eighteenth century: the function of interception  
The Post Office grew unevenly in terms of revenue in the eighteenth century, but in 
terms of complexity and efficiency it rapidly transformed into a large bureaucracy 
overseeing a postal monopoly. It became an apparatus through which a new set of 
relationships between the territory, the state, and the population were articulated. In 
public discourse, the institution came to be regarded as a “private necessity and public 
right”, as Whyman puts it, rather than the distrusted instrument of political 
surveillance it had been. Postal services effectively served as the informational 
infrastructure for the emergent notion of the ‘public sphere’.195 But the General Post 
Office, as it came to be known, was also wrapped up with the technics of population, 
economy, and security through which power operated. If in the eighteenth century 
the “finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the 
perfection and intensification of the processes it directs”, then the postal system is an 
archetypal case study for the emergence of governmentality, which operates not 
though law but through the development of mutable tactics.196  
2.3.1 The postal dispositif  
When the financial administration of the Post Office was placed under Treasury 
control in 1685, postage became an instrument of taxation, payable on a permanent 
basis to the institutions of a fixed and established form of state rather than to the 
temporary holder of a monopoly. Although it continued to lose money, the losses did 
not constrain postal growth in a number of dimensions. First, postal work became 
professionalised. In 1703, a Post Office solicitor was appointed to manage the growing 
need for legal decisions; managers were appointed to conduct uniform weekly audits; 
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an architect was permanently appointed, as were two bag-makers.197 Boys were sent 
to the Post Office to train as clerks; a “good Post Office education” included learning 
postal geography and different postage rates by heart.198  
 
Second, postal institutions became fixed and permanent across the territory. The 
General Post Office redefined conceptions of territory as it became the first reliable 
and regular system for transmitting communication anywhere across the space it 
connected. By the middle of the eighteenth century most market towns and 
manufacturing regions had daily delivery and collection services at official locations. 
Regional postal sorting offices were established to increase circulation speed and 
lower the postage costs of mail within local areas, and London ceased to be the radial 
hub of the network. As the speed and coverage of the mail increased, competing 
networks were swallowed up. Roads, canals, and turnpikes supplied not only 
economic growth to communities, but postal services. The first armoured mail coaches 
appeared in the 1780s, increasing the speed and security of all long-distance 
deliveries.199 Overseas deliveries and postage rates became standardised.  
 
Third, the postal system generated more work for itself by bringing more people into 
view as postal subjects. Its increasing reach and efficiency delivered the opportunity 
to invent oneself: to become an author of letters. Through “reading, copying, adapting, 
and composing narratives about their lives”,200 postal subjects attained the capacity to 
produce themselves in writing for the express purpose of communication with 
others,201 and in the process generated new circuits of economic, financial, news, and 
legal transactions that accompanied changes in labour mobility.202 These postal 
discourse networks recursively amplified their own operations. Contemporary letter 
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writers came to view the institutionalised General Post Office not as object of 
suspicion, but as a necessary public service, from which users demanded constant 
improvements in speed, reliability, and cost.203 It was the ambition of any good postal 
worker to meet those demands.  
 
The postal service had become a governmental dispositif. It continually lost money for 
the Treasury, but that was beside the point. Postal operations generated their own 
reasons for expansion that were not economically determinable. As Siegert puts it,  
it no longer would be the role of postage to achieve maximum utility from an 
established and unquestionable circulation of discourses, but instead to 
produce those discourses in the first place: ‘And henceforth the theory of 
production must always precede that of circulation.’204  
The postal dispositif attained the capacity to measure and adapt its own operations. 
Postal statistics were collected as the institution took account of its operations, which 
were used to refine management practices. When in 1682, Gardiner had considered 
the problem of bye-letters, those letters which were sent and delivered at towns on 
the same road and so could not be accounted for within the Post Office, he suggested 
appointing riding surveyors to apply postal discipline; to inspect and enforce the law 
against postmasters. Postal governmentality, however, solved the problem with 
statistics. By introducing pre-printed post bills upon which each postmaster had to 
account specifically for the number of bye-letters they collected, average figures were 
used to calculate a projected number of bye-letters that statistically ought to pass 
between any two given towns, based on their relative size and commercial 
importance.205 Postmasters whose figures notably deviated from their anticipated 
average flow were placed under suspicion. The problem of bye-letters vanished. Such 
letters were brought into the official postal economy by the application of a norm, 
derived from the very statistics that postmasters were required to gather in the course 
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of their own operations. They effectively disciplined themselves by observing and 
recording their own work, in a media-technical process that was actualised through 
changes made to their pre-printed notebooks. Postal power operated technically, and 
at a remove.  
 
Nonetheless, all such operations occurred within a highly-stratified hierarchical 
society. This is perhaps most clearly visible in the issue of franking, derived from franc, 
meaning ‘free’. Franking rights were granted to ministers, MPs, and members of the 
nobility as privileges of their office. To ‘frank’ a letter, the privileged person simply 
endorsed it with their signature.206 Franked letters were sent and received free of 
charge, and people with franking privileges would allow others to use them in 
exchange for favours. Franking created a bifurcation in the postal economy. Between 
1711 and 1761 the number of franked letters grew by seven hundred per cent, while 
paid-for letters grew by only fifty per cent. In short, many more letters were sent than 
were paid for. When letters were paid for, postage was considered excessively high, 
as the Treasury tried to extract the maximum possible postage to cover losses. Those 
dependent on the mail, particularly bourgeois merchants with money but without 
privilege, frequently wrote to the Post Office to complain that postal methods were 
out-dated, and postage over-priced.207  
 
Although understood to be an exemplary symbol of class privilege, franking was a 
blunt instrument that produced unanticipated effects. In 1764, a statute aimed at 
restricting the abuse of franking privileges created a loophole that allowed MPs to 
have others sign their franks on their behalf. Almost immediately, printers, 
booksellers, and newspaper publishers flooded the Post Office with printed matter, 
signed on behalf of their patrons. Between 1764 and 1796, the number of newspapers 
franked by postal clerks in London rose from one million to over eight million.208 
Newspapers circulated free of charge throughout the country, carrying news, 
criticism, gossip, and providing platforms for anyone who wished to write in response 
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to have their own thoughts circulate back to them. The relatively rapid expansion in 
critical discourse and news reporting were destabilising to the existing monarchical 
order, which ultimately paid for the costs of its transmission via the losses franking 
incurred. As a side-effect, it ensured that writers and journalists were added to the 
long lists of interception targets.209  
2.3.2 Postal intelligence 
Broadly speaking, the eighteenth-century postal dispositif created, collected, and 
transmitted ‘intelligence’ on the population as a whole, which it brought into 
consideration through its operations.210 All postal workers knew that part of the job 
was to record and relay back any “remarkable occurrences” in local areas by writing 
and sending reports through the post.211 Postal surveyors reported on crime, disorder, 
economic conditions, and local elections; postmasters and secretaries in Ireland, 
Scotland, and the overseas colonies reported privately on civil and military issues 
there. Port officers provided news of enemy ship movements and copied passenger 
lists, and foreign spies continued to avail of the network to supply Britain with 
intelligence. One Rotterdam merchant, Richard Wolters, operated an intelligence ring 
that posted information back to London concerning every foreign naval base from 
Ostend to Toulon.212 The Post Office was the interface between government and 
‘society’ at large. These tactics served a broader strategy associated with 
governmentality, which is the bringing to light of the ‘population’ as a kind of 
‘thickness’, a mobile set of diverse groups and categories that are irreducible to 
individual members and that follow a set of natural processes associated with 
factional or group ‘interests’.213 The Office conducted surveys and collected statistics 
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but it was also the channel through which surveys and statistics were delivered to the 
reforming institutions of government in London. 
 
The Post Office had a specific policing function at times of unrest, as demonstrated in 
Hensey’s case of 1758. A Catholic, Doctor Hensey, was prosecuted for treason during 
the Seven Years War with France. At trial, a postman from the City of London 
appeared as a prosecution witness. He said he regularly collected letters from Hensey 
when he rang the post bell on collection nights on Arundel Street, London. He became 
suspicious:  
—I observed that the letters I received of Dr. Hensey were generally directed 
abroad and to foreigners; and knowing the doctor to be a Roman Catholic, and 
as I imagined in the interest of the Pretender, I advised the 'xamining clerk at 
the office to inspect his letters, telling him that I had some suspicion that the 
writer of those letters was a spy. 
—Did you open any one of these letters yourself? 
—No; but I happened to challenge the letter about the Secret Expedition; and 
when it was opened at the post-office and found to be what it is, after that I 
received directions to bring every letter I received from the doctor… 
The next witness was a clerk of the Post Office, who explained,  
when war is declared against any nation, immediate orders are given out by 
the Postmaster General to stop all suspected letters, in order to prevent 
intelligence being given the enemy of our transactions at home.214  
Here are the two sides of the Post Office as a specific organ of intelligence: the 
suspicious postman monitoring his customers in the streets, and the internal use of a 
general warrant to supervise entire channels of communication.  
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2.3.3 Professional interception 
Warrants were prescribed as the only lawful means of authorising the opening or 
delaying of a postal letter or packet by section 40 of the Post Office (Revenues) Act 
1710. Under section 41, all postal workers were required to swear an oath, bringing 
interception and non-interception into a tight relationship with the overall priorities 
of the institution. Warrants symbolically disciplined postal workers, and calibrated 
the seriousness of the interventions they could make into the mail they carried: 
I do swear, That I will not wittingly, willingly, or knowingly open, detain, or 
delay, or cause, procure, permit, or suffer to be opened, detained, or delayed 
any letter or letters, packet or packets, which shall come into my hands, power, 
or custody, by reason of my employment in or relating to the post office; except 
by the consent of the person or persons to whom the same is or shall be 
directed, or by an express warrant in writing under the hand of one of the 
principal Secretaries of State for that purpose …215 
 
Interception work was functionally differentiated in the eighteenth century. If a 
Secretary of State’s warrant for the opening of letters concerned matters connected 
with a criminal investigation in a particular area, they were intercepted in the sorting 
rooms of that area. Such letters were not carefully opened. It did not matter that such 
interception was known to have occurred. Letters intercepted for political reasons, 
however, were forwarded unopened to the Private Office within the Post Office in 
London, where skilled interceptors opened them undetected.216 The cultural 
techniques of letter interception could extract more information from a given letter 
than the sender or receiver intended or expected, and everything significant was thus 
recorded as a future resource for selecting and copying further correspondence. The 
Private Office was the operational centre of a distributed domestic interception 
network. It received letters intercepted under warrants from local sorting rooms in 
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regional offices and the Post Office sorting room in London, processed them, returned 
them, and distributed the intelligence onwards as directed. 
 
The most specialised techniques, however, were applied in the Secret Office, also 
known as the Secret Room. There, diplomatic mailbags were processed as they passed 
through the Post Office. It comprised three rooms within the Post Office headquarters. 
In the Secret Office, candles constantly illuminated the workroom and enabled the 
melting of sealed wax, while a fire was kept alight for comfort and for the disposal of 
executed warrants. Two other rooms served as lodgings – the interceptors lived and 
slept where they worked. They came and went via a private entrance located on 
Abchurch Lane to avoid observation. Admission was strictly controlled, restricted to 
the staff and the Postmaster General only. Only the head of the department, known 
as the Foreign Secretary, was officially listed in the Post Office accounts as a public 
official, and he only from 1723, when the then-Foreign Secretary gave evidence in the 
House of Lords during a trial for treason.217 Otherwise, the very existence of the 
department and the names of the staff were kept secret, with salaries paid 
anonymously from a general pot of secret service money allocated to the Post Office 
by Parliament.218  
 
Interception was performed by teams of professional technicians. Anthony Todd, a 
Secretary of the Post Office, was a farmer’s son who began his postal career in the 
Secret Office. He wrote that a working day would typically begin at 8am or 10pm on 
post days and nights. In order to give the appearance that diplomatic mail was not 
interfered with, the Post Office prioritised the rapid delivery of diplomatic post to 
foreign embassies in London.219 As this compressed the time available to work on 
intercepting it, the clerk’s first duty was to quickly check all the diplomatic bags to 
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select target letters and packets of letters, open them, quickly scan the letter, noting in 
a registry ledger the names of sender and receiver, the address, date, and the general 
thrust of the content. He then indicated particular passages and passed the material 
to the copying clerks. Todd’s role included noting the “connexion of hand, address, 
and seal” revealed in each letter so as to aid future identification of targets.220  
 
Where the use of invisible ink was suspected, special liquors for detecting it were 
applied. Inks and waxes were procured from across Europe to disguise the work. 
Translators were on hand to translate letters penned in other European languages.  
Once the clerks had finished with a letter, the precise colour and type of wax used on 
the original letter was selected, melted, applied, and stamped with a precise forgery 
of the original seal. All letters had to be returned to their original packets intact and in 
the original order. Where a seal had changed or a new target was selected, a forger 
immediately set about carefully engraving a new duplicate. Interception, was no 
longer the work of one or two men, but an organised workflow.221  
 
As in the seventeenth century, the operations required to intercept letters depended 
on selection criteria, applied in the course of the processing and sorting of mail in 
transit. The scale and scope of interception had altered but the essence of the technique 
remained. By the eighteenth century, the interception warrant had become the only 
established means of legally delivering a list of targets, inserting selection criteria into 
sorting operations and demanding their execution. 
2.3.4 The deciphering branch  
The same secret fund that covered the Secret Office and Private Office also paid the 
mathematicians of the Deciphering Branch, which was composed of several 
decipherers sworn to secrecy. They worked mainly from home rather than in the Post 
Office, receiving their work via special messengers. The Deciphering Branch built 
upon the deciphering techniques and archive of codes bequeathed by the seventeenth 
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century decipherer, John Wallis.222 Secrecy was essential, as demonstrated at the 
treason trial of Bishop Atterbury in 1723 before the House of Lords. Two decipherers 
were called to give evidence. They testified that they had deciphered the intercepted 
letters shown as evidence of the Bishop’s treason. The defence challenged them to 
demonstrate how they had done it, to prove the connection between the code and the 
deciphered text. However, the Lords ruled that they should not explain their methods, 
nor say anything that might reveal “the Art or Mystery of deciphering”.223 
 
The decipherers used many of the same techniques and principles as Wallis had a 
century before. But they were assisted by the development of enciphering techniques 
amongst the professional letter interceptors. Clerks of the Secret Office were specially 
trained to recognise information in intercepted letters that could be useful to the 
decipherers, by looking for cribs. A ‘crib’ is any piece of information that gives a 
contextual clue as to what words have been substituted or enciphered. The clerks 
noted down details written in plain alphabetic text that might indicate the meaning of 
enciphered text.224 Cribs could precede or follow the coded text that they refer to; 
therefore, everything that a target sends or receives by post is a potential crib. A 
common source of cribs came from diplomatic staff of foreign embassies encoding the 
contents of documents that their ambassador had obtained from the British 
government. As the decipherers always had access to the original, it was easy to see 
how certain words were encoded. Another frequent mistake was to refer in code to 
events discussed in plain text in previous correspondence. Provided the interceptors 
arranged their registry of intercepted letters carefully to note who wrote to whom and 
when, they could simply look up possible solutions to coded terms in plain text, 
accessing stored records of older elements in an ongoing chain of correspondence.  
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Although better encryption techniques had been devised in theory, some of them 
practically unsolvable by hand, diplomatic clerks generally did not use them.225  In 
practice, they were slow to prepare and complicated to use, and because they typically 
required at least two sets of transformations, mistakes in encoding or decoding could 
easily render the whole letter meaningless. Yet it was known that the codes in use 
were relatively simple to break, and each major European government knew that 
others operated so-called ‘black chambers’. Encoding letters, it seems, was primarily 
a cultural technique that identified the particular skills expected of diplomatic clerks, 
rather than a means of actually securing messages. It was also expensive, costing 
around £150 for a new nomenclature system in the late eighteenth century. 
Governments were reluctant to pay and so carried on using some codes for over a 
decade, rendering them useless; more ritualistic than rational.  
2.4 Nineteenth century: normative closure   
If, for the purposes of this chapter, the seventeenth century was a time of violent 
suppression, and the eighteenth century a time of intensification of political control 
and corruption, then the nineteenth century completes the genealogy by marking the 
differentiation of postal operations from other social distinctions. This was 
accompanied by a transformation in the way interception was observed, and the 
purposes that it was put to.  
2.4.1 Postal reconfigurations  
The dysfunctional economics of the postal service were well-known to complainants 
writing in the 1790s; by the 1830s perennially high postage and the abuse of the postal 
system were widely viewed as counter-productive to social progress. A parliamentary 
committee convened in 1837 heard the following complaints: 
A multitude of business transactions were not carried on at all, or were carried 
on clandestinely, or were hampered by the high postage rates. Bills for small 
amounts were not drawn, commercial travellers did not write until several 
orders could be sent on one sheet of paper, samples were not sent by post, 
communication between banks and branches was restricted, statistical 
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information was denied, social correspondence restricted especially among the 
poor, working men were ignorant of the rates of wages in other parts of the 
country, and the high postage was a bad means of raising revenue.226 
In order to become truly productive and to finally pay for its own operations through 
postage, the postal system had to be ‘liberalised’. 
 
According to Foucault, the ‘biopolitical’ mode of power emergent in the nineteenth 
century aimed at measuring the intensity of applied methods and tactics, striking 
‘balances’, making adjustments, checking results and optimising techniques so that 
they function collectively. All aspects of life became objects of power, developing 
reflexive forms of governmentality. Decisively, biopolitical power is cognitive of the 
risks of governing and takes actions accordingly. The ultimate aim is the improvement 
and growth of society through processes of ‘normalisation’ – bringing things into line 
with mobile norms, while simultaneously assessing and altering norms. This means 
taking a second-order attitude to government itself; politics is then a matter of the 
correct application of “action upon actions”.227  
2.4.2 Systemic closure  
Reform of the Post Office commenced in 1840 under Rowland Hill, a utilitarian 
schoolmaster who had proposed radical changes in a series of published letters, and 
who had no prior experience of the postal system until he was made Postmaster 
General.228 His idea was simple. A letter could be posted anywhere in Britain for a 
penny. The postage charged was the same for each item (classified by weight), 
regardless of how far it travelled between sender and receiver. Distance was therefore 
disconnected from postage. Postage pricing became indifferent to space and all 
deliveries were made spatially equivalent.  
 
The entire domestic territory was reconfigured as a single penny post network. Hill 
correctly foresaw, through studying postal statistics, that the higher cost of letters 
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carried over long distances would be covered by the efficiencies gained in local 
deliveries, and he correctly predicted that introducing a universal penny post would 
spur a rapid rise in use of the mail and induce an end to various abuses. Circulation 
rates and overall revenue would rise. Postal work was simplified greatly, because 
clerks, postmasters, and delivery carriers no longer had to calculate the price of 
postage on each item. All franking privileges were abolished, further simplifying the 
processing of mail. Every item had to be paid for, and as such postage became 
indifferent to the social rank and personal favour that had dominated in the eighteenth 
century.  
 
As Siegert points out in terms drawn from systems theory, Hill’s successful reforms 
implemented the ‘operational closure’ of the postal system. From that point on, postal 
logic formed a closed system that followed its own internal programming when 
processing the mail. Postage would be indicated by prepaid stamps, manufactured for 
the first time to coincide with the new system. Provided a valid stamp was in place, 
no additional input from the environment was required to validate the delivery of a 
letter to its address, wherever it may be. With postage stamps, another differentiation 
occurred: the money economy was separated from postal operations. There was no 
exchange of cash when sending a letter or receiving it. Rather, stamps separated 
monetary and postal operations in time and space. The strict uniform postage rate 
meant that individuals and companies could know the total amount of money 
required for any given number of future deliveries in advance. By purchasing stamps, 
they could pay for deliveries long before composing, let alone sending, a letter or 
parcel. With a stamp, the customer purchases an opportunity to send a letter anywhere 
in the network at some undefined point in the future.  
 
The reforms also compressed the time required for delivery. Letter carriers and 
postmasters no longer had to take time to give out bills and collect cash with each 
delivery, meaning they could move between addressees rapidly and in order, 
dropping off letters that had been paid for the moment their stamps were cancelled in 
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the sorting room. So immediately successful was this plan that the supply of adhesive 
stamps, introduced on 6th May 1840, could scarcely keep pace with demand.229  
 
Circulation speeds increased in line with the explosion in the number of letters sent 
and received. Postal reform not only differentiated its operations from space, and from 
the money economy, it also divorced itself from individuals, with whom postal 
workers no longer had to interact. This was confirmed when, within a few short years 
of the reforms, secure collection boxes for safely posting letters appeared across the 
country in cities, towns and villages, while letter boxes appeared on front doors.230 By 
abstracting postal operations from the personalities, politics, and local differences of 
the institution, the new system functioned by reference to the technical requirements 
of circulation.  
2.4.3 Addressing the nation 
The other side of the closure of the postal system was standardisation of all 
communication sent via the Post Office. Once postal operations ceased responding to 
the differences of particular users, users had to adapt their communication to the 
standards of the postal system. Stamps and delivery boxes demonstrate this, but not 
as clearly as the addressing system.  
 
In 1856, the Post Office began the process of affixing street names and street numbers 
to all addressable sites in the country. There was considerable resistance, particularly 
in wealthier areas where streets were often named for ancestors. By 1871 there were 
around one hundred thousand officially numbered houses and almost five thousand 
renamed ‘areas’. Within London, ten postal districts were established, each with a 
local sorting office. The public were asked to add the districts’ initials to addresses – 
EC, WC, N, SE, SW, and so on. Codes and street names were slowly introduced in 
other large towns and cities.231 Postal addresses operate according to the following 
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presumptions and requirements. First, that every dwelling or building is a potential 
addressee, regardless of who lives there; second, that all buildings and dwellings are 
serially arranged on streets or roads and can be numbered as such; third, that all 
streets and roads have, or can be given, names that are unique within a defined 
locality; fourth, that localities have names that are unique to a defined region; fifth, 
that regions are uniquely named within the country.232 On these principles, the Post 
Office rationalised cartographic geography, ultimately indexing all delivery points 
addressable according to a single master index, a coding of space, indifferent to the 
particular people located there.233 From then on, letter writers had to adjust their mode 
of address to match the one applied by the Post Office. Letter writers were addressable 
by the terms and codes assigned to them. This had always been so, but here it was 
made explicit. 
 
The unified postal address system transformed unmapped urban spaces into a 
panoptical territory by fixing in place both “souls and houses”.234 Without such an 
index of addresses, there is only an indistinct “sea of houses”,235 which required local 
knowledge to navigate. Just as imposing an address ties deliveries to standardised 
and coded locations, it frees postal workers from local knowledge, and means they 
too could go anywhere in the territory. Everyone who wished to use the postal system 
to send mail had to address themselves according to its index, and everyone who 
wished to receive mail in return had to submit themselves to an address. 
We exist in the eyes of the law as long as only one mail slot is to be found at the 
address recorded by power… Thus, there is indeed “no destination before the 
arrival.” Only at the moment of the letter’s delivery is there a destination, an 
address, our existence. The letter therefore is not delivered to the address, but 
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the address is delivered by the letter; there is no place before its arrival, no 
identity before the address.236 
Hill’s reforms meant individuals were liberated from the close attention of postal 
employees. Rather than the Post Office learning about differences between 
individuals, individuals adapted themselves to the names and numbers generated by 
the Post Office. This way they became individuated according to nationwide 
standards, and addresses became an index for confirming identities across different 
information retrieval systems, such as those used by banks, the police, the revenue, 
and so on. Addresses enabled the interception of mail to be targeted with 
unprecedented precision, but also enabled any number of categorisations to be 
applied once each individual became identifiable by more than just their name and 
locality.  
 
A postal address remains a precondition of access to other services. Surveillance, as 
Foucault demonstrated, is simply a prerequisite of inclusion in modern society. 
Indeed, the implementation of the address system occurred concurrently to the 
‘liberalisation’ of labour in the mid-nineteenth century, when workers began to be 
encouraged to save money and enjoy leisure time in addition to labour time, thus all 
of a subject’s time was entered into calculations of economy and political power that 
increasingly channelled subjects into the operations of banks, advertisements, and the 
general expansion of consumption.237  
 
Man, as Rowland Hill put it, “is made of the Post Office, and not the Post Office for 
man.”238 It was always the postal system that dispatched addresses, never people. In 
doing so, the Post Office nonetheless produced the conditions for an anthropocentric 
theory of modern society, i.e. for the appearance of the ‘man of letters’. Provided the 
postage was affordable, “the materiality of the postal service could remain beneath 
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the threshold of consciousness”.239 Yet the postal dispositif determined the conditions 
under which this authority could refer to itself and transfer itself across space and 
time. Postal communication autopoietically generated more postal communication, 
once the blockages caused by humans, and their local differences, had been ironed out 
of the system. Authors or lovers, businessmen or labourers; the postal system only 
succeeded once it became utterly indifferent to the meaning and status of what was 
sent and delivered.  
2.4.4 Interception as infrastructural capacity  
Letter interception had been a secret practice for as long as there had been organised 
postal services, but it suddenly became a topic of public discourse in England in the 
summer of 1844. A prominent Italian nationalist living in exile in London, Giuseppe 
Mazzini, discovered his letters were being intercepted by experimenting with the 
materiality of the network. One account claims he posted letters to himself containing 
poppy seeds, which were missing when the letter was returned.240 Another claims he 
sent two letters to his own address on the same day, one with his name on it and 
another with a different name, and observed that ‘his’ letter arrived later than the 
other one.241 Either way, Mazzini responded by recruiting Chartist politician Thomas 
Duncombe, who was in opposition to the government of the time, to put the matter to 
Parliament and to inform the press. Mazzini aimed to publicise the cause of Italian 
nationalism, rather than to promote English privacy.242  
 
When the Mazzini scandal broke in the English press, an editorial in The Times of 17th 
June 1844 declared: 
The Home Secretary contented himself with declaring, in general terms, that 
there were reasons for his conduct. But the [House of Commons] was not 
satisfied with this, nor will the country be so. We want facts and circumstances. 
We want such evidence as would satisfy any reasonable man or any set of men 
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that the Home Secretary was morally justified in the course which he pursued. 
The whole question is one of constitutional rights, and nothing else. Mr 
Mazzini’s character and habits and society are nothing to the point, unless 
connected with some certain or probable evidence of evil intentions or 
treasonable plots. We know nothing, and care nothing about him. He may be 
the most worthless and the most vicious creature in the world. But this is no 
reason of itself why his letters should be detained and opened.243 
The Times editorial could not be clearer about the irrelevance of the personality of the 
target. What was explicitly required was some normative justification for interference 
in the flow of letters. The Times and its readers never received the express public 
declaration of reasons that it demanded. We shall return to the Mazzini incident, but 
for now suffice to note that in the Report of the Secret Committee presented to 
Parliament in the aftermath of the scandal,244 which was the first attempt to review 
both the history of the Post Office and of letter interception, an evaluation of the utility 
and justifications of postal interception was required.  
 
Apparently, no records were kept of warrants earlier than 1712, and that the few 
which had survived the eighteenth century were vague in detail. Some, however, were 
clearly an abuse of patronage, used to spy on family members within the nobility. The 
report implicitly suggests that by nineteenth century standards, such incidents were 
taken as mere symptoms of a corrupt and bygone political culture. In one example 
that the Committee selected, in 1741 on the request of Mr ‘A’, his eldest son was 
granted a warrant to open and inspect any letters which A’s youngest son should 
write to two named women, “one of whom that youngest son had imprudently 
married”.245 This warrant was selected as an exemplar by the Secret Committee 
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precisely because it indicated triviality, showing how freely warrants could be granted 
in the corrupt age of grace and favour, when match-making within the nobility was a 
critical element of political power. Yet the report only briefly mentions much more 
significant interventions, such as the occasions on which general warrants that 
arrested entire categories of mail had been used. It simply states that no general postal 
warrants had been made since the turn of the nineteenth century.  
 
Contemporary interception was divided in the report into two classes: ‘criminal’ cases 
and ‘political’ cases, the latter of which were almost all concerned, at the time, with 
Irish nationalism.246 In August 1842 a clerk was sent to “the manufacturing and 
mining districts… in the week of the greatest anxiety” with a warrant to open letters 
of named persons. Most of the targets were subsequently convicted before a special 
commission. Two clerks were also sent to other towns with warrants, but found no 
letters to open and returned to “ordinary business” soon after.247 This would seem to 
suggest they were clerks seconded from the Post Office’s Investigation Department, 
which was publicly described as a department that dispatched clerks to investigate 
criminal matters involving abuses of the postal system. Their investigations were 
publicly said to only concern offences against the revenues of the Post Office itself, not 
general criminal investigation, so this cannot be confirmed.248  
 
Tabulated statistics on the use of interception warrants in the report seem to 
demonstrate the decline in the number of interception events. Moreover, the tables 
serve to represent interception as a well-organised, carefully controlled practice.249 
Subjecting the question of interception to a utilitarian moral calculus, the Committee 
calculated the mean number of annual warrants: eight per year since the start of the 
nineteenth century. Each warrant had an average of two names per warrant – thus the 
report finds that it affects an insignificant number of letters within the overall volume 
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of traffic. The Committee concludes that selective interception actually minimises 
intrusions into the “liberty” of correspondents because it produces useful intelligence 
leading to measured responses, thereby avoiding intrusive over-reactions which 
could lead to violent popular reactions. On the population level, then, privacy and 
freedom in the post were found by the Secret Committee to have increased since the 
eighteenth century, and this was in part down to the selective use of interception.250 
 
Having started as a determinative reason for the monopolisation of discourse, 
interception had thus become an exceptional and controversial practice. The ‘public 
mind’, which had come to observe itself through the news and letter media 
disseminated by the Post Office itself, re-entered the operations of the postal system. 
When interception was no longer the raison d’être of the Post Office, no longer a 
necessary condition of state survival, it was possible to imagine that interception 
should not take place at all, that it was normatively unacceptable that anyone should 
invade the privacy of communication. Letter interception thus demanded a normative 
justification extrinsic to the security and operations of the postal system itself.251 As 
Foucault observes, the  
subject of interest overflows the subject of right. He is therefore irreducible to 
the subject of right… and is the permanent condition of him functioning.252  
Liberalism, in other words, meant maintaining and developing existing techniques of 
observation of the population but, at the same time, promoting and producing 
‘freedom’ meant allowing for risk. The moral calculus of interception was a security 
issue, in the sense that the discursive distaste for interception practices did not derive 
from, nor refer to, any moral philosophy concerning privacy or subjective integrity, 
but rather to a utilitarian calculus, comparable to what Foucault has identified as a 
“principle of calculation… the problem of security is the protection of the collective 
interest against individual interests.”253 
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In the aftermath of the Mazzini scandal, the government quietly closed down the 
diplomatic interception of the Secret Office, pensioned off the decipherers, and ceased 
all interception of foreign mail. Yet such foreign letter interception was nowhere 
mentioned in the secret report, which mentioned only domestic interception.  
 
Domestic interception continued as before, and indeed soon found new purposes in 
the moral health of the population. Postage reform in 1870 introduced a new 
halfpenny rate that was specifically designed to allow advertising circulars to be 
distributed to all addressees in general. The 1870 reforms, in essence, opened up the 
addressable population to the discourse network of the advertising industry. But 
commercial circulars contain both legal and illegal offers, and this particular 
adaptation of the postal service soon allowed illegal lottery competitions to emerge, 
which, alongside the rising circulation of pornographic material from overseas, were 
regarded as an immoral abuse of the medium that had to be intercepted, blocked, and 
eliminated from the network.254  
2.5 Twentieth century: media in media  
The latent potential of total interception inherent in the Post Office monopoly over 
mail was realised with the implementation of general interception and, later, mass 
censorship.  
 
In anticipation of war with Germany, in September 1911 the Home Secretary, Winston 
Churchill, secretly signed a general warrant granting the newly formed domestic 
Counter-Espionage Bureau, MO5,255 wide scope to direct postal interception. The first 
task was to identify ‘postmen’, a nickname for messengers who received letters from 
German intelligence and forwarded them to German spies.256 A “carefully compiled, 
cross-referenced index of the intercepted letters” was created, gathering 1,189 discrete 
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entries between 1911 and 1914, when war officially began.257 Rather than intercepting 
individual letters, the pre-war foreign interception task sought to identify networks 
operating through the postal system.258 
 
At the trial of Karl Gustav Ernst, the fact that interception had occurred was 
acknowledged.259 Interceptors Richard Alfred Evans, Frederick Bosworth Booth, John 
Duncan, and John Barr Featherstone provided sworn statements and testimony. They 
described themselves as “clerks in the Secretary’s Office of the General Post Office” 
and said they all understood German. Around 160 different intercepted items were 
exhibited in evidence. Not only did the intercepted letters make it possible to identify 
Ernst’s role in a network of German secret agents, but each agent’s own persona and 
role in the network was established with a depth of detail sufficient to mount a 
successful prosecution of Ernst under the Official Secrets Act. While the German 
nationals were rounded up and deported, Ernst was a British citizen and therefore 
had to be prosecuted. Later, during the war, anyone in the same position could have 
simply been executed. It seems that Ernst’s case may have been the last deliberate use 
of intercepted material as evidence in a British civilian court.260  
 
War began in July 1914. By the end of the year, there were 170 postal censors in place, 
checking items of mail to and from enemy territories. By the 1918 armistice there were 
4,861 censors opening all letters and packets.261 By 1917, the following steganographic 
techniques had been detected:  
… handkerchiefs embroidered in Morse Code; imitations of Raphael Tuck’s 
postcards;262 religious books; newspapers sent in batches, the number of 
newspapers indicating the number of troops; the colour of the ink of the 
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address indicating the arm of the service; phonographic records and printed 
advertisements. Importation and exportation of phonographic records was 
prohibited and all advertisements had to have a police visa before 
publication.263  
Different media formats were mobilised in an attempt to evade censors and infiltrate 
the postal system. External technical assistance was required to detect them.264 
Artificial invisible inks, known to the British as ‘F’ and ‘P’ ink, were infused into 
scarves and socks in order to be utilised by spies. All such items were dipped in water 
when discovered in parcels in order to release any chemicals stored within. An 
escalating series of ever-more sophisticated invisible inks and developing reagents 
unfolded.265  
 
The microdot is perhaps the best illustration of how the interception of letters ceased 
to target discourse and instead targeted storage media. To make a microdot, a message 
is typed on paper, photographed, and developed. The image is optically reduced in 
size and printed at around 0.05 square inches. The miniaturised image is lifted using 
a hypodermic needle and cemented onto an ordinary letter with glue. It must be 
placed somewhere it can be disguised – over a full stop, beneath a stamp, or inside the 
lips of the envelope were frequently used locations.266 To read a microdot, one 
requires the aid of a 200-power microscope. To the naked eye it is just a dot. Without 
some forewarning, an ordinary letter censor had little chance of noticing that a paper 
medium carried a celluloid medium on its surface.267  
 
In the 1950s, according to former MI5 agent Peter Wright, Post Office Investigators 
worked as interceptors under the direction of the Security Service (MI5, formerly 
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MO5). Wearing rubber gloves, they worked side-by-side at a long table. Each 
investigator was equipped with a lamp, a Photostat machine or pedal-operated 
camera, and an electric kettle for steaming open envelopes. The work was repetitive 
and, apparently, quite mechanical. They did not stop to read the letters they worked 
on, but simply photographed them for others to inspect later and returned them to the 
flow of sorted letters. Letter interception no longer required any discursive or 
linguistic skills. It was essentially a repetitive set of technical procedures.268  
 
By collating data from multiple interceptions, targeted correspondence networks 
could be outlined on paper. A ‘letter check’ request from MI5 simply required the 
interceptors to note down everything on an envelope: its origin, its destination, details 
about the stamp. It did not involve opening the envelope and, therefore, on the Post 
Office’s reading of the law, it required no warrant.269 Around 155,000 postal items 
were selected and opened in 1961, growing to 221,000 by 1969.270 Interceptors were 
stationed securely out of sight within Post Office sorting rooms, selecting items to 
inspect according to a rolling list of targets, copying the content, and sending on the 
item for delivery as normal.271 Yet the techniques employed in accessing, copying and 
processing the contents of letters had changed entirely.  
2.6 Conclusion  
The technical operations of postal interceptors vary, but all depend on two 
preconditions: access to the sorting room, which converts disorderly noise into 
regulated, observable discourse available for inspection, and sufficient time. The 
interceptors occupied a physically segregated space into which only authorised 
personnel could enter. Symbolically speaking, it was the space reserved for sovereign 
operations of postal sorting, which was, after all, the materialisation of the monopoly. 
But it also reserved a secret, separated space in which commands issued by secret 
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warrants from the Secretary of State, the symbolic user of intelligence, could be safely 
executed.  
 
Time was a variable that conditioned operations. Interception was constrained by the 
number of disciplined bodies that could be effectively deployed at once. Mass 
interception was possible given hundreds or thousands of hands, but only at the cost 
of severe postal delays and, therefore, widespread knowledge of the practice. The 
‘liberal balance’ in respect of mail interception is not between personal privacy on one 
hand and state security on the other. It is a balance between optimal inspection time 
and optimal delivery time. Delayed deliveries risk other, second-order consequences, 
as Mazzini showed when he (perhaps fictitiously) posted two letters to his home and 
timed the delay between their delivery. 
 
Given the preconditions of access to sorting operations and time, interception is a 
conditional selection operation that can be performed on any posted letter. The 
function of interceptors, then, lies in executing the selection commands they receive. 
Interception techniques were applied, or not applied, to letters according to a 
conditional decision implicitly taken over all sorted mail that entered the apparatus 
of the Post Office. Everything not selected – the vast majority of postal correspondence 
– is positively sorted and paid for, and thus delivery is always dependent on a system 
that permits an item to proceed as ‘normal’. This positivity eventually became the 
norm, and thus it is largely invisible. Nonetheless, one should insist on regarding the 
delivery of an untouched letter as a consequence of its positive non-interception. This 
implies understanding delivery, and thus interception, not as cognitive experiences 
but as media-technical operations. From the perspective of the Post Office, viewed as 
a non-discursive medium that sorts and orders other discursive media, it requires a 
processing decision applied in each and every sorting operation, even if the human 
sorter does not perceive it as such. In terms drawn from systems theory, non-
interception is the ‘unmarked side’ of all interception decisions.  
 
Respect for the ‘privacy’ of a letter is therefore a second-order effect of non-selection 
against a horizon of possibilities that include, at the extreme end, the potential for total 
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interception. The First World War illustrated this. One day, only some traffic was 
selected for interception, and the majority passed undisturbed. The next day, all postal 
traffic was halted and checked, with very little allowed to pass undisturbed. 
Tactically, total interception could not coincide with operational secrecy; the time 
demands and organisational commitments to secrecy made that impossible. The point 
is that the potential is always latent in the network.  
 
While the postal monopoly provided the technical precondition for the application of 
techniques that selected and processed intercepted letters, the symbolic meaning of 
those letters, that is, the ‘intelligence’ generated from interception, is conditioned by 
the discourse networks in which the political, moral, economic, or legal meaning of 
things unfolds. Interception commands are always issued in anticipation of 
something, but such anticipations are secondary to the techniques that select a letter 
for interception.  
 
Recalling Harold Innis, we could argue that the modern postal empire is one in which 
everyone is free to communicate by post, under the condition that the post is free to 
observe everyone’s communications. This is nothing more than a consequence of 
‘good government’. 
The danger emanating from the noise of the people was dispelled as soon as it 
was intercepted by a network that controlled, redirected, sorted, and calculated 
it, thus ensuring that its waves were not emitted at unanticipated speeds or in 
unanticipated directions.272 
The postal system, which takes letters very seriously, is indifferent to whether or not 
an item is intercepted on the way, provided that it is eventually delivered or its non-
delivery is accounted for. What makes the difference between interception and non-
interception are selection criteria that enter the postal system from outside, via the 
medium of the interception warrant.  
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3. Interception and Technical Media   
3.1 Introduction: the processor in the cage  
By 1898, the year that Henry James wrote In the Cage, the telegraph was already the 
most mundane and commonplace of the so-called ‘new’ media developed in the 
nineteenth century.273 The story turns on the observation of communication in transit, 
illustrating the relationship between electrical telegraphy and interception. In the first 
generation of telegraphic systems, interception was, at its most basic, simply a 
possible mode of observation inherent in the technical role that human bodies played 
in transforming alphabetic messages into informative electrical patterns, and back 
again.  
 
The central character is a young unnamed telegrapher, who sits alone in a glass dome 
within a wire telegraph cage at the back of a grocery shop. There she receives and 
sends telegrams, exchanging messages for money. The drama arises when, in a break 
with the normal operating protocols of her role, she appears to become the 
intermediary in a love affair that she believes is unfolding between a rich man and 
woman. The affair, it seems, is being conducted entirely via the telegram messages 
that the telegrapher sends and receives between them each day. The latent ambiguity 
in every thirty-four-word telegram, full of abbreviations and devoid of exposition, 
leaves ample room for imaginative interpretation. The drama is entirely contained 
within our protagonist’s own construction of events; in how she imagines the lives of 
these two characters, their pasts and their future plans, their mutual desire, all based 
upon the enigmatic correspondence that accumulates with each transmission.  
 
All the while, the telegrapher herself remains essentially invisible to the couple that 
she thinks she knows intimately. She is wired to the cage; a moving part in a bigger 
machine. Formally, she should be attuned only to the task of silently writing out text 
messages translated from the coded bursts of noise produced by the electric sounder, 
or passively reading the pencilled characters the customers jot out on the pre-printed 
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telegram forms provided as she ‘keys’ them out with the electric circuit-breaker. She 
processes telegrams endlessly; there is no end to what the machine must 
communicate. But as soon as she assigns meaning to the text that she discretely 
encodes and decodes, she implicitly differentiates herself from the medium and 
instead observes the results of her work, now as a second-order observer. She is no 
longer only transmitting; she is processing transmitted data for herself.  
 
In cybernetic terms, the young woman’s actions add to the trivial medium of the 
telegraph a non-trivial component. The telegraphic dispositif is ‘trivial’ in that it simply 
transforms text into coded pulses and back again. The ‘non-trivial’ element arises 
when she receives the throughput of the telegraph as an input for a different 
operation: meaningful composition. Messages continue to pass through the telegraph, 
unchanged and forgotten thanks to her training in Morse code, but when this 
particular couple’s messages arrive, she selects and copies them to her consciousness 
mind, and thus generates a story. Each message transforms the meaning of those that 
came before, adding a new dimension to the unfolding pattern that she recognises 
(incorrectly, as it transpires) to be a love affair. It is a secret observation that leaves the 
messages unchanged, a consequence of the fact that her technical capacity is essential 
to the operation of the telegraph, which could not transmit without her capacity to 
read, write, and follow commands in two languages, text and Morse code.  
 
For Henry James, this makes his unnamed telegrapher complicit in the process of 
authorship itself, composing stories from the raw data flowing in serial bursts through 
the wires and into her head.274 Hence, although she is wired to her cage, she occupies 
a privileged position, one that enables her alone to determine the meaning of the 
symbols she processes.   
3.1.1 Interception technology 
This chapter traces the relationship between successive generations of technical 
communication systems and interception techniques, with a particular empirical focus 
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on the practices and priorities of UK governmental agencies. It draws specifically from 
the distinctions that Friedrich Kittler’s theory of Medienwissenschaft derived from 
information theory: that all communication media can be assessed in terms of their 
storage, transmission, and processing capacities, and that these operations determine the 
possible understandings and symbolic assignations available to knowledge. All the 
elements required for the interception of communication are identifiable in the 
operations of every technical communication system, and these factors determine the 
spatial and temporal dimensions of the interception of communication, as well as the 
epistemic possibility of naming an operation as ‘interception’ in the first place.  
 
Transmission connects two points, perfectly reproducing information at both ends of 
the wire, but if observed otherwise, it also situates potential targets, spatially defined 
according to the addressing system of the network, and transparent to whomsoever 
can access the visibilities afforded by the transmission medium. Storage connects two 
moments in time, reproducing data for observation at a time chosen by whomsoever 
can access the memory facility. Processing involves the basic operations required to 
make it possible to interface between human senses and technical media, like the 
telegrapher in her cage who switches between Morse and alphabetic coding. But for 
interception there is something more: rather than simply translating data between two 
forms, it requires the capacity to respond to the data in a non-trivial manner, taking 
decisions on the basis of whatever coded symbolic values are observed in 
transmission or storage media. The techniques of ‘interception’ involve processing, 
i.e. performing a pre-configured selection program upon communication, in order to 
select certain messages for copying and further processing elsewhere. These 
parameters become clearer as they are applied across four distinct media domains: 
cables and telegrams, telephones, radio, and digital media.  
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3.2 Cables and telegrams  
3.2.1 Monopolising telegraphy 
Electrical telegraphy began on the railroads, allowing ‘signalmen’ down the line to 
know a train was coming before it arrived.275 The first telegraphic commercial 
messaging service in England began operating on 1st January 1848. Competing for 
business with the uniform penny post, the telegram was marketed as a command 
system for the instant delivery of urgent information and “a collecting service for 
economic and financial news.”276 It was deliberately portrayed in advertisements as a 
‘masculine’ medium, with a curt efficiency and lack of soul that rhetorically 
differentiated telegrams from the inherently ‘feminine’ form of letter writing, which 
was to be relegated to dealing with inefficient matters, like love and gossip and human 
emotion.277  
 
By the 1860s, telegraphy’s potential to transform communication had made it a long-
standing object of governmental attention. At the end of the decade legislation was 
used to compel the sale of all private telegraphic communications services, which each 
operated their own networks, to the government. Beforehand, the Electric Telegraph 
Company ran an unsuccessful campaign against the proposed legislation. According 
to one pamphlet printed in 1868:  
What is a telegram? Practically it is an open letter, the contents of which is 
known to and is capable of being used by everyone through whose hands it 
passes. Is it desirable that the most important part of correspondence of the 
country should pass through the hands and be subject to the surveillance of 
government officials?278  
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A good description, and a good question. It did not make a difference to the outcome. 
Private ownership constrained the connective potential of telegraphy. Different 
networks delivered telegrams only to points located within their own circuits. 
Submitting telegrams to government surveillance was a precondition of 
universalising the network. 
3.2.2 Tapping the line  
Contra Marshall McLuhan, the telegraph did not ‘extend’ human consciousness into 
the wires,279 rather, it incorporated the bodies and minds of telegraphers into its 
apparatus, and disseminated material symbols, not consciousness. It enabled the 
emergence of new discourse networks where it interfaced with other media systems: 
trains, canals, ports, banks, offices, and so on. Time was no longer indexed to the speed 
of postal riders.280  
 
Operations were determined spatially: at the cost of mental exhaustion and repetitive 
strain injury to arms and wrists, known as ‘telegraphic paralysis’, the telegraph 
enabled the instantaneous copying of data from one point in space to another. The 
elision of distance from communication depended on material connections between 
all points of the network. In telegraphic systems, electrical current ‘carries’ a message, 
but no singular ‘thing’ is transported, as in the postal system. The physical medium is 
the ‘connection’ itself. For customers and telegraphers, the wire, the electromagnetic 
switching ‘key’, and the printers and the sounders that it interconnected were mere 
instruments. From the perspective of media, the position of telegraphers and 
customers were assigned by the spatial dimensions described by the line itself, which 
determined the operations required to copy information from one point to another, 
using patterns made from the two possible states (on/off) of the electrical circuit.281  
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What later became known as ‘line-tapping’ (in respect of telephones) first occurred in 
England very soon after the nationalisation of commercial telegraphy in 1870. Once it 
was placed under control of the General Post Office (GPO), an extensive expansion of 
telegraph lines and stations took place, bringing lines to areas remote from the train 
lines and stations where the telegraph originated. Discontent arose amongst 
telegraphers in relation to their new working hours, conditions of employment, and 
long-term remuneration.282 In 1871, they sought to organise a strike. As they had no 
union at that time, the strike had to be secretly organised. The telegraphers used the 
network itself to plan a collective walkout at multiple sites across the network, 
creating a sudden and uncontrollable nationwide disruption to communication. But 
GPO managers learned of the plan.  
 
In an internal report to the Postmaster General, Frank Ives Scudamore (in a file now 
stored in the British Telecom (BT) archives)283 it was explained that the strike’s leaders 
were suspected to be based in the Liverpool and Bristol offices, but that they could not 
be precisely identified. Apparently, the organisers were careful to check the identity 
of the operator on the other end of the line before signalling any sensitive information. 
A memo on file states, 
A combination of telegraphy clerks in different parts of the country is more 
easy (sic) than a combination of Post Office Clerks or Letter Carriers in different 
parts of the country, because the Telegraph Clerks can communicate with each 
other so freely on a wire, no matter what its length may be, as if they were 
sitting face to face in the same room.284 
During daytime working hours the lines were too busy, and managerial supervision 
too intense, for conspiring on the lines. It was therefore at night that the management’s 
spies went to work somewhere on the lines. Where and with what apparatus they 
tapped the line was not relayed to the Postmaster General, who was informed only 
that “they can be watched in a manner which I will not here specify at intermediate 
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points.” Handwritten notes taken contemporaneously at the interception site 
recorded the circuits targeted, the dates and times, and brief summaries of intercepted 
exchanges. A subsequent letter to the Postmaster General confirmed that the leaders 
had been identified and dismissed. With full details of the planned strike on hand, 
contingency plans were put in place, with army telegraphers ready to step in and 
operate the Post Office system should the strike go ahead.  
 
In December 1971, the strike went ahead despite the dismissal of its leaders, and the 
army was ready for it. In order to ensure that army operators in position before the 
striking operators could react, Scudamore ordered that all press telegrams were to be 
delayed for several hours on the day the strike began. This delay in the reporting of 
the news caused a media outcry: it was taken as evidence of abuse of the new 
monopoly, a sinister form of press censorship resulting from governmental seizure of 
the means of telegraphic communication. In press reports of the strike that eventually 
were published, all recorded in the same file in the BT Archives, the secret tapping of 
the lines is not mentioned, but the delay in press telegrams is. The entire episode, 
apparently the first governmental line tap in Britain, appears in few historical 
accounts of the development of the postal system or telegraphy.285  
 
The security of a telegraphic transmission system was thus primarily conceived as a 
physical problem concerning the material network. Landlocked countries learned 
early on to assume that all messages sent and received via international telegraph lines 
were vulnerable to electrical interception by means of simple line extensions, which 
could be installed unobserved at any point beyond the geographical border of the 
territorial state. But effective line-tapping required synchronisation, or rather, a 
solution to the temporal problem of the asynchronous information relationship 
between the sender and the interceptor. Without some additional information 
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provided in advance that would allow one to correctly anticipate messages when 
manning a line-tap, an interceptor cannot anticipate when a discrete message will 
begin or end. Technical solutions to synchronisation problems emerged with the 
invention of automatic teleprinters in the 1920s, discussed below, but until then, 
‘interception’ had to be conducted elsewhere. 
3.2.3 Networked memory  
As Henry James showed, the notion of personal authorship linked to epistolary 
literacy was challenged by the enigmatic structures of telegrams, which standardised 
the value of all words as it mechanised their transmission. Whereas letters had been 
charged according to distance travelled until 1840, and by standard stamps thereafter, 
telegrams, transmitted serially on electrical circuits, were charged according to the 
number of words they contained, which approximated the transmission time each 
message took up on the line. At that point, says Kittler,  
minimum signs release maximum energy. Hermeneutic theories, with their 
notion of context, are inadequate to such a calculus… Once there are telegrams 
and postcards, style is no longer the man, but an economy of signs.286  
The individuality previously attributed to letter writers was absorbed by the technical 
standards of the medium, producing telegrams as a new form of depersonalised 
writing.287  
 
The standardised telegram, however, allowed for smooth integration with the 
standardised operations of the post-1840 postal service, particularly given the 
recently-imposed address system used for postal deliveries from 1856 onwards. As 
standardised forms, telegrams could be handled as if they were posted messages. The 
physical isomorphism of telegrams and postcards is no accident, the latter were based 
on the former.288 Both offered standardised textual message formats, calibrated for 
short and inexpensive communication.  
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The telegram was a versatile interface that could spatially extend the range of 
telegraphic communication beyond the physical parameters of wires and offices. As 
if it were a postcard, one could post a telegram message with an appropriate prepaid 
stamp at any street corner pillar-box. It would be collected, sorted with the rest of the 
mail, and sent to the sorting office’s telegraphy station for transmission to another 
Post Office telegraphy station. There, a copy of the telegram would be delivered to its 
final destination as part of the normal mail delivery routine. Alternatively, one could 
have an urgent telegram hand-delivered by a Post Office messenger boy anywhere in 
the country, sometimes within minutes of sending it. Customers could simultaneously 
send multiple copies of a single message to several receivers, simply by listing them 
and their local offices on the form and affixing the correct number of stamps.289 In 
short, telegrams, packets, letters, and postcards were treated as if they were the same 
thing: a message.  
 
To correspond via telegraphy, one had to enter information into the prescribe form of 
the telegram. At a telegraph office, customers wrote messages onto printed pro-forma 
telegrams, and received replies on the same forms, written, and later typed, by the 
operator. The paper telegram forms allowed operators to queue up messages for serial 
transmission, and this in turn enabled the functional division of labour and time in 
telegraph offices. Facing the public were those who received and gave out both 
messages and money, in the back were those who translated and transmitted them on 
the lines. The telegram form contained a grid of boxes, one for each word, allowing 
customers and clerks to keep track of the charge and emphasising the discontinuity 
inherent in a medium that translated words into money. The telegram form 
established the parameters for textual communication to conform to the requirements 
of wire and electricity, and functioned as a means of storing up and processing time.  
 
Telegrams also provided the telegraph system with an error checking function. Given 
that messages were charged per word, many people, particularly commercial users, 
relied on code books. They were most commonly used for economic efficiency rather 
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than secrecy. Some standardised codes were commercially published, others were 
specialised. They varied in length and complexity.290 Governments developed 
codebooks in order to communicate with ambassadors overseas.291 But because 
telegraphers were then using two codes – first, receiving text from customers written 
in nonsensical coded alphabetic text, then sending that as a Morse message, and 
perhaps receiving an equally nonsensical reply in Morse by return – they 
recommended repeating all coded messages back to the sender, in order to check for 
errors.292 This doubled the cost of transmission, but it ensured accuracy. Provided the 
code had decreased the overall word count by more than half, it remained cost-
effective. In order to conduct this error-checking, the paper forms and a ready supply 
of pencils were essential.  
 
In this way, paper messages provided the entire telegraph network with a non-human 
memory system distributed throughout the network. All transacted telegram 
messages, the sediment of past transmissions, were filed and stored in at least two 
locations, the telegraph office that had sent them, and the one that ultimately received 
them. In media-technical terms, the telegraph’s transmission protocols functioned by 
duplicating information. ‘Sender’ and ‘receiver’ exist where the information was 
processed into text and recorded on paper. Telegrams were stored in telegraph offices 
for a period of three months. Every day, new telegrams were filed and three-month 
old telegrams were destroyed.  
 
The memory system took on another function. The three-month archive provided the 
customer with insurance; it meant undetected errors could be checked and corrected 
later, and that stored messages could be retransmitted or copied to other addresses in 
the network. But at the same time, it served a police function, providing a window of 
time for the reconstruction of events and the tracing of links made by past interactions. 
To enter telegraphic communication was to be constituted as an entry in the storage 
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system of the GPO’s memory, configured according to the parameters of the telegram 
form, and this particular temporality of telegrams altered the possibilities of 
‘interception’. Postal interception techniques were performed in the sorting 
operations required between sending and delivery of all letters, and the line-tapping 
techniques deployed against the striking telegraphers in 1871 placed a parasitic ‘third’ 
listener on the line, but depended on perfect synchronicity and knowledge of which 
line to target. Telegrams, by contrast, afforded interception after the fact.  
 
In 1886, the Home Office obtained a legal officer’s opinion on the legality of 
interception of letters and telegrams. In approving the power, subject to the provision 
of an interception warrant from the Secretary of State, the legal officer observed that 
telegrams:  
do not merely multiply communications but remain for some time as a record 
in the Post Office which, if necessary can be collected during that time without 
the person whose telegrams are examined finding it out and taking alarm, as is 
the case where letters are detained or appear to have been opened. Again, 
telegrams can be identified more easily than letters – a certain man is known to 
have gone to a certain post office, it will be easy to find out the telegram he has 
read without disturbing other telegrams or even delaying the delivery of the 
message. It is obvious therefore that these telegrams in the Post Office 
constitute an immense resource for police investigation only if it is proper they 
should be used for this purpose.293  
In contemporary terms, the Post Office afford the Home Office a ‘back door’ into a 
storage facility, containing hundreds of thousands of discrete indexed units of 
already-processed ‘data at rest’. There was nothing to learn from the materiality of a 
telegram, in the way that one could study the unconscious signs visible in the 
materiality ascribed to letters, like the paper, the seal, the spread of ink, the signature 
and the handwriting. Nor was there anything personal about the messages 
themselves. All telegrams were designed to be identical, except in the spaces where 
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the ‘customer’ was differentiated by whatever variables they entered. An example of 
a telegram interception warrant found in the Home Office records in the National 
Archives, this one prepared on 12th January 1888, reads:  
Sir, I hereby decrie and authorize you to forward to this office copies of any 
telegrams which may during the last three months have been sent by Major 
Teufler to a person of the name of Lane, or to a person of the name of Edward, 
at Birmingham, London, or old Charlton; or to any person at Birmingham from 
the following telegraph offices.   
New Brompton, Kent  
Old Brompton, Kent  
Brompton Barracks, Chatham,   
Chatham,   
Rainham.294 
The delivery possibilities afforded by the telegraph system were directly transposed 
into new options for intercepting communication. Selection criteria referred to the 
addressing options used by the telegraph network: names, dates, addresses, and local 
telegraph offices. Warrants simply listed targeted names and listed the local telegraph 
offices where stored telegrams were to be checked for matches.  
 
A specially-assigned clerk at GPO headquarters received all such warrants from the 
Home Office and arranged for any relevant telegrams to be forwarded on to him 
(whether by courier, post, or re-transmission is unclear). The clerk signed his name on 
a cover letter, added the date of the relevant warrant, and sent the telegram on to the 
Home Office. Telegrams were copied at the Home Office onto standard pre-printed 
Post Office Telegram forms by hand,295 then returned to the Post Office and filed 
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alongside the warrant.296 (see figures 6 & 7) Warrants no longer only directed time-
pressured operations in postal sorting rooms, which were locked and secure spaces. 
Now, they were the condition under which telegrams could be accessed in the GPO’s 
memory. The time allowed for each message to be intercepted was of an order of 
months, rather than minutes. The symbolic positions of sender, receiver, and 
interceptor were confirmed in legislation. By section 20 of the Telegraph Act 1868, the 
privacy of telegrams was given protection in law analogous to the existing status of 
letters. Section 20 prohibited the disclosure of a telegram to anyone but the named 
sender or receiver, except where in the course of a postal worker’s ‘duty’, meaning 
under instructions from above.297 
3.2.4 Empire cables   
The first undersea cable was laid between France and England in 1851 and the first 
functional transatlantic cable was completed in 1866, eight years after the first 
unsuccessful attempt. The British led the way in submarine cable technology thanks 
to their monopoly over gutta percha, then the only available waterproof insulator, 
which they took from the jungles of their colonies in Sumatra, Malaya, and Borneo.298 
Gutta percha transformed the ocean from a technical problem into a vital asset that 
prevented line-tapping. From the 1870s, the British government invested heavily in 
international telegraph companies and regulated their operations via licensing 
conditions. Britain soon displacing Belgium as the hegemonic state in the International 
Telegraph Union.299 The global cable network was inseparable from British 
colonialism. State investment was driven by the desire to secure and connect up 
communication between sites of colonial rule and the metropolitan centre in 
London.300 Cable stations and cable routes were selected to achieve a balance between 
the social and the geographic with regards to “existing populations and infrastructure 
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and the affordances of an area’s natural and social topography”.301 The ‘Empire 
Cables’ became  
the cerebrospinal axis of our political system … through which would freely 
pass the sensory impressions and the motor impulses of the British people.302  
 
Cables were defended on several fronts. The Committee on Telegraphic 
Communication with India in 1891 contemplated the risk that a syndicate of foreign 
state powers could, under cover of commercial aliases, buy the shares of the Eastern 
Telegraph Company and thereby “alienate” it from the Empire.303 In response to this 
phantom financial threat, an ‘all-red line’ was devised an implemented, a submarine 
telegraph network controlled by the Empire and divorced from the market, which 
would land only on safe British shores.304 Its realisation became a “virtual fetish” for 
the Colonial Defence Committee.305  
 
Physical threats to undersea cables came from underwater topography, sea animals, 
earthquakes, ships’ anchors, and deliberate dragging and dredging by enemy vessels. 
Yet the positions that humans operated within the apparatus remained the critical 
point of maximum risk and, therefore, maximum security. Human-operated relays 
and junctions were necessary for the network to function. They had to be distributed 
around the network to operate relays, the locations of which was determined by the 
maximum distance possible to send a clear signal before the electrical resistance of the 
cable made the signals sent by artificial current indistinguishable from the electrical 
noise caused by the earth’s magnetic field. As such, human relay operators had to be 
produced according to the Empire’s standards. Cablemen were typically drawn from 
the metropolitan British middle classes. They trained at a specialised school in 
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Porthcurno, Cornwall, which now, in the age of fibre optics and digital processors, 
serves as a museum to the telegraphic age. Cornish locals provided the telegraphers 
with servants.  
 
Cable work was a form of imperial duty. Cablemen lived apart from local towns 
(assuming any were nearby), and typically reported feeling more connected “to a 
distant homeland and other cablemen instead of to local residents”, according to 
Starosielski. They inhabited: 
…a social structure that kept the men from becoming attached to specific 
locations; stabilized flows within the network; and prevented information, 
expertise, or resources from diffusing to individuals outside the cable colony.306  
They were discouraged from marriage, drinking met with disapproval, and any 
“improper language” or “quarrelling on the instrument” was strictly forbidden. 
Magazines and newsletters circulated to produce an “imagined cable community”, 
which also disciplined their work. Through the apparatus itself, individual errors in 
transmission were remotely tracked and recorded in order to evaluate their reliability 
as they passed ‘cablegram’ messages from station to station, servicing different 
circuits.307  
 
The physical protection of remote relay stations, some on uninhabited islands, entered 
naval and military planning. Cable routes and Royal Navy patrols were aligned. 
Redundancies were added to the network by linking stations in triangular fashion, so 
that the loss of no single station could disrupt the global network. Licencing 
conditions ensured that private cable operators complied with the requirements set 
by the Cables (Landing Rights) Committee of the Board of Trade. Cable huts were 
situated so as to be invisible from the sea, ideally in sheltered harbours, otherwise, 
“where there is a possibility for guns or rifles alone to make it defensible”.308 For the 
first generation of cable landing stations, geographical isolation was threatening, 
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because the station would be sited far from local garrisons and sources of food and 
water in case of attack or blockade.309  
 
As Starosielski shows, securing submarine cables from breaches, interception, and 
noise required a complex set of governmental strategies.310 The imaginary evaporation 
of space in the global communication systems of Empire resulted from the intense 
application of local colonial control, and the close scrutiny of all human interfaces with 
the undersea cables. The cables – critical elements in the production of globalised 
society – in turn produced globalised threats. According to the logic of liberal security, 
all such threats had to be anticipated and foreclosed. Transoceanic communication 
involved imperial property, at least until the development of wireless media. The 
entire network was therefore physically designed to restrict access to the machinery 
to those imperial subjects deemed worthy and reliable enough to enter its operations.  
3.2.5 International cable interception 
Mass interception of telegrams, known as ‘cable censorship’, began along with postal 
censorship on 2nd August 1914, days before the formal outbreak of the First World 
War. The primary aim in the beginning was to ban enemy diplomatic traffic altogether 
rather than to selectively intercept it. Censors were installed at London cable offices 
and in Porthcurno, Cornwall, which had by then become a relay hub for the world’s 
international submarine cables. The submarine network, according to an internal 
report prepared after the war, constituted “a single field which offers facilities for the 
use of circuitous routes apparently remote from the sphere of action.”311  
 
As with the postal system, censorship demonstrated the inherent interception 
capability of the network, and the labour required to do it. All telegrams processed at 
state or commercial telegram receiving stations and relay hubs around the world were 
checked according to the censorship protocols, with potentially useful telegrams 
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selected and passed on to naval intelligence for closer inspection. The initial rules for 
censors were: all languages other than English and French were banned, all diplomatic 
and private codes were banned (except those used in communication between allied 
or neutral governments and their diplomats abroad), all commercial codes were 
banned (they were gradually reintroduced, provided the codes were first registered 
and approved and thus transparent to government), and all commercial traffic was 
automatically delayed by up to forty-eight hours so as to diminish the utility of any 
secret messages smuggled through.312 To apply these protocols every message had to 
be checked and categorised. 
 
Censorship led to one of the most politically charged diplomatic incidents of the war. 
When war was formally declared (by telegram), a cable ship conducted Britain’s first 
offensive action. On the night of 5th August 1914, German submarine cables to the 
Azores, North America, Vigo, Tenerife, and Brest were dredged up and cut in the 
North Sea. Russia cut German overland cables to the east. By 1915, Germany was 
wholly dependent on longwave radio transmission for long-range international 
communication. Knowing the risks of radio interception, Germany used the 
ostensibly neutral Swedish embassy to smuggle encrypted messages via cable to its 
embassies in the Americas. The United States, still formally neutral, secretly agreed to 
bend its own rules against enciphered diplomatic traffic to allow Germany to send 
encrypted traffic via American channels. Britain controlled the relays from Europe to 
America, but the ruse worked. Swedish diplomatic traffic sent by cable was not 
checked by British censors as it was relayed through British cable stations. But when 
it emerged that the Netherlands, formally neutral, were providing Germany with 
imported materials to relieve the British naval blockade of German ports, the British 
began closely checking all cable traffic. The aim was to pressure neutral European 
countries into ceasing trade with Germany,313 but as an unexpected consequence, 
known German codes were spotted amongst what was supposedly Swedish 
diplomatic traffic. Initially, the British complained to the Swedish ambassador about 
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facilitating German communications, but then decided to treat it as a source of 
intelligence. On 16th January 1917, the ‘Zimmerman telegram’ was intercepted. 
Addressed to the Mexican government, it promised that if the Mexicans were to attack 
the United States in response to a US declaration of war against Germany, Mexico 
would eventually be rewarded with Texas, Arizona, and New Mexico. The telegram 
helped persuade President Wilson to declare war on Germany.314  
 
Commercially speaking, censorship was extremely profitable for the cable companies 
who had to enforced the rules. The general ban on private codes meant that the 
average number of words per message increased from twelve to twenty-one, and 
government communications via telegraph increased 327 per cent. To accommodate 
this, cable bandwidth was effectively requisitioned during the war, which further 
drove up prices for other users of what was effectively a monopoly. The backlog was 
such that to send a private telegram from London to Calcutta took around seventeen 
days in 1918,315 which ultimately incentivised telegraph companies to invest more 
seriously in radio technology as an alternative to cable routes for commercial traffic.316 
Additionally, it meant that governmental had to develop an intense and permanent 
interest not only in the security of the physical infrastructure of the network, but also 
in the economics of transmission.  
 
In a sense, cable censorship never ended but merely shifted in intensity and tactical 
aims. The Admiralty’s intelligence team known as ‘Room 40’ in the war was renamed 
Government Code & Cypher School (GC&CS). Control over the new organisation was 
transferred from the Navy to the Foreign Office. Publicly described as a new 
department for securing British governmental communications and codes, it was in 
fact tasked with five main functions. First, organising, developing, and coordinating 
the wireless interception and analysis of foreign communications from various 
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governmental sources across the Empire, which fed back information to the office in 
London via a dedicated network of secure telegraphic and, later, teleprinter links.317 
Second, receiving and processing radio and cable intercepts of international 
diplomatic correspondence passing between foreign countries. Third, processing and 
examining radio signals picked up from foreign armies and navies at a growing 
number of British radio receiving stations around the world. Fourth, helping develop 
and coordinate technical methods for detecting radio broadcasts from clandestine 
agents broadcasting from within the UK.318 Fifth, analysing intercepted commercial 
cable traffic.  
 
To this end, all commercial cable companies operating in Britain were required to 
continue handing over copies of all telegrams to Naval Intelligence each day for 
‘vetting’. On 16th December 1920, the President of Western Union, Newcomb Carlton, 
informed a US Senate subcommittee of the practice. Carlton said he had been told that 
the content of messages was not deciphered, and that the government simply wanted 
“to keep general track of who was cabling” in order to gain “an inkling of pending 
disorders”, connected with “Irish unrest” and “Bolshevik propaganda”.319 In 
response, the Official Secrets Act 1911 was quickly replaced by the Official Secrets Act 
1920. The Home Secretary immediately issued warrants under section 4 of the Act, 
which required telegraphic companies to continue providing their daily traffic, and to 
maintain official secrecy.   
 
In 1944, the first head of GC&CS, Alastair Denniston, wrote a brief, secret history of 
the organisation, first published is 1986. It is worth quoting at length:  
Throughout the twenty years (1919-39) it was our aim to make this procedure 
work smoothly with the companies (British and foreign). It was undoubtedly a 
nuisance for them to have to send all their traffic in sacks to an outside 
                                                
317 A. G. Denniston, ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’, in Codebreaking and 
Signals Intelligence, ed. Christopher Andrew (London: Frank Cass, 1986), 48–49. 
318 Ibid., 54–61. 
319 James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency (New York: Penguin, 1983), 
415–16. 
 125 
department, and I have always considered that the credit for smooth working 
and no questioning should go to Maine [H.C.S. Maine – his deputy]. To carry 
out the work of sorting and copying we took over a comparatively small body 
of GPO lower grade staff that were accustomed to this work. Our aim was to 
inconvenience the companies as little as possible, and throughout we tried to 
let them have their traffic back within twenty-four hours. We only had to sort 
out and copy government traffic and occasional suspicious characters in whom 
our security authorities were interested. I believe we never failed to return all 
the traffic, though many million telegrams must have passed through our 
hands… when the state of unrest in the world became intense, from 1935 
onwards, it was found that the ten days delay granted by the warrant became 
intolerable. Maine was able to cut it down to twenty-four to forty-eight hours 
in the case of foreign companies, and to instant service, where necessary, in the 
case of the CTO [Central Telegraph Office] and Cable and Wireless. Between 
us and the companies there has never been any question as to why we wanted 
the traffic and what we did with it. The warrant clearly said scrutiny, and the 
traffic arrived back apparently untouched within a few hours. I have no doubt 
that the managers and senior officials must have guessed the true answer, but 
I have never heard of any indiscretions through all the years with so many 
people involved. In short, barring the delay, we always had as good service of 
cables when we dealt direct with the companies as in the periods of 
censorship.320  
Interception was enacted by picking up sack loads of copied telegram forms in a van 
each day. Presumably, they were processed by hand according to lists of selection 
criteria. The secrecy of the so-called ‘cable-vetting’ arrangements was maintained 
until 21st February 1967, when journalist Chapman Pincher published a story under 
the headline, “Cable Vetting Sensation” in the Daily Express.321 Apparently, the 
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original warrants had not been updated in almost fifty years, and the Secretary of State 
responsible in 1967 was unaware of their existence when the story was published.322  
 
As it was domestically, so it was internationally. Interception of global cable traffic 
did not take place in the wires, but on paper. It was carried out by rifling through 
paper forms one at time, human processors visually selecting individual messages 
according to standardised content. Below, we shall see how cable media changed. 
3.3 Telephones 
3.3.1 Operators 
When the first telephone networks were installed by private companies in Britain 
beginning in 1877, a year after Alexander Graham Bell’s first call, it was less than a 
decade since the government’s compulsory purchase of all private telegraph 
networks. There was a sense that the government had overpaid for the monopoly, and 
little appetite for a repetition of the problem with telephones. But the governmental 
imperative to set the conditions of communication remained. Hence the Postmaster 
General simply asserted that a ‘telephone’ company and ‘telegraph’ company were 
the same thing, sending messages by wire apparatus. There was thus no significant 
legal distinction between the transmission of voice calls and the transmission of 
telegram messages, and therefore that the power of compulsory purchase in section 4 
of the Telegraph Act 1868 automatically applied.323 In Attorney-General v Edison 
Telephone Co of London Ltd (1880) LR 6 QBD 244, it was held that the GPO’s purchasing 
power:  
… was intended to confer powers and to impose duties upon companies 
established for the purpose of communicating information by the action of 
electricity upon wires, and absurd consequences would follow if the nature and 
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extent of those powers and duties were made dependent upon the means 
employed for the purpose of giving the information.324 
For the purposes of the Post Office monopoly, then, a telegram and phone call did the 
same thing: information transmission via electrical wire. Medium and messages 
coincided in the legal definition of the object under consideration. Britain’s telephone 
networks were first licensed by the GPO, then nationalised in 1910 (with the exception 
of Hull, which still has an independent network today).325  
 
In his study of the development of relay communication systems, Bernhard Siegert 
draws attention to the gendered distinctions that were built into technical networks. 
For technical reasons, a third person was required whose voices could not enter into 
telephonic communication as active subjects. Just as the typewriter replaced the 
traditional scribal functions of a trained male secretary or scrivener with the passive 
female typist, female telephone operators were assigned the passive role of lending 
their voices to the telephone company. To make a telephone connection, the operator 
was required, as Siegert observes, to renounce the ‘I’ of vocalised self-reference, to 
abandon the personal sovereign position of the Cartesian subject. Men, Siegert writes, 
were “complete and consistent failures” as switchboard operators. This he suggests 
should be understood as inability to relinquish ego, as men “continued to train for 
personal responsibility and the ability to appropriate language. Consequently, women 
became indispensable as third persons.” Their voices were chosen not only as a source 
of untapped labour, but also because only a feminine voice could occupy the 
depersonalised position of speaking on behalf of the switching equipment: “Operator. 
Number please.”326 And yet this depersonalised voice occupied the position of power 
over every connection she implemented. 
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The operator, like the telegrapher, occupies the invisible position assigned to the 
interceptor. The imaginary integration of the operator and the network disguised the 
governmental capacity built into the position she occupied. Switchboards enabled 
many thousands of possible end-to-end connections to be organised and monitored 
from the operator’s seat. Whereas the telegraph eliminated space in regards the 
transmission of typographic symbols, telephones eliminated space for oral 
communication, and whereas the telegraph charged per symbol, the telephone 
charged by dividing time into units.  
 
The point of a telephone network is that any handset can connect with any other, 
through a network of switching points that set up relay links between the two ends of 
the call. In order to have access to every call coming or going from a given telephone 
the interception point must be somewhere between that telephone and the first 
exchange switchboard. Before the domestic network was converted to automatic 
switching between 1958 and the late 1960s, callers who wished to dial outside their 
local area had to connect via an operator at their local exchange, which is where the 
tapper had to be. To ‘tap’ a telephone line is, electrically, the same thing as ‘tapping’ 
a telegraph cable. One simply connects a second line somewhere on the target’s circuit 
with an amplifier and media-specific receiver attached; for telephones, that is a 
speaker or headphones. An officer from the Post Office Investigations Branch perched 
next to the female operators in local telephone exchanges, plugging headphones into 
a jack on the switchboard in order to monitor the target’s call. This was the same 
technique used for telephone engineers to check for problems on a line, and perhaps 
gave rise to the clicking sounds that apparently indicated when a stranger was on the 
line. Operators processed calls, giving them the power to interrupt, to listen along, or 
to suddenly cut the connection.  
3.3.2 Audio storage  
Telephone tapping was barely utilised at all until recording technology advanced 
sufficiently. Tapping a telephone call as it occurs means constant careful listening even 
before anything interesting has occurred. When a call does come on the line, it is most 
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likely without context, and certainly without the opportunity for the interceptor to 
intervene in the conversation and perform the usual reciprocal error checking that 
conversations take for granted. There is too much uncertainty in telephone 
communication, too much capacity for surprise. It is too informative to be listened to 
and processed meaningfully at once. Like all aural media, the telephone “registers real 
sounds rather than translating them into phonemic equivalencies as an alphabet 
does”.327 One has to be prepared to listen along to the real sounds made by others. As 
McLuhan puts it, “the telephone demands complete participation, unlike the written 
and printed page”.328  
 
While the call is taking place, and only while the call is taking place, one must be ready 
to pay attention. If an unknown language or code is used, which was a simple matter 
to arrange, the call is incomprehensible. If a target’s call turns out to be completely 
unrelated to the reason for the interception, or made by another member of the 
household, the whole effort is wasted. Although early telephone networks required 
pre-booking lines in order to ensure they were available to connect particular long-
distance calls, one generally did not know in advance whether the calls one was about 
to hear would be interesting or not. The game was not worth the candle. Frederick 
Booth, an MI5 ‘special censorship’ men at the Post Office, who gave evidence 
regarding letter interception during the 1914 trial of Karl Gustav Ernst,329 recalled,  
The only method of recording the conversation was by handwriting. The 
results were not accurate or useful and the written returns showed increasingly 
the remark ‘Conversation in a foreign language – not understood.’330  
Not understood, or simply not worth the patience and mental effort required to 
understand.  
 
Intercepting telephone calls meant recording them. Reusable and reliable recording 
technology with sufficient fidelity to clearly record calls, which could be electrically 
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stopped and started automatically when a called was connected and disconnected, 
enabled the implementation of functionally plausible telephone ‘tapping’ procedures.  
 
The first home answering machines appeared in the late 1920s. One such machine, 
Recordaphone, was briefly available between 1927 and 1929, advertising itself as: 
The final link in the chain consisting of the Telephone, Telegraph, Wireless, 
Gramophone, and other means of transmitting the spoken word or sound. It is 
compact in design, simple to operate, and occupies no more space than a 
typewriter. It will record a telephone conversation between two or more 
persons, faithfully registering every inflection of the voices…331  
As all telephone circuits in Britain were property of the General Post Office, it was for 
the Post Office to decide which machines could be affixed to its lines.332 Recordaphone 
used wax cylinders, which proved to be less successful than anticipated. The 
Dictaphone Company ultimately emerged dominant, producing the first plastic 
recording cylinders in 1947, and magnetic tape recording systems shortly after. It was 
MI5’s Frederick Booth who made secret arrangements with the Dictaphone Company 
for procuring a dedicated recording system for recording telephone taps.333 By 1952, 
all local police stations in Britain were equipped with magnetic audiotape recorders 
for application to selected lines at the local exchange by Post Office engineers.334 
3.3.3 Centralising tapping 
When electromechanical exchange systems were replaced by electronic exchanges 
during the 1960s and 1970s, they were assembled so as to also enabled any telephone 
line on the network to be remotely selected for tapping. Rather than dispatching an 
investigator to the local exchange with headphones and a notepad, or a portable 
recording system with tapes that had to be regularly collected and replaced, the 
automated network directed signals on tapped lines to secure tapping locations, 
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where recording and transcribing could take place at a pace set by the interceptors, 
not their targets. As in the old electromechanical exchanges, each subscriber’s circuit 
joined the telephone network at a main distribution frame in their local exchange. The 
frames were standardised, each measuring ten by thirteen feet. They linked all 
incoming lines onto a grid of electronic contacts. Each contact point was assigned a 
sequentially determined telephone number. In order to intercept all calls on a given 
line, the interception point has to lie between the telephone receiver and the 
distribution frame, the last point through which every signal must pass when 
connected to a particular line. All distribution frames were located in secure GPO 
buildings, closed to the public and guarded.  
 
Investigation Branch engineers, who held the rank of Executive Engineers, would 
arrive early in the morning, before the bulk of staff had arrived to work. Their senior 
status meant they could direct any other workers present to leave while they 
completed their work.335 Tapping a line simply involved attaching a red jumper cable 
to a standard socket on the main distribution frame, where the target line connected 
to it. The jumper was practically unnoticeable amongst hundreds of criss-crossing 
wires. A red cable was used, as on every ‘special service’ line, as a warning sign to 
local telephone engineers not to disconnect it. Red jumper cables did not necessarily 
mean interception; many were put in place to indicate vital services that were not to 
be disconnected, such as doctors’ surgeries or business’s data services. But as all 
intercepted line installations were logged in each local exchange as ‘Defence Circuits’, 
it wasn’t hard to guess what they were for. While the subscriber’s circuit connected as 
usual across the distribution frame into the mechanical exchange unit that selected 
and connected circuits according to the number dialled, the interception cable carried 
the signal into a spare outgoing line. Each local exchange had at least twelve dedicated 
lines running via the national trunk lines to the centralised tapping centres in London. 
Interception capacity was built into the fabric of the telephone network.336 
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Telephone tapping became an ever-higher intelligence priority as encryption 
standards on telegraphic and wireless communications progressively improved 
throughout the Cold War.337 When the network was rebuilt, all MI5 lines ran to 
recording and transcription rooms located on the upper floors of Leconfield House, 
London, where a team of women transcribers, fluent in Russian, worked on producing 
typed highlights. An MI5 case officer on requesting a line tap would provide the 
Transcription Department with a written brief, detailing the sort of intelligence he 
thought might be obtained from the intercepted audio, then they then scanned the 
conversation for the passages corresponding to the brief. This they did by first 
randomly sampling acetate recording discs at various points, listening for clues that 
useful information was being discussed at that part of the recording. They marked the 
disc with chalk where there was something potentially useful to transcribe, then went 
back over the recording to make the transcription.338 By the 1970s, all tapped 
telephone lines were channelled into ‘Tinkerbell’, an anonymous-looking Post Office 
building that stood on Ebury Bridge Road, Chelsea. There, up to a thousand 
individual lines could be simultaneously intercepted. Computers filtered calls 
according to the particular number each target dialled, so as to eliminate trivial calls 
and only record potentially interesting connections.  
3.3.4 Metering  
It was also possible to produce an individual transcript of numbers called in order to 
identify networks of communicants. Ordinarily, telephone exchanges did not record 
the numbers dialled by each subscriber until digital exchanges were installed in the 
1980s and 1990s. Before then, bills were calculated via analogue meters at the local 
exchange, which automatically counted units of time that each line spent on outgoing 
calls. The meter was calibrated to advance at variable rates, mechanically adjusted 
according to the time of day and the distances implied by dialling codes. The meters 
were physically attached to distribution frames and arranged in a uniform grid. They 
were photographed on a quarterly basis in groups of a hundred. Each subscriber’s bill 
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was produced by magnifying the image and deducting the previous quarter’s meter 
reading from the new one in order to calculate the units owed.  
 
Occasionally, customers queried the accuracy of their bills, in which case a Meter 
Check Printer (MCP) was attached to their line. The MCP responded to the same 
electromechanical pulses that delivered call switching instructions. As an outgoing 
number was dialled, the MCP printed each digit, along with the time of day and 
duration of the call. The police and intelligence services used ‘metering’, without 
warrants, to monitor how a particular line was used without recording or listening to 
the content of calls. By converting calls into a textual list of numbers, MCPs recorded 
data on patterns of use that could be collated, compared, and analysed, providing 
second-order usage data for conducting telephone traffic analysis. Such techniques 
are now performed automatically by computer analysis of digital telephone 
metadata.339  
 
While the capacity to access the transmission of a telephone call was always inherent 
in the network – it was the operator’s function – interception always involves copying, 
and to that end synchronised recording media were required. Audio recording was, 
however, just an intermediate phase in the process. Transcription services were 
needed to turn recorded voices into text, and only then could it enter into the files 
through which human analysts processed intelligence information. That condition is 
only in recent years being supplanted by learning algorithms capable of recognising 
and automatically transcribing sound into text for the benefit of human operations. 
 
Yet however much planning is involved, the time required for taping and processing 
conversations is not always available. In Belfast during the conflict in Northern 
Ireland (1968-1998), a different regime applied in a tapping centre run by the Army 
from the top of the Post Office’s Churchill House.340 Dubbed the ‘hen house’, it was 
the place of work for around thirty local women, recruited by the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary. Collectively, the station permanently listened ‘live’ to the telephone 
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lines of targeted paramilitaries, politicians, and probably a few lawyers, journalists, 
and others, for information. The targets, who understood the capacities of the state, 
knew their telephones were probably being listened to. Small inflections, significant 
silences, unusual hints – these were the codes used, and knowledge of local accents 
and vernacular was essential.341 
 
3.4 Radio   
3.4.1 Common use of the ether 
Wireless technology emerged as the result of a haphazard process of trial and error. 
Various engineers, scientists and commercial inventors tried to turn observable 
electrical wave effects into composite artefacts that could be calibrated and patented. 
Of the many attempts, Marconi’s ‘black box’ was the most successful, and the most 
storied.342  
 
Artificially generated radio waves can be modulated into ordered sequence, and thus 
carry information on frequencies that otherwise carry undifferentiated noise, 
signifying nothing but the entropy of the universe as it slowly unfolds itself. 
Information is the superimposition of patterns onto radio waves. Almost from the 
beginning, problems of security and secrecy drove investment and research into 
wireless technology, driving intense interest in a range of possible interception and 
evasion strategies. It was not clear to the experimental pioneers of radio that 
electromagnetic waves could not be bent to human will, and that radio transmissions 
were necessarily open to all receivers.343 Attempts to impose end-to-end security onto 
transmissions to avoid interception drove the development of components that later 
found other uses.  
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Marconi’s early demonstrations of wireless telegraphy used spark transmitters and 
vertical antennas connected to basic ‘coherer’ receivers. Each ‘spark’ of the transmitter 
generated waves on multiple frequencies. The transmitter was used to broadcast 
damped radio waves in discrete bursts that mimicked on/off telegraphic cable 
signalling. But while the multiple resonance produced by spark transmitters allowed 
any un-tuned antenna in range to receive the signal, it had two major problems. First, 
super-positioning of waves of different frequencies meant that frequencies interfered 
with one another, limiting the overall transmission range. Second, just as any un-
tuned receiver could pick up the signal, anyone with an equally primitive transmitter 
could generate interference. Nonetheless, after successful demonstrations at Salisbury 
Plain in 1896 and 1897 and the Bristol Channel in 1897, Marconi attracted investment 
from the Army, Navy and War Office. Compared to cable, the possibility of mobile 
reception made wireless technology a worthwhile investment, particularly at sea. By 
1901, the year of Marconi’s first confirmed transatlantic broadcast, there were already 
around one hundred shore stations and around two hundred ships communicating 
by wireless telegraphy.344  
 
Secrecy and interception remained major concerns. First, syntonic harmony was held 
out as the answer. Syntony is harmonic resonance between the sender and receiver 
units; in short, it means that they are ‘tuned’ to the same wavelength. Tuning was 
initially developed with the express intention of eliminating both interference and 
interception.345 The idea was that two sets tuned to a predetermined frequency would 
effectively produce a secret channel. But a series of public demonstrations of 
Marconi’s syntonic technology soon demonstrated the opposite. Some were 
dramatically disrupted by rival radio entrepreneur Nevil Maskelyne, who 
embarrassed Marconi by beaming in a series of Morse code insults during one event. 
In another incident, Maskelyne set up a receiving aerial at Porthcurno, the cable hub 
of Empire, where the telegraphers were very grateful to receive live intercepted 
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updates on the progress of Marconi’s experimental transmitter at Poldhu, located a 
few miles up the Cornish coast.346 Maskelyne showed Marconi that the ‘airwaves’ 
were open. Anyone could jump in uninvited, whether transmitting or receiving. 
 
During the 1910s, generating and transmitting continuous syntonic waves over long 
range was almost prohibitively expensive. Longwave, as the low-frequency waves 
eventually became known, require transmission antennae commensurate to their 
wavelength, and must channel a large amount of electrical energy in order to transmit 
beyond the horizon. Shore stations could be supplied with sufficient electrical power, 
and giant antennae could be strung on pylons distributed across open spaces. This 
way, longwave signals could transmit over the horizon and across oceans. Ships, 
however, had a much more limited transmission range and therefore had to relay 
messages collaboratively on the open airwaves. Rudimentary rules and protocols 
were therefore required in order to bring order to the “common use of the ether”, 
which is indifferent to geopolitical differences.347  
 
Around the same time, audion valves were being configured to serve as both 
amplifiers and tuning oscillators in wireless sets. This triggered the mass production 
of cheap, small, and portable transmitters and receivers. Technology capable of 
sending and receiving signals over long range were suddenly affordable. Audion-
based ‘tube’ radios, able to clearly pick up relatively weak signals, were marketed as 
one-way units build only to receive signals, and broadcasting was born. Wireless 
telegraphy “transmuted into radio.”348 The audion tube materialised the fact that end-
to-end radio secrecy would never be established at the level of transmissions. Syntonic 
secrecy impossible, but in pursuing it, the capacity to ‘tune in’ was discovered. For 
radio systems, interception and reception are essentially identical: tuning hardware to 
oscillate syntonically in the presence of artificially generated electromagnetic waves 
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carrying information. Rather than damped discrete waves, communicative messages 
became encoded via modulations in amplitude (AM), and, later, frequency (FM). 
3.4.2 Juridical interception   
By 1908, radiotelegraphy had generated concern within the Post Office as to whether 
or not section 2 of the Post Office (Protection) Act 1884, which updated the 1868 
legislation criminalising interference with telegrams, was adequate. No change was 
made at that point; after all, the ‘thing’ that customers sent and received was still a 
Morse encoded telegram, regardless of whether transmission was via cable or 
wireless.349 Thus in English law, for a while, the definition of ‘telegram’ included both 
telephones and radio transmissions.  
 
With tuneable sets, frequencies were formally registered for different purposes, “just 
as a telegraphic address is registered”.350 Anyone tuning in to the same frequency 
would, within range, be able to receive the same signal. The regulation of frequencies 
and the establishment of rules for technical uniformity therefore became subject to 
governmental standards.351 Unlike carefully mapped nodes on cable networks, 
wireless transmission bears no relationship to geographical distinctions. There could 
be no territorially defined ‘all-red’ frequency. Some international co-ordination was 
necessary.  
 
At the third international radio conference, held in 1913 in London, state parties to the 
first International Radiotelegraphic Convention agreed that the wavelengths of 300m 
and 600m would be reserved for ship-to-shore and ship-to-ship communications for 
passing along “public correspondence”. 352 All ships and all shore stations of states 
party to the convention would be constantly ready to receive and relay transmissions 
on these wavelengths, and would ensure their shore stations were connected to 
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landline telegraph networks for onward transmission, regardless of the commercial 
company that initiated the transmission.353 Standard lists of stations, universal Morse 
call-signs, worldwide hours of operation, and financial arrangements for the costs of 
transmission were detailed. Wireless operators were placed on constant ‘listening 
watch’, transforming sea traffic into a distributed network of moving relay points in a 
global commercial transmission system. Any ship or ship’s owner that violated the 
Convention could face legal action. Ships hosting radiotelegraph operators from 
private communications companies, such as Marconi, became mobile telegram 
stations for passengers and police to communicate while in transit. The protocols 
enabled and accommodated a rapid growth in the volume of traffic; by the 1930s, 
radiotelegraph operators on different ships had to ‘queue up’ on their shared 
wavelengths, which constituted channels, each waiting for the chance to jump into the 
stream of traffic to transmit or receive their passengers’ correspondence to shore 
stations.   
 
The wireless ‘network’ was thus the effect of the protocols developed for the common 
use of radio wavelengths, fixed by international legal conventions. The law could not 
determine the status of the ether, so it instead determined juridical rules for operators. 
Licenses controlled access to the radio waves. Only licensed operators could 
participate in radio discourse, and only on the wavelength settings assigned them by 
the law. Licenses also distributed virtual addresses that referred not to any specified 
location or territory, but to the call-sign identity of the ship or station on the air. The 
legal convention was coupled to the technical operations of the network via the device 
of the license, which connected radio operators and their operations to the law. In the 
worldwide network of radio broadcast and reception, interception was produced as a 
purely juridical symbolic form, not a technical operation.  
 
This point was crystallised at the next ITU radio conference, held in Washington D.C. 
in 1927, by which point audion technology and the exponential growth in radio 
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enthusiasm saw contracting states introduce licensing systems for all radio operators, 
whether on ship or shore. Article 2 held: 
The holder of a license must undertake to preserve the secrecy of 
correspondence, both telegraphic and telephonic. Moreover, the license must 
provide that the interception of radioelectric correspondence other than that 
which their station is authorised to receive is forbidden, and that, where such 
correspondence is involuntarily received, it must not be reproduced in writing, 
communicated to others, or used for any purpose whatsoever.354 
When using an open channel for correspondence, the moment of interception was not 
when the equipment receives a signal, or when the operator became cognisant of its 
content, which was inevitable, and frequent. Through the lens of the Convention’s 
protocols, illicit interception had not occurred even if one had tuned to a wavelength 
outside the terms of one’s license, or had received information not addressed to one’s 
particular station. These were the legal preconditions of interception, but the primary 
act occurred at a media-technical level: writing down, communicating to others, or 
using information received under the proscribed conditions. In short, only when 
information was used could it be intercepted. 
 
Interception required policing, particularly in respect of salvage vessels, which 
occasionally were penalised for offering unsolicited assistance to ships that reported 
mechanical difficulties back to their owners or fleets.355 In effect, ships’ radio operators 
were prohibited from responding to other ships’ communication traffic. Only a ship’s 
master, usually the captain, could order a radio operator to disclose signals against 
his legal obligation not to, in which case the captain became legally liable for any 
violation. Absent that, every message not specifically addressed to the ship had to 
ignored. In short, when transmissions were open to all, what had to be secured by law 
was the right to store or process information.  
                                                
354 ‘International Radiotelegraph Convention of Washington, 1927 and General and Supplementary Regulations 
(Washington, 1927)’, accessed 8 April 2017, 
http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/4.39.43.en.100.pdf. 
355 ‘Radiotelegrams on Board Ships: Censorship Arrangements, Interceptions and Use of Radio-Telegrams by 
Salvage Vessels, Part 1 POST 30/2097’ 1928, BT Archives. 
 140 
 
The only exception was those transmissions prefixed by the letters ‘SOS’: the famous 
Morse sequence of dot-dot-dot, dash-dash-dash, dot-dot-dot. The SOS pattern is a 
strikingly obvious rhythm, it immediately grabs and ‘tunes in’ the conscious attention 
of otherwise disengaged radio operators. But at the same time, it has the juridical 
function of authorising the reception and disclosure of a message, and urgently 
responding to it. SOS suspends the interception norm by marking out universal 
emergency condition.  
 
Armies, navies, and state intelligence agencies, of course, recognised no limits on what 
signals they received, occupying the position of sovereign receivers and universal 
listeners who stored and processes as much as possible. Yet radiotelegraphy presented 
new opportunities for resisting governmental control. On the evening 8th May 1932, 
unknown persons came aboard the ship SS Reina del Pacifico, a Liverpool registered 
ship, while it was docked in the Chilean port of Arica. They handed the ship’s wireless 
office a typewritten message for transmission in Spanish and paid 205 Chilean pesos. 
As the ship was in port, transmission was not permitted, but the following morning 
the telegram was transmitted from sea at 10am, addressed to Ilo Receiving Station, 
Peru, on a wavelength of 700m. The message was noted on the log and filed away in 
the usual manner. On 14th May, the ship’s commander was notified that the vessel had 
been fined 500 Peruvian pounds. Unbeknownst to the wireless operators, who spoke 
no Spanish, they had transmitted a ‘Marconigram’ addressed to the “Commanders 
General, Trujillo, Peru, from Commander Jimenez”, giving them the signal to begin 
an armed insurrection: RISING UP HEALS OLD WOUNDS… THE HOUR IS 
DECISIVE FOR PRESENT AND FUTURE OF FATHERLAND. YOUR COMRADE 
EXPECTS ALL TO DO THEIR DUTY.356  
3.4.3 Shortwave  
By 1929, ostensibly to police radio regulations in light of developments in shortwave 
radio technology, new ‘interception stations’ were built. A GPO memorandum of 29th 
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February 1929 regarding a new interception hut at St Albans records that it was “for 
the purposes of ensuring that amateurs do not wander outside their allotted bands, 
and of detecting illicit transmitting stations”.357 However, the development of 
shortwave also meant that radio traffic from locations previously out of range could 
be intercepted and logged. Records of transmissions received at the St Albans 
interception station list signals picked up from various transmitters all around the 
world. The record-keepers scanned all available frequencies, noting time, language, 
signal types, and the likely location and topic of intercepted transmissions. Where 
possible they translated messages into English. As soon as shortwave radio became a 
functioning technology, monitoring became a standardised governmental practice.358  
 
Shortwave radio uses focused beam antennae to generate wavelengths under 100 
meters long. Signals in the shortwave band were discovered to reflect and refract from 
gases in the electrically charged band of the atmosphere known as the ionosphere. By 
‘skipping’ signals between the surface of the planet and the atmosphere, shortwave 
transmissions could connect opposite sides of the planet. Because energy from the sun 
heats the gases in the ionosphere, certain shortwave radio ‘links between fixed points 
are only available at certain times of day, and can be disrupted by bad weather. 
Improvements in engineering and predictive meteorological science helped make the 
system more reliable.  
 
By the late 1920s, the vast majority of commercial telegrams were sent via shortwave. 
Shortwave transmissions cost five per cent of the price of longwave transmissions, 
needed only two per cent of the electrical energy, and could be multiplexed to carry 
three times as much information. Radiotelephony, the two-way transmission of the 
voice by radio, became an expensive but practical service. Cable networks, by contrast, 
did not achieve the bandwidth required to transmit voice information until coaxial 
submarine cables replaced Victorian-era multicore cables after 1945. 
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It was apparent by the second half of the decade that the commercial undersea cable 
companies faced bankruptcy. They were too slow, too expensive, and unable to do 
anything to lower costs to match the prices offered by shortwave systems. The 
potential bankruptcy of commercial cable networks was perceived as a threat to 
Britain’s imperial security. The mathematicians of GC&CS had demonstrated by then 
that eventually, any encryption code could be broken. Transmitting coded signals on 
wireless would supply foreign government codebreakers with an ever-growing 
supply of material to work with. Regularly using codes on wireless exposed them to 
the world, and this inexorably eroded their reliability. Therefore, it was decided that 
all confidential and secret governmental communications were only to go via cable, 
which meant in turn that maintaining the cable infrastructure was critical to imperial 
power.  
 
The solution was to ensure that government could prop up the cable network, even if 
it meant operating the network at a loss. In 1927, the Sub-Committee on Competition 
between ‘Beam’ Wireless and Cable Services, part of the Committee on Imperial 
Defence, decided to create a ‘merger company’ that would immediately acquire all of 
Eastern Telegraph and Marconi’s shares, and a ‘communications company’ that 
would acquire all British communications assets. The two companies would have the 
same directors, of whom the British government would appoint two. No more than 
twenty-five per cent of shares would ever be owned by foreign interests, and an 
Imperial Communications Advisory Committee would supervise the whole 
operation. In 1929, the government founded Cable and Wireless.359  
 
Cable and Wireless cable stations across the world were equipped with shortwave 
radio receivers, mobile detector vans, long-range transmitters, radio direction finders, 
and dummy cables for would-be attackers to target. Operators were trained to report 
back anything of intelligence value that they came across in their postings, even when 
off duty in the local towns and cities. The new wireless telegraphy services 
incorporated the interface devices used in telegraphy: Teletype machines and 
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undulators were transferred directly from the Central Telegraph Office at St Martin’s 
Le Grand to the new ‘Empiradio’ receiving stations, with the same paper ‘slip’ being 
used to print off messages and glue them to telegram forms. As with cable networks, 
wireless messages were duplicated and retained.360 During the Second World War, 
Cable and Wireless was heavily interpolated with British intelligence agents from MI6 
and the British Communications Service. ‘C&W’ brought the entire 
telecommunication network of the British Empire together in a single cybernetic 
feedback loop that has persisted beyond the life of the company itself.361 The company 
was an extension of the intelligence apparatus of the Empire.362 
3.4.4 SIGINT, ELINT, COMINT 
Semantically meaningful messages between humans were only one effect of the 
information that can be ascribed to intercepted wireless media. Radio Direction 
Finding (D/F) opened up an entirely new set of possibilities. Like syntonic tuning, 
direction-finding emerged as a side-effect of the attempt to build secrecy into radio 
transmissions. In 1905, the Post Office began conducting experiments with the Bellini-
Tosi ‘directive wireless’ device. It was designed for directing radio waves in a narrow 
beam in a single direction, rather than in as radial emanations. By 1912, the device had 
been shown conclusively not to work for that purpose. Longwave radio transmitters 
of the time inevitably scattered their signals in all directions.  
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However, in 1914 a modified version of the Bellini-Tosi device was successfully 
deployed for a different function. Rather than altering transmitters, an inverted 
Bellini-Tosi device coupled to a receiver could successfully perform the inverse 
function: it pinpointed, to within a couple of degrees, the vector of an incoming radio 
transmission. This meant it could indicate the direction of a distant transmitter. 
Direction-finding apparatus was rapidly deployed at sea, enabling navigators to 
precisely fix their location relative to fixed D/F transmitters located at ports, 
lighthouses and along shorelines. Through basic triangulation, ships had constant 
access to their geographical location, even in heavy fog. Ever since, naval navigation 
has been based on artificially generated geographical referents. Radio waves became 
a medium for geometrically remapping the world and finding one’s place in it. 
 
Meanwhile, direction finders on land went to work “detecting irregular wireless 
installations”.363 As early as 1903, there were concerns about the use of private radio 
transmitters by foreign spies.364 When war began, the Defence Of the Realm Act 1914 
made it illegal to possess any wireless apparatus without express permission of the 
Postmaster General.365 Police confiscated or sealed up 2,500 licensed sets and 750 
unlicensed sets, using Bellini-Tosi detectors mounted on vans to locate transmitters.366 
But they missed some, and in the end it was amateur enthusiasts who had managed 
to keep hold of their sets that first alerted the authorities to the prevalence of openly 
available German naval traffic, enthusiastically passing on streams of coded messages 
they received.367 Navies in the First World War used sophisticated and specialised 
codebooks to transmit in Morse.368  The British began the war with only one official 
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interception station at Stockton. By the end of 1914, they had embarked on building a 
chain of ‘B’ stations along the coast from Shetland to Kent, in Ireland and Gibraltar, 
and were sending rudimentary mobile stations to the front-line trenches. The purpose 
of each station was not only to intercept communicative messages but also to 
triangulate using D/F techniques the shifting locations of enemy forces. Individual 
German ships were pinpointed as soon as they broke radio silence, and sometimes 
identified by the characteristic ‘fist’, the minute elements of style that, like 
handwriting, was bound to a particular operator.369 The materiality of transmission 
and reception took on strategic dimensions far beyond the value of the information 
they transmitted.  
 
Governments have remained on permanent ‘listening watch’ ever since. COMINT 
(communications intelligence) and ELINT (electronic intelligence) have been 
abbreviations for two distinct subsets of intelligence, grouped together under the 
abbreviation SIGINT. ‘Signals intelligence’ was driven by radio, and includes all 
dimensions of wireless media.370 ELINT was differentiated from COMINT when, for 
the first time, intelligence could be gleaned not only by interpreting a target’s use of 
communicative signs, but by measuring their position, movements, numbers, and 
other technical capabilities, and to seek to undermine their systems by remote 
technical countermeasures.371 In the case of traffic analysis, COMINT and ELINT are 
sometimes difficult to separate, because although the task is to log everything about a 
transmission except the content of the message, this is often more informative about 
the target’s intentions than the content. The addresses that commands originated from 
were more revealing than the data they contained.372 Indeed, it was only through the 
application of algebraic geometry to D/F based traffic analysis that produced cribs for 
GC&CS codebreakers at Bletchley Park to break into the meaning of the messages 
encrypted by the Enigma machine.373 The essential point is that new techniques for 
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using wireless media generated a new order of knowledge about the surface of the 
earth, and about the enemy. The data generated by targets was as revealing, if not 
more so, than the content of whatever messages they intended to relay.  
 
Hence command and control radio signals that had no communicative content were 
productively intercepted. German night-bombing during the Second World War, for 
instance, was conducted by beam radio navigation, enabling relative accuracy without 
any visual cues. The Knickebein-Verfahren system employed one narrow shortwave 
beam to guide pilots to their target, where an intersecting narrow beam triggered the 
release of bombs.374 During the course of the war, radio-based measures rapidly 
evolved. Both the ‘passive’ reception and directional pinpointing of radio emissions 
from enemy aircraft, submarines, and ground stations, as well as the ‘active’ use of 
radar to sweep the horizon with radio waves, in the air and on the ground, became 
increasingly important, as did jamming and other countermeasures.375 Wireless media 
turned the electromagnetic domain into its own scene of strategic and tactical 
escalations. Transmissions no longer had to carry meaning to be informative. 
Individual messages revealed tactical commands, but techniques of ‘traffic analysis’ 
revealed entire networks of strategic operations.  
 
In the twentieth century, the history of COMINT became the history of technical 
cryptography. Until the 1930s, cryptography was still based on addition and 
substitution, as it had been in ancient civilisations. When “a radio message to one was 
a message to all”, better methods were required.376 With ELINT, intelligence took a 
technoscientific turn. The mobilisation of electronic systems to detect, guide, map, 
disrupt, or otherwise seek strategic advantage introduced a dimension of scientific 
measurement and technical escalations into the dispositif of state security. Although 
the British Empire created Cable and Wireless to keep their most secret messages off 
the air, wireless transmissions were nonetheless essential for general governmental 
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and military purposes. At that point, the site of struggles over the strategic escalation 
of media technology and intercepted communication turned decisively towards 
cryptography.  
3.5 Digital media  
Between the 1920s and 1940s, developments in electromechanical transmission 
interfaces that converted alphabetic text into numerical code values led to the 
invention of automatic electromechanical cryptographic machines. Within a few 
years, Alan Turing’s work at Bletchley Park had defeated the machines and 
inaugurated artificial intelligence. At that point, the critical element in interception 
became neither access to material in transmission or storage forms, but how it was 
processed. Until mechanical encryption machines, all processing of intercepted 
material had been performed by humans. Humans took instructions, made selections, 
made copies, and subjected cryptography to cryptanalysis in order to read coded 
messages. By the end of the Second World War, this changed utterly.  
3.5.1 Mechanical coders   
For around the first seventy years of telegraphy, practically every telegraphic 
messaging system required an element of human processing. In order to send and 
relay messages, someone had to be ‘in the cage’, or perhaps operating a relay station 
on a remote island in the middle of the ocean.377 Mechanical instruments enabled this 
processing in different ways. The original Wheatstone and Cooke devices had ‘needle’ 
interfaces that had to be read visually. Some were relatively complex, with rotating 
indicators calibrated to move over a printed configuration of the entire alphabet of 
letters, plus a few key words, whereas others simply oscillated between a limited set 
of printed words relevant to railroad functions. Devices for marking strips of paper 
with incoming sequences of inked dots and dashes were in use before telegraphy 
became commercially popular, as were machines for punching out patterns on 
perforated ticker tape. But it transpired that telegraph operators were able to recognise 
the symbols coming through the apparatus without looking at the paper, instead they 
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simply listened to the steady rhythm of the mechanical printing armature as it was 
magnetised and de-magnetised by the incoming signal.  
 
Morse code is remarkably well adapted to human sensorial processing. The Morse 
alphabet is composed of different combinations of its basic elements, ‘dots’ and 
‘dashes’, with translations selected so that the most frequently-used letters (in English, 
at least) are the simplest elements to ‘key’ into Morse patterns. Because an electrical 
circuit has only two states, on or off, the basic elements of any code language in an 
electrical telegraph system must be signified using these system states. Human aural 
cognition benefits from durational coding of elements. The brain can clearly 
distinguish a shorter ‘dot’ from a longer ‘dash’. In the early printer-based systems, a 
clicking sound occurred when the circuit was closed, bringing the printing arm down 
on the paper, and again when it was opened and the arm sprang back up. The ‘slip’ 
paper moved at a steady pace under the armature. The difference between a dot and 
dash could be aurally determined by the time between each click. Two clicks with a 
short gap between them marked a dot on the page, two clicks with a longer gap 
marked a dash. Every other gap was a space between characters. When telegraphers 
realised they could decode incoming messages without looking at the ‘slip’ but simply 
by listening to the rhythm of the armature, electric buzzers were installed to make the 
task easier. Because Morse is binary, the possible variations in information are limited 
to two elements. In each fleeting silence, the brain need only expect one of two options 
to follow, a dot or dash. With training, one can process a message into written words, 
transcribing sentences faster than the conscious mind can reflect on their meaning.  
 
As long as human operators were needed, human senses and the brain’s ability to 
process information remained limiting factors on processing times. In large 
telegraphic hubs where multiple messages arrived simultaneously, machines were 
used to receive transmissions. Undulators reproduced telegraph signals as oscillating 
waveforms on paper, ticker-tape perforators spat out lines of binary coded slip paper, 
and ink printers marked out coded sequences on paper. But humans were still 
required to read the output and convert it into textual alphabetic language. 
Furthermore, even with rudimentary printers, senders and receivers had to be actively 
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synchronised in order to ensure that the start of a message was recognised as the start 
and the end recognised as the end. A separate circuit with a bell attached to signal the 
start of a message, for instance, was one useful synchronising device that alerted a 
human telegrapher to get the receiving apparatus ready for a new message. 
Otherwise, incoming messages would run into one another irretrievably. In short, 
error-free data transfer required some human means of temporal coordination, a 
governing reference point to maintain synchronicity.  
 
However, once typography and telegraphy had converted text into discrete and finite 
symbolic elements, machine processing became possible. During the 1920s, the need 
to synchronise human attention to the schedule of incoming messages changed with 
the development of the first Teletype machines. The crucial innovation involved 
solving the synchronisation problem. To this end, Teletype incorporated stop/start 
signalling, so that each discrete character was preceded by a START signal and 
followed by a STOP signal. START activated the receiving mechanism, and STOP 
halted it. STOP was essentially an inbuilt delay of a few carefully calibrated 
milliseconds, which stopped the entire printing mechanism long enough to ensure 
that the receiver had completed printing the previous character and stopped moving 
before allowing the next START signal to proceed. This meant that even if a sender 
typed in a message faster than the receiving printer could print it, it could not cause 
errors by jumbling the control signals. The STOP delay ensures each discrete 
movement of the printer mechanism is completed before the next can be activated.  
 
Whereas Morse used a two-bit code comprised of dots and dashes, an alternative 
system based on a five-key piano keyboard had been devised in 1870 by French 
telegraphic inventor Émile Baudot.378 By keying different combinations of the five 
elements, an operator indicated a letter or symbol. The International Telegraph 
Alphabet (No.2) code (ITA2) adapted this system for electromechanical Teletype 
systems. For instance, A = ZZAAA, B = ZAAZZ, C = AZZZA, and so on, where A and 
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Z represent switching between two electrical states.379 Each key also instructs the 
receiver to start, transform the next five switching operations into a key-value, print 
the character corresponding to the key-value, then stop printing. A letter is thus 
printed directly onto a page. Typewriters could be remotely twinned over cable 
connections, and global text messaging was invented.  
 
Teletype machines accelerated everything, and rapidly. In 1920, Morton and Krumm’s 
first machine ran at 40 characters per minute. By 1931, the Creed Model 7 ran at 400 
characters per minute; it was selected for use in the Post Office’s new Inland Telex 
service. Telex integrated telegraph circuits to the telephone exchange. From then on, 
Telex subscribers no longer needed to physically interact with the Post Office at all.  
They simply paid a subscription fee, installed the line and equipment, and were from 
then on able to send typed text to any other machine on the Telex network. Now the 
signals flowing through most commercial channels, by wire or wireless, were entirely 
insensible to human cognition and could only be converted into alphanumeric text by 
machines compatible with the ITA2 protocol. Teletype and Telex took human 
processing out of the telegraphic transmission process altogether. Telegraphy became 
a field for electrical engineers and statistical mathematicians, defining and refining 
coding languages for closed systems of data exchange.  
 
 
 The International Telegraph Alphabet 2. Pic: Ali Lokhandwala, CC licence 
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Automatic telegraphy meant that no special skills were required to operate radio 
interception stations, according to a letter to the Post Office from the Foreign Office.380 
In 1939, new Wireless Interception Stations were installed at Brora, Cupar, and St 
Albans in anticipation of war. The Post Office supplied telegraphers to operate the 
stations. Telegraphic messages arrived via wireless receivers, and “on tap” from cable 
circuits extended from the telegraph network. The apparatus included old-fashioned 
undulators and contemporary teleprinters, and the  
degree of skill called for, and the measure of responsibility involved, [were] 
considered to be no greater than apply in the case of Cable Rooms de rigueur.  
Seven officers were required for each station, working in shifts on handling incoming 
transmissions. A further five officers would carry out “scrutiny work”,  
…[Which] consists of scanning ‘dead’ telegrams and extracting certain of these 
in accordance with a prescribed list. A retentive memory is necessary to the 
performance of this duty which, owing to the large number of forms falling to 
be examined, has to be discharged at a fair speed. This work must, after some 
time, tend to become monotonous in character but it is of a purely routine 
nature and is not considered to call for any exceptional knowledge or skill… 
any telegrams sent to or by Foreign Governments… are easily distinguishable 
from other traffic by prefix and/or address. Accumulations of slip are 
examined very speedily as soon as opportunities offer, a very great percentage 
of the slip being of course discarded.381 
The wages were identical to those paid to ordinary commercial cable room staff in the 
GPO, because the techniques used were identical. In fact, one memo on file states, 
there would be less pressure to work quickly than in a commercial setting, and 
therefore the job was in one sense less onerous than the ordinary work of a 
telegrapher. On the other hand, there would be some new technical difficulties in 
tuning in, monitoring, and relaying wireless signals back to ‘Room 59’ (a codename 
for Government Code & Cypher School, which by then had relocated to Bletchley 
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Park). Aural processing of signals using headphones would be required where the 
intercepted radio signal was too weak for the apparatus to differentiate, with such 
signals noted by hand and forwarded to Room 59 by teleprinter.382 The automation of 
transmission systems put the interception officers in much the same role that cable 
censors had performed in the First World War, and would perform again in the Post 
Office during the second. They were to sort through all messages received on selected 
wavelengths, process the undulated or hole-punched ‘slip’ paper, identify the prefixes 
and addresses of the messages encoded in the signals, and compare those 
reconstituted messages against the listed selection criteria. If they found a particular 
format or addressee in a message, then they passed it on for cryptanalysis at Bletchley 
Park. 
3.5.2 Cryptological machines  
Automatic telegraphy produced automatic cryptography. As soon as typewriters 
gained the capacity to copy their output to distant printers, in addition to printing 
onto paper they simultaneously transmitted electrical patterns, signal elements of pre-
programed Teletype code. Hole-punched paper tape was soon added to Teletype 
machines in order to store patterned messages for automatic transmission. When fed 
into the receiver of an automatic teletypewriter, the patterns were read as a sequence 
of linear binary operations and transmitted automatically. In December 1917, when 
Teletype was still an experimental technology, an AT&T engineer named Gilbert 
Vernon realised that the patterned signal generated when typing a message into an 
automatic Teletype machine could be synchronised and added to a second signal, 
generated by another punched tape machine, this one containing random key 
characters. With each stroke of the keyboard, the assemblage would pull through and 
automatically add on a randomised key value. The output of the two characters 
combined could be transmitted as an encrypted signal, appearing completely random 
to anyone intercepting the transmission. Provided that an exact copy of the random 
string of text, i.e. the key, was correctly synchronised with the receiving teleprinter 
machine, then the random masking values would be automatically subtracted from 
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each incoming symbol so that a perfect copy of the original plaintext would be 
printed.383 This way, cryptography could be completely automated. Perfect secrecy 
was made available to parties who, for the first time, needed to have no knowledge 
whatsoever as to how the message was encrypted.  
 
The Telekryption machine that AT&T manufactured is, effectively, an 
electromechanical instantiation of a ‘one-time system’, the only theoretically 
unbreakable method of cryptography.384 The limiting factor is the production, 
distribution, and synchronisation of keys, which must be genuinely random and 
unique in order to be secure from cryptanalysis. Any duplication of a particular key 
would create repeated patterns, however obscure, and thus weaken the encryption of 
a message. Identical random key pairs cannot be mass-produced if they are to be truly 
random, and each key pair must be used only one time. Therefore, any agency 
utilising such a secrecy system must plan for and produce an equivalent number of 
random key pairs to the total number of encrypted transmissions they will need to 
make, and must distribute matching keys in advance to either end of each 
communication. In a complex network, in which communication cannot be perfectly 
predicted in advance, this is impossible.  But one-time systems work well when 
applied individually to fixed two-way channels, such as corresponding with a spy, 
linking up military headquarters to a particularly important bunker, or contacting two 
fixed diplomatic posts.385  
 
Based on a different approach, electromechanical code-wheel systems independently 
arrived during the 1920s. The most successful models were Hebern’s Electric Code 
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Machine in the US, the Swedish Hagelin M-209, and most famously, Arthur Scherbius 
and his German Geheimschrijfmachine, or Enigma machine.386 In each of these devices 
a series of combinatory rotors performed complex transformations that turned plain 
text into cipher text and back. The ‘key’ was the particular starting position of the rotor 
wheels, which was changed each day. Provided each setting was a randomly different 
from the previous setting, it was humanly impossible to solve the system before it 
changed again. As the rotors moved independently of one another, each individual 
letter input to the machine underwent a unique set of transformations. With Enigma, 
every cipher letter was the output of one of eight billion possible transformations. It 
was like a typewriter without an “unequivocal link between input and output… For 
the first time, hitting a letter key offered numerous combinatory surprises.”387 The 
British initially believed Enigma messages were unsolvable; and the Germans 
continued to believe it until after the war.  
 
However, Polish mathematicians had devised mechanisms capable of simulating the 
Enigma machine’s transformations, which they supplied to British intelligence. 
Because every Enigma setting produced a linear set of transformations – that is, each 
letter of cipher text corresponded to a single letter of plain text for each setting – it was 
mechanically possible to reverse the transitions, provided one had a good idea of what 
the original plain text words said. In other words, because Enigma was a machine, its 
mechanical transformation operations could be inverted. Doing so was structurally 
the same as designing any other discrete mathematical algorithm, the problem was 
performing the necessary steps sufficiently quickly to eliminate the incorrect 
combinations before the code settings changed again the next day. Alan Turing, who 
joined GC&CS on 4th September 1939, had a blueprint for a solution. The Enigma 
machine was defeated by simulators called Bombes, which electronically cycled 
through all possible encryption settings that could match intercepted code phrases to 
possible plain-text words. Once the machine found a pattern that matched coded 
letters to the assumed plain words, it stopped ‘working’, and its final configuration 
was the solution.  
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The Siemens Cryptwriter machine was more complex than Enigma, used only for 
sending and receiving top-secret signals from German high command. It worked on 
similar principles as the Telekryption machine described above.388 It was eventually 
defeated by the first programmable computer: fifteen hundred vacuum tubes 
arranged to operate as a matrix of two-state binary switches, named Colossus, capable 
of processing patterns much more quickly. Crucially, the Mark II version had the 
capacity to automatically switch programs on the basis of its own previous 
calculations, making ‘conditional jumps’ that determined the best way for the 
machine to arrive at a solution. Previously, the cryptanalysts’ job had been to enter 
possible encryption patterns for analysis, but Colossus could make those selections 
for itself better than the mathematicians. The programmable machine could sort, and 
discriminate between, different possible programs. Designed first as a theoretical 
flowchart in 1936,389 the Universal Turing Machine, or ‘universal discrete machine’, 
had been operationalised. 
 
A machine capable of seeking solutions for itself undid thirty years of technological 
progress in the pursuit of mechanical secrecy systems. As Kittler provocatively 
suggests, all that then remained for human spies was to create myths and legends to 
disguise the invention of the computer, and all of its radical processing advantages. 
During the war, a concerted disinformation campaign gave both Allied battlefield 
commanders and German generals alike the false impression that human ingenuity, 
not machines, had won the war, and this myth-making carried on until the truth about 
Turing and Colossus was eventually published during the 1970s and 80s.390  
3.5.3 Harvesting data  
After the war, technology and capital shifted across the Atlantic. Coaxial cables 
replaced the undersea network of copper-core cables, increasing the volume of data 
that could be transmitted following the introduction of automatic transmission 
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systems. By the mid-1960s, worldwide US armed forces alone were connected via the 
Defence Communications System, transmitting over a quarter of a million messages a 
day on over ten million miles of coaxial cables, with over two hundred relay stations 
connecting more than 1,500 tributary stations, employing over 30,000 men.391 As with 
the British empire, the US recognised that cables were inherently more secure than 
radio transmissions, and that their security depended upon hegemonic influence on 
the commercial companies building and operating the networks.392 Daniel Kahn, 
historian of cryptography, recounts that Strategic Air Command alone operated six 
networks, combining radio networks and hard-wired cables, partly leased from 
commercial operators, transmitting messages to nuclear-armed aircraft on constant 
alert.393 Integrating the military and intelligence services of allied nations was even 
more complicated. In order to produce a coherent and coordinated global military 
force, a global network for communications was essential. The speed of 
communications accelerated: supersonic aircraft and submarine ballistic missiles on 
permanent standby required a commensurate capacity to reliably send messages on 
the both sides.  
 
In the latter half of the twentieth century, the critical issue was not so much 
intercepting transmissions or devising storage media as being able to effectively 
process what was intercepted. The NSA was formed in 1949 as the United States’ 
international signals intelligence agency. From the beginning, it was tasked with 
intercepting communications and cryptanalysis. The agency rapidly grew in parallel 
to the computer industry. Between 1963 and 1973, for instance, the NSA grew its 
computing power by fifty per-cent and lowered its computing costs by twenty-five 
per cent, per annum.394 As an early explanatory paper in the NSA Technical Journal 
explained, a ‘computer’, a name formerly applied to people working arithmetically 
with pencil and paper, is fundamentally an electronic arithmetical machine. Any 
sequence of discrete operations in any order can be computationally performed. 
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Whereas a special-purpose machine had fixed functions and a single mode of logical 
organisation, digital computers can be programed to perform any set of sequential 
operations.395 Transmission and storage techniques evolved, while processing 
techniques began to depend less on solving codes than on programming computers 
to find solutions.  
 
At the first meeting of the NSA’s Crypto-Mathematics Institute in 1958, Howard 
Engstrom, deputy Director of the NSA and one of the buildings of the UNIVAC 
computer, explained that the cryptologist working on intercepted material  
no longer had a piece of paper delivered to him which contained some 
meaning, but had to plumb the depths of the atmosphere to extract his raw 
material… extracting information from the atmosphere around us by the use 
of all possible scientific means available.396  
Machine encryption, coupled with a vast increase in the number of radio signals 
available, made intelligence-gathering tasks progressively more complex to detect, 
filter, store, and process, all within an effective period of time. Selecting signals to 
collect and analyse became more complex because radio communication signals and 
command signals were hard to differentiate and both were encrypted, the latter being 
those addressed to machine operations rather than carrying informative intelligence. 
Throughout the 1950s, the largest part of interception ‘front end’ work was the manual 
task of translating Morse signals into alphanumeric characters for analysis. All 
intercept material was couriered back to Washington, often taking weeks to arrive, 
while interception stations around the world sent back overview summaries 
electrically.  
 
In 1957, the NSA created a Special Intercept Typewriter (SPIT), a modified Remington-
Rand Synchro-tape typewriter with special keys added for ‘tagging’ data, for instance, 
indicating call-signs or radio frequencies. The next generation of modified typewriter 
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included more tags referring to traffic data, like start-of-message and end-of-message, 
but more importantly added a perforated paper tape output. Tape could then be 
transmitted electrically into a remote processing computer.397 From that point on, all 
NSA operations, and the US SIGINT system generally, was driven by computer and 
network requirements.398  
 
Superior computing power became the essential element of NSA strategic planning. 
The first large-scale stored-program computer, the UNIVAC 1101, was built with 
secret assistance from NSA scientists. In the 1950s, a secret NSA project, LIGHTNING, 
funded the development of computer technology by corporations and academic 
researchers, including Norbert Wiener and John von Neumann.399  As a report on 
LIGHTNING from 1959 put it,  
So long as it is possible to have computing facilities in excess of what others 
may consider feasible, it behoves us to have them. Eventually we foresee that 
natural limitations on speed and size will be encountered, and then the 
inevitable advances of our opponents will corner us, so that the duel will 
become one of pure wits. But while we can we must maintain our superior 
weapons.400 
In 1959, the first digital ‘word spotter’ was developed, as described in an article in the 
NSA Technical Journal.401 The prototype could process 50,000 Teletype words per 
minute, up to a maximum 12-character word-length. Input was from different sources 
of serial Teletype data, initially limited to magnetic tape or paper punch-cards, with a 
perforated tape reader later added to the system.  
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In 1962, the NSA installed Harvest, which was then “the most sophisticated computer 
ever built… certainly the most advanced in the crypt community”.402 The conceptually 
unique system was originally proposed to the US government by IBM in 1955. Two 
were built, one for the NSA and one for the Atomic Energy Commission. The NSA’s 
version included logical input processing units specially designed for NSA 
operations. A magnetic tape handling system called Tractor selected from 160 stored 
cartridges, transferring data at 1,128,000 characters per second. The other is still 
classified It was the fastest processing machine in the world for at least a decade, still 
running ten years later in 1972, having progressively increased its capacity through 
developments in programming. Harvest ran its own code language, Alpha, designed 
to operate on “large masses” of data.403 The NSA continued to ensure it remained 
ahead of commercially available computing systems.404 
 
The NSA had the world’s largest collection of computers by the mid-1960s, in the 
United States and at field sites around the world. The average field officer “become a 
communications tape handler rather than a SIGINT analyst”.405 The aim was to 
differentiate computer processing from conceptual programming skill, so that 
computers could be made “conveniently accessible to users, who don’t really know 
much about what goes on down in the basement”.406 Ideally, they would interact only 
with a specially-designed ‘user environment’ interface. This meant decoupling human 
operatives from the need to understand or direct computation processes so that what 
the computer actually does and what the user can interact with are separate things. At 
around the same time, as Krajewski and Vismann note, Xerox was doing the same 
thing with the first commercial desktop computers:  
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Personifying the computer led to an incisive division between people and 
lawgivers, or, in computer terms, between users and programmers.407 
Cryptanalysts were turned into users because the machines they were to use were too 
complex, too expensive, and had to service too many users to allow anyone to simply 
interact with them at the level of programming. Networking, in turn, required 
regulations in order to implement shared access to processing time. At this point, 
unnoticed to most, computers began to take on the properties of the law, assigning 
subjects what data they were permitted to access. The machine had taken over the 
sovereign position of the sorter of data.408 
 
By the mid-1960s, NSA radio interception stations were equipped with automated 
collection systems, eliminating the need for radio officers to type out the signals they 
received. On-site computers filtered transmissions for keywords across a variety of 
signal types, triggering processing and forwarding routines automatically upon the 
recognition of high-interest text.409 As a senior cryptanalyst put it in 1972, 
We find ourselves today in the position of beginning to be a factory… I think 
one of the biggest developments was when the target countries began to use 
Teletype equipment and began to send their data electrically… which led to 
our being able to forward this data electrically. We are currently handling by 
electric circuits some [REDACTED] per day which come directly into the 
building and are handled automatically.410 
Whereas in the early days of computer cryptanalysis, all intercepted data had to be 
transferred onto machine-readable punch cards before it could be processed, the 
growth in Teletype data links around the world meant that signal-receiving hardware 
could directly interface with analytic computers. At that point, the targets did the 
input work for the interceptors. All sorting operations were performed internally in 
the NSA network. Interface equipment located in radio receiving stations and cable-
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tapping sites applied algorithmic selection criteria to the signals passing through, 
selecting some for forwarding to the mainframe analysis machines in Maryland, 
deleting the rest. Interception was effected via (relatively) smooth transfers from the 
target’s Teletype interface into the NSA’s computers, located “down in the basement” 
where not even the analyst ‘users’ could directly interact with them.  
 
The same applied to intercept officers stationed around the world listening for signals. 
Every NSA intercept officer became a key punch operator, and every stroke of the 
typewriter keyboard: 
produces an electrically forwardable signal which is sent to NSA and processed 
by computers. The feedback goes via reverse route such that in effect we are no 
longer a nice working team; we're a factory.411  
The factory’s input and output circuits stretched around the globe, feeding data back 
for processing. The long-term plan was for all NSA systems to be electronically 
connected by 1980, with users granted access to different computational processors 
according to their position and role. Intelligence would circulate fluidly around the 
world, permanently exchanging inputs and outputs across interfaces tailored to the 
human users who carried out instructions from the US government:  
I like to think of it in terms of a person working on a particular cipher system. 
He arrives in the building at eight o'clock in the morning and goes to a remote 
terminal… and twenty-nine messages appear on the screen of this cathode-ray 
tube. He decides what he needs to do with each message to get plain text and 
then he goes home.412 
3.5.4 Cable Analysis 
As military radio encryption systems advanced, targeting diplomatic and commercial 
cable traffic became increasingly important to western intelligence services.413 Soviet 
military and command signals were effectively unbreakable, thanks to machines like 
Telecipher, which transformed a single line of plain text into around two hundred 
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random letters. The only limit on the complexity of the cipher was the standard size 
of IBM paper used to feed random keys into the computer. Each Soviet 
communications encryption key was ‘one-time’, and never repeated. The Soviets sent 
Telecipher signals in a constantly modulating stream of data, twenty-four hours a day. 
This made it impossible to identify individual messages within the signals and to 
differentiate meaningful signals from ‘dummy’ data. Traffic data was masked, 
offering no way to determine the start, end, duration, or format of intercepted radio 
signals.414 Effectively, the Soviets had achieved communication secrecy. 
 
Hence the movement of money, markets, and third-party diplomatic communication 
along cables provided by telex and International Licensed Carriers (ILCs) became 
ever-more important, particularly market transactions concerning commodities like 
iron, steel and gas.415 Given the complexity of the communications environment, with 
a large number of possible cable and wireless transmission channels, the easiest way 
to gain access to communications was, as before, while they were ‘at rest’. This mean 
obtaining data directly from commercial companies.416 Both the NSA and GCHQ 
carried this out on a daily basis. By the time that cable vetting was exposed in 1967, 
GCHQ operated a similar or identical processing system based on NSA hardware.417  
By then, the London international data exchange was computer-controlled, based on 
a ferrite-core computer memory matrix capable of storing and processing around 
2,000 telegraphic characters at once.418 Any message stored in the exchange could be 
selected for inspection or editing. The system generated copies of all processed 
messages on magnetic tape and stored them for at least thirty days in case of queries, 
delays, or diagnostic reviews.419 The requirements to enable mass automated 
                                                
414 Ibid., 498–99. 
415 Ibid., 489. 
416 Thomas R. Johnson, American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book III: Retrenchment and 
Reform, 1972-1980, Excised & Declassified 2007 (National Security Agency: Center for Cryptological History, 
1998), 83, https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-
histories/assets/files/cold_war_iii.pdf. 
417 Moran, Classified, 143; Aldrich, GCHQ, 350. 
418 Renton, Telegraphy, 322. 
419 Ibid., 320–22. 
 163 
processing of daily cable traffic meant it was also readily available for processing by 
intelligence agencies.420  
 
The US cable collection program was called Operation Shamrock. Only a small 
number of NSA officers aware of it, and with the cable companies having no 
knowledge of what the messages were used for. Tapes were couriered to the NSA 
each day for processing.421 The Agency processed around 150,000 selected cable 
messages a month, the rest having been destroyed in the ‘burn bag’. In four hours, the 
Harvest computer could scan about seven million Teletype messages, searching for 
instances or combinations of around seven thousand keyword selectors.422 It was 
closed down when agency lawyers decided it was probably a violation of the US 
Constitution.423 Diplomatic traffic was automatically selected and forwarded for 
deciphering, all disregarded messages were put straight into the ‘burn bag’, while the 
computer was fed a constantly changing set of key word search terms used to analyse 
traffic for matches and patterns.  
 
Under the UKUSA pact, Britain and the US shared cable intercepts. Each agency had 
access to the miles of tape procured by the other, processing them through their word-
recognition computers. In addition to monitoring foreign state activity, the NSA used 
the data procured ‘incidentally’ through its cable analysis to populate the Minaret 
database, the name for the illegal US ‘blacklist’ of domestic political activists 
collaboratively compiled by the FBI, CIA, and NSA.424  
 
Since the end of the Second World War, GCHQ has been in some ways an appendage 
of the NSA. The ‘special relationship’ transfers technology and money into the 
interception apparatus of the UK. This is not the result of a particular Anglo-American 
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shared ‘culture’, but because one legacy of Britain’s Empire was control over critical 
junctions in world communication systems.425 
3.5.5 Extra-terrestrial interception 
As well as collecting cable messages from commercial companies, interception 
stations were geographically distributed around the world, located according to the 
channels they aimed at intercepting. Global commercial cable traffic was carried by 
both cables and radio waves. Cables were intercepted near shore landing sites, which 
were licensed by the Post Office,426 while radio receiving stations were located 
according to where shortwave channels were known to ‘bounce’ down from the 
ionosphere.427 At twelve radio sites in the UK, intercepted transmissions were 
automatically filtered and forwarded on to GCHQ headquarters in Cheltenham. At 
Cheltenham, the ILC Control Party used a large wall chart to coordinate all the 
receiving stations, so that if weather conditions meant that on occasion a station lost 
reception on an important route, such as Bucharest to Moscow, then extra coverage 
could be temporarily provided elsewhere.428 At 8-9 Palmer Street, London, a GCHQ 
station collected all radio messages in encrypted Teletype format to and from foreign 
embassies; later, the interception station moved to the Empress State Building near 
Earl’s Court. All embassy signals were sent to Cheltenham for analysis.429  
 
The first commercial communication relay satellites were successfully launched 
between 10th July 1962 and 21st January 1964. They relayed multichannel telephony 
and colour television channels on dedicated radio frequencies over the Atlantic, 
linking the US to the UK and France.430 By 1970, the second generation of INTELSAT 
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satellites was in place, providing global satellite telecommunications.431 By 1983, there 
were around 30,000 satellite communication channels in operation carrying telephone, 
telegraph, data streams, and television.432 As with shortwave in the 1920s, wireless 
transmission again outperformed the submarine cable network.  
 
Signals transmitted to earth from communication satellites rarely land entirely within 
the jurisdiction of a single state. Instead they illuminate large areas of the surface of 
the globe. Hence the international consortia that operate satellite systems devised 
frequency plans that assigned different baseband transmission frequencies to every 
governmental or commercial client using their satellites.433 The UK’s first fixed point 
earth station for sending and receiving satellite transmissions was built by the GPO in 
the early 1960s at Goonhilly Downs in Cornwall.  
 
In 1967, GCHQ completed a duplicate receiver station, sixty miles along the coast at 
Morwenstow. There, GCHQ collected all traffic on all frequency bands transmitted by 
communication satellites in range. Satellite signals can be differentiated according to 
the operating protocols of the networks they serve: a baseband frequency 
differentiates a country, a local area code designates a city or region, and a particular 
telephone or Telex number, as it was, identifies an individual address. Similar 
‘shadow stations’ were built in Cyprus and Hong Kong. The data received at each 
station was correlated, so NSA and GCHQ together covered both ends of any satellite 
communications, ensuring global coverage.434  
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435 
The flood of intercepted data that satellite interception produced exceeded all 
previous sources by several orders of magnitude. This presupposed the availability of 
digital filtering systems. The GCHQ word search program used for the purpose of 
sifting through satellite traffic was named Dictionary. It automatically combed the 
throughput of communications traffic for key phrases and words.436 Once again, the 
selection and processing of intercepted information is a mirror image of the 
computerised systems that organise, multiplex, transmit and decode communication 
in their ordinary course of transmission.437  
 
Unlike earlier transmission systems, satellite communications contained a mixture of 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ communications. The totality of satellite transmissions sent 
and received on the UK’s baseband frequency included communications with both 
‘ends’ located within the UK, as well as communications that transit international 
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boundaries.438 Consequently, there was concern within GCHQ about the legality of 
selecting transmissions on UK baseband frequencies, and about selecting UK 
telephone codes for bulk selection. Government legal advice was obtained, which 
apparently stated the practice was legal.439 Obtaining information about that advice is 
currently impossible, as legal advice is exempt from Freedom of Information requests 
and is not released to the National Archives, regardless of the question of ‘national 
security’ exemptions. What is most significant for our purposes is to note that with 
satellites, the territoriality of communication ceased to map neatly onto the 
geographical division of the planet into national units. Now, national territories had 
to be delineated, differentiated, and selected according to purely technical criteria: the 
numbers that indicated baseband frequencies, and the codes that indicated local and 
regional network zones.  
 
In the 1970s, interception hardware was launched into outer space. High frequency 
radio transmitters, designated as VHF, UHF, and microwaves, transmit narrow beams 
at high frequencies that are capable of much higher rates of data transfer than 
shortwave signals, and attract less interference. Such signals do not skip off the 
atmosphere but carry on in beyond the horizon, radiating into outer space.440 Line-of-
sight relays are required to intercept the beams and relay signals onwards, usually 
positioned no more than around forty kilometres apart. The Post Office Tower in 
central London, opened in 1964, is a conspicuous example. The use of high frequency 
relays meant that all such signals could be secretly intercepted from space. The US 
Rhyolite and the short-lived British Zircon projects were only the first generation of 
interception satellites, circling the globe in high synchronous orbits, ensuring 
collection occurred just above every horizon.441 They created an orbital network that 
still collects and relays communications traffic down to dedicated earth-stations, like 
                                                
438 Aldrich, GCHQ, 343–44. 
439 Hugh Lanning and Richard Norton-Taylor, A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-1991 (New Clarion, 1991), 69 I 
contacted Mr Norton-Taylor seeking further information, without success. 
440 Pascall and Withers, Commercial Satellite Communication, 4–5. 
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the radomes visible at Menwith Hill in Yorkshire.442 Similarly, high-frequency 
transmission can be intercepted by ground stations positioned anywhere in the line of 
sight of a transmitter dish. With a network of receivers located in Belfast and Derry in 
Northern Ireland, Anglesey in Wales, and Macclesfield, GCHQ collected all voice and 
data traffic passing over microwave communications circuits in the Republic of 
Ireland during the conflict in Northern Ireland.443 
3.5.6 The network of networks  
The Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) established the first 
operational packet-switching computer network, ARPANET, in 1969. Beginning with 
a small network of university computers in California, it was based on the TCP/IP 
protocol, which enables computers and local computer networks that use different 
languages to exchange data. ARPANET formed the basis of what became the 
internet.444 One of its first practical instantiations was the NSA’s Platform, a global 
packet-switched network that initially connected up to 125 NSA terminals on four 
host complexes, each connected by a Honeywell 316 Interface Message Processor 
(IMP: a precursor to contemporary internet servers). On the Platform system, 
intercepted data from computers processing communications from satellites, cable 
stations, radio stations, and telephone networks came together in a distributed 
network of networks, allowing data from any point in the global NSA network to be 
copied anywhere else. This enabled the analysis of bulk patterns of communication 
simultaneously derived from multiple media sources around the world. Intercepted 
data passing through the NSA network transited the same physical channels as the 
commercial data traffic that it was derived from, except NSA’s traffic was encrypted 
using a system codenamed ‘Blacker’, showing that the NSA always recognised packet-
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444 Although the Internet has many genealogies, see Roy Rosenzweig, ‘Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and 
Hackers: Writing the History of the Internet’, The American Historical Review 103, no. 5 (1998): 1530–52 and 
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switching networks are an inherently insecure medium, in which one’s intercepted 
data could potentially be intercepted by others.445  
 
As it did for the internet, the TCP/IP protocol gave the Platform network the inherent 
capacity to expand.446 The universality of the protocol is the critical element. As with 
the internet itself, it enables connectivity. The network can be expanded and 
individual components interchanged or upgraded. Platform set the scene for the 
complete digital integration of all NSA operations, and for digital connections to 
international partner networks. To do this, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) 
processes data into standardised packets and assigns them a metadata header. Each 
address on the network is assigned an address by the Internet Protocol address (IP), 
which then routes them to that address. Packets are transmitted individually via any 
available connection between intermediate servers on the network. The best path for 
each packet is heuristically decided independently at each intermediate server, based 
only on the best available route to the next available relay point. Rather than switching 
relays to form a connection between two end points, as in a telephone network, 
TCP/IP switches packets into available channels on the basis of their present capacity. 
It increases the overall efficiency of a network by maximising the use of its overall 
transmission capacity to find a route to the destination IP address. Transmission 
begins without certainty as to the eventual transmission route each packet shall take. 
If part of the network is damaged, packets are automatically re-routed via available 
channels until they reach their destination address; hence its appeal to defence 
planners contemplating nuclear war. Packets may not arrive in serial sequence, as 
each has potentially taken a different route to the destination, so they are buffered, 
collated, and then reassembled in their original file format according to TCP at the 
destination IP address. Collectively, each message that is sent between two IP 
                                                
445 NSA, ‘The PLATFORM Network Evolution’, Cryptologic Quarterly, 1989, https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-quarterly/assets/files/The_PLATFORM_Network_Evolution.pdf. 
446 Johnson, American Cryptology III 1972-1980, 1998, 155. 
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addresses is relayed via a large number of independent ‘micro-decisions’ regarding 
each packet at each intermediate server.447  
 
Military and SIGINT circuits therefore populated the datalinks of the early internet 
before other forms of traffic, and they still do. Military, governmental, and civilian 
traffic share the same channels. This was the case even prior to packet-switched 
networks. In the United States and globally, some specific physical links are of course 
reserved exclusively for military or government purposes, but strategically, relying 
exclusively on a totally separate infrastructure is risky, as dedicated channels are 
obvious targets for disruption. The more lines are potentially available, the lower the 
risk of losing communication capabilities. Defence circuits are therefore deliberately 
integrated into civil communication infrastructure. As Hu puts it, any particular ‘type’ 
of network on the internet, from military circuits to cloud services, should be viewed 
as “a logical overlay, rather than a physical thing; it is a process, not a static 
moment”.448 Symbolically, the internet has always been a military installation, but no 
more so than it is a university installation, a commercial installation; a general purpose 
infrastructural medium that can be observed as mediating differentiated 
communication, none of which determine it.449  
3.5.7 Collect it all 
IP addresses are like postal addresses, they define the position of operations in the 
network, nothing more. The symbolic instantiation of meaning to those nodes 
depends on other techniques. ‘Users’, the position assigned to subjects (including both 
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humans and intelligent machines), are bound to IP addresses via other indexes, 
primarily the databases compiled by Internet Service Provider companies. Those 
records convert IP addresses into human subjects, who are tied to their machine 
addresses using cryptographic authentication software.450 Hence there is a 
genealogical link from interception techniques, via cryptography, computer 
processing, and computer networking, back to interception techniques performed on 
the data of internet ‘users’ today. Whereas the NSA aims to “collect it all”,451 the ‘it’ 
refers to operations that are in part derived from its own past operations. The internet 
was intercepted in advance.  
 
The software programs and hardware used to intercept internet communication as 
described in the Snowden archive are not addressed here. They exceed the scope of 
this genealogy, and requires a more thorough exposition than can be accommodated. 
However, it is instructive to briefly consider how elements of the genealogy presented 
above converge. At the transmission level, interception is possible in the ‘micro-
decisions’ taken at each server. Just as every Internet server is required to inspect the 
destination IP address of each packet it receives, it is equally possible a server to 
conduct ‘deep packet inspection’ on the traffic it processes. Such packet inspection is 
openly used in some markets, for instance where commercial Internet Service 
Providers offer their subscribers priority speeds on certain types of traffic. For 
instance, a company may prioritise the transmission of data packets carrying a live 
‘stream’ of certain sports broadcasts, at the expense of other packets.452  
 
If a particular server is equipped with sufficient specialised hardware to temporarily 
buffer (i.e., copy) all traffic, analyse the packets for key selector terms, and copy all 
selected packets to a storage and processing system elsewhere, then it can effectively 
intercept all internet traffic. The micro-decisions performed in each server of the 
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internet afford the opportunity to apply interception decisions. This undermines in 
advance “the dreamlike promise of a democratizing Internet” as an inherently open, 
architecturally democratic system.453 As Florian Sprenger puts it:  
The extent of the subsequent automated surveillance is an effect of the 
architecture of digital networks. The place of decision-making during the time 
of interruption is the main gateways at which the necessary act of control is 
placed side-by-side with the act of surveillance.454  
Both GCHQ and NSA apply this principle at points where submarine fibre optic 
cables come ashore, forming bottlenecks through which international internet traffic 
must pass. Fibre optic cables have reclaimed superiority from radio waves, facilitating 
an exponential growth in world communication.455 The genealogy presented above 
reminds us that the data being intercepted and copied from the packet-switching 
internet is forwarded into another packet-switching network, the NSA-GCHQ global 
network that predates the public internet.456 This ‘upstream’ collection carries on the 
inheritance of constant radio-watch and automated cable and satellite ‘taps’. Hence 
within the internet, digital media intercept digital media. Intercepted packets flow 
past non-intercepted packets indifferently, their symbolic status to be determined at 
their destination. It just depends on gaining access to enough servers, bearers, or 
devices to ensure one has enough ‘coverage’ to intercept and re-assemble meaningful 
files that have been broken down and dispersed during transmission.   
 
Nonetheless, intercepting data in transmission on the internet is as demanding on 
resources as it was in the era of the telephone. It remains easier to obtain data ‘at rest’, 
just as it was easier to collect telegrams, record phone calls, or obtain magnetic tapes. 
One of the biggest controversies arising from the Snowden documents was the 
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existence of the NSA’s PRISM system, through which major internet service providers 
granted access to user’s data: stored, processed and profiled.457 ‘Users’ are 
preconfigured for interception. At scale, the semantic content of messages becomes 
irrelevant when compared to the information generated by observing patterns 
‘mined’ from datasets.458 
3.6 Conclusion 
According to the theory of cultural techniques, media condition the transmission, 
storage, and processing of information. The techniques by which they perform these 
operations define their agency. The way that things can be handled is predetermined 
before any wilful subject claims control over them. In this chapter, organised 
interception, which began with the postal service and continued across new technical 
media, is the outcome of a radically different array of techniques performed through 
different technical media. In a chain of substitutions in which one medium displaced 
or replaced another, the role assigned to persons in the interception of communication 
disappeared. Now, human analysts who are nominally making decisions about 
interception work from carefully designed user interfaces.459 Different media and 
prescribed different interception techniques, which like media themselves, either 
replaced older media and techniques, or existed diachronically alongside them.  
 
With the emergence and implementation of digital media, however, interception has 
slowly become fully automated. Where cultural techniques are performed through 
persons and bodies, the cultural techniques of the law functioned to assign subjective 
action to the person executing the technique. But where techniques are performed by 
media and therefore executed independently of bodies, they are formalised as rules, 
directions, instructions, and other symbolic means of applying rules in order to 
explain and assign subjective responsibility.460  
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At the media-technical level, all interception techniques surveyed in this chapter are 
performed at defined spatio-temporal points of privileged access. Communication 
operations, through which a ‘sender’ and ‘receiver’ appear to exchange information 
across space or time, are themselves generated from the operations of transfer media, 
symbolically articulated through techniques by which each assumes their position in 
relation to the message. Media transfer information regardless, and in so doing they 
designate both ‘ends’ of the communication. The poles of each transfer operation do 
not pre-exist the transfer operation itself. Hence interceptors, too, are assigned their 
roles by transfer operations. Their position is the one from which all communication 
can be selected. Intended receivers, by contrast, are assigned their position by each 
communication operation.  
 
The distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate act of interception is 
symbolically designated by the normative order of law, which assumes that 
interception is the result of the will of one subject who wishes to know the 
communications of another without that information being visible to the other. As 
demonstrated by the prohibition of interference with telegrams in the absence of a 
warrant, and the prohibition on acting on radio signals addressed to someone else, 
there is nothing in the transfer operation itself that discriminates between legitimate 
and illegitimate interceptors. Materially speaking, they are exactly the same. 
Addressing translates the physical nodes in networks of metal wires, radio waves, or 
optically connected interconnected servers into the symbolic domain of alphabetic text 
and thereby into the domain of law and subjects. But addressing does not determine 
or exhaust the possible operations of the network. For an interceptor, all addresses in 
a network are universally accessible. Hence the data used to address communication 
to a specific point in a network is reconstituted as the data required to secretly select 
information from the network medium for copying. Addresses function as commands 
carried in interception warrants and executed by interceptors. 
 
The interceptor is thus the one who occupies the position of sovereign observer who 
sorts data, which is a position assigned by the medium itself. The ‘sovereign’ position 
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is used here figuratively, indicating whatever agent occupies a technically “privileged 
position of observation and intervention”.461 Sovereignty in relation to 
communication media is the position that the interceptor must occupy, a position 
derived from the medium itself, which determines the capacity to process 
information. The role of governments in legislating for interception has been to ensure 
that they have access to that position in relation to each medium at stake, and to ensure 
that others are relegated to the positions of ‘sender and receiver’, or ‘user’, who must 
communicate through the interface available to them and accept the risk of 
interception.  
 
When humans are out of the picture and all communication and interception is 
automated, media are sovereign. Media intercept media. All that is required is a 
quantum of information issued by the ‘user’ of the digital command system to send 
instructions to the sovereign-interceptor system, which executes its instructions in the 
form of a ‘conditional jump’. An IF-THEN command instructs a processor, whether 
human, mechanical, fibre optic, or silicon, to make a coded selection among the data 
it is processing. It copies the selected element and returns the copy for further 
processing, while releasing the original element to complete its transmission circuit.  
 
Controlling access to the symbolic position of the interceptor-sovereign is a long-
standing function of the law, which claims the right to define the media that transfer 
the data required to make ‘conditional jumps’; that is, to make selections from the 
privileged position of interception. That data is transferred through the making of 
legal media named warrants, to which we now turn. 
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4. Programming Warrants  
4.1  Introduction: execution 
Since 1710, the British state has used warrants to direct interception. In 1710, 
legislation concerning the Post Office made it an offence to interfere with the post, 
except pursuant to an express warrant made under the hand of the Secretary of State. 
Since then, it has been a criminal offence to interfere with communication other than 
where authorised to do so by a Secretary’s warrant.  
 
Warrants are typically understood to be legal tools used for administering political 
power. A warrant legally authorises its addressee to do something that, but for the 
warrant, would be illegal. Where a warrant commands the searching of premises, or 
the arrest of a suspect, it authorises the bearer to do something to a third party. Its 
target is the object of administrative power; the warrant transforms its addressee into 
its agent. A warrant may be seen as a way of transmitting or extending power, giving 
a longer reach to the command of the authorising authority by recruiting its addressee 
to perform the task. In this sense, it acts as an instrument, a medium for the extension 
of the sovereign’s will, voice, or presence, allowing the power inherent in the 
sovereign, whether that be a person or an office, to extend beyond their immediate 
locus.  
 
Warrants do not merely authorise actions, however. There is an imperative: the 
warrant’s command must be performed. It is wrapped up in the official status of its 
addressee. For instance, a police officer does not arrest a suspect under a warrant as 
an optional exercise of delegated authority, but because it is their duty to do so. It is 
inherent in the official status that they hold. In this sense, the addressee of a warrant 
must obey it; the instructions that it delivers must be executed. 
 
Warrants command their own execution. It is no coincidence that the word ‘execution’ 
is the term used in computer science for performing the instructions contained in a 
program of commands. The ability to enter different conditional programs into a 
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warrant is one reason for the durability of the form as a symbol of legal authority. In 
their execution, warrants define and order operations according to the terms of their 
programming. In relation to interception warrants, the symbolic role of the Secretary 
of State as the authorising authority is programmed into the device. She appears to 
command the interception of communications, regardless of what operational steps 
‘interception’ involves. The old juridical schema of sovereign power is repeated in the 
programs of warrants, and the law in turn has confirmed this symbolic authority 
through its own programs, as shown in chapter five. But that is only an effect of how 
the warrant is programmed. This chapter decompiles the warrant to present a 
genealogical account of their making. 
4.2 Medieval warrants  
Warrants belong to a sort of primal scene in the history of written legal culture in 
England. During the reign of Edward I (1239 – 1307), a survey was made of holdings 
of the nobility, asking by what warrant (quo warranto) they held their franchises and 
privileged jurisdictions. If they could not trace their claim to a documentary source, it 
would not be recognised by the King. The word ‘warrant’ comes to the English 
language from the French ‘warrant’ or ‘warand’, a regional variation on ‘garant’. For 
a while, it was commonly used generally to signify a guarantee, protection, defence, a 
place of refuge, or taking safeguards,462 and the time of the quo warranto hearings, 
‘warrant’ did not specifically refer to a particular species of document, but what 
documents could do.  
 
The documentary form typically used in the thirteenth century for granting and 
proving legal title was a charter, typically obtained from the Chancery by donors 
passing title to a beneficiary. Charters were not addressed to the beneficiary directly 
but to an undetermined future readership, for example, to “those whom the present 
writing shall reach”.463 Legal rights began as specific grants. Charters awarding titles 
and privileges had long been the mechanism of rule for Germanic and Anglo-Saxon 
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kings.464 Although some pre-date the Norman conquest of 1066, by the thirteenth 
century they had become the only recognised form of legal title, and tens of thousands 
of charters were issued. For Clanchy, Edward I’s quo warranto prosecutions mark the 
differentiation point between a law that recognised oral or object-based claims, and a 
law that recognised only documentary claims.465 During the trials, the following was 
said to have occurred.   
[The] Earl Warenne was called before the King’s judges. Asked by what 
warrant he held, he produced in their midst an ancient and rusty sword and 
said: “Look at this, my lords, this is my warrant! For my ancestors came with 
William the Bastard and conquered their lands with the sword, and by the 
sword I will defend them from anyone intending to seize them”.466  
Clanchy observes that the survival of the story in legend is itself reflective of the fact 
that, at the time, an oral culture of memory and law was being supplanted by the 
centralisation of legal authority under the King.467 Until the quo warranto trials, objects 
including swords, knives, and cups had indeed served to materialise titles to property, 
in some cases such artefacts were physically attached to charters. Regardless of what 
actually unfolded, Clanchy claims that the Earl Warenne story serves to memorialise 
both the injustice of undocumented legal titles being seized, and to simultaneously 
mourn the loss of oral culture in itself. And indeed, in 1290 the King compromised on 
quo warranto, passing a statute stating that charters were only required to authenticate 
legal title transfers post-dating the accession of Richard I in 1189. That somewhat 
arbitrary date, which remained significant in English land law for centuries 
thereafter,468 marks the point from which all property titles have been warranted by 
documentary transfers, an economy based on possession of authenticated material 
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objects, rather than the physical act of occupation and possession. What mattered was 
the document, not what it said on its face.469  
 
Clanchy’s description of ‘warrants’ symbolising a shift from oral law to written law is 
borne out in other sources. The Oxford English Dictionary lists John de Trevisa's 
Polychronicon Ranulphi Higden of 1387 as an early example of the word ‘warrant’ in 
use; here in reference to a documentary form of royal authorisation, which  proved a 
particular command even “in absens of þe kyng”.470 Another dictionary definition, 
that of “a writ or order issued by some executive authority, empowering a ministerial 
officer to make an arrest, a seizure, or a search, to execute a judicial sentence, or to do 
other acts”, was in use by around 1490: ‘warrant’ was by then a species of writ.  
 
Writs are the earliest forms of ‘letters’ in England, in the sense of a written missive 
sent between two people. Most writs were destroyed upon reading, hence not many 
have survived, but in essence the writ was originally a brief (Latin: breve) written 
message, authenticated by sealed wax. Their use dates from at least the tenth century. 
It was a uniquely Anglo-Saxon administrative device; the Normans knew of no 
equivalent prior to invading England in 1066. According to Clanchy, writs were 
simply “a written command given by one person to another”.471 The device of the writ 
held “immense administrative possibilities, without as yet any exact analogy on the 
continent”, and the production of Chancery writs soon gave rise to:  
… a flow of documents quite different in character to the formal and solemn 
charters… [with] no invocations… specifically addressed with a bare 
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salutation, [they are] brief informal notifications of what the King has done or 
wishes to be done, and are direct and to the point.472   
Writs were issued in considerable number and their validity was independent of time, 
with the result that no one knew exactly how many writs were in circulation, when 
they had been made, or what rights and privileges they assigned. Hence, according to 
Clanchy, clauses like, “I forbid you do X, no matter what writ might be produced” 
became necessary, in order to give supremacy to a command against unknown rival 
writs that could be in circulation. For Clanchy, their emergence exemplifies Weber’s 
notion of the “routinization of charisma”, in that the presence of God was constantly 
invoked to bless standard legal transactions, and was therefore “multiplied into tens 
of thousands of trivial pronouncements”.473 
 
Until the reign of Edward (1272-1307), writs of the Crown were issued on demand. A 
person came before the King to complain about a wrong. For a fee, the King issued 
them a writ to remedy the complaint. For instance, an aggrieved party might purchase 
a writ addressed to the local sheriff (shire-reeve), ordering him to seize the offender in 
his shire, or a writ addressed to the offender himself, ordering the return of an item 
on pain of death. Given the slow progress of courts, a royal writ was generally 
preferable to going to court. But these peremptory writs often only deepened disputes. 
As a consequence, the number of valid writs in circulation rose assigning incompatible 
and ambiguous rights and duties. This lead to a “war of writs” in which canny 
operators accumulated writs in order to pitch them against others, sometimes 
anticipating the writs that their opponents would present and seeking to purchase 
countervailing writs in advance.474 This excess of authority results from the non-
discursive products that the Chancery produced. The production of so many 
documents had the effect that writs could not achieve the performative effects that 
their rhetorical messages demanded, but instead produced a sort of secondary 
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economy in which the aim was to monopolise as many declarative statements as 
possible. 
 
However, in Cornelia Vismann’s genealogy of law’s writing instruments, the 
presumption that writing supplanted an oral legal culture, and the related desire to 
situate the device of the ‘warrant’ as a kind of ur-writing for the law, is precisely not 
how law’s media should be approached. Legal instruments – files, or akten in German, 
which better expresses the duality of taking action and of writing and recording 
something on paper – do not transmit an absent presence, nor do they simply record 
and extend the primarily oral expression of subjective will. The prevalent sense that 
documents have these functions is itself an ascription generated when files are 
symbolically used – that is, when their commands are executed. Documents and files 
are not the residue of past oral expressions or commands, but of processes. Their 
genealogy is protocological rather than oral.475  
4.2.1 Warrants and the making of writs  
The Chancery was responsible for producing and authenticating legal documents, 
including charters, diplomas, certificates, and writs. It emerged from the scriptorium 
of the King’s royal household by the tenth century.476 The King’s household remained 
a mobile assemblage that had no fixed location, travelling around the kingdom, but 
by the mid-thirteenth century the volume and complexity of documents being issued 
by the Chancery necessitated a permanent fixed site. By 1310, the Chancery, like the 
Exchequer before it, was established at Westminster. There the Chancellor kept 
possession of the great seal used for authenticating documents. Access to the 
Chancery was barred except for the scribes and the Chancellor himself. Behind the 
latticed screen, the techniques of document production were carried out according to 
strict protocols. Medieval documents carried their authority with them, and so the 
precise techniques of production were secret, because they constituted the ultimate 
guarantors of authenticity.477 The need to confirm the authenticity of documents gave 
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rise to the discipline of diplomatics, concerned only with differentiating authentic 
documents from forged ones.478  
 
Before a writ was issued, a warrant for the use of the great seal had to be received and 
entered on the Chancery Rolls. Warrants for the Great Seal are described as:  
 
… writs, bills or letters, nearly all on parchment, giving the Lord Chancellor, 
as keeper of the great seal, authority to affix the great seal to them to solemnise 
the Crown’s wishes. Royal commands were expressed, if not verbally, chiefly 
through the privy seal or smaller seals, later through the signet, and 
subsequently by signed bill, using the sign manual. Privy seal writs, mere 
strips of parchment, are much more numerous than letters and “bills”, which 
are a later, but equally formal, development of warrants from the early 
fourteenth century.479 
According to Pollock and Maitland, the great seal was the “key of the kingdom” and 
few actions are attributable to kings that are not evidenced by a document bearing its 
mark. The earliest surviving great seal of an English King belonged to Edward the 
Confessor (1042-66). None survive from Harold’s reign. William the Conqueror’s is 
therefore the second-oldest surviving seal.480 While most authenticated formal 
documents that emanated from Chancery were authenticated by the great seal, other 
seals – privy seal and signet seal, and later the signature – were introduced over time, 
sometimes to issue writs, but mainly to make the warrants that operated the Chancery. 
As they did not publicly circulate, there were fewer warrants than writs outside the 
confines of the royal apparatus, and far fewer warrants than writs have been 
preserved. Hence, unlike writs and charters, they were not well known to 
contemporary writers and historians of the period, and they are not often referred to 
in documents that were issued from the Chancery. For a time, they were unfamiliar to 
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many historians and antiquarians.481 This is a consequence of diplomatics, which was 
concerned only with determining the validity of transmitted law, not with how the 
transmission was made; and historiography, which searched archives assuming that 
documents could be read as accounts of past events, and paid no attention to texts 
“neither designed for perpetuity nor [to] carry any probative force… the 
administrative operations, the transmission medium itself remains a blind spot of 
legal history.”482 
 
Early medieval government was conceived of as entirely ‘public’, in the sense that 
everything was manifested in the form of issued documents and open proclamations, 
and the enactment of legal powers of the King under the great seal was typically 
prefaced with an oral address, performed before his entourage of barons.483 Yet prior 
to the ceremonial realisation of a formal document, there was an administrative 
process, and it is in that process that the warrant has significance. After the Chancery 
took up residence at Westminster, the Chancellor no longer accompanied the King 
and the court as it travelled around the territory dispensing justice. He remained at 
Westminster, presiding over the “great secretarial bureau” of Chancery clerks 
producing writs and charters under the great seal. The privy seal became the King’s 
“instrument of communication with the Chancellor”.484  
 
To issue a writ, a warrant made under the privy seal was sent to the Chancery, where 
it was registered on rolls and counter-rolls that noted the type of writ ordered, the 
price (the poor had their writs for nothing), and the clerk responsible for making it.485 
A high-ranking clerk was responsible for each writ, but the “almost mechanical” 
penning of ordinary writs was assigned to lowly cursitors (cursarii), and “consisted 
chiefly of filling with names and sums of money the blanks that were left in the forms 
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that they found in their registers.”486 The rolls listed types of available writs, but the 
list was not exhaustive. Over time, new forms were ordered by justices in court, and 
others were occasionally tailored for individuals. No action could be brought before 
the King’s courts without an ‘original’ writ issued by the Chancery under the great 
seal. As the law developed primarily in the King’s courts, original writs became 
increasingly valuable, and the power to direct the making of writs increasingly a 
matter of concern.  
 
Under Henry II (1133-89), a “system of standardized writs” was introduced to 
“automate and depersonalize the legal process”.487 Forms were standardised so that 
clerks did not require drafts or personal authorisation for each writ. A seal-press was 
created, and the number of clerks increased so as hundreds of writs could be produced 
per week.488 Disturbed by the proliferation of writs, and the installation of a register 
of common forms that required “a Chancellor who was such only in name”, the barons 
demanded a ‘real’ Chancellor sworn to issue writs only under warrant from the 
baronial Privy Council.489 The privy seal was originally held in the King’s privy, the 
most intimate and secret (secretum, separated) part of the King’s household,490 and was 
transplanted instead to a fixed office under an appointed keeper. If the barons did not 
approve of a measure they withheld the privy seal. While royal authority was 
externally manifested outside the curia in documents, the internal relationship of 
authority between the King and the nobility was articulated through control over 
seals, which in turn held the power to order writs.  
 
During Edward’s reign, writs were occasionally issued directly by the King under the 
privy seal, and once again the barons constrained the monarch, who promised in 1300 
that no writs concerning the common law would be issued except under the great seal. 
Thereafter, many privy seal writs were issued to the Chancellor simply instructing 
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him to set the great seal to some instrument as the “final expression” of the King’s 
will.491 In 1314, Edward II introduced a new form of personal seal to authorise 
documents,492 using a ‘secret’ seal to communicate orders directly to the Chancellor. 
By the Ordinances of Walton of 1338, the King was again constrained, agreeing that 
only writs for simple legal matters could be issued under the great seal via warrants 
under the secret seal. The measure of its success is its recognition: Pope Urban III 
wrote in August 1363 to Edward III, “As the pope sees by the King’s secret seal that 
he has the matter much at heart, he will grant the request if possible.”493  
 
In 1377, King Richard II introduced a signet seal in place of the secret seal, which his 
personal secretary kept for protection. The secretarius had been the personal assistant 
to the King, and the signet seal thus marked the beginning of the modern symbolic 
power enjoyed by the Secretary of State.494 Records from the fourteenth century bear 
different combinations of the three distinct seals. Impressions of the signet seal alone 
appear on warrants to the Chancellor, the Exchequer, to Justices of the Peace, and to 
local sheriffs and other officials.495 Some recorded writs from the Chancery bear both 
the signet and great seal, but not the privy seal. Most of the time, all three are 
present.496 The earliest surviving English royal signature is that of Edward III, made 
in 1362.497 Medieval seals lost currency as the “personal sign-manual” (i.e., the King’s 
handwritten signature) evolved, particularly with the growing availability of paper in 
Europe.498  
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The long struggle for control over making warrants was a struggle for the authority 
to make law. Warrants did not simply instrumentally mediate between the sovereign 
and the law, they produced and defined the relationship. As Vismann explains, while 
the Chancery came ‘before’ the law, synchronically speaking, it was the place where 
the law was processed into existence, and therefore the relationship between 
Chancery and law was also diachronic.499 Only when an original writ emerged under 
the great seal did the law, as such, commence. The arcane barriers behind which the 
Chancery produced its writs, which were copied from exemplars by scribes according 
to their secret protocols, excluded all others from making enquiries into the origins of 
the law. Warrants that ordered the making of writs are amongst the non-discursive 
processors that kept the processing of law moving, products of techniques and 
agencies that transfer authority within the apparatus of medieval government. They 
were not part of the law itself, however, and therefore had no legal status. They were 
executed by being entered in the Chancery’s rolls. Warrants served to operate the 
barriers of the Chancery, to activate the process of writ-making.  
 
Warrants appear to stand ‘behind’ writs only if one assumes there must be some 
authoritative origin ‘behind’ the law; some secret link back to the sovereign’s presence 
or record of his orally expressed will. But as Vismann explains, the erasure of origins 
was the precondition of law-making. In the Chancery, it was the deletion of writing, 
not its positive production, that established the validity of the law. Once a draft 
document had been copied into the final version to be sealed with wax and thus 
become the ‘clean’ copy, that is, the ‘original’ writ, the draft from which it had been 
copied was made illegible by ‘cancelling’ it, i.e. crossing it out so that it was obliterated 
from legibility.500 The secret of the Chancery was that it had no secrets, it obliterated 
what lay before the law in order to produce documents that gave no account of their 
origins and could be compared against no higher power. A warrant was not the secret 
presence of sovereignty behind each writ, but another barrier, another gateway that 
stood only for itself and gave no account of its origins. One cannot truly account for 
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law in the making, because it is made by destroying and denying its origins.501 One 
can only offer opinions.502 
4.2.2 Seal and persona 
The point may become clearer if we address the mechanism by which warrants to the 
Chancery were fabricated. According to Bedos-Rezak, the protocols of royal seals 
mattered because seals first and foremost “produced an order of reality grounded in 
permanence by obscuring the contingency inherent in the individual ruler as a 
person”, and therefore seals “achieved meaning as constitutive agents of the very 
conditions and framework that made their production and function possible.”503 A 
royal seal was not simply the validation of a particular warrant or document, but a 
medium for manufacturing the concept of kingship itself. Seals affixed authority to a 
document by “incorporating the author into the text”, and thereby “transforming the 
document into a monument, which is the name by which sealed charters came to be 
known during the twelfth century”.504 This in turn enabled sealed documents to 
transform individuals into official personae.  
 
Official positions within a-temporal structures, like the state, depend on their 
ascription as such in the documents that name the holder as an authority. The 
“individual person was represented on seals as a person subsumed within his group”, 
marking a distinction between the rational individual, their legal personality, and 
their position in a fictive collective, corporate person that acts through its individual 
agents.505 By impressing wax with the medium of the seal, the individual was re-
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constituted as the “effective site for the production of symbolic activity”.506 The imago 
of the seal encoded legal identity, materially reproducing it as a replicable 
resemblance. The auctores – the authority of the document – was an imprint of the 
persona linked to their office,507 while officium, the nature and powers of certain 
officers, “bestowed distinction on the holder, conveying the almost paradoxical sense 
both of the honour accorded the recipient and his personal unworthiness”.508 
 
Therefore, it is a mistake to view medieval documents as instrumental devices that 
aimed at performing certain ends. Rather, sealed documents produced the identities 
that then found their own purposes as they were wrapped up in procedures 
elsewhere, such as in the production of documents by the Chancery. The authority of 
an office-holder, including the King, is an effect of the mobilisation of particular seals 
and documents, and the correct application of protocols for its use. This is why the 
economy of seals could not simply be overridden by royal command. There was no 
other way to make royal commands.  
 
Seals took effect in all areas of medieval society, not just law and monarchy. Seals were 
incorporated into both practical and philosophical investigations into signification, 
“distributing meaning across the spectrum of human experience in a manner at once 
supportive and constitutive”.509 Seals “trafficked in world disclosure”, producing 
documentary media that generated new relationships and understandings with 
effects far beyond the legal and administrative context.510  
 
Warrants, like writs, generate the administrative power that they were wrapped up 
in. The point, however, is not to begin by claiming that the secret of authority is that 
there is no authority, that the symbolic seat of the sovereign is in fact empty, and so 
on, which has been the work of deconstructionist accounts of law. The originality and 
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force of Vismann’s work is that it demonstrates that the symbolic position is an effect 
of the a priori agency of files, documents, and other modes of writing that take effect 
by producing law. What needs to be accounted for is not a theoretical replacement for 
the absent sovereign, but the notion that there should be a sovereign in the first place. 
The symbolic order of juridical authority does not need to be explained, rather it is the 
explanation that emerged to account for the production of documents.  
4.2.3 Administrative writs 
The legal order, then, begins with the need to process the meaning of the writs and 
charters that emerged from the Chancery. For Van Caenegem, the organisation of a 
coherent, institutionalised, and singular common law emerged as a consequence of 
the need to process the conflicting claims that competing writs generated. Amongst 
the proliferation of the common forms of writs under Henry II, a critical innovation 
was the ‘returnable’ writ, which instructed a sheriff to produce the writ before a royal 
justice at a specified time and place, and coupled sheriffs to the commands of the 
law.511  
The return of the writ [to court] was a practical device completely in line with 
the increasing bureaucratization of the time and its careful keeping of records; 
it put the commission to hear the case before the judges and immediately 
showed them the essential data of the case.512 
In order to deal with the sheer volume and variety of competing writs in circulation, 
all referring in some way to the King for their authority but lacking any hierarchy, the 
transfer medium had to be transferred back to the symbolic authority of the King, this 
time in the setting of the King’s courts. Whereas disputes might begin over a piece of 
land, theft, or disputed entitlements, writs drew them into documentary form and 
delivered them to the court for adjudication. 
                                                
511 S. F. C. Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law (London: Butterworths, 1969), 212. 
512 Van Caenegem, The Birth of the English Common Law, 53; Milsom says the writ was “the court’s warrant to 
act”, a figurative use of the word indicating the slippage from naming a thing “warrant” to describing its 
symbolic function, Milsom, Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 22–24; Pollock and Maitland called writs 
“the justices” warrant for entertaining [an] action”, Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law Before the Time 
of Edward I, 1:206. 
 190 
Judicialization turned these executive measures into original writs and judicial 
instruments initiating formal lawsuits only at a later stage; this was done 
piecemeal, each new type of writ commanding a specific form of process, so 
that a good deal of procedural variety resulted… [The writ praecipe] was not 
devised ex nihilo as a writ of summons for the royal courts, but started as an 
executive order of redress addressed to an alleged wrongdoer. In the course of 
time this sort of order was judicialized in that the alleged wrongdoer was given 
the chance to come and state his case in the King’s court. 513 
In this manner, competing claims were enfolded into legal proceedings, becoming 
instruments through which a progressively centralised form of royal justice came to 
absorb other local modes of legal adjudication and set the material conditions for 
elaborating a coherent common law.514 The administration and centralisation of the 
courts transformed writs into procedures. 
A judicial system which was created by the naked will of the King, but made 
to relate his powers to his people’s rights, provided a fruitful context for the 
definition of the ‘state of the King’ (status regis) in England.515 
As all disputes referred to law had to be articulated through writs, conversely, writs 
became the singular form around which both the substance and procedure of law, and 
the powers of kingship, came to be articulated. Around the documents that attracted 
opinionated explanations for their existence, dogmas emerged in judgments, 
commentaries, procedural rules and judicial orders, establishing “normative forms at 
the margins of a legal corpus, programmes for legal acts and actions, algorithms of the 
law”.516 Common law grew epiphenomenally around the need to process the symbolic 
transfers effected by the proliferation of documents. The ‘original’ writs above 
evolved into devices for initiating specific legal procedures before courts. Each writ 
could initiate a case according to a set of procedural rules known as ‘forms of action’. 
Anyone purchasing a writ had to carefully select the correct form of action, because 
the legal procedure that followed was determined entirely by that selection. The text 
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attributed to Glanville, commonly regarded as the earliest compendium of the English 
common law, is nothing more than a “juridical alphabet”, an “exposition of the writs 
which controlled such cases as were then brought before the court,”517 and “an 
insider’s handbook for the royal bureaucracy”.518  
 
As Murphy points out, the “artificial reason” of common law cannot be disentangled 
from matters of procedural and formal rules. Both government and adjudication were 
the products of long practical experience in managing disagreement, providing 
vehicles through which disputes could be articulated and, moreover, society could be 
apprehended.519 Common law forms of action are comparable to the formulae of 
Roman law as presented by Yan Thomas, insofar as a given form “was not 
instrumental; it was not a vehicle for anything other than itself.”520 Writs and warrants 
defined the world rigidly, not in the service of other latent social goals. The medieval 
order conceived of the world as a natural hierarchy that unified all things in a coherent 
structure. Legal instruments did not provide particularised abstract representations 
of the natural hierarchy, but rather recursively re-generated and re-inscribed people 
and things into it,521 service as preconditions for a particular mode of legal discourse 
through which objects were assigned meaning within a particular frame, each of 
which made available “a range of remedies which has as it were came down from the 
skies”.522 To bring a dispute to law, one had to fictionalise it in the terms provided by 
a particular form of action, as such, “the problem was made real by its very 
unreality.”523 For hundreds of years, legal technique concerned the ability to 
fictionalise a dispute so as to make it fit into an available form of argumentation, which 
then determined the entire legal procedure that would follow. This unreality is 
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precisely what secured the reflexive stability of the law, which in its operations 
“secured the world”.524 The procedures of common law are better understood, as 
Murphy puts it, as ritualisation rather than rationalisation.525  
 
This way, law reflexively administered to its own procedures, with registries, rolls, 
writs and warrants providing symbolic forms for “sending confidential instructions 
in writing and of checking on whether those writs were obeyed”.526 When Matthew 
Hale wrote his seventeenth century survey of criminal law, Historia Placitorum Coronae 
(published posthumously), he gave an account of judges’ ability to issue warrants for:  
[Arrests] of felons or persons suspected of felony by warrant or precept, namely 
not of precepts that issue upon matter of record, as upon appeal or indictment, 
which regularly are to be by writ, but such warrants as a preparatory to it, or 
for conservation of the peace.527 
Whereas judicial writs solemnised a final legal decision on a case, warrants preceded 
them by permitting preparatory orders to be issued according to fixed procedures. On 
Hale’s account, only a Justice of the Peace, coroner, or sheriff could independently 
“give out a warrant for apprehending the felon before indictment”.528 While warrants 
were normally directed to sheriffs, bailiffs, and constables, they could be addressed to 
“any private person or his own servant”. Any officer so addressed by a warrant was 
required to execute it, within their jurisdiction.529 Hale recognised the potency of these 
devices. By authorising action before the determination of a case by the law, warrants 
risk supplanting the law. Hale was particularly concerned with elaborating the correct 
protocols for making writs of the Crown, particularly the issuance of general, open-
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ended warrants.530 He states that each warrant had to make clear the reason for its 
issue, except in cases of felony or treason, and that warrants should not be issued 
blank by the court so as to be filled in with names later.531 The form of the warrant had 
been reconfigured as a legal instrument, and subjected to legal protocols. What was 
ultimately issued, necessary for the law to have agency in the world, was a physical 
warrant.  
 
The instrumentalisation of the law, which generates and applies normative rules and 
sees that they are executed, is built on and preceded by the techniques and practices 
of document production. The elaboration of jurisprudence, for Vismann, is the effect 
of the transfers of rights and entitlements that documents perform. Legal technique is 
the putting into order of the files and documents of the law, which process the 
symbolic order that the law produces. The text inscribed in legal documents is the 
software that describes and orders the operations of their hardware.532 Documents 
transfer and transact rights, powers, debts, and attribute legal subjectivities. The 
particular instrumental ends that legal media are put to are protocological responses 
to symbolically account for those operations.  
4.3 The interception warrant   
By the sixteenth century, the Secretary of State had emerged as the primary “agent for 
communicating the king’s pleasure”.533 Beginning as keepers of the signet seal in the 
fourteenth century, the secretaryship grew in importance as the signet, like the great 
seal and privy seal before it, became formalised and integrated into procedures that 
explained its operations and effects. Secretaries of State kept the signet in their 
custody, receiving it in a formal presentation on appointment and delivering it 
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directly into the King’s hand on resignation.534 The signet seal was affixed to all 
‘personal’ communication issued by the King. Registers were kept of all letters issued 
under the signet seal. The staff of the signet office, employed by the Secretary of State, 
drafted and transcribed formal letters on behalf of the King, which he signed and the 
Secretary sealed.535 By the time of the reign of Charles II in the late seventeenth 
century, there were four signet clerks, with at least one attending the court wherever 
it moved. 
 
Although all administrative acts were recorded in writing, they were stored in a 
disorderly fashion created a “general and unclassifiable mass of documents.”536 The 
secretaryship was a sinecure; effectively, a secretary was his King’s client. Offices were 
essentially viewed as property.537 Secretaries (like other officials) charged for their 
services, and often took their papers away with them on leaving office.538 As Luhmann 
observes, today it would be called “corruption”.539 There were two conflicting theories 
about the status of secretarial papers; the Secretary was a private and personal servant 
whose staff, papers, and techniques were his own concern; but at the same time, the 
office-holder was responsible for the most important administrative questions of state, 
and therefore considered to be a public servant under the law, who produced public 
records.540 A distinction was also drawn between formal documents passing the signet 
as a stage towards the making of a writ under the great seal, and the “personal 
correspondence or private commands of the King, which were sealed with the signet 
only… the distinction between them is, in the main, one between administration and 
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politics.”541 The elements of the symbolic order of the medieval juridical hierarchy had 
survived, although they had been rearranged and reconfigured.  
4.3.1 Command and reason of state 
During the seventeenth century, the concept of raison d’état was promoted by the 
Stuarts as the basis of their rule. As a result, their dynasty (1603-1714) was interrupted 
by the execution of Charles I and Cromwell’s ‘Interregnum’ government. According 
to the logic of raison d’état, the juridical order was founded on the absolute authority 
of monarchs. Put briefly, where necessity demands, raison d’état held that the monarch 
could personally determine the situation and make decisions that could not be 
questioned or examined by judges.542 Viewed historically, the insistence on the 
absolute power of the sovereign was an attempt to secure political survival after 
theology had exhausted its capacity to compel obedience. In France, the doctrine of 
the “will of the sovereign formed part of the solution to societal instability”.543 But in 
England, the Crown’s authority relied on a “different overall cognitive and normative 
environment” to the rest of Europe,544 so that rather than securing social order, the 
absolutist model of government in England only led to greater instability.  
 
While raison d’état invoked the mysteriousness of divine monarchy under the rubric 
of arcana imperii, in fact the real “secret of authority was that it was none”,545 and so-
called ‘state secrets’ were “neither more nor less mystical than the modern concept of 
the secret ‘know-how’ of a business.”546 To some extent, it simply meant keeping 
things off the record. James I, for instance, attempted to use the signet as “the private 
seal it had originally been”, but finding it already “too formalised”, he instead used a 
“bedchamber” practice to issue secret orders. Charles II, making a secret treaty with 
France in 1676, did not let the “dangerous document pass the seals”, instead he 
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“sealed it with his cipher, himself lighting the taper to melt the wax.”547 The true secret 
was the one that did not enter the register.  
 
Yet reason of state did manifest itself in written forms. The Secretary of State Henry 
Coventry wrote on 13th September 1677 to the Postmaster General that “a Secretary of 
State may demand an Account of any letters that come to the post house from anybody 
employed there”. To intercept letters, Secretaries of State needed no permission except 
the King’s,  
to all inferiors their Order is sufficient or else our Warrants to the postmasters 
are illegal, they not being our servants. The opening of letters is what no man 
can justify but from reason of State or the King’s particular Command.548  
As Evans notes, the Post Office was created for the transmission of state dispatches, 
not private correspondence. Transmitting and receiving state dispatches was the 
“essential function” of the secretariat; the posts grew out of that function, which 
“naturally brought them under the influence of the chief writer of those dispatches.”549 
Yet even reason of state remained indexed to documentary forms. In another letter, 
Secretary Coventry recounted that Charles II orally ordered him to intercept the letters 
of Edward Coleman, a Catholic courtier executed under false charges of treason in the 
‘Popish plot’.550 Coventry asked for a written order, but Charles “told me there was 
no need of an order because the matter was to be kept secret”. Coventry explained he 
wanted only “to justify myself in case of his forgetting”, because Charles was 
capricious. But Charles replied that his memory would suffice. The Secretary had no 
choice, he instructed the Deputy Postmaster to intercept and copy Coleman’s 
correspondence with “severall Roman Catholiques both at home and abroad”.551 If 
Charles would not commit his command to writing, it would have been unwise for 
Coventry to do so in turn.  
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Charles’ oral command, and the concern it caused Coventry, is instructive. On one 
hand, Coventry formally had to accept that the King’s decision was law, absolute and 
supreme; on the other, he knew that without a written record, his own actions risked 
being deemed illegal. The law held that the prerogative power of the King to govern 
was “no more than what the law has determined”, and that where it was exceeded, 
the ministers involved were personally responsible, because the “King could do no 
wrong”. Oral statements remain off the record. The action that does not enter the 
register is secret, and the one that can be denied, but only Charles would be exempt 
from the consequences if he later decided to discuss it. If a warrant or other instrument 
was found to be illegal, there always had to be someone who could be held legally 
responsible for “deceiving” the King, thereby inducing him to commit a “temporary 
injustice”.552 Indeed, on 18th November 1678, another Secretary, Williamson, was sent 
to the Tower of London by Parliament for illegally signing commissions in favour of 
“popish recusants”. Williamson’s claim that he merely counter-signed orders from the 
King only made things worse for him, as his function – his only function – was to take 
the signing of warrants seriously.553  
 
Hence Coventry’s problem was not simply a matter of obtaining a written record of 
the King’s true will at a fixed point in time. Even under conditions of raison d’état, files 
generated responsibilities that had to be respected. For a Secretary, doing something 
that went unrecorded in writing was a very real risk because it was to abdicate his 
status as office-holder and act only as a person. The authority of his office was 
wrapped up in the protocols for making signet warrants.554 Outside those protocols, 
he had no legal authority. Only through the practices of registering, drafting, counter-
signing, and sealing could a Secretary of State take effect. The problem was not the 
legality of letter interception against the rights of Coleman – a Catholic, accused of 
treason, who was ultimately condemned to death on the basis of letters found in a 
search of his home – but how it was to proceed. 
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Warrants, then, do not merely represent or confirm lawful oral commands even under 
conditions of raison d’état. Oral commands cannot take effect in administrative terms. 
Only writing can, and only writing produced according to the procedures that make 
the correct form, which do not follow the logic of speech.555 A warrant unsigned, 
unsealed or prepared incorrectly could not take effect. Documents issued under 
signature and seal, however disorderly they ended up when stored, functioned by 
providing their addressees with both “imperative and information”,556 recursively 
generating the ‘culture’ that transformed offices “from mere collections of 
independent employees to departments of state”.557 
4.3.2 The function of warrants   
By section 40 of the Post Office (Revenues) Act 1710, interference with the post was 
criminalised except where subject to “an express warrant in writing under the hand 
of one of the principal secretaries of state”.558 The necessity for recording all 
imperatives in writing, and naming such documents as ‘warrants’ was thus confirmed 
in legislation. The implication of the legislative formulation is that the Secretary of 
State’s warrant gives lawful form to a type of decision or command that the Secretary 
of State is uniquely empowered by law to make, and thus responsibility for the 
interception operation that results is made attributable to the Secretary alone by the 
law. The Secretary acts autonomously through warrants according to the law, but 
from the perspective of media, the ascription of decision and autonomy to the 
Secretary is merely the recognition of long-standing techniques for processing the 
administrative effects of warrants.  
 
More importantly, the legislation defines the privileged position of interception. 
Anyone who works in the sorting office of the Post Office has, at least in theory, the 
capacity to intercept communication. The position is defined by the processing of 
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letters through the Post Office. Intercepting letters therefore had to be inscribed into 
the symbolic order of the law in order to assign authority to the Secretary of State by 
excluding all others.  
 
The earliest surviving interception warrant identified by the parliamentary Secret 
Committee of 1844 was dated 20th September 1712, not long after the passage of the 
1710 Act. Incidentally, the only earlier case that the Secret Committee mentioned was 
that of Coleman, the target of Charles’s oral command to Coventry. The Committee 
noted that despite the Post Office Act 1710 and a Parliamentary resolution of 1735 
which stated that a Secretary’s warrant was the only lawful means of authorising letter 
interception,559 until 1799 “it was not the practice to record such Warrants regularly 
in any official book”.560 The Committee reported that general interception warrants 
were issued during the Jacobite rebellion of 1745 and on the declaration of the Seven 
Year’s War against France in 1756, but makes no mention of any record of those 
documents. 
 
The image at figure 1 is an example of a copy of a Home Office warrant dated 28th 
April 1792.561 It is contained in a Home Office entry book of copies of ‘Out Letters’ in 
the National Archives. Based on this copy, the document loosely resembles a letter. It 
begins: 
To His Majesty’s Post Master General,  
This is to authorize and direct you to open and take copies of all letters which 
pass through the Post Office directed to any of the following persons. 
There follows a list of eleven names, headed by two notable entries, Thomas Paine 
and John Horne Tooke.562 No reasons are provided as to why they are targets. Some 
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of the names are located in particular cities: Bruxelles, Rotterdam, The Hague. The 
warrant’s authority is confirmed with the phrase,  
And for so doing this shall be Your Warrant. Given under my hand and Seal at 
Whitehall, the 28th day of April 1792. 
Here is the administrative function of the warrant: making lists.  
 
For the interceptors in the Post Office, lists of targets provided them with the 
information required to discriminate between the letters that they searched. The cities 
mentioned would direct the sorting clerks to provide the relevant foreign mail bags 
for searching, and the names would enable them to identify individual letters, seals, 
and handwriting to recursively include in their search operations. Interception 
warrants existed as elements in an information exchange, a two-way transfer 
operation by which the Home Office transferred lists of selected targets to the Post 
Office, which performed the technical operations of searching, selecting, and copying, 
then returned intercepted material to the King and Secretary of State for the Home 
Office for processing. For interception techniques to take effect, conditional 
instructions are required. They enable the differentiation of targets from non-targets, 
and thereby provide the input that operationalises the whole procedure.  
 
The process was bookended by lists, which also controlled the output from the Post 
Office, where in the eighteenth century, original warrants were burned after use. A 
‘Distribution List’ controlled the transfer of intercepted material outwards. 
Everything intercepted in plain text went directly to the King, while enciphered 
messages were couriered to members of the Deciphering Branch for analysis, and sent 
on to the King as soon as possible. The King passed them to the Secretary of State for 
circulation to selected ministers, who received them in a distinctive envelope known 
as the ‘Long Packet’, then returned them to the secretaries’ office for filing and storage 
under the category of ‘private’ papers. Ellis suggests that not more than thirty people 
overall ever saw intercepted material.563  
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4.3.3 Storage protocols 
Record keeping improved after 1782, when the offices of the Secretaries of State 
became institutionalised as the Home Office and the Foreign Office. Clerks became 
employees of a bureaucracy administering to programs and policies rather than 
servants of a patron.564 According to the Secret Committee, between 1799 and 1805, a 
registry was maintained of all interception warrants issued by the Home Office. From 
1806 until 1844,  
the practice was introduced at the Home Office of recording the issuing of 
every [interception] Warrant in a private book belonging, not to the head of the 
department, but to the Office, and always accessible to the two Under 
Secretaries of State and the Chief Clerk of the Domestic Department.565  
The separation of interception warrants as a categorised type of Home Office 
correspondence, and the implementation of record-keeping protocols, confirms a 
change had occurred in the organisational conceptualisation of power.566 Files that 
contain instructions for their own preservation rather than allowing themselves to be 
discarded or destroyed create the conditions under which historiography first came 
to conceptualise files as records of things that really happened, rather than 
manifestations of particular ritualised practices. The 1844 Secret Committee report is 
in itself an example of this historiographical approach. This explains why it was 
unable to account for interception warrants any earlier than 1712, the year of the 
earliest surviving example.  
 
The same thing happened in other government departments. From 1822 onwards, 
“original warrants [were] preserved at the Post Office; the earlier warrants having 
been destroyed.”567 By recording and storing the interception warrants that were 
generated, they became events that linked together actions and time. When a warrant 
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is registered, it becomes an event in time with two valences: an authorisation in the 
Home Office register, and an instruction in that of the Post Office.568  
 
Procedures became more clearly defined. In 1844, the Secret Committee described the 
contemporary warrant processes as follows. For a criminal investigation warrant,   
The application is made, in the first instance, to that one of the two Under 
Secretaries of State who is of the legal profession; and the usual course is for 
the applicant to state the circumstances in writing; but if the case be very 
urgent, owing to the time being too short, before the departure of the post, to 
draw out a written statement, that condition is sometimes dispensed with… If 
the Under Secretary accedes to the application, he submits the case to the 
Principal Secretary of State; with whose approval, a Warrant is drawn by the 
head clerk of the Domestic Department, under the instructions of the Under 
Secretary, and is then signed by the Principal Secretary of State. A record of the 
date of the Warrant is kept under lock and key, in a private book, to which the 
two Under Secretaries and the above-mentioned head clerk have access.569  
Investigators applied to the Home Secretary for authorisation of the interception of 
correspondence. They provided the names to populate the list. The Home Secretary’s 
staff would then transfer the list into the form of a warrant, enter a copy in the records, 
and present it to the Secretary for his signature. His ‘will’ extended to adding his name 
and, for a while, the signet seal. This way, operations passed through the processing 
bottleneck of the Home Office warrant, even if the particular ends were not Home 
Office business. For political warrants, by contrast, the process came from the top 
down, initiated by the Home Secretary.  
The Principal Secretary of State, of his own discretion, determines when to 
issue them, and gives instructions accordingly to the Under Secretary, whose 
office is then purely ministerial. The mode of preparing them, and keeping 
record of them in a private book, is the same as in the case of Criminal 
Warrants. There is no record kept of the grounds on which they are issued, 
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except so far as correspondence preserved at the Home-office may lead to infer 
them.570  
There were, therefore, two circuits for interception warrants in existence. In relation 
to criminal matters the Home Secretary was an administrative element in an 
investigation process that began and concluded elsewhere.571 His role was merely to 
provide access to information thought to be circulating in the postal system. On the 
intelligence front, the Home Secretary issued instructions “of his own discretion”, but 
he did so on the basis of information received from spies, informers, and information 
returned from the Post Office. The functional differentiation of interception is 
manifest in the transfer of information through each of these procedurally 
differentiated circuits, both inflexions on the repetitive copying operations carried out 
all day by the clerks. 
 
The Secret Committee’s report is itself a governmental document. It is the result of 
recovering and processing stored files, putting them in order, and giving legal and 
historical accounts of their existence. It sought to account for the existence of 
interception techniques that for the previous two centuries, since the foundation of 
the Post Office in the mid-seventeenth century, had been the preserve of the King’s 
closest ministers. The production of a historical account of those practices by the Secret 
Committee transformed the status of secrecy itself. It converted it into procedures that 
could be accounted for, and thus transformed the making of interception warrants 
into a normative realm. The report anticipated that the archive of warrants would 
continue to be maintained and that warrants could therefore be counted and 
reviewed. Therefore, the power to intercept letters, while remaining out of ‘public’ 
sight (of which more in the following chapter), would nonetheless provide a material 
account of itself. Procedures were no longer required simply for a warrant to take 
effect as a first-order symbol of authority, they were required in order to assess how 
that authority was made and exercised. From then on, as Vismann puts it, storage of 
files matters, and “administrative acts reveal themselves to be historical 
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anticipations.”572 The Secret Committee’s report is itself a monument to the new order 
it inaugurated. 
 
The Committee put forward possible procedural rules for making warrants: granting 
interception warrants for the investigation of crime only on receipt of clear written 
reasons; recording those reasons; recording the period of time that each warrant 
remained in force; recording the number of letters opened under each warrant; 
maintaining a record of the results it achieved.573 No such action was taken. But these 
suggestions prove Vismann’s hypothesis that the emergence of the constitutional 
state, which had become a question for legal theorists and historians in the nineteenth 
century, did not depend so much on the ‘world-spirit’ of history or the accumulated 
wisdom of judges as it did on the “profane administrative techniques” that 
materialised such spirit in the effort to produce official state archives.574 
4.4 Office media  
From 1848, all papers arriving in the Home Office each day were registered centrally 
in order to better manage the growth in the bureaucracy. Older papers were selected 
for disposal, and those that were retained were re-numbered retrospectively into four 
series that overlap in terms of both subject and date.575 An inspectorate was created to 
review and reduce ‘waste’ by assessing the utility of retaining older materials.576 
During the same period, new technologies changed the administrative procedures 
and media through which warrants were created. Such media-technical transitions are 
materialised in an entry book of outgoing letters and warrants send from the Home 
Office to the Post Office.577 It is the only collected set of interception warrants available 
                                                
572 Vismann, Files, 120. 
573 ‘Secret Committee’, 19. 
574 Vismann, Files, 122. 
575 The National Archives, ‘Home Office Correspondence 1782-1979’, The National Archives, accessed 11 
September 2017, http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-guides/home-office-
correspondence-1782-1979/. 
576 Pellew, Home Office: Clerks to Bureaucrats, 64. 
577 ‘HO 151/7’, 7. 
 205 
in the National Archives – although its position in the catalogue suggests that similar 
records once existed and have been destroyed. 
4.4.1 The letter copying book  
The orderly storage of interception warrants was aided by new copying technology. 
In 1887 the Home Office acquired copying presses, eliminating the need for clerks to 
work as scriveners.578 Copy presses and ‘Letter Copying Books’ vastly reduced the 
time required to duplicate items,579 thanks to the invention of quick-drying aniline 
ink. They were sold as blank bound entry books containing sheets of tough tissue 
paper. Dampers, sheets of oiled paper, and blotting material were also required. An 
office boy counted the number of outgoing letters of the day and prepared the 
corresponding number of pages in the copybook by dampening them with a sponge. 
Taking the first available blank page in the book and putting a fresh outgoing letter 
face up beneath it, he placed an oiled sheet on either side to prevent water and ink 
from soaking through, then closed the book and compressed it in the copy press for 
about two minutes, which was essentially a vice-like clamp. When all the letters had 
been copied, the boy took them to be posted and the book was left to dry by the 
fireplace. The method gives the records in the entry book a distinctive blotted 
appearance (figure 2), a consequence of a relatively short-lived cultural technique 
bracketed by handwriting and typing.580 
 
Copied warrants stored in the entry book did not merely register and store past 
authorisations of warrants, they also recorded cancellations. When a cancellation 
letter had been sent to the Post Office, the copy of the initial warrant was overwritten 
with the word ‘cancelled’, and the date of cancellation added. The practice of writing 
‘cancelled – date’ on copies of letters persisted until 1933, by which point it had simply 
become an inherited practice. The use of typed cancellation notices had allowed 
carbon copy ‘flimsies’ to be put on files, and this negated any functional value that 
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overwriting had once served. The practice itself was cancelled on 17th October 1933.581 
The need for cancellation practices was driven by the Post Office. The Postmaster 
General wrote to the Home Secretary at various stages with lists of names that had 
returned no intercepted materials asking that their names be formally cancelled. 
While the Home Office issued warrants and, apparently, simply forgot about them, 
for the Post Office, the validity of each warrant took effect as an ongoing process by 
which all mail had to be checked each day for the specified names. The development 
of efficient file-checks in order to ensure timely cancellations thus began as an 
administrative efficiency, a kindness to the interceptors rather than to their targets.582   
 
In the entry book, the copied warrants are preceded by copied covering letters 
addressed to the Postmaster General stating the purpose and target of the warrant. 
Warrants merely repeat the information stated in the covering letter, distinguished 
only by variations on the phrase we saw used on the warrant of 1792, And for so doing 
this shall be your sufficient warrant, and the formal application of the signature of a 
Secretary of State. This indicates the symbolic difference between a letter and a 
warrant. The difference mattered, a warrant needed to be made. Unlike the warrant 
from 1792 discussed above, there are no references to seals, only signatures. Rather 
than the medieval symbol of the seal, the Home Office switched to a new system for 
guaranteeing authenticity: the reference number. The Home Office first adopted a 
numerical file reference system in 1871, updated in 1880 with an alphanumerical series 
that began with an ‘A’ prefix.583 Earlier entries in the interception copybook, which 
began in 1876, show reference numbers overwritten in pencil at some point after the 
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warrant was initially issued and copied. From around 1890 onwards, file references 
were included on the face of the original letters (figure 3).  
 
Entries in the copy pressed book end abruptly. The Home Office acquired two 
typewriters in 1890, with some reluctance. Typing was considered a feminine job, and 
the subject matter that the Home Office dealt with too distressing and vulgar for 
women.584 At that point, typed warrants superseded handwritten warrants. The final 
letter impressed into the copybook is dated 22nd March 1899; fittingly, it was typed 
(figure 4).  
 
The file replaced the entry book, centralising all case-matter into one location. 
Whereas the copybook stored copies of outgoing letters arranged by topic, the file and 
the filing cabinet brought all elements in a given case together as particularised 
matters of concern.585 In figure 5, a stenographer’s draft warrant appears in 
handwriting and next to it is a typed carbon copy of the final document, which 
includes the standard phrase, and for so doing this shall be your sufficient warrant, but 
bears no signature. From then on, the signature would only be applied to the version 
that was posted. Intercepted telegrams were copied onto telegram forms and inserted 
into files (figure 6). A case file concerning correspondence on the interception of 
telegrams in relation to a murder suspect in 1901 contains a copy of a letter received 
from the Postmaster General, illustrating the difference between a typed carbon copy 
slip and an outgoing pressed copy (figure 7). After typing took over, ‘original’ 
documents are differentiated from their otherwise identical file-copies by their 
materiality: the use of pre-printed stationery, embossing, the weight of paper, and 
handwritten signatures.586  
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With the shift from entry books to individual files, collected case material is bound 
together with a lace tag and kept in a single uniform cardboard file. Files themselves 
contain their own protocological procedures. All files can be operated by one 
administrator, while files can be universally shared amongst bureaucrats who can add 
their own memos and amend one another’s draft letters before they are typed. Files 
themselves become the active agents in bureaucracies.587  
4.4.2 References and indices  
The introduction of reference numbers evidenced in the copy pressed entry book 
indicate that warrants had begun to be produced within a new order of knowledge, 
which grew in complexity as new copying and filing systems accelerated the 
production of files and letters. More efficient modes of information management were 
required.588 In March 1901, two Home Office employees, Locke and Boehmer, devised 
an index card catalogue for the Home Office registry. They apparently spent several 
years deciding which older items were worth preserving as indexed ‘precedents’ and 
which were not. By 1908, Boehmer had presided over the categorisation of fifteen 
years’ worth of arrears and had destroyed over twelve tons of correspondence and 
generated several new categories of governmental knowledge from stored papers 
formerly regarded as ‘miscellaneous’ matters. In 1909, the Home Office moved to 
larger premises, allowing the Registry to expand into its own dedicated room – it grew 
to employ thirty-five members of staff by 1911. It became the model for other 
government departments, whose staff regarded it with envy.589 
 
Krajewski explains that index catalogues act as idiosyncratic information retrieval 
systems, coding information according to the functional aims of a particular office.590 
They install “formal representational structures”, allowing discrete entries to be 
selected and combined in different ways. In the Home Office’s first iteration of a card 
index system, approximately four thousand cards performed different operations. 
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Some referred the user to entries in notebooks that contained instructions for 
performing different operations. Others, cross-referencing cards, drew connections 
between different categories of governmental knowledge. Some referred to specific 
files containing useful precedent materials that could be referred to in future.591 
Everything produced in the office required a reference number, which in turn 
provided an address for the storage of material within the office’s own paper memory 
system.  
4.4.3 Making connections 
The coding of entries to a reference system was the precondition for developing 
connections and comparisons between cases. This in turn generated a new mode of 
visibility that was formed by making connections within the Home Office’s registered 
memory system itself. This is demonstrated in the counter-espionage campaign 
conducted before the First World War. The ‘Special Intelligence Bureau’ was 
originally created within the Home Office to investigate German espionage in Britain.  
 
In 1911, the Home Secretary Winston Churchill signed a general warrant authorising 
the opening of letters addressed to suspected spies in Britain. The bureau quickly 
generated an enormous amount of paper-based knowledge about suspected foreign 
national spies and their intermediaries. In 1921, a post-war report explained that the 
index card catalogue had created 1,189 separate entries on named individuals between 
1911 and 1914.592 By issuing one Home Office Warrant (HOW) in relation to a given 
suspect, the information returned from the Post Office regarding their correspondence 
generated new suspects and drew connections between them. Each subject was 
indexed individually and the entries were cross-referenced. The new entries, in turn, 
were made subjects of HOWs, and thus their mail was opened and checked and 
specially recruited policemen were sent to observe them. This in turn produced new 
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and previously undetected connections.593 General warrants for wartime censorship 
enabled the system to carry on efficiently throughout the war years.594 
 
Networks were diagrammatically described through the collection, collation, and 
crosschecking of communications, enabling counter-intelligence agents to proactively 
observe meetings, infiltrate networks, or arrange for the police to make arrests. Several 
spies were executed as a result. Authority was formally provided by issuing 
warrants,595 each one generated by the connections discovered through previous 
warrants in a chain leading back to the general warrant. The point of the warrant was 
not to legally authorise interception, which was formally permitted by the general 
warrant anyway. Nor did warrants exist in this context to provide the Post Office with 
lists of targets, or express any formal decision made on the deliberations of the 
Secretary of State, as new targets arose from the data generated by interception 
operations in the Post Office in the first place. Rather, their function was to generate 
and authorise new files, and thus new individual entries in the registry, which 
constituted the principle elements upon which the entire intelligence system 
functioned. Warrants served to initiate files, and thereby coupled together records of 
different individuals across time and space, abstracting them into collections of 
intercepted material and other intelligence observations, while tying them to the 
symbolic coding of the indexing system that allowed them to be connected in diverse 
ways. The indexing of information served as the first-order recording process that 
enabled selective recall of stored information according to second-order observations 
of the connections they formed, materialised through the reflexive sorting of files.  
 
The same principle served to reorient the operations of the English civil service in 
general. Past decisions provided authoritative instructions for future decisions, 
regardless of the circumstances and the particular civil servants involved. Precedent 
forms of action were connected with unfolding events, securing uniformity of 
                                                
593 On the potential creativity of cross-referencing, see Krajewski, Paper Machines, 63–67. 
594 See ‘Censorship Warrants Which Should Be Revoked on Cessation of Hostilities in Europe HO 45/25973’ 
1946, National Archives. 
595 ‘KV 1/48’, 33, 36. 
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governmental policies over time. In relation to interception powers, when legal 
questions arose during the twentieth century as to the ambiguous status of warrants, 
reference was made to older legal advice and exemplary cases.596 Moreover, policies 
of secrecy were implemented and maintained through recursive references to 
precedent practices. It is possible that, paradoxically, the relatively little material on 
interception that has survived and been disclosed to the National Archives was spared 
from total destruction only because it had precedent value for indicating when similar 
files should be eradicated rather than retained.597  
4.4.4 Linking registries   
If the indexing of the registry enabled internal connections to be drawn within the 
Home Office’s paper memory machine across time, its capacity to absorb complexity 
also enabled connections to be made with the Office’s external environment, in 
particular with commercial communication services. Once again, warrants provided 
a coupling mechanism.  
 
In 1920, the President of Western Union publicly informed the US Senate that, despite 
censorship supposedly having ended in Britain, his company and others were 
required to pass copies of all international telegram traffic to British intelligence each 
day. In response, a new version of the Official Secrets Act entered force on 23rd 
December 1920. Section 4 stated: 
4. Power to require the production of telegrams. 
(1) Where it appears to a Secretary of State that such a course is expedient 
in the public interest, he may, by warrant under his hand, require any 
person who owns or controls any telegraphic cable or wire, or any 
apparatus for wireless telegraphy, used for the sending or receipt of 
telegrams to or from any place out of the United Kingdom, to produce to 
him, or to any person named in the warrant, the originals and transcripts, 
either of all telegrams, or of telegrams of any specified class or 
description, or of telegrams sent from or addressed to any specified 
                                                
596 See 5.4.3. 
597 There is scope for a media-focused analysis of English law and administration, akin to Vismann, Files. 
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person or place, sent or received to or from any place out of the United 
Kingdom by means of any such cable, wire, or apparatus, and all other 
papers relating to any such telegram as aforesaid. 
(2) Any person who, on being required to produce any such original or 
transcript or paper as aforesaid, refuses or neglects to do so shall be guilty 
of an offence under this Act….598 
Secretaries of State had issued general warrants over foreign correspondence in times 
of war before, but the Act marked the first public statement of such a capacity. It also 
introduced a formal distinction between domestic and foreign communication in law. 
It is, technically, the first legislative grant of a positive power to intercept 
communication, albeit framed in relatively narrow terms.599 It marked a break with a 
long-established practice of official secrecy, but given the publicity already generated 
by the President of Western Union, it was presumably calculated as a risk worth 
taking to prohibit any future disclosures. The Foreign Secretary, Lord Curzon, noted 
at the time, “it is important to leave this part of our activity in the deepest possible 
obscurity.”600 
 
As described in chapter three, the practice of so-called ‘cable vetting’ continued 
consistently from 1920 onwards. In 1967, when a whistle-blower revealed details of 
the practice, it was reported that authority was provided by warrants signed after the 
passage of the 1920 Act. As the first head of the Government Code & Cipher School 
recalled in 1944,  
The warrant clearly said scrutiny, and the traffic arrived back apparently 
untouched within a few hours. I have no doubt that the managers and senior 
officials must have guessed the true answer, but I have never heard of any 
indiscretions through all the years with so many people involved.601 
                                                
598 ‘Official Secrets Act 1920’, accessed 19 October 2016, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/10-
11/75/contents. 
599 See 3.2.5 on international cable ‘vetting’. 
600 Corera, Intercept, 96. 
601 Denniston, ‘GC&CS Between the Wars’; cited in section 3.2.5. 
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In 1967, the then Home Secretary was apparently unaware of the existence of those 
warrants or the authority they conferred.602 The warrants were apparently lost, yet 
their efficacy had not been diminished. As official secrets, they prevented the 
companies from having to explain or justify their collaboration. At that point, all that 
mattered was the recursive transfer of storage material for processing – first ink and 
paper telegram forms, later digitally encoded magnetic tape – which enacted the 
transposition of symbolic entries in one registry system into another.  
 
The Official Secrets Act 1920 did not only address cable services. Section 5 addressed 
private postal systems that moved physical media, explicitly mobilising the interface 
capacity of registries. Section 5 required anyone in “the business of receiving for 
reward letters, telegrams, or other postal packets for delivery or forwarding” to 
register their business with the police and to keep and make available for police 
inspection records of the following particulars,  
(a) the name and address of every person for whom any postal packet is 
received, or who has requested that postal packets received may be 
delivered or forwarded to him; 
(b) any instructions that may have been received as to the delivery or 
forwarding of postal packets; 
(c) in the case of every postal packet received, the place from which the 
postal packet comes, and the date of posting (as shown by the post-mark) 
and the date of receipt, and the name and address of the sender if shown 
on the outside of the packet, and, in the case of a registered packet, the 
date and office of registration and the number of the registered packet; 
(d) in the case of every postal packet delivered, the date of delivery and 
the name and address of the person to whom it is delivered; 
(e) in the case of every postal packet forwarded, the name and address to 
which and the date on which it is forwarded. 
                                                
602 Corera, Intercept, 96. 
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These protocols became preconditions for all private delivery services. In 1925, a file 
was opened on a recently opened private mailbox and property registry company 
named Monomarks. It was marketed as a service for registering personal property, in 
order to “establish Identity, Ownership, Citizenship, the Law of Property and the 
Inalienable Rights of Man”, according to a newspaper advertisement contained in the 
file. It also offered a document delivery and storage service, and in this capacity the 
company is still in business today. The concern arose from the fact that it operated in 
more than one country. While Monomarks’ registry was located in London, if the 
company moved its files abroad to an office overseas, the registry would lie outside 
the jurisdiction and therefore section 5 of the Official Secrets Act would no longer 
apply to it.603 A series of confidential letters exchanged with Monomarks eventually 
resolved the concern. From looking at the file, it seems likely that all private 
communication companies in the UK have been secretly required to open their 
registries for inspection for almost a century.  
 
The critical point concerned the registry, and the ability to interface with it. In 
Vismann’s phrase, registries act as “universal exchangers”,604 symbolically linking 
diverse discrete events. Items may already be delivered, but the particular connections 
that delivered items materialised could be reproduced from records of past 
transmissions. Private communication networks were thereby integrated into the 
apparatus of government. This practice is analogous to compelling Internet Service 
Providers to retain complete records of past communications metadata today.  
4.5 Warrants and interception   
Interception warrants in the twentieth century came to function in a number of 
different registers. For the Home Office, the police, and the intelligence agencies that 
had been created prior to and during the First World War, they served as reference 
points for ongoing and past intelligence operations. For the Post Office and companies 
who were addressed by warrants, they provided inputs that commanded what items 
                                                
603 See ‘Monomarks: System of Identification: Instructions to the Commissioner’s Office and the Position under 
the Official Secrets Act 1920 (1925 – 1978) MEPO 2/9582’ 1978, National Archives. 
604 Vismann, Files, 82. 
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or categories of items were to be selected. As explained in chapter three, every 
communication medium defines its own parameters for interception, the privileged 
position from which all communications are potentially available for selection. But as 
this was in each case a technical question, it did not particularly affect the 
administrative form of the warrant, which functioned symbolically to reproduce 
authority rather than prescribe techniques. 
 
The form of the warrant could adapt to any technical medium. For instance, the 
warrant copy shown in figure 5 simply requires the collection of “all letters, telegrams 
or other postal packets believed to come from Lawrence Jones”, or other named 
targets, and those pertaining to anyone else at the listed addresses. For the Post Office, 
the warrant was a transfer medium containing selection data for target messages. The 
warrant transferred information required to make the ‘conditional jumps’ that 
discriminate between messages and channels, address data, locations, and so on: the 
information required to actualise interception as selections made against the horizon 
of traffic – which, as wartime censorship showed, could include total interception of 
all traffic. The warrant, once its elements are assembled so that it is recognisably 
materialised as a warrant, transferred information to be added to lists of active targets 
across different communication networks. The cancellation of a warrant removes an 
entry from the list. It takes effect as a simple conditional command actualised in 
interception techniques: if an item matches these terms, then select it for copying and 
distribution procedures. Archival examples of warrants pertaining to different 
technical media illustrate the point.  
4.5.1 Radiotelegraphy   
After the First World War, communication between Britain and the Soviet Union 
became a topic of concern for British intelligence, which was concerned with 
communist espionage. It was decided to intercept all “non-official telegrams” as an 
experiment, so as to see “what they amount to after a month”. In March 1920, direct 
telegram communication with Moscow was only possible via radio as there was no 
cable link, and a radio-telegram service was provided by Marconi Wireless Telegraph 
Ltd on shortwave frequencies. Due to atmospheric interference, radiotelegrams could 
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only reach Moscow from Britain during a window of around ninety minutes each day. 
However, a submarine cable connecting Peterhead in Scotland with Alexandrovsk in 
Russia was soon to be extended directly to Moscow, offering another source of 
intelligence.605  
 
The Security Service, MI5, wanted to ensure that both media were targeted for 
interception. To this end the Post Office drafted an appropriately formatted warrant 
and sent the text to MI5 to formalise and sign. The draft and the final warrant are both 
relatively simple, but the exchange itself is interesting as it demonstrates the role of 
the Post Office in framing its own operations. The Post Office could ensure that the 
widest possible technical reach was granted, while still specifying a relatively narrow 
set of parameters, so that Post Office staff tasked with carrying out the interception 
would have clear unambiguous instructions. The Security Service, on the other hand, 
had the operational interest in the material collected, and could provide more granular 
lists of future intelligence targets once the flow of information was operational. The 
Security Service’s task was to make the formal warrant and have the Secretary of State 
apply his signature to it. The warrant, eventually signed on 16th June 1920, ordered 
interception of all  
…telegrams which have been received or transmitted from or to those 
parts of Russia which are under the control of the Soviet Government or 
from or to any officers or agents of that Government. And for so doing 
this shall be your sufficient warrant. 606 
Intelligence expertise was contained within the Security Service, technical expertise in 
the Post Office. The only role for the Secretary of State was to assign a signature so 
that the connection between Security Service files and Post Office files could be linked 
via the correct protocological medium.  
                                                
605 ‘Warrants Authorising the Production of Letters and Telegrams to and from Russia for Inspection HO 
144/1684/400430’ 1921, National Archives. 
606 Ibid. 
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4.5.2 Telephone warrants 
Although the Home Office had had its own telephones since 1896,607 telephone 
interception was conducted without warrants until May of 1937, when they were 
introduced as a matter of policy, as opposed to law.608 As observed in chapter three, 
this coincided with the availability of portable magnetic recording equipment, which 
made telephone interception feasible as an investigatory device. Six months later, on 
22nd November 1937, the Labour Member of Parliament for Nuneaton, Reginal 
Fletcher, raised the topic in Parliament. He asked the Home Secretary when the 
government’s policy on telephone interception warrants had been established and 
what the practice had been beforehand.  
 
In response, the Home Secretary consulted Vernon Kell, Director of the Security 
Service. The file contains a memo stating that there was no legal requirement to use 
any particular form of warrant for telephone tapping, but that some “authorisation” 
had always been sought from the Director-General of the Post Office.609 A pencilled-
in margin note says this information should not become public. According to a note 
from Kell,  
In May last it was decided that as an additional safeguard against a too free use 
of this procedure there should always be a written warrant under the hand of 
the Home Secretary. 
By bringing telephone interception into the Home Office loop and indexing it to the 
production of warrants under the protocols applied to other modes of interception, 
the use of the technique would be regulated in case of over-zealous police activity led 
to it being publicly disclosed. Standardising warrants meant the practice itself would   
become standardised and this authority, if given, should always take the form 
of a warrant under the hand of the Secretary of State.610 
                                                
607 Pellew, Home Office: Clerks to Bureaucrats, 98. 
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The idea was not that the Secretary of State should personally assess all applications 
but that the ‘warrant under the hand of the Secretary of State’ had come to symbolise 
a set of filing procedures and protocols that regulated the practice according to wider 
governmental priorities, not the least of which was maintaining secrecy. To be 
controlled and accounted for, activities had to be channelled through the prescribed 
steps.  
 
A draft of the proposed telephone interception warrant form is contained in a carbon 
copy of a letter dated 1st May 1937 (figure 8), following legal advice of 14th April 1937 
that had criticised an earlier draft, (figure 9). A pre-existing template for telegram 
warrants had been directly copied over, but it was deemed inappropriate to speak of 
“detaining” or “opening” phone calls. The phrase “imposing a check” had been 
suggested, but rejected as “too ambiguous”. A note added 15th April 1937 suggests 
that time limits should be included to prevent the Post Office or police from having to 
indefinitely listen in to calls on the targeted line. Other than these semantic details, 
which were designed to avoid ambiguity when addressed to telephone engineers, the 
form itself remained the same.   
4.5.3 Standardisation of interception warrants    
General censorship warrants were implemented in both World Wars. In the Second 
World War, in addition to warrants covering postal packets and telegrams, separate 
warrants were produced for telephone lines. The Postmaster General was required 
to divulge to any person acting under the authority of the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air, the 
Lord Commissioners of the Admiralty and the Minister of Information any 
information which may be obtained from any telephone call, and to provide 
them with facilities to listen to any telephone call or on telephone line.611  
However, as in the years prior to the First World War, general censorship powers were 
intended to identify potential spies or enemy sympathisers. Individually targeted 
warrants were required to investigate them further, so that each distinct target would 
                                                
611 ‘Policy with Regard to the Interception of Private Lines by Telephone Units without HOWs 1941-1944 KV 
4/445’ 1944, National Archives. 
 219 
be assigned an individual entry in the registry. This applied to postal and telegram 
communication but also to telephones. The centralised trunk network that enabled 
remote telephone tapping, discussed in chapter three, had not yet been created. 
Mobile Telephone Censorship Units were used to make general checks on any given 
local telephone exchange. Only in exceptional cases were the mobile units to be used 
to actively target individual lines for ongoing monitoring under the general warrant 
of 1940.612 In this regime, if a suspected individual had more than one telephone line, 
there was to be a separate warrant for each, as “the check was imposed on the 
telephone number and not the individual concerned”. This is counter-intuitive if one 
thinks of warrants as imposing the authority of the state upon human subjects, whose 
privacy is at stake, but if one considers instead that in the telephone network, 
connections are made between numbered lines and not between individuals, its 
intelligence value becomes clear. Warrants began to address themselves to 
communication systems rather than their human users.  
 
Prompted by the increased level of interception activity, on 21st May 1942, a set of 
standardised procedural guidance notes was issued within MI5 regarding letter and 
telephone checks,613 to bring all interception warrants together into a carefully 
prescribed protocol (see figures 10-15). Pre-formatted slips and cards were printed 
with their own identifying catalogue numbers. Detailed protocols were included; one 
listing the procedure to be followed when applying for postal or telegram warrants, 
another in relation to telephone warrants. Samples of how to correctly complete the 
basic pre-printed forms were also included, including both warrants and warrant 
cancellation forms. The circular is instructive also as to the complexity of the internal 
communication networks based on registry references and filing techniques. Marked 
as a circular, the copy of the covering letter addresses itself to “All Officers” within 
certain coded categories. In the first paragraph, it states that “all previous circulars on 
this subject are cancelled”, thereby indicating the supremacy of the new protocols over 
the old.   
                                                
612 Ibid. 
613 ‘Policy and Procedure for the Imposition of Home Office Warrants for the Interception of Mail and Telephone 
Communications in the UK 1939-1945 KV 4/222’ 1944, National Archives. 
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Pre-printed forms produce standardised feedback so that any of the intelligence 
analysts receiving data, regardless of their prior knowledge of the file, can 
immediately see all relevant information in a single location (see figure 16). Forms 
have agency, they prompt action. In order to complete the form, all the administrative 
and legal requirements pertaining to the execution of the warrant must be correctly 
entered, processed, and thus recorded for the future in the pre-printed blank spaces.614 
The form establishes and elaborates the correct procedure to be used when storing 
intercepted data, to format it in advance of processing. Henceforth the warrant is no 
longer just making a command, or unifying two entries in two different registries. It 
is also prompting further action from its addressee beyond the bare command to 
intercept communication. It demands feedback from its addressee in a standardised, 
coded manner that bring uniformity across files.  
 
Ultimately, a ‘warrant’ is compiled of the protocols and connections that are unfolded 
in the process of issuing it. When it takes effect, it always refers back to governmental 
authority. It allows governmental power to appear as an effect of all the operations 
that are organised around it. The ‘textocracy’ of government is an effect of the 
processes that go into making the symbolic products of government, which in turn 
take effect by commanding the execution of other technical operations elsewhere – in 
sorting rooms or telegraph offices, for example. Hence the form of the warrant is 
flexible, as they can be programmed in different ways. Warrants are capable of 
symbolising diverse worlds, technologies, and subjects. It articulates connections 
between such operations by referring them back to its symbolic authority.615 The 
warrant is the switch point at which diverse circuits of technical knowledge and 
governmental practices meet.  
 
Public knowledge of the state’s capacity to carry out secret surveillance on the 
population meant that secret files came to be regarded as a dangerous and repressive 
                                                
614 Vismann, Files, 128. 
615 The word ‘textocracy’ is borrowed from Krajewski, World Projects, 186. 
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resource, with which citizens’ personal lives could be monitored and assessed without 
any democratic oversight. In the second half of the twentieth century,  
… files have been the medium instrumentally involved in the differentiation 
processes that pit state against society and administration against citizenry. The 
state compiles records, society demands their disclosure.616  
In relation to interception power, the production of warrants and information erupted 
as a topic of public concern following a scandal about telephone tapping in 1957.617  
4.5.4 Procedural norms 
In 1957, a group of Privy Councillors (i.e. retired ministers of state sworn to secrecy 
and loyalty to the Queen) led by Sir Norman Birkett were appointed to investigate 
and publicly report on the legality and procedures of telephone interception. The 
legality of telephone tapping was confirmed, albeit in carefully chosen and somewhat 
ambiguous terms (the legal analysis is discussed in greater detail in chapter six).  
 
Administratively, the report confirmed that the Home Secretary acted as the authority 
that authorises applications for interception warrants. Applications to the Home 
Secretary were made by other agencies, indicating that investigative work was 
completely differentiated from the operations of the Home Office. Fourteen different 
agencies had been granted interception warrants between 1937 and 1956, although 
most applications came from just three agencies: the police, customs, and MI5. 
Apparently not all agencies had adopted the uniform protocols circulated by MI5 
during the war, each used their own internal application procedures for seeking 
Home Office warrants. At paragraph 78, the report states: 
… the keeping of full and accurate records is a necessary part of any 
procedure to ensure that the use to which interception may be put is 
effectively controlled. The Home Office records of warrants issued for the 
detection of crime are reasonably full. Each case is separately recorded in 
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a file. These all contain the ground on which the warrant was issued, a 
copy of the warrant itself and the date of its cancellation.618 
The report recommended standardising applications across all agencies in order to 
implement firm procedural norms. It recommended that individual warrants should 
always be sought for individual targets. Some existing warrants contained long lists 
of named targets on the same warrant. Few warrant applications contained any reason 
for interception, thus failing to justify the intrusion into privacy that would follow. 
And as there were no records of any refused applications, it was apparent that the 
Home Office did not give any consideration to the normative question of which 
applications could be justifiably granted and which could not. The records gave the 
Privy Councillors the impression that applications were always granted regardless of 
the circumstances. The report recommended reasons for applications be included, and 
a record of all refusals maintained. Furthermore, it stated, time limits should be built 
into every new warrant so that their validity would automatically lapse unless 
positively renewed by further application.619 Responsibility for making cancellation 
and renewal requests to the Home Office should always rest with the agency 
concerned.  
 
Long-term filing practices were deemed inadequate; many internal documents had 
been disposed of, making any detailed audit impossible. 
Until 1947 the Home Office kept a card index of names and addresses 
showing alphabetically by name and geographically by area all the 
warrants issued for security purposes. In 1947, at the suggestion of the 
Security Service, which was disturbed by the existence of these records in 
the Home Office, all of them were destroyed and no complete records 
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were kept thereafter except for the serial numbers of the warrants 
issued.620 
This implies that the Security Service (MI5) maintained its own card index. Only the 
Home Office was to destroy theirs, which from a security perspective represented an 
unnecessarily risky redundancy. The Home Office was simply processing and 
granting warrant applications without any means of assessing the assessments that 
lay behind applications. Since 1954, records of the minutes on each file had been kept 
by the Home Office, but they gave only a brief account of the reason for each warrant. 
Meanwhile, 
The Metropolitan Police destroyed all warrants between 1937 and 1946 
upon their cancellation, and the same practice was followed from 1946 – 
1953, except that a bare record was kept of the number of interceptions 
authorised by the Secretary of State. Detailed records exist only from 1953. 
The Security Service also destroyed detailed records before 1952 although 
it kept figures of the numbers of warrants issued. It was not possible to 
discover the exact number of interceptions in earlier years, but only the 
number of warrants issued; the discrepancy between these two figures 
would, however, be very small indeed.621 
Since the Privy Councillors began their inquiry, the report notes, the Home Office had 
implemented a new protocol for making and retaining records. In every application, 
the following points should be noted, in one place:  
(a) The ground on which the warrant is applied for,  
(b) A note of any subsequent decisions concerning the warrant. 
(c) A copy of the warrant issued or, alternatively, a note that the 
application has been rejected.  
(d) A record of the date of the cancellation of the warrant and the reason 
therefore.622 
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622 Ibid., para. 84. 
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This data would be collated and transformed into statistics, and the statistical figures 
would then be made subject to post facto monthly reviews.623 All of this, however, 
would be done secretly, particularly where Security Service tapping was concerned. 
Reviews should remain within the administrative chambers of government: 
We are strongly of the opinion that it would be wrong for figures to be 
disclosed by the Secretary of State at regular or irregular intervals in the future. 
It would greatly aid the operation of agencies hostile to the State if they were 
able to estimate even approximately the extent of the interception of 
communications for security purposes.624 
The Birkett Report marked the first time that the procedures for making interception 
warrants had been observed from outside the Home Office and interception agencies 
since 1844. Whereas the Secret Committee made some general suggestions on 
procedure, the Birkett Report demanded them in stronger terms, and the government 
publicly approved of the suggestions.  
 
What mattered, in media-technical terms, was that protocols and procedures be 
implemented so that the normative considerations demanded by abstract values were 
integrated into, and evidenced by, the filing processes that generated warrants and 
processed their effects. The Home Office was to ensure that senior officials 
independently recorded and reviewed each application, so that while the agencies – 
police, Security Service, customs, and so on – used their index systems for intelligence 
and investigation, the Home Office would retain a copy of their applications and 
perform reviews over its own master-index of applications, including any refused 
applications, in order to supply a second-order normative review. This way, 
normative standards could be superimposed on technical standards, and the 
application of technical standards could become a medium for normative self-
assurance. Provided the new procedures were implemented and followed strictly, 
whatever warrants resulted – and whatever information the files processed – would 
in advance be normatively acceptable, and would remain so provided the ongoing 
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files were properly handled, cancelled, and correctly stored (and not destroyed) for 
post facto review. In short, files had to be made according to new procedures, and the 
implementation of those procedures in turn had to be evidenced in the file. Whereas 
the making of medieval writs had involved a fictionalised chain of ex ante authority 
culminating in the King, the making of modern warrants became subject to a chain of 
post facto reviews, ultimately reporting statistics back to the ministerial offices of the 
Secretaries of State. They thus occupied two positions in a symbolic circuit, acting both 
as the authorisers and the auditors of interception.  
 
Although no samples of warrants post-dating 1957 are publicly available, the 
recommendations of the Birkett report were apparently put in place and 
operationalised throughout all the government agencies concerned with interception, 
as evidenced by a report obtained under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 in the 
course of this research.625 The report was prepared by a Working Party of the Home 
Office established in 1979 to prepare for the possible requirement to draft legislation 
concerning interception powers. It refers frequently to the “Birkett arrangements”, 
which all the agencies concerned confirmed had been rigorously complied with 
within their bureaucracies since 1957. These procedures, in turn, were felt to guarantee 
the propriety of interception and ensured that it was only used where warranted by 
the Secretary of State.  
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that the Secretary of State’s authority to direct 
interception has always been a consequence, not a source, of the making of warrants. 
The Secretary’s ongoing power is an effect of the ongoing operations that give the 
Secretary’s position its appearance of timeless continuity. Warrants express the 
symbolic authority to define operations, and thereby reproduce the notion that “only 
the subject can carry out actions and rule over things.”626 Communication media 
define the course of action that results in the interception of information, warrants 
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attribute those results to the will of the Secretary of State. Yet the Secretary of State is 
today neither the source of decisions to intercept communication nor the one who 
determines the lawfulness of the process. The techniques of warrant making, which 
were always drafted by under-secretaries and merely brought before the Secretary to 
sign, link the body of the office-holder to the authority that the warrant ascribes to 
them. They have always been products of particular procedural rules, which must be 
obeyed in order to reproduce authority in a recognised form.627 
 
The Birkett arrangements transformed procedures for making warrants into 
normative prescriptions. To make a warrant, one had to follow the new procedures, 
and this way one would be assured of making a document that respected civil 
liberties, privacy, and so on. Yet such arrangements could not rectify the fundamental 
split that the creation and processing of files and warrants had come to symbolise 
between state and society, in Vismann’s formulation.628 They sustained the split. The 
Birkett arrangements were the latest edition in a line of administrative recipes and 
formulations that resulted in files, and thus they simply reproduced the existing 
symbolic authority of the state and its offices, now reconfigured to function as auditors 
of their own decisions.  
 
Interception warrants were administered in secret and they excluded the law. Appeals 
to the law – meaning courts, judges, and open hearings – were impossible in relation 
to interception powers, until a surprising event in 1978 forced the issue.  
  
                                                
627 Ibid., 88. 
628 Vismann, Files, 147. 
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5. Secrecy and Surprises 
5.1 The law of interception warrants  
In this chapter, the implementation and function of legislation about interception 
powers is analysed. First, the chapter examines the judicial decision that preceded the 
creation of legislation. The suggestion is that the problem to be solved was not simply 
the need to give interception a legal footing, but to manage the publicity that law 
depends on. Legislation, rather than representing the subjection of political power to 
law, is better understood as a technique of media-management.  
5.1.1 The warrant before the law  
In January 1979, an interception warrant appeared on the bench of the High Court in 
London, presided over by the Vice-Chancellor of the Rolls, and Privy Councillor, 
Robert Megarry. Journalists Patrick Fitzgerald and Mark Leopold described the scene.   
The Solicitor General, Peter Archer, arranged for a copy of the warrant to be 
brought to court where it lay, like some sacred scroll, untouched upon 
Megarry’s bench inside a sealed envelope.629  
The interception warrant came before the law unexpectedly. In the summer of 1978, a 
London antiques dealer named James Malone was one of five defendants tried in the 
Crown Court for offences connected with handling stolen property. He was acquitted 
on some counts and the jury failed to agree a verdict on others. At a retrial in 1979 he 
was fully acquitted. On 18th July 1978, during the first trial, a notebook belonging to 
the lead investigator in the case was entered in evidence. It happened to contain 
details of a 1977 conversation between Malone and a co-defendant, with a note 
indicating that it was obtained by ‘tapping’ Malone’s telephone line. Counsel for the 
prosecution admitted,  
In the circumstances I am authorised to say that there was such an interception 
carried out on the authority of the Secretary of State’s warrant.630 
                                                
629 Fitzgerald and Leopold, Stranger on the Line, 135. 
630 Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner [1979] 344 Chancery Division, 349. 
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Malone wrote to the Post Office directly regarding the line tap. Apparently, a senior 
executive wrote back and confirmed the tap had been removed.631 Malone issued a 
writ against the police on 17th October 1978, seeking an injunction against further line-
taps, delivery of copies of all intercepted information and destruction of any in police 
custody, and damages. He also sought a subpoena against the Post Office requiring 
they produce the warrant in court, which is how it came to be before Megarry. 
 
The warrant required an explanation from the court. The problem facing Megarry was 
that there was none readily available. This was an unusual situation in relation to a 
purportedly legal instrument that had, for three centuries, assigned to Secretaries of 
State the power to direct and determine the interception of communication. By 1979, 
the symbolic authority assigned to the Secretary of State by interception warrants 
referred to highly complex operations of information transfer, constantly flowing 
between the public and private interceptors of various forms of postal and technical 
media on the one hand, and the consumers and processors of intelligence on the other. 
The warrant also functioned to exclude, by omission, everyone else from accessing the 
privileged position in which interception operations are performed. It reserved access 
to those from whom the warrant demanded execution.  
 
However, the law operates according to a different set of programs and protocols. In 
all the stores of textual decisions and statutory rules that were then available as 
resources, the law lacked a text that clearly assigned to the telephone interception 
warrant a definite position within the legal system. This was not in itself an 
insurmountable problem. The common law is a textual production machine, its 
resources are old texts that it turns into new texts. The cultural-technical skills 
required to operate texts of the common law are flexible. As Murphy puts it, the 
specific genius of common law lies in “the mobilization of virtual orders, and a realism 
of the ‘as if’”.632 Common law is non-epistemological and non-empirical. There is no 
dogma as to how material objects must be constructed. Law selects its facts in each 
case. It is 
                                                
631 Fitzgerald and Leopold, Stranger on the Line, 133–34. 
632 Murphy, The Oldest Social Science? 113. 
 229 
a science of the hypothetical – but not the experimental hypothesis. It is a 
paradoxical knowledge of the ‘what if?’, or society understood and 
characterized through its pathology (as that pathology appears in the 
courtroom), a science of imagined possibilities which is simultaneously the 
basis for the elaboration of a range of techniques for avoiding in advance the 
possibility of a pathology, pathology being defined as the need to go to court.633 
The telephone interception warrant presented one such pathology. To remedy it, a 
new decision had to be written that would account for the existence of the warrant 
and ascribe it a settled position within the law. If a place could not be found for the 
warrant, then it would have to be declared illegal.  
5.1.2 The danger of judgment  
The problem, however, was not in making a decision that would make the warrant 
legal, but the potential consequences of doing so. Law functions by making analogies. 
If the decision were to bring the informational content of the warrant into legal 
discourse and assign it a position, it would mean bringing the content of all past, 
present, and future interception warrants into legal discourse. Whatever decision was 
arrived at, if it engaged with the content of the warrant, then future cases could do so 
too. This is an unavoidable consequence of the techniques of the common law, which 
mobilises texts to recombine and develop them analogically in a “continuing 
consolidation of a perpetual present which was somehow out of time.”634 Rather than 
being determined by the past, each decision must reconstruct the present, but with an 
eye on the future. The future is what always remains changeable. A judicial decision 
must look forwards as it mobilises the past. Judgment “cannot be determined by the 
past but attempts to treat the future differently”.635 
 
The operational function of the content of the warrant was, as we have seen, to provide 
interceptors targets that are added to lists. The targets varied with each warrant while 
the general symbolic form that linked authority to execution remained the same. The 
                                                
633 Ibid., 118. 
634 Ibid., 89. 
635 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 283. 
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lists mattered because they directed the application of interception techniques that 
were, by definition, state secrets. State secrets are not the same as religious mysteries 
or mystical powers, they are technical operations that are understood according to a 
political logic of time that addresses itself to the future. To open the envelope and 
discuss the legality of its content would mean bringing the conditions of listing targets 
directly into the legal order, which would, in turn, damage the state by reducing the 
effectiveness of the techniques in the future. If the targeting of individuals, 
organisations, or communication channels were made subject to law, then they would 
be made subject to legal protocols that would, in turn, have to be legally reviewed. 
Hypothetically, everyone who even suspected their name might appear on such a 
warranted list could go to the law and demand an account. 
 
On the other hand, to simply declare the warrant illegal would be worse. That would 
be to declare that its symbolic attribution of legal authority to the Secretary of State, 
and to the actions of interceptors, was also illegal and always had been. By analogy, 
every other telephone interception warrant would, potentially, be made illegal. It 
would, to put it mildly, trigger a crisis. At the very least, it would require Parliament 
to urgently pass interception legislation in order to create a legal position for the 
interception warrant. That would generate even greater attention, causing political 
embarrassment as well as tactical problems for the agencies that depended on 
intercepted data. 
 
Moreover, in his position as a judge, Megarry could not simply refuse to decide. The 
only true imperative he faced was that he had to produce a decision. Courts can rule 
one way or the other on the issues before them, but they cannot abdicate the duty to 
decide. If they did, the law would come to a halt. Luhmann calls this the “prohibition 
of the denial of justice.”  
Courts have to decide even when they cannot decide… And if they cannot 
decide, they must force themselves to be able to decide. If the law cannot be 
found, it must simply be invented… the decision must be translated into 
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distinctions which can be managed, for example the distinction between 
decision and consequence or between legal principle and its application.636 
The translation of a decision into the distinction between principle and application is 
precisely the course that Megarry took.  
5.1.3 Materialising political secrecy 
We can more clearly delineate the delicate status of the warrant as it sat on the bench 
by reference to terms drawn from political history. As an administrative device, the 
warrant appears as an arcanum of state. A political arcanum (from arca, meaning 
treasury, coffin, or chest) refers to an essential tool of political security that is wielded 
by the state to maintain its own security. The definition includes any technique of state 
power that is based on “silence and concealment” or any information that is “locked 
away and hidden”. Modern arcana are mundane techniques typically identified by 
their formal classification as official secrets. Formal classification of the arcana, in turn, 
is a technique of political time management. To remain silent about the arcana is to 
maintain their effectiveness. Silence about the use of interception warrants stabilises 
the environment in which they take effect, this way, the warrant remains an effective 
option for future use, keeping secure the status quo.637 In other words, arcana are 
techniques that must be kept out of the mass media, such as newspapers, television, 
and broadcast radio. 
 
In a different register, the English word ‘secret’ is etymologically derived from the 
Latin verbal participle secretus, which refers to a thing having been separated. A 
secretum refers to a thing that has been separated from something else. In this sense, 
the ‘secret’ indicates a structural distinction in relation to a given piece of information. 
The secret is constituted by the difference between access (inclusion) and restriction 
(exclusion). The form of the ‘secret’ describes the unity of the difference between those 
in the know and those in the dark. Borrowing from Derrida, Eva Horn observes that 
this relationship of inclusion and exclusion is generative of a ‘secrecy effect’ produced 
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whenever withheld information is known to exist. 638 The arcana, if properly managed, 
generate only silence. An arcanum of state should never enter into discussion at all, 
beyond the small circle constituted by those who ‘need to know’. The secrecy-effect, 
on the other hand, generates an over-abundance of communication. Horn compares it 
to Foucault’s observation that in modern society, supposedly ‘repressed’ sexuality is 
discussed endlessly. Similarly, the effect of the secrecy-relationship is that everyone 
talks about secrets.639  
 
The story of the warrant sitting on the bench was formally recorded only by 
journalists. Its presence in the courtroom is not mentioned at all in the judgment, 
which refers only to the application for a subpoena. This is not surprising, as the 
biggest consumers of secrets are the mass media. This shall be discussed further 
below. For now, we return to the courtroom.  
5.2 Re-programming the problem 
One does not necessarily construct the components of a judgment in the order that is 
suggested by the final draft of the text. Like a mystery novel, or a thesis, it may be 
easier to work out the ending and work backwards. Megarry, who as a Privy 
Councillor had formal duties to the state that were equal if not superior to his duties 
to the law, had to arrive at a final judgment that would both legitimise the warrant in 
the symbolic order of law and simultaneously avoid saying anything about it that 
might require him to open the envelope as a consequence. The task was to include the 
warrant symbolically within the law by excluding it from any direct discussion. Its 
presence in the courtroom had to be dealt with by using the law to make it legally 
absent from the discussion.  
 
There were two possible arguments for excluding the warrant presented to Megarry. 
One came from the police, who were represented in the court because they had been 
named as the defendants by Malone’s writ. The other argument came from the 
Solicitor-General, who was there to represent the Secretary of State for the Home 
                                                
638 Ibid., 109. 
639 Ibid., 105. 
 233 
Office. The Home Secretary, a fellow Privy Councillor, had ‘intervened’ in the case on 
Megarry’s invitation. It was, after all, his authority on the line. 
 
The Solicitor-General invited the judge to find that the common law would not open 
the envelope and reveal the warrant’s contents for “reasons of public safety”. This 
option was not unprecedented in the common law, and therefore was a valid response 
open to the court. Only two years earlier, in the case of Hosenball, before the Court of 
Appeal, Lord Denning had said,  
When the public interest requires that information be kept confidential, it may 
outweigh even the public interest in the administration of justice.640 
But the police’s lawyer made a more elegant suggestion, which Megarry ultimately 
adopted in his judgment. Focusing on the part of Malone’s writ that sought an 
immediate interlocutory (i.e., interim) injunction against the police to ban them from 
further telephone-tapping, Megarry cited the case of American Cyanamid Co. v Ethicon 
Ltd. [1975] A.C. 396, 407, a commercial case that dealt with the question of the correct 
legal procedure to follow when dealing with applications for injunctions.  
 
American Cynamid provides a procedural rule for the common law: that an 
interlocutory injunction should only be granted if the illegality of the alleged action is 
already settled in law, so that only the facts are to be determined during a full trial of 
the action. Such an interlocutory injunction should not be granted in cases where the 
legality of the alleged facts is unclear, because if, after a full trial has been adjudicated, 
the assumed legal basis for the injunction turns out to have been incorrect, then the 
defendant who was subjected to that injunction has suffered unnecessarily during the 
period of the trial.  Conversely, if an injunction is refused and the legal argument later 
shown to be correct, then the plaintiff has to suffer the ongoing activity until the law 
has been clarified. Between these two options, the court in American Cynamid decided 
                                                
640 R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex p. Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766; Mark Hosenball, an American 
journalist, was facing deportation from the UK for his part in writing a story about GCHQ’s existence and 
operations. His co-authors were tried under the Official Secrets Act in the so-called ‘ABC Trial’. Hosenball was 
simply deported; see also, ‘ABC Case’, accessed 8 June 2017, http://www.duncancampbell.org/content/abc-
case. 
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that the law will only intervene in the world by issuing an injunctive writ once the 
legal basis for doing so is clear. Where the law is unclear, the hypothetical ‘status quo’ 
is to be maintained by non-intervention. 
 
Using the cultural technique of legal analogy, Megarry applied this line of conditional 
programming to the case before him. He held that it would be “inappropriate” to alter 
the situation by issuing an interlocutory injunction against the police without first 
allowing for “detailed argument and mature consideration” in respect of the 
underlying legal issue. As the judgment explains, 
The upshot was that on Day 2, by consent, the motion was transformed. It was 
agreed that the motion should be treated as the trial of the action and heard on 
the existing affidavit evidence, without more. The statement of claim was 
heavily amended in relation to the relief sought. All claims to any injunction, 
order for delivery up, order for destruction and damages were deleted. Further, 
all allegations that there had been a conspiracy between the Post Office 
employees and police officers (for which the defendant was liable under section 
48 of the Police Act 1964) were withdrawn; and no allegations of criminal 
conduct were made. In lieu of the relief sought by the statement of claim, 
various declarations were claimed, relating to the legality of telephone tapping; 
and these were substituted for the relief sought by the notice of motion.641  
Rather than seeking disclosure and damages on the basis of unlawful behaviour, 
Megarry ‘deleted’ the material facts from the case before him and ‘substituted’ in 
‘various declarations’ instead. He responded to an impossible set of imperatives by 
side-stepping them, and thus eliminated the need to address in any way the empirical 
status of the sealed document before him. By this protocological recoding of the 
matter, the trial was transformed to a simple hypothetical question, which Megarry 
phrased as, “Is telephone tapping in aid of the police in their functions relating to 
crime illegal?”642  
                                                
641 Malone v MPC [1979] 344 Ch., 350. 
642 Ibid., 355. 
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5.2.1 Assembling a judgment  
Once the materiality of the specific warrant was out of the way, the path was clear to 
assembling an abstract account of its status in the law. After two days of preliminary 
argument on the warrant, Megarry formally dismissed the subpoena application as 
irrelevant, handed the sealed envelope back to the envoy from the Post Office, and 
sent him on his way. Once the material presence of the warrant had been removed 
from the court, it could be dealt with solely by reference to the legal meaning of its 
long-standing symbolic effects. In short, did the abstract office-holder of the Secretary 
of State have in law the power that the warrant ascribed to him?  
 
The judgment began by considering the possible laws that telephone interception may 
have violated. First, Megarry found no general right to privacy in the common law. 
Although Malone’s counsel presented analogies in the common law that could, when 
taken “together with the requirements of justice and common sense”, amount to the 
finding of a right of privacy, Megarry decided this was too much to ask of a court as 
it would have political consequences far beyond the immediate facts of the case. 
Whereas he avoided assigning a political boundary to legal decisions in relation to 
political secrecy, he was happy to inscribe a political limitation around more 
comfortable topics like the notion of privacy. Ultimately, he said, “it is no function of 
the courts to legislate in a new field.”643 Telephone tapping was clearly an invasion of 
privacy in fact, but invading privacy was not legally forbidden by the common law.  
 
Turning to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, Megarry 
agreed that it was “impossible to see how English law could be said to satisfy the 
requirements of the Convention” in relation to interception of communication, which 
demanded some legislative basis for the practice. The law had to give positive 
assurances that it would only be used ‘proportionately’ and according to ‘necessity’ 
in a democratic society, and supply a right of recourse in case the law was breached. 
                                                
643 Ibid., 372. 
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However, as the Convention was not justiciable in English law in 1979, it had no 
validity and was thus irrelevant to the determination of the case.644  
 
Megarry next identified two sources for a duty of confidentiality in English law. The 
first was contractual confidentiality, but that was eliminated because Post Office 
legislation explicitly stated that the relationship between the Post Office and 
subscribers was non-contractual.645 The other was the equitable duty of 
confidentiality, but this could be found only in certain situations involving the abuse 
or unauthorised disclosure of sensitive information. For a court to find such a duty 
depended first on the particular quality of the confidential information in each case, 
second on a finding that there was expectation of confidentiality when the information 
was imparted, and finally on some measure of harm done by the disclosure. As these 
fact-dependent criteria could not apply generally to the relationship between the Post 
Office and all telephone subscribers, it could not apply to the abstract question of the 
general legality of telephone tapping. On the contrary, Megarry held:   
When this is applied to telephone conversations, it appears to me that the 
speaker is taking such risks of being overheard as are inherent in the system 
[…] so much publicity in recent years has been given to instances (real or 
fictional) of the deliberate tapping of telephones that it is difficult to envisage 
telephone users who are genuinely unaware of this possibility.646 
In other words, users of the Post Office telephone network should presuppose that 
their calls were anything but confidential. He went on to state that even if telephone 
tapping in aid of the police did constitute a breach of confidentiality in the case of 
police interception, the countervailing public interest in the prevention and detection 
of crime would justify the breach.647  
 
Having concluded this review, Megarry found that there was nothing to outlaw 
telephone tapping in English law. It was not illegal because nothing forbade it. What, 
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then, was the purpose of a warrant? On Megarry’s reading, interception warrants are 
simply administrative tools for delegating orders, but they neither recognise or 
generate any legal authority. Statutory rules that prohibited the interception of posted 
letters and telegrams without a warrant existed, but they simply criminalised 
unwarranted interception. That alone did not assign any positive authority to the 
Secretary of State. Warrants simply frame orders in a form that immunises Post Office 
staff, and nothing more.648  
 
In respect of telephones, however, there was no reference whatsoever to warrants in 
any legislation. The only analogous rule was found at section 80 of the Post Office Act 
1969. It stated that Post Office staff could be made subject to ‘requirements’ compelling 
them to inform ‘officials of the Crown’ of any matters ‘transmitted’ by telephone. 
These ‘requirements’ were undefined. Megarry concluded simply that, 
A warrant was not needed to make the tapping lawful: it was lawful without 
any warrant. But where the tapping was done under warrant (and that is the 
only matter before me) the section afforded statutory recognition of the 
lawfulness of the tapping.649 
Having found that there was nothing in English law to make telephone tapping illegal, 
Megarry ruled that it therefore  
requires no authorisation by statute or common law; it can lawfully be done 
simply because there is nothing to make it unlawful.650 
By implication, the law does not require governmental power to have a specific legally 
defined source. This is a controversial finding, summed up by Megarry’s infamous 
quip: 
England, it may be said, is not a country where everything is forbidden except 
what is expressly permitted: it is a country where everything is permitted 
except what is expressly forbidden.651  
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Here, the analogical nature of the common law worked against him. The judgment 
served up the desired result: telephone interception was not illegal, and the existing 
warrants regime could lawfully continue. However, once the logical steps taken in 
order to arrive at this result are analogised, they imply that there is no legal difference 
between a person acting as a private citizen and a person acting as a public official. 
Like anyone else, then, government officials are free in law to do anything that is not 
otherwise illegal. This particular finding is considered so controversial by English 
public lawyers that it is now the main reason that the case is remembered, often 
viewed as a bad decision.652  
 
There are hints that suggest Megarry realised the controversy that would follow. 
Towards the end of the judgment he states that the topic of interception “cries out for 
legislation”,653 and emphasises that his decision is confined narrowly to the specific 
question of facilitating telephone tapping by the police where they have “just cause” 
for the request.654 It is hard to resist the impression of Pontius Pilate, as Megarry 
distances himself from the bigger picture. On this reading, the judgment appears as a 
placeholder, a temporary fix to an unpredictable and unlikely situation. It enabled 
interception to continue for the immediate future, while the government formulated 
the legislation that would inevitably be required once Malone had taken the country 
to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg. Malone did go to Strasbourg, 
which moved slowly at the time. Six years later, for reasons that Megarry himself had 
identified, he won.655 
                                                
652 Adam Tomkins, ‘The Authority of Entick v Carrington’, in Entick v Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law, 
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655 As we shall see, the outcome was fully anticipated by the British government, see Malone v. The United 
Kingdom [1985] ECHR 5. 
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5.2.2 The symbolic meaning of authority  
Megarry’s ruling remains troubling to some constitutional theorists who deal with 
English law because it has implications for the meaning of the ‘rule of law’ in relation 
to governmental power generally.656 The debate has recently been framed via two 
alternative readings of the 1765 case of Entick v Carrington, which since the late 
nineteenth century has been mobilised as a common law resource for legally 
constraining executive political decisions where they infringe upon civil liberties.  
 
In Entick v Carrington, the Secretary of State issued general warrants ordering the 
King’s Messengers to search for and seize any papers belonging to anyone suspected 
of involvement in the printing of seditious libel. The warrants were ‘general’ in that 
they named only the crime, not the suspects, and provided no peremptory reason for 
targeting them. Anyone suspected by the Messengers was rounded up and their 
homes searched for papers. As we saw in chapter four, Hale had previously written 
about the legal requirements for Justices of the Peace to issue search warrants; he 
explicitly stated general warrants were illegal.657  
 
Lord Camden, the presiding judge in Entick v Carrington, found that there was no legal 
source of authority in common law or statute for a Secretary of State to issue general 
search warrants. It could not be justified by the royal prerogative because committing 
trespass was a legal wrong, and under the prerogative the King could do no wrong. 
Rather, he found the general warrants illegal, having no authority whatsoever. In an 
often-cited maxim, the judgment says: “If it is law it will be found in our books. If it is 
not to be found there it is not law.” The Messengers and their superior officers were 
trespassing when they broke into and searched private premises, and as the general 
warrant had no authority in law it could not excuse them. Damages were awarded 
accordingly.  
 
                                                
656 Note that this particular debate does not exhaust the concept of rule of law, see Martin Loughlin, Sword and 
Scales: An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics (Oxford: Hart, 2000), 65–75. 
657 See 4.2.3. 
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Recent interpretations of the case’s significance argue that Entick v Carrington is 
authority for the proposition that no public authority can do anything unless they can 
point to a positive legal authorisation to do it. A positive legal basis must be found in 
at least one of three possible sources: the royal prerogative, common law precedents, 
or legislation. Otherwise, any exercise of governmental power is unlawful, regardless 
of its consequences.658 This broad interpretation assumes, a priori, a difference 
between public and private subjects. Private subjects are free to do anything except 
what is explicitly prohibited. But public subjects occupy public personae, and in that 
capacity exercise powers that are defined by their office – powers which private 
citizens do not have. Public powers must be rooted in positive law. Law is positioned 
as the only legitimate medium of political power.659 
 
Alternatively, Entick v Carrington simply means that no one can infringe on the legally 
protected rights of anyone else unless they have some positive lawful authority to do 
so. The consequence of this older understanding of the case is that everyone is free to 
exercise their powers and capacities as they see fit, so long as no one else’s rights are 
infringed. This implies a negative conception of freedom that applies equally to public 
and private subjects. On this view, there is nothing inherently special about 
governmental actions. The critical issue in Entick v Carrington was that the Messengers 
had trespassed on private property without lawful authority. Consequences arose not 
from the absence of a power to make warrants, but from the absence of a justification 
for the trespass.660 This reading underpins long-standing criticism of the common law 
as a resource for protecting human rights. Relying only on common law, as advocated 
by some opponents of human rights legislation, leaves rights open to abuse in any 
situations where they do not coincide with conservative property rights, such as the 
tort of trespass.661 
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In the Malone case, Megarry was presented with the argument that the Secretary of 
State required some positive legal basis on which to make interception warrants. He 
therefore had to explicitly favour the narrow reading of Entick v Carrington and 
differentiate the cases from one another in the factual domain.662 Hence, whereas 
Entick had suffered trespass in his home, the technical interception of phone calls by 
the Post Office ‘happens’ somewhere else: 
The subscriber speaks into his telephone, and the process of tapping appears to 
be carried out by Post Office officials making recordings, with Post Office 
apparatus on Post Office premises, of the electrical impulses on Post Office 
wires provided by Post Office electricity. There is no question of there being 
any trespass on the plaintiff's premises for the purpose of attaching anything 
either to the premises themselves or to anything on them: all that is done is 
done within the Post Office's own domain.663 
Only by including this controversial element could Megarry reach the outcome he did.  
5.3 Birkett and prerogative  
When the Committee of Privy Councillors led by Norman Birkett reported on the 
legality of telephone tapping in 1957, they had taken a very different view of the 
question of legality:  
49. … it was submitted that, so far as the interception of telephone messages is 
concerned, reliance could be placed on the doctrine followed until 1937 that the 
Post Office was entitled to intercept and that it was not unlawful to do so …  
50. We should not be happy to feel that so important a power as the power to 
intercept telephone messages rested on either of the grounds set out in 
paragraphs 44-49. We favour the view that it rests upon the power plainly 
recognised by the Post Office statutes as existing before the enactment of the 
statutes, by whatever name the power is described.664 
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On this account, there was a positive source of power to intercept communication in 
general. In this respect, Birkett reiterated the findings of the 1844 Secret Committee, 
which found that letter interception was an emanation of the royal prerogative, the 
same power that had first established the Post Office. Birkett summarised the Secret 
Committee’s position on the legality of interception as follows:  
(a) The power to intercept letters and postal packets and to disclose their 
contents and otherwise to make use of them had been used and frequently used 
through many centuries. 
(b) Such a power existed and was exercised widely and publicly known as the 
debates in the House of Commons and the House of Lords plainly showed. 
(c) At no time had it been suggested with any authority that the exercise of the 
power was unlawful.665 
But it was not clear whether or how this analysis applied to telegrams and, more 
especially, to telephone communications. Birkett, like Megarry a senior member of the 
judiciary as well as a Privy Councillor, was unable to identify any legal authority for 
the interception of communication in general. There appears to be a degree of 
deliberate ambiguity in the report’s conclusion; the phrase “if there is a lawful power” 
and “by whatever name the power is described” at paragraph 51(c), cited above, 
indicate uncertainty.  
 
The view that interception was grounded in the royal prerogative was the long-
standing view of lawyers within the Home Office. While various statutes concerning 
the Post Office had been made over the years that prohibited intercepting or 
interfering with the mail or telegrams, except where authorised to do so by a warrant, 
these legislative clauses did not explicitly grant a power of interception to the 
Secretary of State. Rather, they implicitly suggested that such a power already existed 
under the royal prerogative. Legislation was drafted to criminalise anyone who tried 
to interfere with the post without a warrant. Such provisions were, in effect, part of 
                                                
665 Ibid., para. 39. 
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the consolidation of the monopoly over the transmission and interception of 
correspondence.  
 
The major problem, as Birkett saw it, was new technology. Postal correspondence and 
telegrams were addressed in legislation mentioning warrants, however obliquely, but 
telephones were not. It was put to the Privy Councillors that perhaps there was a 
prerogative power to intercept “any messages”, rather than specific media. But Birkett 
found difficulty with this argument. There was no legal record of a prerogative power 
over communication in general, and since the Glorious Revolution of 1689, no new 
prerogative powers could be created. Various constitutional writers had published 
works listing the various residual prerogative powers of the Crown that had survived 
the rise of Parliamentary sovereignty after 1689 – no general intereception power 
existed. 
23. The opponents of the view that the power to intercept is a prerogative 
power emphasise the fact that no constitutional writer when dealing with the 
Royal Prerogative, mentions this particular power as being a prerogative 
power. In Chitty's Prerogatives of the Crown published in 1820, the learned 
author states that he has attempted “to present a comprehensive and 
connected, yet compressed and logical, view of every prerogative and 
corresponding right of the subject”; but nowhere is any reference made to a 
prerogative power of detaining and opening communications. 
That interception was a long-standing government practice was not in itself legally 
persuasive. That argument was explicitly rejected, along with arguments of state 
necessity, in the case of Entick v Carrington. Just because successive Secretaries of State 
had assumed the power to intercept communication did not make it lawful. If 
ministers had issued warrants without authority, it meant only that they had been 
acting unlawfully. The law’s past perfect progressive tense indicates that, where the 
authorities turn a blind eye to legality in the service of other goals, the legal status of 
their actions is not inherently legal, rather, it is risky. The risk is that the question will 
have to be determined in the future, and it is that risk which must be evaluated.666 
                                                
666 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 179. 
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The ambiguity of Birkett’s report may have influenced the government’s legal strategy 
in 1979, which avoided the assertion that interception was a prerogative power. In his 
judgment Megarry does not dwell on the prerogative, or on the Birkett report’s 
analysis of the law. He says only that he will not rule one way or the other on the 
existence of a prerogative power to intercept communication. This does not mean that 
the issue was not argued in court. Given that Malone’s case was that no such power 
existed, only the police or Home Office would have raised it. If they did so, then they 
dropped the argument by the time argumentation ended. Common law judges are not 
required to perform an exhaustive investigation of the law, only to assemble and 
respond to the arguments that are put before them. Megarry could ignore the issue in 
his judgment only because no one asserted it.  
5.3.1 The instrumental past in print 
Common law involves using the past in a particular manner that has no regard for 
hermeneutical strategies or historical context. It means reading legally-valid texts of 
any age as if they co-exist on a plane of immanence. In Lord Camden’s words, it means 
finding law “in our books” and treating it with complete indifference to the “pastness 
of the past”, an a-temporal horizon, or eternal present.667   
 
Stepping away from legal techniques and towards legal-historical techniques, the 
explanation for the contradiction between Megarry and Birkett is clearer. The doctrine 
that there should be a statement of all prerogatives had emerged within the common 
law during the nineteenth century, as it drew up textual lists of prerogative powers in 
order to ensure no ‘new’ ones could be claimed by representatives of the Crown. In 
structural terms, when the Post Office was founded the law did not consider that the 
arcana had to be presented as arcana, and therefore no secrecy-effect (secretum) was 
generated that required legal determination. The law did not have any firm rules 
about the prerogative. It occupied an important but thinly-defined element in the 
resources then available to the law. Martin Loughlin points out three features of the 
prerogative as it was described by legal theorists of the seventeenth century:  
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First, that the existence of the absolute prerogative, one which derives from the 
distinction that the medieval scholastics made in theology between God's 
potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata, in no way suggests that such powers are 
unbounded. The absolute prerogative refers to an autonomous power of the 
king to govern, not arbitrarily to undermine the established legal order. It is a 
power assigned to the king—by fundamental law—to determine according to 
“reason of state”. Secondly, that it is in the nature of this governmental function 
that aspects of it must remain secret and be conducted free from public gaze. 
And, thirdly, that these “mysteries of state” have always been connected to—
and also impose limits on—the legal order.668 
Around 1760, Blackstone, the most famous compiler of legal codes of his era, noted 
that seventeenth-century monarchs had thought their prerogative powers “too 
delicate and sacred to be profaned by the pen of a subject”. It was considered a 
forbidden topic for any kind of legal writing. The royal prerogative could not be 
assigned a place within the legal order as it was not subject to the legal order. It was 
outside the law and superior to it. The prerogative, says Blackstone, was held to be 
“among the arcana imperii”.669 Royal assertions about the prerogative were contrary to 
already existing traditions in English law, and so they were viewed by many as an 
abuse of power. The prerogative thus provided the political backdrop to the English 
Revolution and to the classic contractual theories of government that followed. 
 
According to Blackstone, things definitively changed after 1689 when the prerogative 
became decisively subject to law, via a legislative instrument known as the Bill of 
Rights.670 If a King attacked the sovereignty of Parliament, that is, if a King tried to 
rule by proclamation, he would be legally deemed to have abdicated his throne. De 
facto abdication was the only formula that fit, because it was otherwise accepted that 
                                                
668 Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law, 380. 
669 William Blackstone, The Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s: Commentaries on the Laws of England: Book I: Of 
the Rights of Persons (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 291. 
670 ‘Bill of Rights 1689’, UK Parliament, accessed 20 September 2014, https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
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the King governed in the “public good”, that he could “do no wrong”, and that the 
general interests of Parliament and Crown were therefore aligned. In practice, the 
Crown retained most of its pre-existing powers, and the King was rarely challenged 
in terms of how he or his ministers exercised them. The crucial difference was that the 
King could not break the ‘contract’ upon which his rule relied by acting against the 
‘constitution’. Writing contemporaneously to the events that led to Entick v Carrington, 
Blackstone’s prerogative thus remains a special type of power, existing “out of the 
ordinary course of the common law”, which “must be in its nature singular and 
eccentrical; that it can only be applied to those rights and capacities which the King 
enjoys alone, in contradistinction to others”.671 Secret powers were fully compatible 
with the prerogative.   
 
It was under the symbol of the prerogative that the administrative organisation of 
governmental institutions took shape. European juridical and political theorists were 
not blind to the developments in governmental practices and the spread of 
disciplinary institutions. On the contrary, their task was to invent juridical theories to 
account for them. In such discourse they were described, generally, as ‘police’ or 
‘policy’ matters. The concept of ‘police’ became more developed in French and 
German theories of state than in England, but it was recognised in England. In 1760, 
Adam Smith addressed a lecture to the need to enhance the growth and prosperity of 
the nation. For Smith, trade, security, and infrastructure were critically important 
matters in need of governmental regulation. Regulation, as a mode of jurisprudence 
to be distinguished from adjudicating disputes between private persons, he described 
as a police matter.672 Blackstone, for his part, related “the public police and œconomy” 
to the King’s powers, amounting to 
the due regulation and domestic order of the kingdom: whereby the 
individuals of the state, like members of a well-governed family, are bound to 
conform their general behaviour to the rules of propriety, good 
                                                
671 Blackstone, Commentaries I, 292. 
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neighbourhood, and good manners; and to be decent, industrious, and 
inoffensive in their respective stations.673  
The administrative tasks of the ‘police’ developed complexity through legislation, but 
remained matters for the secretaryship. During the twentieth century, the number of 
Secretaries of State multiplied as the administrative welfare state grew in size, in turn 
provoking the development of judicial review, and the kind of critical public legal 
theory that is exemplified by demands for a clear conceptual distinction between 
public and private jurisprudence and a categorical definition of public power in the 
UK, which remains ambiguous.674 Of course, this in no way affects the daily 
administration of things, which are attributed to the ‘public power’ of the state only 
through symbolic references that are constantly regenerated via cultural techniques 
of ascription. The technical reproduction of ‘state’ activities in no way depends on the 
internal coherence of legal theory.675  
 
In the eighteenth century, general powers of security were subsumed under 
prerogative power, and therefore not subject to question by the law. By the twentieth 
century, when Entick v Carrington was unearthed as a constitutionally significant case, 
the legal understanding of the prerogative had altered completely. Political decisions 
to wield executive powers were more tightly coupled to the legal system. Judges were 
notoriously deferential to the executive, but nonetheless that deference had to be 
expressed in legal terms, whereas under the eighteenth century model, there was 
rarely any call to review political decisions of the executive.676 The courts did not 
review how the prerogative was exercised until 1984 – coincidentally, the substance 
of prerogative decisions was first judicially reviewed in a case involving strike action 
                                                
673 Ibid., 425; citing volume 4 of Blackstone’s Commentaries. 
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by civil servants working at GCHQ677 – but before that,  it was necessary to know what 
the prerogative powers claimed by government under the symbol of the Crown 
actually were, in order to be certain that executive decisions all fitted within a legally 
prescribed list. For the Home Office, the interception of communication was rooted in 
a continuation of a valid practice established in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries. Applying the criteria of validity that had evolved in the legal system by the 
late twentieth century, it was rooted in nothing at all.  
5.4 Law and publicity  
Knowledge of the legally ambiguous status of interception power circulated within 
the files of the Home Office for a long time. So long as warrants continued to be made 
and the Post Office continued to recognise their authority, interception continued 
regardless. Problems of legal theory did not impact at all on the technical operations 
of interception. Legal incoherence did not matter, unless and until it was publicised, 
at which point it became politically dangerous. In short, the legality or illegality of 
certain practices could be used against the government, and could generate publicity 
that would in turn damage the effectiveness of the practices. Publicity is mobilised via 
the application of certain political techniques, which developed alongside the rise of 
the mass newspaper industry (spurred by the economics of the Post Office itself, as 
we saw).678 When legal questions are used this way, the aim is not to achieve legal 
outcomes for their own sake, but to use law to mobilise the mass media, and thereby 
generate publicity.  
 
The importance of publicity in relation to the political uses of law can be illustrated 
by returning to the case of Entick v Carrington. While the judgment later became used 
as a textual resource with which the common law could make decisions about public 
power, it originally came before the law as part of a tactical move to mobilise the 
courts themselves as weapons in an ongoing ‘propaganda war’. What was at stake, 
                                                
677 Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (HL 22 22 November 1984); for a full account 
of the strike at GCHQ, see Lanning and Norton-Taylor, A Conflict of Loyalties; Conor Gearty, ‘The Courts and 
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678 See Section 2.3. 
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politically, was the ability to use or to suppress the medium of the printing press to 
political effect.679  
5.4.1 Wilkes takes the stage 
The celebrated Entick v Carrington judgment was the culmination of a series of cases 
and a longer series of events. In November 1762, The Monitor and North Briton 
newspapers. In 1762 general warrants were issued, targeting anyone connected to 
eight editions of The Monitor, and in 1763, targeting anyone connected to issued No.45 
of The North Briton for publishing an article criticising the King over the terms of his 
peace treaty with France, which concluded the Seven Years’ War.680 The King’s 
Messengers, under warrants of the Secretary of State and Under-Secretaries, seized 
papers and arrested men. They did not actually charge them: the aim was to intimidate 
them into self-censorship.681 The crime of seditious libel was useful for the task as it 
was very broad. First, the truth or untruth of the libel against the sovereign was 
irrelevant; second, one could seditiously libel even a dead King, and third, seditious 
libel did not require publication. Merely passing the information to a third party 
sufficed.682  
 
In response, the printers and journalists sought writs against the Secretaries and 
Messengers who had harassed them, on the basis of trespass and false imprisonment. 
On 6th December 1763, the case of Wilkes v Wood came before Pratt J, who had already 
ruled in favour of two printers who had been arrested under the general warrants. 
Wood was an Under-Secretary of State who had attended John Wilkes’ house, 
knowing him to be a backer of the The North Briton, but had not seized anything. 
Wilkes, an outspoken and popular Member of Parliament, sought to claim that as he 
had not been personally named in the general warrant, Wood had trespassed on his 
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property. Wilkes did not challenge the legality of the general warrant that directed the 
search and seizure of his property, which would have raised a technical matter for the 
judge alone to decide on. Instead he sought a trial of the facts, which meant a jury 
would be assembled. That way, Wilkes could call witnesses and question ministers. 
His strategy was to win the case by having a jury pass judgment on the situation. The 
procedures of the trial would give him the theatre of the courtroom in which to 
perform the role of champion of freedom, to publicly query “whether English liberty 
be a reality or a shadow”.683 The strategy was not to change the law, but to generate 
publicity.  
 
As it happened, Pratt J made clear in his judgment that he felt the general warrant was 
unlawful, a “discretionary power given to messengers to search wherever their 
suspicions may chance to fall”, but as that was not how Wilkes had put his case, the 
legality of general warrants could not arise and Pratt’s comment was no more than 
obiter dicta.684 On 27th November 1765, when Entick’s case was determined, Pratt J, 
who had by then become Lord Camden, went through the legal issues in an explicit 
analysis. It may be summarised in three points: a defence of the absolute protection of 
private property from the tort of trespass in the absence of lawful justification; second, 
a specific rejection of state necessity, or reason of state, as a factor in English common 
law; and third, the famous insistence on positive “in our books” authority for actions 
carried out by the state.685 To view the case as a triumph for English liberty would be 
misplaced: Wilkes anonymously sent threatening letters his jury, and published their 
names in newspapers to apply political pressure. Pratt, the judge, was a friend of Pitt, 
then in opposition to the government, whose own close associates financed The 
Monitor and the North Briton.  
 
The important point is that for the printers, journalists, and radicals of London’s 
political milieu, the law was a publicity device to be used for political ends. 
Conversely, Lord Camden’s famous rhetorical statement that law is what is “in the 
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books” points to the media-dependency of a law that, under the scrutiny of others, 
must assemble decisions from the resources found in printed matter. Printed books 
enabled recorded judgments to be reproduced as texts, disseminated widely in a form 
that gives certainty to the particular formulations of words in each case. Only then 
could such texts be decontextualised and reassembled systematically as precedent and 
collated into a series of analyses and commentaries.686 Law and media exchanged 
competencies. The legal system, rather than simply being a way of generating 
publicity, unexpectedly ruled that the integrity of a man’s personal papers had to be 
legally protected. Printed matter was confirmed as the guarantor of what law is, its 
media-technical substrate “in our books”. When Lord Camden rejected the argument 
in Entick v Carrington that general warrants were justified by reason of state, he 
showed that the idea that political necessity could generate novel rules or exception 
would not fit within a system that had attained stability through rearranging texts. 
The coupling of law and media coincided with a rejection of the mythical power of 
reason of state.687 Entick v Carrington can be read as a confluence of law, power, and 
media. From that point on, both publicity and law have been regarded as different 
elements that can be mobilised towards different ends.  
5.4.2 Neither confirm nor deny 
When the Mazzini interception scandal occurred in 1844, the English press erupted in 
a “paroxysm of national anger”.688 The Post Office monitored the anger. During the 
currency of the scandal, all relevant news reports, commentaries, magazine articles, 
and letters to editors were all carefully cut out and glued into an entry book for ten 
months, between 14th June 1844 and 4th April 1845. The Post Office observed itself 
being publicly observed by the ‘public’, apprehended via the tenor of reporting in the 
mass media.689  
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In response to the scandal, Parliament convened a Secret Committee. Their report, as 
we have seen, was the first historical and legal analysis of English interception power. 
Hansard, the official record of parliamentary proceedings that began publishing 
transcripts of debates and speeches around the turn of the nineteenth century, records 
that the constitution of the Secret Committee on the Post Office was viewed with 
suspicion by members of the opposition. In a departure from normal procedure, the 
Committee did not feature any legally-qualified MPs from the House of Commons. 
Meanwhile, the unelected members of the House of Lords contributed three ex-
Ministers and two ex-Chancellors, men both loyal to the government and 
“accustomed to the most skilful mode of examination either for suppressing or for 
eliciting information.”690 This information was relayed in a speech from Thomas 
Duncombe, the Liberal MP who first raised Mazzini’s case in Parliament, who claimed 
to have witnesses willing to testify about the details of interception practices. Hansard 
records that he unsuccessfully raised a motion in the Commons on 18th July 1844 
seeking a vote to alter the constitution of the Committees. During the debate, 
Duncombe demanded to know if his own letters were being targeted by the Post 
Office. The Home Secretary, Sir James Graham, replied that he was unable to answer 
publicly,691 saying,  
[Duncombe] has put to me a question to which he knows it is not consistent 
with my own sense of duty to attempt an answer. I have already stated to the 
House, respectfully and firmly, that consistently with my sense of duty, and 
bound by the obligation by which I am bound—and I am the judge of that sense 
of duty—I cannot answer, and will not answer this question.692 
This appears to be the first recorded occasion on which a government minister refused 
to answer a question in Parliament. To neither confirm nor deny the premise of the 
question is to end the discussion. It is a barrier to further communication. It was the 
only way to give a public response and simultaneously maintain secrecy. The limit of 
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publicity was publicly drawn by publicly issuing a non-answer. The alternative would 
be to set a precedent for answering such questions. The formal ‘neither confirm nor 
deny’ response marks the limit of governmental publicity and secrecy today.693 The 
abbreviated form, NCND, is shorthand for official UK government policy on 
responding to questions about official secrets.694  
 
The Report of the Secret Committee, which of course was unavailable to the press, 
posits public opinion as a critical factor in its concluding recommendations. 
Prefiguring the problems that Birkett and Megarry later addressed, the report points 
out that although letter interception had been recognised as a prerogative power of 
the Crown by successive statutes, it was not based on any positive statement of law.695 
This was not a problem in itself, but the report does consider whether or not the 
government should legislate on the topic. In that respect, the question is publicity. The 
public would probably tolerate letter interception if they knew it was done only under 
a warrant, rather than via “extraordinary powers”.696 But while the public would 
probably tolerate interception for policing purposes, the Secret Committee suggests 
that the political uses of interception warrants risked inducing stronger “moral feeling 
which exists against the practice of opening of letters, with its accompaniments of 
mystery and concealment”.697 Ultimately, legislation would only attract unwanted 
attention:  
it must not be forgotten that, after the publicity given to the fact, that the 
Secretary of State has occasionally recourse to the opening of letters as a means 
of defence in dangerous and difficult times, few who hereafter may engage in 
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dangerous designs, will venture to communicate their intentions by the 
medium of the Post; and the importance of retaining the power, as a measure 
of detective police, will consequently be greatly diminished.698 
Therefore, “it may appear to some that to leave it a mystery whether or not this power 
is ever exercised is the way best calculated to deter the evil-minded”. In the final 
analysis, the Committee recommended maintaining the status quo.699 The issue of 
whether or not to clarify the law was not decided by reference to justice or legal 
coherence, but by measuring the certainty of legislation against the effects of 
publicity.700 To return to the distinction between forms of secrecy, in order to protect 
the arcanum, the secrecy effect created simply by signalling through legislation that a 
secret existed had to be minimised. 
 
On 18th February 1845, when the affair was no longer a pressing news story, the Home 
Secretary, “telling the truth in carefully chosen words”,701 announced that the Post 
Office department maintained by the “Foreign Secretary of the Post Office” had been 
abolished. Meanwhile, interception of inland communication continued as before, 
soon expanding to include the telegraph.702 The Post Office continued collecting news 
cuttings for two more months, presumably making sure that press attention had 
moved on.  
5.4.3 Policies of secrecy   
Secrecy within the administration of government had long been “embedded in 
administrative structures, regulations, and mentalités”,703 with silence being an 
inherent expectation of a gentlemanly civil servant. The historian of state secrecy, 
Christopher Moran, links the switch to legislative control under the Official Secrets 
Act, the first iteration of which was passed in 1889, directly to the growth in 
bureaucracy of the late nineteenth century. As government increasingly organised 
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itself through the constant updating of registries, memos and filing catalogues, more 
and more bodies were required to service the movement and copying of files. This 
opened up government to men of lower standing, who were felt by senior civil 
servants to lack the moral cohesion of the elite, and to be vulnerable to the temptation 
to sell secrets.704 Criminalisation was the inevitable outcome after a series of high-
profile leaks during the second half of the nineteenth century, as secrecy was 
transposed into legal rules.  
 
In media-technical terms, publicity-management is a procedural inflection on file-
management. The circulation of information to and from files could only be permitted 
via closed, secure channels. A ‘leak’ was the name given to any information that 
escaped the closely prescribed circuits that files prescribed. To take effect on files, 
policies had to be placed in files. Policies became indexed as ‘precedents’ that could 
be stored and recalled as needed in the processing operations of the filing system itself. 
They operated reflexively, telling the users of files how to use them as and when the 
question of choosing between publicity or secrecy arose.  
 
As explained previously, there are relatively few examples of files and materials 
concerning interception in the National Archives, which is probably a consequence of 
the excision of files on the topic. As Birkett discovered in 1957, the simplest approach 
to maintaining the secrecy of documents was to destroy them.705 Yet there are several 
files in the National Archives that are indicative of the secrecy policy in respect of 
interception, and how it was maintained and used.  
 
The particular prohibition on interception warrants entering courtrooms was clearly 
articulated in a file generated in 1929 in connection with the Meerut Conspiracy trial 
in India, in which a group of English and Indian trade unionists were prosecuted for 
conspiring to organise a railway workers’ strike.706 The prosecution wanted to include 
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intercepted material as evidence of the conspiracy. However, under Indian law the 
prosecution had to include interception warrants as evidence, in order to show that 
the intercepted material was lawfully obtained. In correspondence with Indian 
prosecutors, the Home Office indicated that this “would be very undesirable”, and 
refused to provide the warrants despite the consequences for the prosecution. A letter 
to the Indian prosecutors again referred to precedent and explained that, as of 
September 1929, no interception warrant had ever been produced in court and this 
was policy not about to change.707  
 
The press was kept under observation. Between 1926 and 1932 the Security Service, 
MI5, maintained a file dedicated to monitoring breaches of secrecy around 
interception powers. Left-wing newspapers occasionally reported on “The Black 
Cabinet in the Post Office”, as the headline in a clipping from the Workers Weekly of 
10th December 1926 puts it. On one occasion, a registry slip from MI5 accidentally 
ended up enclosed in an envelope delivered to one interception target, which was 
duly reported in The Daily Worker on the 12th December 1931.708 Interest in interception 
was not limited to left-wing journalists. In 1935, the Postmaster General’s office 
received a letter from a journalist working for the conservative magazine John Bull, 
proposing a feature on the interception of illicit and communist material in the postal 
system. The Post Office wrote to the Home Office, who responded with a letter 
making clear their prohibition on co-operation with mass media discussions of 
interception. The Home Office quoted a statement from Sir William Harcourt made in 
1882, when he was Home Secretary: 
‘The very essence of the power is that no account can be rendered. To render 
an account would be to defeat the very object for which the power was 
granted.’  
Harcourt’s statement had become a policy maxim. The letter to the Post Office 
continued: 
                                                
https://web.archive.org/web/20080303235605/http://www.wcml.org.uk/internat/meerut.htm; ‘Cases of Leakage 
of Information about Interception of Mail 1926-1932 KV 4/221’ 1932, National Archives. 
707 In the trial of Ernst prior to WW1, intercepted letters were produced, but the warrant was not. Section 2.5. 
708 ‘KV 4/221’. 
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Accordingly, while Parliament is aware of the existence and exercise of the 
power, it has been the invariable practice to decline, in the public interest, to 
furnish any information, even to Parliament, as to details …. If articles are 
published it is perhaps better on the whole that they should be inaccurate, and 
capable of denial, if questions should be asked in Parliament.709 
Even Parliament was subject to the ban on communication about interception and in 
fact, Parliamentarians could be fair game for deliberate misinformation strategies.  
 
During the early twentieth century, the Post Office was charged with identifying and 
intercepting postal packets thought to contain ‘indecent material’ and solicitations to 
enter illegal lotteries.710 In 1920, a general warrant was signed for the interception of 
any letter suspected of containing solicitations to enter lotteries, a memo stating that 
it would be ‘troublesome’ to seek a specific warrant on each occasion that lottery 
correspondence was suspected. In 1934, it was decided that the general lotteries 
warrant should be replaced by individual specific warrants. Citing precedent legal 
advice obtained and stored in 1866,711 the memorandum of 1934 discusses section 
56(2) of the Post Office Act 1908, which said no one could open, delay or detain a 
postal packet, except “in obedience to an express warrant in writing under the hand 
of a Secretary of State”.712 This legislative formulation could not justify general 
warrants. Although it would be costly in terms of time and resources, the Home Office 
lawyers felt this to be the correct reading of the law, confirming that their lawyers did 
take law seriously even in the absence of judicial scrutiny. The alternative was to 
legislate for general powers of interception in respect of lotteries and indecent 
material. A lotteries bill was passing through parliament at the time, but it was 
decided that to amend the bill in order to allow for general interception of lottery 
material was too risky, despite the administrative benefits. Legislation would,  
                                                
709 ‘“John Bull” Article on Working of Postal Warrants HO 45/25960’ 1935, National Archives. 
710 Including novels. See ‘PUBLICATIONS: Interception in Mail of Copies of Poetry Book Pansies by D H 
Lawrence HO 144/20642’ 1929, National Archives; ‘HO 144/1837’; ‘HO 45/25958’, 259. 
711 As cited in chapter three, ‘HO 144/164/A42354’, 164. 
712 ‘Post Office Act 1908’, accessed 25 May 2017, 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1908/48/section/56/enacted. 
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… give rise to the most acute controversy and indeed might throw a doubt on 
the legality of actions taken in the past, and might also have far reaching 
consequences on the exercise of the prerogative power generally.713   
The protection of secrecy thus took precedence over administrative convenience. The 
file includes a recent newspaper clipping of an article about Post Office interception. 
The uncertainty of the law in the absence of legislation was a problem, but the constant 
threat of publicity was more important.   
5.4.4 Publicity trumps law  
While the Home Office’s filing system maintained and reiterated the imperative of 
non-publicity in respect of interception, it also began to signal that interception might 
be legally unsound. Perhaps prompted by the need in 1934 to consult precedent legal 
advice dating from 1866 in respect of lotteries, the legality of postal interception was 
reviewed in updated legal advice obtained from a government legal advisor in 1935. 
First, registry files were reviewed and a series of precedent examples noted and 
collated in a single reference file.714 Then the prerogative, as a legal form of authority 
for intercepting letters and packets, was analysed in a detailed eighteen-page 
memorandum stored in a separate file.715 It concluded that the prerogative form was 
ambiguous, but ultimately the interception of letters and packets was lawful.  
 
However, telephone interception was different. In 1937, telephone interception 
warrants were introduced for the first time as a matter of policy.716 Legal advice 
obtained from government lawyers as part of the process, however, strongly 
suggested that no lawful power of telephone interception existed. On the question of 
letters and telegrams, the government lawyer cited section 20 of the Telegraph Act 
1868, which made it an offence for a clerk to disclose the contents of any telegram in 
circumstances “contrary to his duty”. The Post Office Act 1908 criminalised any 
interference with a “postal packet”, except “in obedience to an express warrant in 
                                                
713 ‘HO 45/25958’, 259. 
714 ‘HO 45/25961’. 
715 ‘HO 45/25962’, note that the precedents file and the legal advice file have sequential index numbers. 
716 See 4.5.2. 
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writing under the hand of a Secretary of State”.717 Section 89 of the Post Office Act 
1908 held that a “telegram” was included in the definition of a “postal packet”. The 
prohibition on disclosure of a telegram in section 20 of the Telegraph Act 1968 could 
therefore be overridden by a warrant. But no analogous law regarding telephone 
warrants existed. When the Post Office had been awarded the right to issue licenses 
to telephone companies, it had successfully argued in the case of Attorney General v 
Edison Telephone Company that a telephone call and telegram were the same thing in 
law.718 An individual clerk would be acting in line with his ‘duty’ if ordered to disclose 
a telephone call’s contents by the Postmaster General, but there was nothing that 
suggested the Postmaster General would not then be liable to prosecution for making 
such an order. This analysis was far more pointed than anything later discussed by 
Birkett or Megarry. In short, the Home Office lawyer who drafted telephone 
interception warrants felt that telephone interception was illegal.719    
 
It was generally assumed that legislation would resolve any ambiguity as to the 
legality of interception. In 1957, the Birkett report stated that if legislation were 
desirable, “it would be for Parliament to consider what steps ought to be taken to 
remove all uncertainty if the practice is to continue”.720 However, when the Birkett 
report was published, the leaders of both the Conservative and Labour parties 
ensured that their Members of Parliament remained silent. No questions were asked 
in Parliament concerning the report, and no subsequent questions were raised about 
the implementation of its recommendations.721 Similarly, there was little coverage in 
the press of the Birkett report, despite large amount of sensational reporting when the 
phone-tapping ‘scandal’ that triggered the report first occurred. Journalists Fitzgerald 
and Leopold attribute this to a political agreement between editors and government 
officials to minimise the coverage.722 This is plausible; by the 1950s the British 
                                                
717 Section 56, ‘Post Office Act 1908’. 
718 ‘Telegraph Act 1868’; Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Co of London 6 QBD 244. See fn. 336. 
719 ‘HO 144/20619’. 
720 Birkett, ‘Birkett Report’, paras 51–52. 
721 Fitzgerald and Leopold, Stranger on the Line, 124–26. 
722 Ibid. 
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government had established an effective system of voluntary press censorship based 
on the so-called ‘D-Notice’ system.723  
5.4.5 Publicising secrets  
For over a century, the Home Office and successive governments had been warned 
that the legal consistency of the prerogative in relation to interception was 
increasingly doubtful and that legislation would have provided a solution. Only when 
Malone finally brought the matter into court did change become a necessity rather 
than an option. In the immediate aftermath of Megarry’s decision in Malone, the Home 
Office convened a Working Party on Interception in March 1979 to consider the 
judgment and assess the options for legislation, and to ask whether it would indeed 
be necessary. The Working Party’s correspondence, partly redacted, was obtained 
under a Freedom of Information request for this thesis.724  
 
It opens with two press cuttings, an article from the New Scientist and another from 
the New Law Journal, both dated 8th March 1979, and both critical of the state of the law 
after the judgment. In general, the correspondence involves different agencies such as 
the police, Post Office, customs, and the prison service informing the Home Office of 
the utility of interception for their roles and their current practices and internal 
procedures for seeking and granting authorisation to use it. On the whole, the Home 
Office was satisfied that the existing practices “strike an appropriate balance” between 
“the need to preserve the value and efficacy of interception and […] the protection of 
the liberty of the subject”. However, “we could not in fairness say that the public 
knows this to be so.” Noting that “since the Birkett Report the climate of opinion has 
become more critical”, it continues: 
… any more vigorous defence of the present arrangements confronts the classic 
dilemma that, in delicate matters of crime and security, as little as possible 
                                                
723 A Privy Councillors’ report was commissioned into the D-Notice system after Chapman Pincher revealed 
international cable interception, as discussed at 3.5.4. The aim of the report was to better suppress reporting of 
secret materials, see ‘Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire into “D” Notice 
Matters’; see also Moran, Classified; Nicholas Wilkinson, Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the 
United Kingdom’s D-Notice System, (London, New York: Routledge, 2009). 
724 It is now accessible in the National Archives. ‘HO 325/536’. 
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should be said publicly to avoid compromising the very value of the operations 
on wishes to justify. Some foreign countries have responded to this problem by 
setting their interception arrangements in the context of a detailed law … We 
have been informed, and have no reason to doubt, that the law enforcement 
and intelligence agencies in those countries have been severely handicapped in 
their capacity to obtain advance intelligence via interception, and the greater 
openness of the arrangements has often removed useful sources of 
information.725 
The report anticipated, correctly, that the European Court of Human Rights would 
insist on legislation. Therefore,  
In the Working Party’s view “legislating Birkett” would be the least 
objectionable course, but it would be best framed in such a way as to avoid 
cases becoming justiciable as a result. Our legal advice is that this cannot be 
done with certainty.  
One concrete means of doing this prefigures current arrangements, discussed below: 
In order to provide a limited form of independent appeal, we also recommend 
the appointment of three advisers to the Secretary of State to whom aggrieved 
persons could appeal. These advisers would have access to the files on the case 
in question. They would not be able to tell the individual whether or not his 
telephone had been tapped; but they would be able to assure him that if it had 
been tapped this had been done for good reason and the proper procedures 
followed. 
The Malone case took place against the backdrop of a wider change in government 
strategy concerning secrecy. During the 1970s, faced with leaks, spies, and the 
publication of memoirs, the British government gradually accepted that it was unable 
to constrain publications about controversial aspects of its national security and 
foreign intelligence agencies. There was simply too much information accumulating, 
and too many people to effectively censor. Instead, the strategy shifted to embracing 
“a public relations-infused approach to information control, based on experiments 
                                                
725 Final report, 9th July 1979, ibid. 
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with opinion-forming”.726 Rather than suppressing information about the arcana of 
state power, they would be framed for consumption by the mass media.  
 
The strategy involves a wide range of measures in a number of fields, not least of 
which is what Aldrich calls “policing the past”: carefully vetting and censoring secret 
documents and then releasing them to the National Archives.727 That strategy includes 
material used in this thesis. Other changes include publicly advertising jobs in the 
intelligence and security services, allowing public appearances by named directors of 
the services, and commissioning new buildings by postmodern architects to give the 
agencies a distinct visual identity in relation to the city and the countryside, with MI6’s 
“Babylon on Thames” and GCHQ’s “doughnut”, typically photographed from above 
as if it were only to be seen from a satellite, just the most famous instances.728  
 
The turn to publicity informed the making of legislation to bring the intelligence and 
security services onto a public legal footing. The Security Services Act 1989 and the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 assigned MI5, GCHQ, and MI6 formally defined legal 
roles. Malone taking his case to Strasbourg may have forced the timing of the 
Interception of Communication Act 1985 upon the government, but it coincided with 
a broader shift in strategy that saw legislation as a tool for proactively determining 
the frame of public discourse about formerly secret agencies, rather than a triumph of 
the rule of law.  
5.5 Mediated reality 
In Foucault’s account of the rise of nineteenth century liberalism out of eighteenth 
century absolutism, government does not create or promote ‘freedom’ so much as 
generate it and feed from it. ‘Freedoms’ are always relationally defined, and evaluated 
as binary distinctions that can be evaluated according to the achievement or hindrance 
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728 Moran, Classified; Aldrich, ‘Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British Intelligence Since 1945’; 
Andrew, The Defence of the Realm; Keith Jeffery, MI6. The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949. 
(London: Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, 2011). 
 263 
of other governmental ends.729 Publicity management is one such governmental 
practice amongst others. Viewed strategically, government mobilises and manages 
the ‘freedom of the press’ through selective practices designed for withholding 
information.  
 
Publicity as a governmental resource is particularly significant because more than any 
other technique or governmental practice, it is the means by which government 
describes itself to itself and others. The unity of the ‘state’ is not an ontological given, 
as implied by most legal and political theories, nor is it simply the agglomerate effect 
that emerges from an assemblage of different instrumental governing strategies. The 
notion of ‘state’ as an emergent effect of ascription, and the circumstances under 
which the meaning of the state is formed, can be understood by focusing on the 
structural coupling of legal and political communication to the reality that is 
recursively generated by the dissemination of information through mass media 
operations, as described by Niklas Luhmann. We must here suspend a close reading 
of the agency of technical media and deploy instead a theory based on observation. 
5.5.1 Theory of the mass media  
To understand mass media and publicity, we begin with the “addictive and generative 
power of ‘information’”,730 as perceived by an observer. ‘Information’ is used here in 
the phenomenological sense articulated by Gregory Bateson, that is, as a “difference 
that makes a difference” to an observer, rather than information as physical order 
distinguished from entropic disorder.731 For information to make a difference in this 
sense presupposes an observer. Where the observer is capable of second-order 
observation, meaning the capacity to observe oneself in the act of observation and thus 
shift between what is observed and how it is observed, the observer can observe other 
possible modes of observation that were open to them but not actualised. To do so, 
the observer requires time. The present is the vanishing instant of observation, 
                                                
729 Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 63–65. 
730 Alain Pottage, ‘Our Geological Contemporary’, in In Search of Contemporary Legal Thought, by Desautels-
Stein and Tomlins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 182. 
731 See Gleick, The Information; César Hidalgo, Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to 
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connecting the past and future. The observer is perpetually in the present of 
observation.  
 
According to systems theory, neither the creator nor the addressee of a given piece of 
information can experience the other’s role in communication. Hence the 
informational aspects of each ‘utterance’ are determined by whatever each observer 
considers to be significant. The utterance, which means the selection of how the 
information is mediated, is also an attribute ascribed to the information by each party. 
For each observer, any piece of information that can be observed as such presents a 
horizon of possible understandings. The world is produced differently for each 
observer or observing system as a broad and unpredictable horizon of possibility. 
Readers, writers, listeners, viewers, and users of mass media must all select and 
reconnect for themselves the ‘information’ and ‘utterance’ of each item in radically 
different ways, using techniques of second-order observation.  
 
The role of a medium is to provide some stability by narrowing the possible selections. 
By the repeated use of recognised forms of presentation, media function to constrain 
the range of possible understandings so that communication can become relatively 
consistent and reliable, even where millions of different people are watching, 
listening, or reading along. While technical conditions determine the possible scope 
of observation, they do not determine the meaning that observers ultimately attribute 
to each statement. Communication occurs only at the moment that an observer assigns 
meaning to a statement, which is not necessarily the same instant that a technical 
medium performs its digital, electric, or physical operations.  
 
The mass media in this sense includes any system for disseminating information that 
uses copying technology to reproduce information, and which does not pre-determine 
or particularise its addressees. Luhmann argues that modern society has come to 
anticipate a certain mode of second-order observation that structures how mass media 
are understood. This includes scepticism about the truth of information. It has long 
been agreed, for instance, that advertising is designed to manipulate, that 
entertainment is formulaic, and that newspapers have political agendas. The point is 
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that all such observations about the mass media presuppose the capacity to alternate 
between first and second-order observation, and thereby consume information while 
filtering it through the difference between what is said and how it is delivered. 
Knowing how observations are manufactured is built into the observation of what is 
communicated. This way, everyone is expected to keep up with the world, allowing 
complete strangers to communicate on the assumption that everyone is more or less 
aware of what is ‘going on’, and what is important at the moment. As Alain Pottage 
puts it, “dealing with the mass media is in itself an education in second-order 
observation.”732  
 
The notion of constantly knowing what important things are ‘publicly’ unfolding in 
the world through the media implies that society is informed about topics via a 
temporal dynamic that constantly substitutes old information for new information. 
The process of disseminating ‘new’ information instantly transforms it into ‘old’ 
information. The mass media system itself feeds on its own product. It seeks out new 
information only to immediately transform it into redundancy simply by processing 
it.  
Information cannot be repeated; as soon as it becomes an event, it becomes non-
information. A news item run twice might still have its meaning, but it loses its 
information value. If information is used as a code value, this means that the 
operations in the system are constantly and inevitably transforming 
information into non-information. The crossing of the boundary from value to 
opposing value occurs within the very autopoiesis of the system. The system is 
constantly feeding back its own output, that is, knowledge of certain facts, back 
into the system on the negative side of the code, as non-information; and in 
doing so it forces itself constantly to provide new information.733  
When a news item is broadcast, it cannot be repeated, at least not the following day. 
If a story has been ‘broken’ elsewhere, then a news organisation must assume that 
observers are already informed and the story has to be abandoned, or presented with 
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a novel twist. After producing news, the next task for the editor or the journalist is to 
find a new angle. This might mean adding more information to the story, or deepening 
it by finding connections elsewhere, or correcting it because new facts have emerged, 
or employing a commentator from the senior echelons of the profession, or perhaps 
even from academia, to add an opinionated ‘perspective’. What is ‘new’ is actively 
manufactured, and folded into the operations of the news organisation, 
simultaneously setting the departure point for more news to come.  
 
The cumulative effect is that contemporary social reality is structured by the 
operations of the mass media. In classical and ancient societies, it was the priests who 
informed society about itself. For a period of time, philosophers believed that they 
alone had the tools to correctly interpret the world and give it meaning. Today, one 
switches on the television or logs onto so-called ‘social’ media. As Luhmann puts it,  
Every morning and every evening, an inexorable web of news settles over the 
earth and sets out what has happened and what one has to be ready for.734  
Some events are not subjects for the mass media, and they are ignored except insofar 
as society is described as a turbulent place where unexpected things happen all the 
time. Other events occur specifically in the expectation that they will be picked up in 
the mass media. Mass media do not invent the topics they report on, but when they 
select information they present it in a way neither determined nor explained by the 
priorities of other functional social systems. The dynamics of mass media always 
depend on generating information about society and, at the same time, determine the 
horizon of possibilities for other social systems when it comes to interacting with the 
‘public’ or ‘society’ at large. Mass media therefore have a “retroactive effect upon 
communication in the environment of the mass media”.735  
 
This means that law, too, must respond to the imperatives of the mass media when 
deciding whether or not to discuss state arcana – put figuratively, the issue is whether 
or not to open the envelope and peer inside. Luhmann’s theory of the mass media 
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serves to confirm that secrecy has no mysterious valence or metaphysical quality in 
the modern age. It simply requires preventing information from being reproduced 
and disseminated through the mass media. Whatever knowledge can be attributed to 
the ‘public’ is generated via the mass media. There is no other system that can 
disseminate information to undefined recipients in a generalised and widespread 
manner. The protection of the arcana of state, which must not be communicated about 
in order for their techniques to remain unobserved and thus effective, is particularly 
attuned to the dynamics of the mass media. Few things attract mass media attention 
like the disclosure of secret information. This is not because secrets are politically 
important or intellectually interesting, but because they are always novel. As such, the 
“secrecy effect” that Horn discussed is always materialised as a media effect:  
Instead of being part of the sphere of political rationality, the secret today is 
relegated to the domain of slip-ups and indiscretions. It can come to light only 
in the form of scandal – or fiction.736 
Paradoxically, mass media both demand full transparency and, at the same time, 
renew their operations each day on the basis that there is always something hidden, 
and therefore something more to know. The secrecy effect – the knowledge of the 
unknown – is the presupposition of believing there is something ‘new’ to say on a 
‘rolling basis’.  
 
In 1844, when the Secret Committee set the tone for future discussions about 
interception and legislation, they referred to the ‘public mind’ and anticipated it 
would respond to more information about interception badly. The point was not 
about whether or not interception was felt to be justified: it was. The point was that 
the mass media would make much of the story and thereby information about 
interception practices would be used by potential targets to evade detection. The 
engine of publicity, motivated by ‘public opinion’, would have unacceptable strategic 
consequences. The leaking of secrets to the mass media, therefore, is a tactical problem 
more than a democratic problem. The utility of secrecy aims at ensuring the ongoing 
reproducibility of interception operations as effective sources of intelligence, rather 
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than a concern that ‘public opinion’ will lead to a change in the law towards a more 
‘transparent’ regime. This is not to say that such outcomes are impossible. The myth, 
however, is the assumption that the ‘public’ is a pre-existing collective of willing 
individuals with political agency, who will rise up and demand change from the 
government if only they were better informed.  
 
Public opinion itself is a fiction of the mass media. It can never be consulted in advance 
of reporting on it, rather it is projected onto the position of the spectator, the imaginary 
consumer of mass media who is at once affected by social changes, takes part in them, 
and at the same time feels anxious about their consequences. Media producers must 
project an idea of the ‘public’ as the sum of segmented stereotypes and audience 
typologies, which have been produced by and for the mass media’s own operations.  
It therefore makes little sense to ask whether and how the mass media distort 
reality; they generate a description of reality, a world construction, and this is 
the reality on which society orients itself. Information is disseminated in large 
quantities and day by day. This produces immense redundancy, which 
obviates having to investigate what individuals really think and know.737 
Media determine what they presuppose, and the rest of society has to adapt, including 
political decision-makers.738 Public opinion “is the ‘Holy Spirit’ of the system, the 
communicative availability of the results of communication.”739 
 
For those in opposition to government, it is also understood that the mass media 
determine public opinion. Consider the way in which the Snowden story was 
reported. Edward Snowden chose to give his cache of leaked material to journalists 
Glenn Greenwald and Laura Poitras because he knew from their published work that 
they had adopted political positions critical of the US government’s secret intelligence 
activities. In order to process the information into the public domain, Snowden, 
Greenwald and Poitras devised a strategy of working with different news 
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organisations in different countries. Each news organisation was assigned particular 
types of ‘revelation’, and a schedule was devised so that information would emerge 
incrementally, “so as to enable an enduring public debate with real consequences, 
rather than achieve a one-off scoop that would accomplish nothing beyond accolades 
for the reporters.”740  
5.5.2 Consequences of mass media  
The symbolic fictional collective of the ‘public’, generated via the mass media, plays a 
central role in the law. When the European Court of Human Rights found the UK to 
be in breach of Article 8 of the Convention in Malone, it was on the basis that no public 
law existed indicating the rules and procedures governing interception powers. A 
secret governmental practice that, by its nature, interfered with privacy must be 
‘foreseeable’, and this foreseeability must take the form of law. It does not mean that 
operational secrecy must be sacrificed, but it does require that the general 
circumstances in which interception powers may be authorised must be indicated to 
the ‘public’. This connects legality to democratic legitimacy, via the symbolic status of 
legislation as the highest form of valid law – even if in reality only lawyers ever read 
it.  
 
The legal expertise required to cognitively understand legislation is totally irrelevant 
to the legal question of ‘foreseeability’. What matters is that there is ‘public’ law, in 
the sense of legislation that is publicly disseminated. The technical methodologies of 
interception are not required to be published, as that would defeat their ends, but 
detailed guidance codes that explain the general requirements are necessary. The 
inscription of secrecy and publicity within the law recently led to unusual decisions 
in the specialised forum designed for hearing such cases. In other words, the 
normativity of legislation is determined not by any normative content about practices 
of interception, but by the standards of mass media. Law self-assesses its own capacity 
to disseminate information.  
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5.5.3 Below the waterline with the IPT 
In order to facilitate complaints, the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT) was 
established by the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). The IPT was 
legislatively constituted to have exclusive jurisdiction over complaints from 
individuals who believe themselves to be subject to unlawful violations of RIPA, or 
related unlawful infringements on rights protected by the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR). The Tribunal was specifically designed to maintain the 
secrecy of individual cases while conducting its work.  
 
Members of the Tribunal, all security-vetted lawyers or judges, are empowered to 
compel the police, intelligence services, or other relevant agencies to disclose to them 
all information relevant to any complaint. Working secretly with the agencies, the 
Tribunal must, in each case, independently arrive at a decision from a prescribed list 
of possible decisions. Where a complainant has in fact not been the object of 
interception at all, they receive the determination: ‘Complaint Not Upheld’. Precisely 
the same answer is issued to any complainant who is in fact under communications 
surveillance, provided the agencies concerned have operated in accordance with the 
law. The response ‘Complaint Not Upheld’ is deliberately ambiguous so that a 
network of complainants cannot use the Tribunal to establish who is and who is not 
under investigation. The government’s policy of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ remains 
intact. Only where the Tribunal finds unlawful interception of communication 
occurred is a complaint ‘upheld’. If that happens the IPT must report the details 
directly to the Prime Minister, while providing the complainant with general 
information about the finding, but no details that would compromise operational 
secrecy in general. There are no rights of appeal from the IPT under RIPA (although 
this is to change under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016).741  
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However, in 2003 the Tribunal altered its procedures to enable open hearings in 
certain circumstances. A complaint brought by an individual, with support from a 
civil liberties NGO, sought to address not only the legality or illegality of the alleged 
interception of his communication but also challenged the legality of the Tribunal’s 
procedural rules.742 Under section 68 of RIPA, the Tribunal was empowered to modify 
its own procedures so as to be able to assess matters flexibly. The Tribunal found that 
section 68 gave it authority to judicially review the procedural rules made for it by the 
Home Office, and then ruled that maintaining absolute secrecy in each situation 
interfered with the right to a fair trial.  
 
Since then, echoing Megarry’s strategy in Malone, the Tribunal has conducted open 
hearings on preliminary questions of law where the law is unclear. The government 
is party to such cases but formally holds a position of ‘neither confirm nor deny’ in 
respect of the alleged facts. The law is assessed on the basis of ‘assumed facts’, a 
fictional hypothecation that allows a generic legal argument to unfold, addressing 
whether or not the claimant’s allegations would be legal or illegal. Once the legal 
question has been determined by the Tribunal, consideration of the specific facts of 
the complaint take place in closed proceedings without the complainant or his lawyers 
present, a phase that the Tribunal has come to refer to as ‘going below the waterline’.  
 
After the Snowden revelations, a number of NGOs petitioned the IPT, notably an 
organisation called Privacy International, which organised a series of challenges to the 
legality of different aspects of UK interception powers as described in the published 
material. Here, we shall address the two instances in which the Tribunal ruled that 
hypothetical powers were unlawful when measured against the requirements of 
Convention rights. The critical issue in both instances concerned the ‘foreseeability’ of 
potential violations of privacy by the government under the law.  
 
In the first case, Privacy International and Liberty, a civil rights organisation, led a 
coalition of international NGOs in arguing that regardless of the UK’s legal 
                                                
742 ‘Summary in the Matter of IPT/01/62 and IPT/01//77’, Case summary (Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 22 
January 2003), http://www.ipt-uk.com/docs/Summary_IPT0162_0177.pdf. 
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framework as it applied to UK agencies, there was no publicly available legal 
framework that governed the transfer of data obtained under RIPA powers to foreign 
governments. Given that the Snowden documents demonstrated close co-operation 
and extensive data transfers between GCHQ and the NSA, amongst others, the lack 
of any publicly available legal framework meant that transfers and sharing of private 
data governed by RIPA was not ‘foreseeable’ to the public, and therefore unlawful 
under Article 8 of the ECHR.743  
 
In the second case, the issue concerned the collection and use of bulk datasets 
containing various aggregated digital databases of personal information, and 
communication records from telecommunications companies. The latter were 
compelled to provide records of users and their communications not under RIPA 
powers, but under section 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984, legislation for 
regulating the telecommunications market upon the privatisation of British Telecom. 
Section 94 enables the Home Secretary to issue any ‘directions’ to a 
telecommunications company that she deems necessary for the purposes of national 
security, and binds the addressees of such directions to secrecy. The acquisition of 
personal data in this manner was held to be unlawful due to lack of foreseeability.744   
 
In both instances, the Tribunal ruled that the unlawfulness caused by the lack of 
foreseeability had been remedied by the time of the publication of the Tribunal’s 
decision. During the course of the hearings in relation to bulk datasets, the 
government publicised draft Codes of Practice offering rules on how the intelligence 
and security agencies collected and processed bulk data, and how these processes 
were made subject to oversight. Bulk data practices were described in a report issued 
by the Intelligence and Security Committee,745 a Parliamentary oversight body, and 
                                                
743 Liberty & Others v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs & Others, IPT/13/77/H 
(2015). 
744 Privacy Internation v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs & Others, IPT/15/110/CH 
(2016), there have been subsequent developments in this case, following on from this legal determination, 
which are not relevant for present purposes. 
745 ‘Privacy and Security: A Modern and Transparent Framework’ (Intelligence and Security Committee, 2015), 
http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312_ISC_P+S+Rpt(web).pdf. 
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by the government’s ‘terror law watchdog’, David Anderson QC.746 These disclosures 
and reports were sufficient to make the collection and analysis of bulk datasets 
sufficiently ‘foreseeable’.  
 
In relation to sharing intercepted data with other governments, the IPT also ruled that 
any such activity had hypothetically been unlawful, but had been made lawful on the 
day of the first determination in the case, which addressed the legality issue. It was 
remedied not because of the publication of governmental information, but because of 
the Tribunal’s own decision, the same one in which it formally found that the practice 
had been unlawful. The judgment explicitly referred to itself as the vessel by which 
information on intelligence-sharing, and the procedures governing it, came to public 
attention. Intelligence-sharing was unlawful until the moment that the IPT found it 
unlawful. The text was both the medium of legal review and the medium of legal 
remedy, both a normative assessment of the situation and a factual intervention into 
the situation. The law altered its informational environment in the process of assessing 
it. Here, the line between secrecy and publicity was mobilised and redrawn through 
its assessment. The distinction that the IPT had to draw in order to consider the law 
in the first place re-entered the process as information, in the sense of a “difference 
that made a difference”.747 The legal distinction between publicity and secrecy was 
both the condition of making a decision and altered by the decision.748  
The IPT determined that it had been illegal and in doing so, paradoxically, made it 
legal.  
 
What shifted was the line of the secrecy-relationship inscribed within the legal system 
itself. The device of ‘assumed facts’ effectively insulates interception practices from 
consideration. There will never be another interception warrant sealed in an envelope 
on the bench, on the cusp of revealing its secrets. Even a finding of illegality is enough 
                                                
746 Anderson, ‘A Question of Trust’. 
747 This is Gregory Bateson’s definition of information, see Luhmann, Social Systems, 40. 
748 Bernard Keenan, ‘Going “Below the Waterline”: The Paradoxical Regulation of Secret Surveillance in the UK’, 
SSRN Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 1 March 2015), 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2583806. 
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to erase any pathologies that may emerge. All such legal processing operations are 
hermetically sealed within the law itself, which assesses itself in terms of the 
information it transfers to the public domain. Law assesses itself by standards derived 
from the function of the mass media.  
 
As the IPT has made clear, the question of ‘foreseeability’ is measured by the fact of 
publication of information about legal rules and processes. Legislation, Codes of 
Practice, official guidance notes – the processing of these media converted illegality 
into legality before the IPT. They produced foreseeability – which has nothing to do 
with cognitive foresight, but is entirely determined by the availability of information 
in the ‘public domain’. This confirms the fictitious status of the ‘public’ as constructed 
by the law which, simply through the publication of a judgment by a tribunal, 
suddenly achieved foresight previously lacking. If one were to seek out cognitive 
foresight and measure its sources, it is perhaps more likely to have arisen as a result 
of the mass media reporting of Edward Snowden’s disclosures than any documents 
promulgated by the Home Office or the IPT.  
5.6. Conclusion: legislating against surprises  
Transforming legislation from a source of risk into a publicity-management device 
inevitably meant producing a secrecy-effect in the law, to insulate legal attention from 
arcane techniques. Both the Interception of Communications Act 1985 and the 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 were deliberately drafted to obfuscate 
the practicalities of the interception of communication; they provide a legal 
framework composed in an abstract and complex manner, and which reveals almost 
nothing about the powers they supposedly govern.749 They reveal nothing about the 
materiality of interception techniques but simply abstract the issue by specifying 
requirements and protocols for the production of interception warrants. The warrant, 
as it was before Megarry, marks the distinction between legal process and interception 
                                                
749 A list of quotes from senior judges describing the difficulty of understanding RIPA can be found in, Graham 
Smith, ‘Future-Proofing the Investigatory Powers Bill’, accessed 28 January 2017, 
http://www.cyberleagle.com/2016/04/future-proofing-investigatory-powers.html. 
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techniques and at the same time couples them together. Where the warrant has been 
manufactured according to the prescribed formulae, all that follows shall be lawful.   
 
Snowden succeeded in terms of transforming the parameters of ‘public’ discussion 
about interception powers. They ultimately caused a rapid increase in the amount of 
publicly available information regarding interception. In the UK, more information 
was released as legal challenges were brought before the IPT. During some 
proceedings, government lawyers stated that some ‘assumed facts’ were to be 
formally ‘avowed’. Occasionally they issued previously-classified documents, with 
some redactions. Over three years, there was an unpredictable and unplanned amount 
of information passing from “below the waterline” into publication. This line of cases 
is not discussed in detail here, but must be reserved for another article.  
 
In 2015, the government proposed legislation to replace RIPA. The Home Secretary 
has called the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 “world-leading legislation that provides 
unprecedented transparency and substantial privacy protection”.750 She may have in 
mind the detail of the legislation, which contains 272 sections divided into nine parts, 
each of which deals with a separate topic. In this respect, it is the antithesis of the 
legislation it replaces. Privacy campaigners disagree. Where government promotes 
the structure of the legislation itself, they focus on the political implications of the 
techniques that the Act authorises, which include all of the practices that Snowden 
revealed. There is nothing in the Act that curtails the technical capacities reserved for 
the government.751  
 
Viewed through the lens of mass media, however, the debate about whether the 
legislation is ‘transparent’ or ‘repressive’ is beside the point. Snowden’s disclosures 
unfolded in the mass media. There is a documentary, Citizenfour, directed and filmed 
                                                
750 Amber Rudd, cited in Burgess, ‘What Is the IP Act and How Will It Affect You?’ 
751 Ibid.; ‘UK Parliament Passes Most Extreme Surveillance Law in UK History’; Liberty are challenging the 
legality of the Act itself in relation to European Data Protection Laws, see Armour, ‘Liberty Gets Go-Ahead to 
Challenge Snoopers’ Charter in the High Court’; Alan Travis, ‘Tribunal Says EU Judges Should Rule on Legality 
of UK Surveillance Powers’, The Guardian, 8 September 2017, sec. World news, 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/08/snoopers-charter-tribunal-eu-judges-mass-data-surveillance. 
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by Laura Poitras, the first journalist Snowden contacted about his planned disclosures. 
It captures the moment she first met him.752 His delivery of material to her and the 
journalist Glenn Greenwald, and his subsequent escape from Hong Kong to Russia, 
self-consciously unfolded under the observation of the mass media. Whereas 
Malone’s High Court case began with an accidental disclosure of evidence before a 
criminal court, the fictionalised ‘assumed facts’ based on Snowden’s disclosures 
before the IPT emerged through the mass media. For the campaigning groups 
involved in litigation before the IPT, the Tribunal was as much a place to generate 
publicity, force further disclosures, and thus compel legislative change as it was a 
place to seek justice – which, in any event, could only be delivered hypothetically.753  
 
It is therefore unsurprising that the outcome of this strategy is equally attuned to the 
observations of the mass media. The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) can most 
clearly be differentiated from the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA) 
by its textual redundancy. Both pieces of legislation translate the data transfer 
operations of digital media into the symbolic order of the law. But whereas the textual 
interface provided by RIPA, when it addressed itself to the ‘public’ at large was 
enigmatic and ambiguous, its replacement is demonstratively clear. Where RIPA was 
drafted in a deliberately abstract and minimalist form, the IPA lists categories of 
different technical operations available: interception of communication in transit, 
acquisition of stored communication data, the use of bulk datasets, and so on. Whereas 
RIPA authorised powers according to minimally-stated, abstract formulations, 
positioning clauses regarding ‘safeguards’ in different parts of the text to the powers 
they ‘safeguarded’, and so on, the IPA has a large degree of textual redundancy, 
repetitively restating the same procedural qualifications for each type of operation.  
 
                                                
752 Citizenfour. (2014). [DVD] Directed by Laura Poitras. Germany: Praxis Films 
753 This is based on personal observations during the period concerned – a formal research project is planned. 
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Snowden’s revelations were highly informative in the sense that they were highly 
surprising. For the mass media, information is by definition surprising.754 Once 
information has been processed by the mass media, it is no longer surprising. It is 
already known, and thus redundant. Information (surprise) is transformed into 
redundancy simply by entering the ‘public’ domain. Many paragraphs of the IPT’s 
judgments in its post-Snowden determinations are devoted to explaining how the 
‘assumed facts’ derived from the Snowden archive were indeed authorised by RIPA’s 
enigmatic formulations. Only where the legal technique of analogy could not succeed 
in explaining assumed facts by reference to existing legislation did the IPT rule that 
such hypothetical scenarios had been unlawful – at least until, via the IPT’s own 
process that put ‘Codes of Practice’ and ‘arrangements’ into the public domain, more 
surprising information (but not particularly interesting information) was disclosed, 
thereby making the practices referred to hypothetically lawful. The surprises had to 
be made non-surprising to be made lawful.  
 
Despite naming the various categories of techniques that Snowden revealed and 
enfolding each category into a framework of authorisations, time-limits, and other 
prescriptions, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 is not informative. It discloses no 
information that Snowden had not already addressed to the mass media, and that the 
mass media in turn disseminated, transforming unknown and unforeseeable secrets 
into cognitively foreseeable knowledge with each publication. Once published and 
disseminated, the classified information entered the ‘public domain’. The 
Investigatory Powers Act converts what mass media made cognitively foreseeable 
into legislation, thus making it legally foreseeable. Its content is derived not from any 
normative standards about privacy, but from information provided by the mass 
media.  
 
This allows us to assess RIPA by reference to the distinction between variety and 
redundancy. RIPA contained little information about the processes of interception that 
                                                
754 This equation applies to Luhmann’s model of social systems generally, Luhmann, Theory of Society, 2: 44-48; 
the observer-dependency implicit in this definition of ‘information’ is indicative of what makes Luhmann and Kitter 
difficult to theoretically reconcile.   
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it authorised in law. In systems theoretical terms, we can say it was high in variety. 
Redundancy and variety are opposed, in that:  
redundancy involves the information that is available for the processing of 
information, and variety is the information that is as yet missing. The greater 
the variety of a system, the more difficult it becomes to use one operation about 
which there is little information to draw conclusions about other operations [...] 
and the more surprises there are to be generated.755 
RIPA was high in variety, the IPA is high in redundancy. The legislation’s high level 
of textual redundancy serves to close down the possibility of being surprised by more 
information in the future. RIPA had a surprisingly large variety of meanings ‘below 
the waterline’. The effect of the legislation is not to create ‘world-leading legislation’, 
in the Home Secretary’s media-minded, legally meaningless formulation. It functions 
as publicity management, forming a shield against the risks of further disclosures and 
thus the publicity effect generated by surprises and secrets. It does this by narrowing 
the possible variance of future meanings latent in the law. 
 
Paradoxically, by making more legal rules, the legislation narrows the potential for 
future legal action. Legislating for interception powers neither constrains operations 
nor makes them ‘accountable’. Ultimately, it serves to reiterate a much older fiction – 
that interception is attributable to subjects. In so doing, law makes them redundant as 
factual categories in order to safeguard their operational unknowability. Secrecy of 
the arcana as they operate in practice depends on constraining surprises, which are 
akin to the secretus – the knowledge that there are secrets. Today, the arcana of state 
are not protected through absolute prohibitions on speaking about them, but through 
speaking about them in great detail, via legislation. Law is thus determined by the 
reality of the mass media, which it has come to equate with foresight.  
 
If the legislation functions, we shall not hear much more about interception beyond 
what the law already makes public: that the Secretary of State remains in charge, and 
that audited statistics are available on governmental websites. If the law fails, we shall 
                                                
755 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 320. 
 279 
not know in advance. We can only wait until we are surprised by the next unexpected 
leak of arcane information, which will necessarily refer to new interception techniques 
that are presently unforeseeable. 
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6. Conclusion: Silicon Sovereignty   
6.1 Digital warrantry  
The Snowden archive of leaked documents include a set of PowerPoint slides on 
‘warrantry’, created in November 2008 by GCHQ’s ‘Operational Legalities’ team to 
deliver training to intelligence officers.756 The team exists to “enable SIGINT” by 
providing guidance and assistance with warrant applications; developing policy; 
taking decisions regarding the disclosure of secret files and documents; and 
‘implementing’ legal processes.  
 
As of 2008 when the slides were created, there were four pieces of UK legislation that 
directly affected the so-called ‘warrantry’ associated with GCHQ’s operations. They 
were the Intelligence Services Act 1994, the Human Rights Act 1998, The Regulation 
of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA), and the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006. The 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 placed the UK’s existing foreign intelligence agencies, 
GCHQ and the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), onto a legal footing. It states that their 
function is to serve the following three purposes: the protection of national security, 
the maintenance of the economic well-being of the UK, and the prevention or 
detection of serious crime. These purposes are identified and formalised in practice 
by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC).757 The Intelligence Services Act 1994 also 
provides warrants and certificates authorising ‘interference’ with property in the UK 
or overseas, which secretly formed the basis for tactics such as ‘equipment 
interference’ and ‘computer network exploitation’ (CNE). These are more commonly 
known as ‘hacking’ computer systems and networks, essentially to make them 
perform operations that are imperceptible to their immediate users. The Human 
Rights Act 1998 gives direct legal effect to the European Convention on Human Rights 
                                                
756 The slides date from November 2008 and were first published in June 2015, ‘Operational Legalities - GCHQ’ 
Snowden Doc Search, https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/ContentorMetadata%3F2015-09-25nsadocs. 
757 ‘Joint Intelligence Committee - GOV.UK’, accessed 12 September 2017, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee one of the Committee’s stated purposes is: 
‘to contribute to the formulation of statements of the requirements and priorities for intelligence gathering and 
other tasks to be conducted by the intelligence agencies.’ 
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(ECHR), meaning that any interference with the right to respect for private life has to 
be in accordance with law, must be necessary within a democratic society, and must 
only involve action that is proportionate to the particular ends. The Wireless 
Telegraphy Act concerns intercepting or interfering with radio transmissions, while 
RIPA provides the main legal footing spelling out the circumstances and conditions 
under which interference with private communications can be authorised, via an 
interception warrant or analogue form of authorisation. To take effect, these legislative 
enactments have to be translated into processes.  
 
There are a wide range of legal descriptions of various technical operations that 
GCHQ’s legal experts must be aware of. However, we shall focus on the interception 
warrants available under RIPA, which serve as useful examples. There are two types 
of interception warrant available, determined by the territorial dimensions of targeted 
communications. Under section 8(4) warrants, ‘external’ communications may be 
intercepted. External communications are those in which the sender or receiver is 
located somewhere outside the British islands. A section 8(4) warrant’s function is to 
provide “an intelligence gathering capability”.758 As such, it need not specify a human 
target. In fact, the warrant’s targets are specified pieces of communication media, 
described in technical terms as ‘communications bearers’. Bearers that may be 
targeted include submarine fibre optic cables, earth stations for sending and receiving 
satellite transmissions, or wireless relay masts.  
 
Using a section 8(4) warrant means that all ‘external’ communications, including both 
the content and metadata, can lawfully be collected in their entirety from a targeted 
bearer. However, intercepted material can only be subject to ‘human examination’ 
provided an element of its semantic content matches against a ‘selector’ term. Selectors 
are, by analogy, a reconfiguration of the list of targets formerly provided to human 
interceptors. All selectors must be listed on a certificate that must accompany each 
section 8(4) warrant in order to validate it. The certificate contains the list. It provides 
“descriptions of intercepted material the examination of which [the Secretary of State] 
                                                
758 ‘Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner: Annual Report for 2015’ (IOCCO, 8 September 
2016), 31, http://iocco-uk.info/docs/56850%20HC%20255%20ICCO%20Web%20only.pdf. 
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considers necessary”.759 The certificate and the warrant both must be signed by the 
Secretary of State in order to be validated.  
 
By contrast, a section 8(1) warrant is required for all communications ‘internal’ to the 
British islands. The warrant must name a particular person or particular premises as 
a target, and it must also provide details as to the background of the case, how it 
connects to the target, the methodologies to be employed, why the operation is both 
necessary and proportionate to its ends, any ‘collateral’ intrusion into the privacy of 
others that may result, any particularly ‘sensitive’ factors involved such as medical, 
religious, journalistic, or legal confidentiality; and any particularly urgent factors. The 
applicant must also provide written assurances that all collected data will be lawfully 
handled and disposed of.760 While the warrant itself, and any renewal, must be signed 
by a Secretary of State, each warrant made under section 8(1) must include a ‘schedule’ 
that provides granular operational details. Schedules can be modified without 
requiring the Secretary to re-authorise the warrant, for instance where a target 
changes his mobile phone for another.  
 
When commercial communication service providers are served with a warrant and 
any relevant parts of the schedule needed to implement it, they are required to enable 
the interception to proceed. GCHQ can in turn be served by schedules requiring it to 
facilitate interception on behalf of other government or police agencies, and the legal 
department advises staff to insist on seeing the full schedule before taking any action; 
otherwise the Interception of Communication Commissioner has to be informed of a 
breach of the law. As one slide emphasises, “Say: No schedule No targeting!”  
 
Section 8(1) warrants therefore require detailed prior knowledge of the target. 
Whereas section 8(4) warrants are about gathering intelligence overseas on an open-
ended basis, section 8(1) warrants are investigatory tools. The two types of warrant 
therefore inscribe different temporalities into technical interception operations in 
relationship to the information they produce. Furthermore, the difference between the 
                                                
759 Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, Section 8 (4)(b)(i). 
760 ‘IOCCO Annual Report 2015’, 24–25. 
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warrants must also take effect on a material lever. The architecture of the internet is 
such that data packets are routed by TCP/IP protocol between servers on a heuristic 
basis. National borders do not determine the transmission decisions made by servers 
in the ordinary course of operations. Online communication that is both sent and 
received within the UK, therefore, could be routed via overseas servers, and therefore 
packets of data pertaining to ‘internal’ communications are inevitably collected as 
they transit bearers targeted by section 8(4) external warrants. The law holds that such 
data cannot be examined only on the basis of it containing selectors. It is protected by 
the territorial location of the sender and receiver, which are machines, not people, 
located within the British islands. Any such communications pertaining to ‘internal’ 
individuals must be specifically targeted, or the material cannot be examined.761 But 
in order to operationalise this distinction, the difference between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ packets of data must be established by examination. The IP addresses of 
sender and receiver, provided they are not disguised, indicate the country within 
which communicating devices are located.762 All communications on a bearer must be 
collected in the first instance, and algorithmically sorted so as to eliminate packets that 
cannot lawfully be examined. In physical terms, interception is a reductive process of 
elimination from a ‘buffered’ total collection. This is not simply a legal protocol but an 
inflexion upon an operationally necessary process, as the totality of data collected is 
full of irrelevant or redundant data and must undergo a ‘Massive Volume Reduction’ 
process to be made useful.763  
 
All warrants are formally addressed to the person who makes the application to the 
Home Secretary. There is a prescribed list of possible applicants; for each agency, it is 
the most senior official in that agency. For GCHQ, then, only the Director formally 
‘makes’ a warrant application. The warrant symbolically couples the office-holder of 
an agency with the office-holder of a ministry. All warrants must be signed 
                                                
761 This is the effect of section 16, Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
762 IP addresses are assigned within certain ‘ranges’ for each country, see IP2Location, ‘IP Address Ranges by 
Country’, IP2Location, accessed 26 September 2017, http://lite.ip2location.com/ip-address-ranges-by-country;  
the coupling of protocological standards to nation states has been addressed, in a somewhat dialectical 
fashion, by Galloway, Protocol, 121. 
763 ‘GCHQ Problem Book’, 10. 
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‘personally’ by a Secretary of State, although there are no rules specifying the media 
to be used to personally constitute her signature.764 Interception warrants are signed 
by the Home Secretary for domestic purposes, and the Foreign Secretary for oversees 
purposes, but the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, and 
the Cabinet Secretary for Justice in Scotland may also sign interception warrants.765  
 
Legal authorisation has three functions, according to the Operational Legalities 
presentation slides. First, it ensures compliance with the positive obligations of human 
rights law, such that any interference with privacy is carried out lawfully. Second, it 
is necessary because interception and other GCHQ activities, such as hacking into 
computer systems, is straightforwardly a criminal offence otherwise, and “civil 
servants are not immune from prosecution”. Finally, authorisation “gives visibility of 
operational activities to GCHQ seniors and [the Secretary of State]”, meaning that all 
operations can be referred to official governmental policy and can be reviewed 
accordingly by management for efficacy. Everything GCHQ does in pursuit of its 
functions has to be “authorised, necessary, and proportionate”; with the latter 
described as the “most challenging” part of each application. Rather than a full 
legislative exposition, the aim of this section is to highlight how these elements of 
legislation are folded into the production of warrants.  
6.1.1 External warrants 
The computer software used to interface with intercepted material in 2008 was, and 
perhaps still is, referred to as Corinth/UDAQ (Unified Data Access and Query tool). 
It is a portal, it controls access. In passing through the portal, an intelligence analyst 
passes through the law. If one cannot pass through the portal, one cannot enter the 
privileged position of interception.766 The interface contains fields that are specifically 
                                                
764 ‘IOCCO Annual Report 2015’, 17–18; ‘Interception of Communications Code of Practice’ (Home Office, 
January 2016), 24, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/496064/53659_CoP_Communicat
ions_Accessible.pdf. 
765 ‘IOCCO Annual Report 2015’, 18. 
766 A GCHQ presentation on interception concludes by reminding analysts that they are in an ‘enviable’ and 
‘privileged’ position – ‘you have access to a lot of sensitive data… have fun and make the most of it’ ‘Access to 
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set up “for legal compliance reasons”.767 They cannot be avoided, and are a necessary 
precondition for carrying out any operation that accesses intercepted data, or that 
initiates interception.  
 
To gather data for ‘external’ section 8(4) purposes, an intelligence analyst adds selector 
terms to the lists that must be appended to a warrant’s certificate, or set of certificates. 
Because no individual or premises need be known in advance, they can add selectors 
on the basis of thematic topics. The list of selectors on each certificate is updated on a 
rolling basis, while the warrant covering the communications bearer itself remains in 
force. In 2008, when the training slides were made, there were ten certificates in effect, 
including one ‘global’ certificate for all GCHQ signal processing operations around 
the world. The rest are assigned individually to particular “special source access” 
sites. This seems to indicate that the certificates function on an administrative logic, 
rather than legal: a ‘global’ certificate legalises operations universally, but not all 
selectors are useful in all locations. As such, local certificates are used to differentiate 
locally interesting topics.  
 
Apparently, a sample certificate was passed around during the session, which further 
suggests that analysts do not normally see the certificates. In other words, while 
certificates must contain a formal list of terms that describe the themes being searched 
for, they exist as an element in the formal legal paperwork, a nexus of legal media that 
couples the Operational Legalities team to GCHQ’s senior management, and on to 
government ministers. The certificate is a legal document that draws lines between 
elements in a complex organisational hierarchy. Analysts, however, do not normally 
use the certificate as such. They interact with selector terms not on paper, but through 
the UDAQ interface. According to the training notes, this procedure ensures that 
“individuals’ ECHR rights are protected on a world-wide basis” by tying them back 
to the legal framework encoded into the portal. 
                                                
the Future’, Snowden Doc Search, 21 June 2013, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/Accesstothefuture2013-06-21_nsadocs_snowden_doc. 
767 ‘Operational Legalities - GCHQ’. 
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6.1.2 The portal 
The image in figure 17 is a screenshot of the UDAQ interface, taken from the training 
slides (the resolution is less than ideal). We can discern some instructive features. First, 
the interface has been accessed via Microsoft Internet Explorer, “provided by GCHQ”, 
and the browser address bar is directed to a redacted website using the encrypted 
‘https’ protocol (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol Secure). This protocol is commonly 
used for web-based financial services and other sites that require secure encryption of 
traffic. One of the systems used to generate encryption keys for such services was 
compromised by the NSA, as discussed in the introductory chapter.768  
 
The secure web address suggests that gaining access to the portal to work with 
intercepted material via UDAQ is possible via the internet. Provided that Internet 
Explorer is configured correctly and the user has logged in securely, it appears that 
analysts can access GCHQ’s internal network from any internet connection, making 
the delivery of intercepted data subject to the same protocols that enabled the 
interception of that data. However, it could equally be the case that access is limited 
to fixed terminals within GCHQ and allied states’ installations.     
 
The ‘Source’ tab on the interface offers two options, ‘intercept’ and ‘opensource’. On 
the screenshot in figure 17, ‘intercept’ is selected. Presumably, ‘opensource’ data is 
less interesting for training purposes, as it likely refers to information that has been 
gathered from websites and other ‘open’ sources of published information rather than 
interception, and therefore no warrant is required to access it. The interception tab 
offers three checkboxes, which seem to correspond to codenames for sources of 
intercepted data.769 Below, the ‘Search Terms’ tab offers a textbox for entering 
keywords and drop-down menus for setting the parameters within which the search 
is to be conducted. Presumably, results would be offered in the unmarked space 
below, which offers either ‘structured’ or ‘freeform’ views. 
                                                
768 Landau, ‘Highlights from Making Sense of Snowden, Part II’, 63; see 1.1. 
769 A ‘counterveillance’ blog (my ascription) containing a useful ‘opensource’ list of such codewords is available 
at ‘GCHQ Codewords and Abbreviations’, accessed 20 September 2017, 
http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/gchq-nicknames-and-codewords.html. 
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On the right of the screen is the ‘Properties’ tab, which we shall return to below. Below 
‘Properties’ is the HRA (Human Rights Act) justification section, which requires entry 
of a ‘Miranda’ number, with the label ‘JIC priority’ next to it. According to the training 
slides, the Miranda number “equates to [an] intelligence requirement”. The number 
refers to a centralised list of political priorities for the UK’s intelligence services as a 
whole, set by the Joint Intelligence Committee of the UK Government.770 This, then, is 
what makes a given query qualify as ‘necessary’ for the purposes of human rights law, 
which stipulates requires that all intrusions into privacy must be “necessary in a 
democratic society”. The Miranda number includes such standards in every 
operation; it addresses itself to the legally-mandated question of ‘necessity’. 
Individual GCHQ intelligence analysts are neither qualified nor required to make 
necessity judgements, they just need to include a valid and relevant Miranda number.  
 
To enter a valid selector term, the analyst must provide a short ‘justification’. 
According to the training materials, the intended target of a particular selector term 
may be human or non-human. For instance, it could be aimed at detecting the 
communications produced by a software-based ‘bot’. But because the data that is 
returned does not discriminate between human users except according to location, the 
analyst will inevitably see data attributable in some sense to humans. As such, the 
human rights justification box must be populated with some semantic textual 
explanation as to why that is to be so. This entry, the trainers emphasise in their slides, 
cannot simply repeat other factors entered elsewhere, but should connect the selector 
term to a wider justificatory strategy. Each selector has to be justified by the analyst 
using it.771  
 
Certificated selectors take effect by populating a database called ‘Broad Oak’. Broad 
Oak is a ‘strategic target’ database. The database is distributed, meaning that it is 
copied to memory systems at all GCHQ sites where any ‘external’ communication 
bearers are intercepted. As described above, the technical effect of a section 8(4) 
                                                
770 ‘Joint Intelligence Committee - GOV.UK’. 
771 ‘Operational Legalities - GCHQ’. 
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warrant is that all data packets passing through the targeted bearer are lawfully 
copied to a temporary memory system, known as a ‘buffer’.772 Once the data has been 
purged of uninteresting types of data packet, the packets are reassembled into 
communications, referred to as ‘sessions’, and semantic content of each 
communication is inspected with reference to the active selector terms in the Broad 
Oak database. If data packets contain content that matches an active selector, that 
content is collected for processing and analysis. ‘Selection’, paradoxically, is realised 
by selective forgetting. The legal act of ‘selecting’ is performed in a subtractive process 
of elimination; everything that has not been authorised to be retained is deleted. 
However, this only applies to packets of semantic content. All collected ‘traffic’ data 
is universally collected and stored, compiling a map of all ‘external’ communication 
links observed in the system. 
 
From thematically defined ‘seed’ selectors that are generally applied across the buffer, 
information thus emerges and offers itself as the basis for further enquiries.773 The 
training notes state that the selectors listed on a certificate need not be precisely the 
same as the selectors an analyst enters into Broad Oak. The certificates do not require 
the same granularity used in actual operations, but need only list “general categories 
of material” that “broadly mirror” the intelligence priorities set by the Joint 
Intelligence Committee. In practice, analysts can go beyond those legally certificated 
terms when actually implementing selectors, which means there is a distinction 
between the formal entries on the certificate and the operational entries that may 
follow. Despite being coded into one interface, law and intelligence analysts still obey 
different logics, and thus remain elements in two different registers even as they are 
co-produced.  
                                                
772 Technical details have been leaked and published independently of the Snowden archive, see Ryan 
Gallagher, ‘The Little-Known Company That Enables Worldwide Mass Surveillance’, The Intercept, accessed 23 
October 2016, https://theintercept.com/2016/10/23/endace-mass-surveillance-gchq-governments/. 
773 The process summarised here is more complex and requires patient analysis of Snowden documents to 
understand, see generally ‘Tempora - GCWiki Entry’; ‘GCHQ Problem Book’; ‘Special Source Access 
(Supporting Internet Operations) - GCHQ Presentation’, 2010, Snowden Doc Search, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SupportingInternetOperations2015-09-25nsadocs; ‘XKeyScore - NSA 
Presentation’; for a summary, see Greenwald, No Place to Hide. 
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Figure 18 shows the results: a screenshot of UDAQ, displaying the features of an active 
selector. The HRA justification entry states: “SUSPECTED OF PRCOCURING ARMS 
FROM IRAN IN CONTRAVENTION OF UN SANCTIONS”. This second screenshot 
is an example taken from the Broad Oak database, the logo appearing in the top left 
of the image. This particular selector, the semantic content of which is blanked out in 
the slideshow, was to be applied only to email traffic, thereby narrowing the 
processing requirements. On the completed selector screen in figure 18, there is a 
visible Miranda number, a JIC ‘priority code’ in a separate box, and a date set for ‘HRA 
review’ (that is, presumably, a Human Rights Act-mandated review). Furthermore, 
there is a reference code specifying the ‘Legal Authorization for Target’. This code 
number is most likely the reference number against which the term appears on all 
relevant certificates and warrants, bearing in mind that it could be applied on any of 
the ten active certificates that were then in force. At the bottom, the list shows the 
interception locations where the selector is active.  
 
Where the justifications for a selector term no longer apply, the reasons for removing 
it from the list of active selectors must be recorded and the selector deactivated in the 
Broad Oak network. If an overseas target enters the UK, there is a five-day window in 
which interception can continue while the analyst obtains a section 8(1) warrant that 
will subsequently authorise the continuing process, superseding the section 8(4) 
authorisations used while the target was abroad.774 The Operational Legalities team 
advise that they are available to help convert any ambiguous cases into an 
“appropriate format”. For instance, where no specific information is known about a 
topic, such as any specific names, devices, or locations, GCHQ bulk databases can be 
analytically mined to produce targets, but doing so requires senior official approval. 
The slides stress that the ‘belief’ element required of analysts – for instance, where 
they believe the target to be located, what they believe the situation to be that justifies 
interception – does mean “100% knowledge with hindsight”. While operatives should 
not “turn a blind eye” to inconvenient data, they should nonetheless always be 
                                                
774 The legislation is complex, but see also section 16(3) Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. 
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confident in proceeding on the basis of available knowledge at the time. What matters 
most, the training says, is always recording the reasons for doing something. Even if 
an assumption is later proved incorrect, the interface generates a trail of evidence to 
demonstrate to the “good faith” reasons for the initial “judgement call”. 
6.1.3 Internal warrants 
For any interception operation targeting persons or premises located within the 
British islands, a RIPA section 8(1) warrant must be in place. The unified system for 
lawful interception within the UK is called the Preston system. In a 2007 document 
describing its architecture and functions, it is described as follows:  
PRESTON collection is the warranted intercept of all UK line access. It covers 
fixed and mobile communications; and voice and data. Each target must be 
covered by a RIPA 8(1) warrant. GCHQ is one of eight intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies involved in this type of collection.775 
The document provides details of the logical architecture of the system’s ability to 
intercept, process, and store communications via ‘streams’ that are copied via a one-
way link from commercial ‘communication service providers’ in the UK, all of whom 
must, by law, co-operate with section 8(1) warrants. Here we shall briefly review the 
“Use-Case view” section of the document, which describes how intelligence analysts, 
rather than systems engineers, interact with the architectural environment of Preston. 
It describes  
how the actors apply a formal process to achieve the interception.  In short, the 
process covers preparing a case for interception, application for a warrant, 
warrant review, and (if successful) the provisioning of communication 
intercept.776 
                                                
775 ‘Preston Architecture - GCHQ’ (The Intercept, 5 July 2007), 5, 
https://theintercept.com/document/2016/06/07/preston-architecture/. 
776 Ibid., 11. 
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To enable interception, both an “intelligence analyst” and an “interception authority” 
must be in place. As the document explains,  
the process is compliant with RIPA, as no communication interception can 
occur without a warrant in place. The RIPA requirements ensure compliance 
with HRA, in particular, the case for interception must be strong for the 
warrant to be obtained.777 
The approval of a warrant is the result of the procedural confirmation of its 
lawfulness. The procedure is graphically rendered in figure 19. The so-called 
“business process” does not only ensure lawfulness, it also integrates the technical 
process of “stream routing” into “collection or survey” systems. A collection system 
is used where a data stream requires no technical analysis before it is presented to an 
intelligence analyst; for instance, the recording of a voice call. A survey system is one 
that disentangles a complex data stream into component elements, where the initial 
structure of the data is not already understood. After all; “the internet is flexible, and 
supports a myriad of protocols, so a more complex process is used”.778 Working in 
tandem, the intelligence analyst and the tasking manager ensure that all streams 
operationalised by GCHQ are confirmed to be of value, and so are kept ‘on stream’ 
only for so long as operationally necessary (figure 20). This way, the technical 
application of interception processes and the intelligence analysis are coupled 
together via the medium of the warrant, which at the same time confirms the legality 
of all such collaborative operations.  
 
The Corinth/UDAQ interface shown in figures 17 and 18 is, or at least was, used for 
adding ‘selectors’ to Preston.779 As with external communications, the routines were 
coded to ensure the intelligence analyst, as the functional ‘user’ of the interface, can 
only interact with the Preston system in accordance with the law. But, as the Preston 
Architecture document makes clear, this alone does not describe how the data is 
                                                
777 Ibid. 
778 Ibid., 12–13. 
779 Ibid., 15. 
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intercepted, parsed, or made available for analysis.780 There are more complex 
processes involving systems administrators and collection managers, but these do not 
concern the legalities that centre on the intelligence analyst.781 The arrangement is 
summarised in the chart shown in figure 21. 
6.1.4 Legalities table  
It should be emphasised again that we have dealt with the interception of the ‘content’ 
of communication here, rather than also including the position in respect of 
‘communications data’, more commonly referred to as ‘metadata’. A document from 
2007 provides a simplified breakdown of the legal situation under RIPA regarding the 
content and metadata of intercepted communications as determined by the location 
of the target. As can be seen, RIPA permits the collection of all metadata without 
warrant (figure 22).  
 
The table refers to a second distinction, that of ‘Second Party’ locations or nationals. 
Second party nations are the members of the ‘Five Eyes’ alliance: the UK, US, 
Australia, Canada and New Zealand. To intercept material covered by the legal 
systems of those states, no warrant is required, but ‘STA’ is.782 STA stands for 
‘Sensitive Targeting Authorisation’.783 It has subsequently been replaced by COPA 
(Combined Policy Authorisation), through which the close SIGINT allies coordinate 
their activities.784 This can involve different operational distinctions. For instance, 
unlike the UK’s legal system which legally differentiates data according to its 
                                                
780 For the technical side of the Preston system, see ibid., 21–40 the codewords are, of course, difficult to 
decipher without further resources in the Snowden archive. 
781 ‘Preston Business Processes - GCHQ’ Snowden Doc Search, 18, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/PRESTONBusinessProcesses2016-06-07_nsadocs_snowden_doc. 
782 ‘Legalities Table - GCHQ’ Snowden Doc Search, https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/Legalities2015-
09-25_nsadocs_snowden_doc; An operational flowchart of the warrantry regime summarises the overall 
position, see ‘Legal Authorisation Flowchart - GCHQ’, Snowden Doc Search, 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/LegalAuthorisationFlowchartsTARGETINGandCOLLECTION2015-06-
22_nsadocs_snowden_doc. 
783 ‘GCHQ Codewords and Abbreviations’. 
784 Ryan Gallagher, ‘From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users’ Online Identities’, The Intercept, 
accessed 10 October 2016, https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-online-
identities/. 
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territorial points of transmission and reception, the US legal system attaches rights to 
individual citizens. US citizens must therefore be eliminated from intercepted datasets 
in a subtractive process. While on a semantic level this indicates a higher degree of 
legal protection for US citizens, conversely, it requires some prior set of stored and 
reliable connections between the IP address of a given device and the nationality of 
its user. To avoid surveillance under these conditions, a US citizen’s electronic devices 
must already be known, stored, and indexed to their identity in internationally 
distributed government databases.  
 
Returning to figure 17, in the ‘Properties’ tab of UDAQ, the analyst must name their 
specific query and indicate its classification status. There are options on a menu in 
which one can specify a particular country in the ‘Five-Eyes’ alliance. This indicates 
that other nation’s analysts may interface with and use UDAQ. The ‘Properties’ tab 
appears to be designed for producing a ‘Targeting Protection Security Label’, an 
example of which is seen near the bottom of the interface in the following image of a 
completed selector. The label indicates to anyone within the ‘Five-Eyes’ alliance the 
classification status of the selector and, perhaps, whether or not they are permitted to 
access material generated by it. Within the global network of shared interception 
systems, each nation can still keep some things from its partners.  
 
The five national agencies all make data available to one another, with the caveat that 
they all respect one another’s legal arrangements. For instance, in order to access NSA 
databases, GCHQ operatives require a special license with ‘STA’ approval. According 
to the training slides, such a license is easy to obtain. In 2008 at least, it involved an 
“open-book exam” with multiple-choice questions, presumably on the basic 
application of US constitutional law and rules derived from the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act 1978 (FISA), or rather, the interfaces through which the NSA 
operationalises those rules. Only the category of ‘other’, that is, everyone else in the 
world, can freely be targeted under the broad range of generalised selectors added to 
Broad Oak through the medium of a section 8(4) warrant and certificate.  
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6.1.5 Dissemination and audit 
The dissemination of intelligence produced from intercepted material must be 
channelled via the National Technical Assistance Centre (NTAC), part of GCHQ.785 
The Operational Legalities notes state that a single interface system is in place for 
“passing intelligence to customers”, that is, to anyone outside GCHQ. The training 
emphasises that emailing someone with classified intelligence is a bad idea; doing so 
can lead to prosecution. Deciding on the content of an intelligence report requires a 
separate legally-mandated proportionality assessment, in addition to the one that 
generated the intercepted material in the first place. There is a proportionality 
assessment when deciding what data to examine, and another when deciding what 
observations derived from intercepted data can be disclosed. Data no longer required 
for operational purposes must be destroyed, and data use must be minimised; the 
guiding principle is that private data is looked at, copied and disseminated as little as 
possible. Errors leading to breaches of law or policy have to be immediately reported, 
and in any case, it would be much worse should mistakes covered up later emerge on 
audit. The analyst thus interfaces with the world via another closed system, that 
imposes a different set of legal requirements.786  
 
All activities carried out in this digital environment are subject to audit. Each year, a 
percentage of all entries are randomly selected and checked by the Interception of 
Communication Commissioner’s Office (IOCCO). Each domestic section 8(1) warrant 
entry is checked individually, alongside a random selection of the more numerous 
‘externals’. The inspectors sample all data sets and can personally observe the use of 
interfaces and data by various agencies.787 There is an ongoing audit process, 
conducted on all agencies that utilise any of the powers granted in RIPA, and 
generalised results are published annually. Every operation carried out is fully 
recorded and attributable. As each operative in GCHQ is constructed as a user of an 
                                                
785 ‘The National Technical Assistance Centre | GCHQ Site’, accessed 8 July 2017, 
https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/national-technical-assistance-centre NTAC ‘manages the delivery of 
intercepted communications to the agencies that have a lawful authorisation in place to acquire them’. 
786 ‘Interception COP’, 41. 
787 ‘IOCCO Annual Report 2015’, 26–31. 
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interface, their persona is attached to every action they perform in the network. Every 
application for authority to act generates a unique reference ID that connects it to 
subsequent actions under the same warrant, making it possible to recombine data for 
legal compliance purposes. The inspection regime operates not only by inspecting 
individual warrants but by sampling data and running various mathematical analyses 
on it, looking for patterns that may indicate poor practice or insufficient consideration 
of legalities.  
 
As Marilyn Strathern puts it, with auditing processes, reflexivity “sustains a 
judgmental and thus an ethical self.”788 We can, with audits, see auditing as an 
independent subsystem that reproduces itself through the accounts that it elicits from 
organisations. Auditees are “turned into ethical self-auditors – typically they do their 
own audit on themselves before the experts come in.”789 In order to do this, the 
complexity of the organisation itself has to be reduced to a few simplified critical 
differences that can capture the ethical moments – here defined by legislation – which 
can assure the auditors that all is, statistically speaking, carrying on in accordance 
with the law. Audits take effect via disciplining the correct application of procedures, 
rather than engaging substantively in retrospective assessments of normative 
decisions to intercept communication. Bluntly, it is about form and not content. In 
what sense has this enhanced the role of law? Strathern again:  
Now what makes audit virtuous is its power to purify the principles of (good) 
organization as such. Audit does not just produce auditees and auditors; it is 
an organization that produces trust in organization(s). Its own self becomes 
recognizable in the efforts others make to come up to standard… The 
practitioners (auditors) are ethical arbiters with guidelines to implement rather 
than social observers with a job of analysis to do. Audit keeps its own virtue 
through its own self-description as (the phrase is mine) an enabling 
technology.790 
                                                
788 Marilyn Strathern, ‘Bullet-Proofing: A Tale from the United Kingdom’, in Documents: Artifacts of Modern 
Knowledge, ed. Annelise Riles (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 191. 
789 Ibid. 
790 Ibid., 192. 
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Strathern’s notion of audit as an “enabling technology” is useful. Recall that in order 
to be legal under contemporary human rights law, any interference with personal 
privacy must be in accordance with the law, necessary, and proportionate. The 
interface itself is designed so that the only operations possible are in accordance with 
the law; the law is encoded into its architecture. Necessity is a political determination 
which is controlled by the use of JIC priority codes.  
 
For an individual analyst, the legal variable that they must generate concerns the 
‘proportionality’ of the particular operation. From a legal perspective, the key legal 
elements of the assessment are already in place: first, the legitimacy of interception in 
general is established by legislation; second, the necessity of the operation is 
confirmed by inserting the JIC priority code; third, the suitability of interception is 
inherent in the fact that it is the only way to access private communications. The 
interface, holding all other elements together, requires only the entry of a fourth 
element, the ‘balancing’ of the interest in the data against the interference with privacy 
that is presumed to follow.791 It requires a statement that accounts for the contingency 
of the future anterior operation by assigning a normative value to the anticipated 
difference between the state of the situation before interception and the situation after; 
that is, to explain the anticipated outcome in normative terms.  
 
The warrantry processes outlined above posit warrants as technologies that link 
together and enable a number of other processes. Not least, they designate and 
differentiate the symbolic roles of the Secretary of State and the requirements of the 
legal system, making possible the attribution of legal responsibility to her in the form 
of a decision to sign a warrant. However, what is presented to the Secretary of State 
to sign has already passed through the portal: her scope for ‘decision’ is intentionally 
narrow, given that she has no basis for second-guessing the applications presented to 
her. As the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s latest report confirms, 
very few applications are refused because inadequate applications are corrected, 
                                                
791 These four elements are taken from a doctrinal overview of the concept of proportionality in constitutional law, 
see Kai Möller, ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’, International Journal of Constitutional Law 10, no. 3 (1 
July 2012): 711. 
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filtered out within the agencies before reaching the Secretary of State.792 By the time it 
reaches her desk, the decisive elements are already in place.  
 
Her authorisation validates the creation of an indexed reference number, in reference 
to which authorised operations are automatically recorded as digital ‘files’ for 
auditing. Data access, data retention periods, and intelligence dissemination are all 
similarly coded into the system. Making a warrant is impossible without entering data 
in a form that is already coded to these purposes, or, put the other way around, it is, 
as the annual statistics confirm, almost impossible to make an illegal warrant.  
 
As Luhmann points out, the binary difference between legal and illegal is easy to 
institutionalise, provided one knows what is legal and what is illegal.793 An institution 
that establishes its own procedures for interfacing with the world outside can in turn 
observe how those procedures appear when considered through the law; this is the 
self-auditing logic that Strathern describes. But to actualise this reality, so-called 
warrantry must be ascribable to the decisions made by GCHQ operatives and their 
political masters. Digital media, which can simulate and perform the operations of 
any other medium, transcribe the requirements of the law into media-technical 
procedures that control access to the privileged position media assign to interceptors.  
 
Interception is a privileged position assigned by technical media. The warrantry 
process works not to restrain action but to legalise it.  
6.2 Conclusion 
To return to the founding question: can technical literacy produce laws that control 
interception? The answer is no, because interception has already superseded the law. 
Both interception and the law are symbolic ascriptions given to media-technical 
operations. Digital media, which can simulate all others, are capable of performing 
both interception and legal operations at the same time. The challenge is designing a 
                                                
792 ‘IOCCO Annual Report 2015’, para. 6.12, 7.5. 
793 Luhmann, Law as a Social System, 180. 
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suitable interface that directs the operations of the analyst, and allows them to occupy 
the position of ‘user’ who sees themselves as in control.  
 
Technical literacy is no answer, because literacy is always already an effect of technical 
operations. As long as government actions were performed on paper, it was possible 
to believe that law could direct them. As Vismann and Krajewski show, this position 
is no longer sustainable. Interfaces were first designed by the NSA in 1971,794 since 
then, access to intercepted data has been determined by the rules of computer 
architecture, not legislature.795 Digital operations supersede legal operations.  
 
Increasingly, as experiments in machine learning indicate, the reasons for adding 
selectors to the growing lists of interception targets are generated by machine-learning 
processes that filter and interrogate the agglomerated data derived from interception 
and related techniques.796 Whether or not such processes are ‘effective’ is beside the 
point. The criticism that intelligence agencies collect ‘too much’ data to be functionally 
effective is weak criticism.797 It only justifies further experiments in improving the 
efficiency of learning algorithms; which by definition requires more data than can be 
‘useful’ for a prescribed end. The point is that the algorithm must learn to identify 
everything that is not useful.798  
 
Moreover, arguments based on the empirical effectiveness of how intercepted data is 
used seek to ascribe a temporal process based on law to operations determined by 
media. Intelligence agencies cannot only collect the data that they will use, because it 
is humanly impossible to know ascribe meaning to data after it has been collected and 
inspected. Hence legal distinctions can only be applied to data after it has been 
collected. The fiction that the human analyst who, in adding a new selector term to 
                                                
794 Section 3.5.3  
795 Vismann and Krajewski, ‘Computer Juridisms’, 91–92. 
796 ‘GCHQ Problem Book’. 
797 Glyn Moody, ‘MI5 Collecting “significantly More” Data than It Can Use, New Snowden Docs Reveal’, Ars 
Technica UK, 7 June 2016, https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/06/mi5-too-much-data-preston-milkwhite-
analysis/. 
798 Ethem Alpaydin, Machine Learning: The New AI (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2016), 166. 
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the database, is responsible for generating the reasons for adding that selector is 
sustainable so long as human analysts remain in the position assigned to users, who 
enter semantic search terms that digital media operationalise through selection 
operations applied to the distributed stores of intercepted data. Yet as machines 
increasingly come to determine the selection of data for intelligence purposes, the 
legally generated notion of an a priori justificatory reason for intercepting data will 
lose its place in the order of things. Machines supplant their users.  
 
Learning machines cannot account for their decisions in semantic terms, any more 
than studying the brain can give an account of consciousness.799 Justificatory reasons 
emerge from the interception and analysis of data, not before. They will continue to 
exist only so long as the law maintains the fiction that the results of recursive 
computerised pattern recognition can be attributed to the Secretary of State through 
her signature.800  
 
Already, the analyst’s job is simply to semantically translate the output of past 
interception operations into input for the next; already, the post-facto analysis of 
intercepted data generates ‘justifications’ for intercepting more. The law disguises this 
process by attributing action to human intentions, but in linking abnormal patterns of 
intercepted data to abnormal human behaviour, machines are learning to do this too. 
Without the function assigned to them by the law, humans have no grounds on which 
to second-guess machines.801 At the point when the law is finally confirmed to have 
lost its ability to assign meaning to media-technical operations, it may become 
possible to glimpse the real locus of power today.   
 
 
 
                                                
799 Ibid., 22. 
800 On law’s fictions and computers, see Vismann and Krajewski, ‘Computer Juridisms’, 92. 
801 Elena Esposito has elegantly compared the human position in this situation to the position of the priests in 
ritual forms of divination, see Elena Esposito, ‘Digital Prophecies and Web Intelligence’, in Privacy, Due Process 
and the Computational Turn, ed. Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries (London New York: Routledge, 2013), 
121–42. 
 300 
  
 301 
Bibliography 
  
 302 
Books and Scholarly Articles  
Aldrich, Richard. GCHQ. London: Harper Press, 2011. 
Aldrich, Richard J. ‘Policing the Past: Official History, Secrecy and British 
Intelligence Since 1945’. The English Historical Review 119, no. 483 (2004): 922–53. 
Allen, E. J. B. Post and Courier Service in the Diplomacy of Early Modern Europe. The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972. 
Alpaydin, Ethem. Machine Learning: The New AI. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press, 2016. 
Amoore, Louise. The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability. 
Durham: Duke University Press, 2013. 
Andrew, Christopher. The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. 
London: Penguin, 2010. 
Andrew, Christopher, and Keith Neilson. ‘Tsarist Codebreakers and British 
Codes’. In Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence, edited by Christopher Andrew, 6–
12. London: Frank Cass, 1986. 
Audibert, Lucie C., and Andrew D. Murray. ‘A Principled Approach to Network 
Neutrality’. SCRIPTed 13, no. 2 (2016): 118–43. 
Bakir, Vian. Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror: Agenda-
Building Struggles. Farnham, Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2013. 
Bamford, James. The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America’s Most Secret Agency. New 
York: Penguin, 1983. 
———. The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on 
America. Doubleday, 2008. 
Barker, Elaine, and John Kelsey. ‘Recommendation for Random Number 
Generation Using Deterministic Random Bit Generators’. Computer Security 
Resource Center, 2012. https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-
90a/archive/2012-01-23. 
Barnard, H. C. ‘The Messageries of the University of Paris’. British Journal of 
Educational Studies 4, no. 1 (1955): 49–56. 
Barty-King, Hugh. Girdle Round the Earth: The Story of Cable and Wireless and Its 
Predecessors to Mark the Group’s Jubilee, 1929-1979. London: Heinemann, 1979. 
 303 
Bauer, Friedrich L. Decrypted Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology. Third 
Edition. Berlin: Springer, 2002. 
Beale, P. O. A History of the Post in England from the Romans to the Stuarts. 
Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998. 
Beattie, J. M. Crime and the Courts in England, 1660-1800. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986. 
Bedos-Rezak, Brigitte. When Ego Was Imago: Signs of Identity in the Middle Ages. 
Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2011. 
Bellamy, J. G. The Law of Treason in England in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1970. 
http://ebooks.cambridge.org/ref/id/CBO9780511522369. 
Blackstone, William. The Oxford Edition of Blackstone’s: Commentaries on the Laws of 
England: Book I: Of the Rights of Persons. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
Bratton, Benjamin H. The Stack: On Software and Sovereignty. Software Studies. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2015. 
Brown, A. L. ‘The Authorization of Letters under the Great Seal’. Historical Research 
37, no. 96 (1 November 1964): 125–56. 
Campaigne, Howard H. ‘Lightning’. NSA Technical Journal 4, no. 3 (July 1959): 63–
67. 
Campbell-Smith, Duncan. Masters of the Post: The Authorized History of the Royal 
Mail. London: Penguin, 2012. 
Carruthers, Mary J. The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. 
 Chester, Sir Daniel Norman. The English Administrative System 1780-1870. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981. 
Chrimes, S. B. An Introduction to the Administrative History of Mediaeval England. 
Third Edition. Studies in Mediaeval History. Oxford: Blackwell, 1966. 
Clanchy, M. T. From Memory to Written Record: England 1066-1307. Second Edition. 
Oxford: Blackwell, 1993. 
Clarke, Arthur C. How the World Was One: Beyond the Global Village. London: 
Gollancz, 1992. 
 304 
Cohen, Julie E. Configuring the Networked Self: Law, Code, and the Play of Everyday 
Practice. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012. 
Corera, Gordon. Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies. W&N, 2015. 
Couldry, Nick, and Alison Powell. ‘Big Data From the Bottom Up’. Big Data & 
Society 1, no. 2 (2014). 
Daunton, M.J. Royal Mail: The Post Office Since 1840. London: The Athlone Press, 
1985. 
‘Defence Requirements for Cable Landing Sites’, 1910. BT Archives. 
Deleuze, Gilles. ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’. October 59 (1992): 3–7. 
Delgado, Alan. The Enormous File: A Social History of the Office. London: John 
Murray Publishers Ltd, 1979. 
Denniston, A. G. ‘The Government Code and Cypher School Between the Wars’. In 
Codebreaking and Signals Intelligence, edited by Christopher Andrew, 48–70. 
London: Frank Cass, 1986. 
Diffie, Whitfield, and Susan Landau. Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping 
and Encryption. Updated Edition, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2007. 
Dickens, Charles. The Signalman: A Ghost Story. London: Profile Books, 2015. 
Eachus, Joseph, Walter W. Hagedorn, Samuel S. Snyder, and Howard H. 
Campaigne. ‘Growing Up with Computers at NSA’. NSA Technical Journal, no. 
Special Issue (1972): 3–14. 
Ellis, Kenneth. The Post Office in the Eighteenth Century: A Study in Administrative 
History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958. 
Endicott, Timothy. ‘Was Entick v Carrington a Landmark?’ In Entick v Carrington: 
250 Years of the Rule of Law, edited by Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, 109–30. 
Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015. 
Engstrom, Edward T. ‘Science and Cryptology’. NSA Technical Journal 3, no. 3 (July 
1958): 1–6. 
Esposito, Elena. ‘Digital Prophecies and Web Intelligence’. In Privacy, Due Process 
and the Computational Turn, edited by Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries, 121–
42. London, New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Evans, Florence Greir. The Principal Secretary of State: A Survey of the Office from 
1558 to 1680. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1923. 
 305 
Ewing, Keith, and Conor Gearty. The Struggle for Civil Liberties: Political Freedom and 
the Rule of Law in Britain, 1914-1945. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. 
Fari, Simone. Victorian Telegraphy Before Nationalization. Basingstoke, Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2015. 
Firth, C. H. ‘Thurloe and the Post Office’. English Historical Review 13 (1 January 
1898): 527–533. 
Fisher, John H. ‘Chancery and the Emergence of Standard Written English in the 
Fifteenth Century’. Speculum 52, no. 4 (1977): 870–99.  
Fitzgerald, Patrick, and Mark Leopold. Stranger on the Line: The Secret History of 
Phone Tapping. London: The Bodley Head, 1987. 
Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. Translated by Alan 
Sheridan. London: Penguin, 1991. 
———. ‘Governmentality’. In Power, by James D. Faubion, 201–22. translated by 
Robert Hurley & Ors. Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984. London: Penguin, 
2002. 
———. Security, Territory, Population. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson. Translated by 
Graham Burchell. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007. 
———. Society Must Be Defended. Translated by David Macey. London: Penguin, 
2003. 
———. The Archaeology of Knowledge. Translated by A.M. Sheridan Smith. 2nd 
edition. London ; New York: Routledge, 2002. 
———. The Birth of Biopolitics. Edited by Arnold I. Davidson. Translated by 
Graham Burchell. Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008. 
———. The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences. London: 
Tavistock, 1970. 
———. ‘Truth and Juridical Forms’. In Power, by James D. Faubion, 1–89. 
translated by Robert Hurley & Ors. Essential Works of Foucault 1954 - 1984. 
London: Penguin, 2002. 
———. ‘What Is an Author?’ In The Art of Art History, edited by Donald Preziosi, 
299–314. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998. 
Fraser, Peter. The Intelligence of the Secretaries of State and Their Monopoly of Licensed 
News, 1660-1688. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956. 
 306 
Fuchs, Christian. Critical Theory of Communication: New Readings of Lukács, Adorno, 
Marcuse, Honneth and Habermas in the Age of the Internet. London: University of 
Westminster Press, 2016. 
———. ‘Surveillance and Critical Theory’. Media and Communication 3, no. 2 (30 
September 2015): 6–9.  
Galloway, Alexander R. Protocol: How Control Exists After Decentralization. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2006. 
Gearty, Conor. ‘The Courts and Recent Exercises of the Prerogative’. The Cambridge 
Law Journal 46, no. 3 (1987): 372–74. 
Gleick, James. The Information. London: Fourth Estate, 2012. 
Goodman, Dena. ‘Epistolary Property: Michel de Servan and the Plight of Letters 
on the Eve of the French Revolution’. In Early Modern Conceptions of Property, 
edited by John Brewer and Susan Staves, 339–64. London, New York: Routledge, 
1995. 
Grant, J. Kerry. A Companion to The Crying of Lot 49. Athens: University of Georgia 
Press, 1994. 
Greenwald, Glenn. No Place to Hide. New York: Macmillan US, 2014. 
Gumbrecht, Hans Ulrich. ‘Media History as the Event of Truth: On the Singularity 
of Friedrich A. Kittler’s Works’. In The Truth of the Technological World, translated 
by Erik Butler, 307–29. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. 
———. ‘Second Order Observation Historicized - An Epistemological Frame 
Narrative’. Stuttgart: Akademie Schloss Solitude, 2010. http://www.design-in-
human.de/lectures/gumbrecht.html. 
Habermas, Jürgen. The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: Inquiry into a 
Category of Bourgeois Society. Translated by Thomas Burger. New Ed edition. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. 
Haggerty, Kevin D., and Richard V. Ericson. ‘The Surveillant Assemblage’. British 
Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 (2000): 605–22. 
Hale, Sir Matthew. The History of the Pleas of the Crown (Published from His Lordship’s 
Original Manuscript, and the Several References to the Records Examined by the 
Originals). Reproduction from British Library. Vol. 2. London: Gyles, Woodward, 
and Davis, 1736. 
 307 
Harding, Alan. Medieval Law and the Foundations of the State. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002. 
Hardt, Michael, and Antonio Negri. Empire. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 2000. 
Harvey, P. D. A., and Andrew McGuiness. A Guide to British Medieval Seals. 
London: British Library and Public Record Office, 1996. 
Headrick, Daniel R. The Invisible Weapon: Telecommunications and International 
Politics, 1851-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991. 
Hemmeon, J. C. History of the British Post Office. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1912. 
Herman, Michael. Intelligence Power in Peace and War. Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
Hickman, Tom. ‘Revisiting Entick v Carrington: Seditious Libel and State Security 
Laws in Eighteenth-Century England’. In Entick v Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule 
of Law, edited by Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, 43–84. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2015. 
Hidalgo, César. Why Information Grows: The Evolution of Order, from Atoms to 
Economies. London: Allen Lane, 2015. 
Hildebrandt, Mireille. ‘Profile Transparency by Design?’ In Privacy, Due Process 
and the Computational Turn, edited by Mireille Hildebrandt and Katja de Vries, 221–
46. London, New York: Routledge, 2013. 
Hill, Christopher. Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution Revisited. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997. 
Hodges, Andrew. Alan Turing: The Enigma. London: Vintage, 1992. 
Hong, Sungook. Wireless: From Marconi’s Black-Box to the Audion. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001. 
Horn, Eva. ‘Logics of Political Secrecy’. Theory, Culture & Society 28, no. 7–8 (2011): 
103–22. 
Housden, J. A. J. ‘The Merchant Strangers’ Post in the Sixteenth Century’. The 
English Historical Review 21, no. 84 (1906): 739–742. 
Hu, Tung-Hui. A Prehistory of the Cloud. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
2015. 
 308 
Innis, Harold Adams. Empire and Communications. 2nd ed. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1972. 
  
 Jagodzinski, Cecile M. Privacy and Print: Reading and Writing in Seventeenth-
Century England. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1999. 
James, Henry. ‘In the Cage’. In In the Cage and Other Stories. London: Penguin, 
1972. 
Jeffery, Keith. MI6. The History of the Secret Intelligence Service 1909-1949. London: 
Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd, 2011. 
Johnson, Thomas R. American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book II: 
Centralization Wins, 1960-1972. Excised & Declassified 2013. National Security 
Agency: Center for Cryptological History, 1998. https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-
histories/assets/files/cold_war_iii.pdf. 
———. American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989, Book III: Retrenchment 
and Reform, 1972-1980. Excised & Declassified 2007. National Security Agency: 
Center for Cryptological History, 1998. https://www.nsa.gov/news-
features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-
histories/assets/files/cold_war_iii.pdf. 
Joyce, Patrick. The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 
Kahn, David. The Codebreakers: The Comprehensive History of Secret Communication 
from Ancient Times to the Internet. 2nd ed. New York: Scribner, 1996. 
Kantorowicz, Ernst H. The King’s Two Bodies. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1957. 
Kennedy, Paul M. ‘Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy, 1870-1914’. The 
English Historical Review 86, no. 341 (1971): 728–752. 
Kittler, Friedrich. ‘Authorship and Love’. Theory, Culture & Society 32, no. 3 (2015): 
15–47. 
———. Optical Media. Translated by Anthony Enns. Cambridge: Polity, 2010. 
———. ‘Towards an Ontology of Media’. Theory, Culture & Society 26, no. 2–3 (1 
March 2009): 23–31. 
 309 
Kittler, Friedrich A. Discourse Networks 1800/1900. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1992. 
———. Gramophone, Film, Typewriter. Translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. 
Stanford University Press, 1999. 
———. ‘Protected Mode’. In The Truth of the Technological World, translated by Erik 
Butler, 209–18. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013. 
———. ‘The Artificial Intelligence of World War: Alan Turing’. In The Truth of the 
Technological World, translated by Erik Butler, 178–218. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2013. 
Krajewski, Markus. ‘Paper as Passion: Niklas Luhmann and His Card Index’. In 
‘Raw Data’ is an Oxymoron, edited by Lisa Gitelman, translated by Charles Macrum 
II, 103–20. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2013. 
———. Paper Machines: About Cards & Catalogs, 1548-1929. Translated by Peter 
Krapp. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011. 
———. World Projects: Global Information Before World War I. Translated by Charles 
Marcrum II. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014. 
Kynaston, David. The Secretary of State. Lavenham, Suffolk: Terence Dalton, 1978. 
Landau, Susan. ‘Highlights from Making Sense of Snowden, Part II: What’s 
Significant in the NSA Revelations’. IEEE Security Privacy 12, no. 1 (January 2014): 
62–64. 
———. ‘Making Sense from Snowden: What’s Significant in the NSA Surveillance 
Revelations’. IEEE Security Privacy 11, no. 4 (July 2013): 54–63. 
Lang, A. ‘The Bishop’s Plot.’ Edited by William III Blackwood. Blackwood’s 
Edinburgh Magazine 161, no. 975 (January 1897): 90–99. 
Lanning, Hugh, and Richard Norton-Taylor. A Conflict of Loyalties: GCHQ 1984-
1991. New Clarion, 1991. 
Lessig, Lawrence. Code 2.0. CC Online. Basic Books, 2006. 
http://codev2.cc/download+remix/Lessig-Codev2.pdf. 
Lewins, William. Her Majesty’s Mails: A History of the Post Office and an Industrial 
Account of Its Present Condition. London: S. Low, son, and Marston, 1864. 
 310 
Lippert, Randy, and David Wood. ‘The New Urban Surveillance: Technology, 
Mobility, and Diversity in 21st Century Cities’. Surveillance & Society 9, no. 3 (2012): 
257–262. 
Longley, Paul A., Michael F. Goodchild, David J. Maguire, and David W. Rhind. 
Geographic Information Systems and Science. 4th Edition. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & 
Sons, 2015. 
Loughlin, Martin. Foundations of Public Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
———. Sword and Scales : An Examination of the Relationship Between Law and Politics. 
Oxford: Hart, 2000. 
———. ‘The State, the Crown and the Law’. In The Nature of the Crown: A Legal and 
Political Analysis, edited by Maurice Sunkin and Sebastian Payne, 33–76. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999. 
Luhmann, Niklas. Law as a Social System. Translated by Klaus Ziegert. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
———. Social Systems. Translated by John Bednarz and Dirk Baecker. Stanford 
University Press, 1995. 
———. The Reality of the Mass Media. Translated by Kathleen Cross. Cambridge: 
Polity, 2000. 
———. Theory of Society. Translated by Rhodes Barrett. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2012. 
———. Theory of Society. Translated by Rhodes Barrett. Vol. 2. 2 vols. Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2012. 
Lustgarten, Laurence, and Ian Leigh. In From the Cold: National Security and 
Parliamentary Democracy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
Lyon, David. ‘Everyday Surveillance: Personal Data and Social Classifications’. 
Information, Communication & Society 5, no. 2 (January 2002): 242–57. 
Mack Smith, Denis. Mazzini. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996. 
Marshall, Alan. Intelligence and Espionage in the Reign of Charles II, 1660-1685. 
Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
———. ‘Sir Samuel Morland and Stuart Espionage’. In King Charles Lecture. Bath 
Spa University College, 2003. 
 311 
http://www.academia.edu/1557372/Sir_Samuel_Morland_and_Stuart_espionage
. 
McLuhan, Marshall. Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man. London: 
Routledge, 2001. 
Menke, Richard. ‘Telegraphic Realism: Henry James’s In the Cage’ 115, no. 5 
(October 2000): 975–90. 
Merkel, Miles A. ‘A “Word Spotter”’. NSA Technical Journal 4, no. 4 (1959): 91–100. 
Meyer, J.A. ‘Computers: The Wailing Wall’. NSA Technical Journal 1, no. 3 (1956): 
69–90. 
Milsom, S. F. C. Historical Foundations of the Common Law. London: Butterworths, 
1969. 
Möller, Kai. ‘Proportionality: Challenging the Critics’. International Journal of 
Constitutional Law 10, no. 3 (1 July 2012): 709–31. 
Moody, Glyn. ‘MI5 Collecting “significantly More” Data than It Can Use, New 
Snowden Docs Reveal’. Ars Technica UK, 7 June 2016. 
https://arstechnica.co.uk/tech-policy/2016/06/mi5-too-much-data-preston-
milkwhite-analysis/. 
Moran, Christopher. Classified: Secrecy and the State in Modern Britain. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012. 
Morland, Samuel. ‘A Brief Discourse Concerning the Nature and Reason of 
Intelligence’. Egmont Papers. Vol. CCXIV (ff. ii+276)., 1695. Add MS 47133. British 
Library, Western Manuscripts. 
Murphy, W. T. The Oldest Social Science? Configurations of Law and Modernity. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. 
Nickels, David Paull. Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed Diplomacy. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003. 
NSA. ‘The PLATFORM Network Evolution’. Cryptologic Quarterly, 1989. 
https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/declassified-documents/cryptologic-
quarterly/assets/files/The_PLATFORM_Network_Evolution.pdf. 
Ogilvie, A. M. ‘A New History of the Post Office’. The Economic Journal 23, no. 89 
(1913): 137–141. 
 312 
Oldcorn, Benjamin David. ‘On the Wire: The Strategic and Tactical Role of Cable 
and Wireless during the Second World War’, 26 September 2013. 
https://ore.exeter.ac.uk/repository/handle/10871/14642. 
Omand, David. Securing the State. London: C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd, 2012. 
Paget, Mary. The King’s Messengers, 1199-1377: A Contribution to the History of the 
Royal Household. London: Arnold, 1961. 
Palmås, Karl. ‘Inauthentically Intense: Coveillance and Consumer Culture among 
Speedsurfers’. Surveillance & Society 13, no. 3/4 (2015): 487–496. 
Pascall, Stephen C., and David J. Withers. Commercial Satellite Communication. 
Oxford: Focal Press, 1997. 
Paul Baran. On Distributed Communications Networks. Santa Monica, California: The 
RAND Coporation, 1962. 
https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/papers/2005/P2626.pdf. 
Peacey, Jason. Politicians and Pamphleteers: Propaganda During the English Civil Wars 
and Interregnum. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004. 
Pellew, Jill. The Home Office 1848-1914: From Clerks to Bureaucrats. London: 
Heinemann, 1982. 
Perry, Charles R. ‘Frank Ives Scudamore and the Post Office Telegraphs’. Albion: A 
Quarterly Journal Concerned with British Studies 12, no. 4 (1980): 350–67. 
Pollock, Sir Frederick, and Frederic William Maitland. History of English Law Before 
the Time of Edward I. Vol. 1. Liberty Fund Inc, 2009. 
Poole, Thomas. Reason of State. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Pottage, Alain. ‘Law after Anthropology: Object and Technique in Roman Law’. 
Theory, Culture & Society 31, no. 2–3 (1 March 2014): 147–66. 
doi:10.1177/0263276413502239. 
———. ‘Our Geological Contemporary’. In In Search of Contemporary Legal Thought, 
by Desautels-Stein and Tomlins, 177–95. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2017. 
———. ‘Power as an Art of Contingency: Luhmann, Deleuze, Foucault’. Economy 
and Society 27, no. 1 (1998): 1–27. 
———. ‘The Measure of Land’. The Modern Law Review 57, no. 3 (1994): 361–84. 
 313 
Potter, Lois. Secret Rites and Secret Writing: Royalist Literature 1641-1660. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989. 
Potter, Simon James. News and the British World: The Emergence of an Imperial Press 
System, 1876-1922. Oxford: Clarendon, 2003. 
Price, Alfred. Instruments of Darkness: The History of Electronic Warfare 1939-1945. 
Revised. Barnsley: Frontline Books, 2017. 
Renton, R. N. Telegraphy. London: Pitman Publishing, 1976. 
Richardson, Malcolm. ‘The Fading Influence of the Medieval Ars Dictaminis in 
England After 1400’. Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 19, no. 2 (2001): 
225–47.  
Rosenzweig, Roy. ‘Wizards, Bureaucrats, Warriors, and Hackers: Writing the 
History of the Internet’. The American Historical Review 103, no. 5 (1998): 1530–52. 
Rowbottom, Jacob. ‘The Propaganda Wars and Liberty of the Press’. In Entick v 
Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law, edited by Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, 
85–107. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015. 
Schmitt, Carl. Dictatorship. Translated by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward. 
Cambridge: Polity, 2013. 
Scott, Paul. ‘Entick v Carrington and the Legal Protection of Property’. In Entick v 
Carrington: 250 Years of the Rule of Law, edited by Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, 
131–60. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015. 
Sedley, Stephen. Lions Under the Throne: Essays on the History of English Public Law. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Serres, Michel. The Parasite. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2007. 
Shannon, Claude E. ‘A Mathematical Theory of Communication’. The Bell System 
Technical Journal 27, no. July (1948): 379–423. 
Siegert, Bernhard. ‘Media After Media’. In Media After Kittler, edited by Eleni 
Ikoniadou and Scott Wilson, 79–91. London, New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
International, 2015. 
———. Relays: Literature as an Epoch of the Postal System. Translated by Kevin Repp. 
Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999. 
 314 
Smith, Graham. ‘Future-Proofing the Investigatory Powers Bill’. Accessed 28 
January 2017. http://www.cyberleagle.com/2016/04/future-proofing-
investigatory-powers.html. 
Sood, Gagan D. S. ‘The Informational Fabric of Eighteenth-Century India and the 
Middle East: Couriers, Intermediaries and Postal Communication’. Modern Asian 
Studies 43, no. 5 (2009): 1085–1116. 
Souden, David. Voices Over the Horizon: Tales from Cable and Wireless. Cambridge: 
Granta Editions, 1999. 
Sprenger, Florian. The Politics of Micro-Decisions. Translated by Valentine A. Pakis. 
Lüneburg: meson press, Hybrid Publishing Lab, 2015. 
http://meson.press/books/the-politics-of-micro-decisions/. 
Srnicek, Nick. Platform Capitalism. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016. 
Staff, Frank. The Penny Post, 1680-1918. London, Lutterworth Press, 1964. 
Starosielski, Nicole. The Undersea Network. Durham: Duke University Press Books, 
2015. 
Strathern, Marilyn. ‘Bullet-Proofing: A Tale from the United Kingdom’. In 
Documents: Artifacts of Modern Knowledge, edited by Annelise Riles, 181–205. 
University of Michigan Press, 2006. 
Thomson, Mark A. The Secretaries of State 1681-1782. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1932. 
Tomkins, Adam. ‘The Authority of Entick v Carrington’. In Entick v Carrington: 250 
Years of the Rule of Law, edited by Adam Tomkins and Paul Scott, 161–84. Oxford: 
Hart Publishing, 2015. 
Tout, T. F. The Place of the Reign of Edward II in English History. Manchester: 
University of Manchester, 1914. 
Tuchman, Barbara W. The Zimmerman Telegram. London: Constable, 1959. 
Turing, Alan Mathison. ‘On Computable Numbers, with an Application to the 
Entscheidungsproblem’. Journal of Math 58, no. 345–363 (1936): 5. 
Underdown, David. Royalist Conspiracy in England, 1649-1660. New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1960. 
Van Caenegem, Raoul. The Birth of the English Common Law. 2nd ed. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988. 
 315 
Vincent, David. ‘Surveillance, Privacy & History’. History & Policy, 1 October 2013. 
http://www.historyandpolicy.org/index.php/policy-
papers/papers/surveillance-privacy-and-history. 
———. The Culture of Secrecy: Britain 1832-1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999. 
Vismann, Cornelia. ‘Cultural Techniques and Sovereignty’. Theory, Culture & 
Society 30, no. 6 (1 November 2013): 83–93. 
———. Files: Law and Media Technology. Translated by Geoffrey Winthrop-Young. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008. 
———. ‘Jurisprudence: A Transfer Science’. Law and Critique 10, no. 3 (October 
1999): 279–86. 
Vismann, Cornelia, and Markus Krajewski. ‘Computer Juridisms’. Grey Room 29 
(2008): 90–109. 
Wade, Nicholas. ‘Glomar Explorer Said Successful after All’. Science (New York, 
N.Y.) 194, no. 4270 (1976): 1142. 
———. ‘Glomar Explorer: CIA’s Salvage Ship a Giant Leap in Ocean Engineering’. 
Science 192, no. 4246 (1976): 1313–1315. 
Ward, John O. ‘Rhetorical Theory and the Rise and Decline of Dictamen in the 
Middle Ages and Early Renaissance’. Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric 
19, no. 2 (2001): 175–223. 
‘Warrant, n.1’. OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 19 June 2017. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/225837. 
West, Nigel. British Security Coordination: The Secret History of British Intelligence in 
the Americas 1940-1945. London: Little Brown, 1998. 
Whyman, Susan E. The Pen and the People: English Letter Writers 1660-1800. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009. 
Wilkinson, Nicholas. Secrecy and the Media: The Official History of the United 
Kingdom’s D-Notice System. London, New York: Routledge, 2009. 
Winthrop-Young, Geoffrey. Kittler and the Media. 1 edition. Cambridge: Polity, 
2013. 
 316 
———. ‘Silicon Sociology, Or, Two Kings on Hegel’s Throne? Kittler, Luhmann, 
and the Posthuman Merger of German Media Theory’. The Yale Journal of Criticism 
13, no. 2 (2000): 391–420. 
Wright, Peter. Spycatcher. New York: Viking, 1987. 
Wymer, Norman. From Marconi to Telstar: The Story of Radio. London: Longman’s, 
1966. 
 
 317 
Archival Materials 
‘“A Report to the Postmaster General, July 1866” HIC 0197/005/033’, 1866. BT 
Archives. 
‘Cancellations of Postal Warrants: Practice HO 45/25957’, 1933. National Archives. 
‘Cases of Leakage of Information about Interception of Mail 1926-1932 KV 4/221’, 
1932. National Archives. 
‘Censorship Warrants Which Should Be Revoked on Cessation of Hostilities in 
Europe HO 45/25973’, 1946. National Archives. 
‘Central Criminal Court Deposition, Defendant: ERNST, Karl Gustav. Charge: 
Offences against the Official Secrets Act. Session: November 1914, CRIM 1/151/2’, 
1914. National Archives. 
‘Chancery: Warrants for the Great Seal, Series I, 1230 - 1485 C 81’. National 
Archives. Accessed 28 June 2017. 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/C3641. 
‘Code and Cypher School - Erection of Wireless Interception Stations and Staffing 
FO 366/1059’, 1939. National Archives. 
‘Complete List of Radio Conferences’. ITU. Accessed 8 April 2017. 
http://www.itu.int:80/en/history/Pages/CompleteListOfRadioConferences.aspx 
‘Constitutional Authority to Stop Letters in the Post  HO 45/25962’, 1935. National 
Archives. 
‘Detection of Lottery Correspondence in the Post; Secretary of State’s Warrant of 
19 April 1920 HO 45/25958’, 1934. National Archives. 
‘Devices for Recording Telephone Conversations POST 33/904’, 1930. BT 
Archives. 
‘Disturbances: Warrant Issued for Production of Telegram Addressed to Anarchist 
Prisoner at Stafford from the “United Anarchist Groups, London” HO 
144/242/A53582B’, 1892. National Archives. 
‘Draft Report by the Metropolitan Board of Works, Including Post Office Proposals 
for New Street Names in Central London POST 17/120’, 1856. Royal Mail Archive. 
Electric and International Telegraph Company. Government and the Telegraphs: 
Statement of the Case of the Electric and International Telegraph Company against the 
 318 
Government Bill for Acquiring the Telegraphs. London: E. Wilson, 1868. 
https//catalog.hathitrust.org/Record/006847104. BT ARCHIVE check citation 
‘Empiradio Beam Services: Method of Recording Received Signals POST 33/2227’, 
1930. BT Archives. 
‘Home Office: Post Office Correspondence 1787-1816 HO 33/1’, 1816. National 
Archives. 
‘Home Office: Post Office Correspondence 1823-1837 HO 33/3’, 1837. National 
Archives. 
‘Indecent Wares from Abroad: Warrants for the Detention of Illegal Postal Packets 
(1911-1923) HO 144/1837’, 1923. National Archives. 
‘Interception of Postal and Telephone Communications: Interception Working 
Party Correspondence’ HO 325/536’, 1979. National Archives. 
‘Interception Service FO 366/2381’, 1938. National Archives. 
‘International Radiotelegraph Convention of Washington, 1927 and General and 
Supplementary Regulations (Washington, 1927)’. Accessed 8 April 2017. 
http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/4.39.43.en.100.
pdf. 
‘International Radiotelegraph Convention, Signed at London, July 5, 1912. 
(London, 1912)’. Accessed 8 April 2017. 
http://search.itu.int/history/HistoryDigitalCollectionDocLibrary/4.37.43.en.100.
pdf. 
‘Investigation of Espionage 1914-1919: Incomplete, Draft Summary KV 1/48’, 1919. 
National Archives. 
‘“John Bull” Article on Working of Postal Warrants HO 45/25960’, 1935. National 
Archives. 
‘Letters and Papers. Correspondence Relating to Post Office, Customs, Excise, 
Auditors’ Office, College of Arms, Lord Chamberlain and the University of 
Oxford.’ HO 42/208, 1792. National Archives. 
‘Marconi-Bellini-Tosi Apparatus for Directive Wireless Telegraphy POST 30/3139’, 
1914. BT Archives. 
 319 
‘Ministry of Economic Warfare’, 1942. Cable and Wireless archive (redacted). 
http://discovery.nationalarchives.gov.uk/details/r/edf70107-39c9-4ba2-b750-
68c7e2bb3b6f. 
‘Minutes of 23rd Meeting. (Home Defence; Possibility of Invasion; Use by Private 
Persons of Wireless Telegraph Stations in War-Time; Importance of Joint Naval 
and Military Manoeuvres.) CAB 38/3/72’, 1903. National Archives. 
‘Monomarks: System of Identification: Instructions to the Commissioner’s Office 
and the Position under the Official Secrets Act 1920 (1925 – 1978) MEPO 2/9582’, 
1978. National Archives. 
‘Newspaper Cuttings Relating to Letter Opening, 1844/1845 POST 23/7’. 
Newspaper cuttings relating to the Secretary of State’s abolition of the board 
established at Post Office Headquarters to consider the policy on the opening of 
letters from persons suspected of treason against the UK and foreign governments, 
4 April 1845. British Postal Museum and Archive: The Royal Mail Archive. 
 ‘Out Letters to the General Post Office Regarding the Interception of Telegrams 
and Letters (1887-1899) HO 151/7’, n.d. The National Archives, Kew. 
‘Policy and Procedure for the Imposition of Home Office Warrants for the 
Interception of Mail and Telephone Communications in the UK 1939-1945 KV 
4/222’, 1944. National Archives. 
‘Policy with Regard to the Interception of Private Lines by Telephone Units 
without HOWs 1941-1944 KV 4/445’, 1944. National Archives. 
‘POST 120 Series: Post Office Investigation Department 1836-1999’. Royal Mail 
Archive. Accessed 21 September 2017. 
http://catalogue.postalmuseum.org/index.php? 
‘Post Office Act 1908’. Accessed 25 May 2017. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1908/48/section/56/enacted. 
Post Office (Revenues) Act 1710, 9 Anne I, c. 11 § (1710). 
‘POST OFFICE—OPENING LETTERS. (Hansard, 18 July 1844)’. Accessed 22 
August 2017. http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1844/jul/18/post-
office-opening-letters. 
 320 
‘Postcodes’. The Postal Museum. Accessed 28 August 2017. 
https://www.postalmuseum.org/discover/explore-online/postal-
history/postcodes/. 
‘Precedents in Common Law for Opening Letters in the Post HO 45/25961’, 1935. 
National Archives. 
‘Publications: Interception in Mail of Copies of Poetry Book Pansies by D H 
Lawrence HO 144/20642’, 1929. National Archives. 
‘Radiotelegram Intercepted: Legislation to Enforce Secrecy POST 30/1904D’, 1908. 
BT Archives. 
‘Radiotelegrams on Board Ships: Censorship Arrangements, Interceptions and Use 
of Radio-Telegrams by Salvage Vessels, Part 1 POST 30/2097’, 1928. BT Archives. 
‘Radiotelegrams on Board Ships: Censorship Arrangements, Interceptions and Use 
of Radio-Telegrams by Salvage Vessels, Part 2 POST 30/2098’, 1933. BT Archives. 
‘Reports on Directed Wireless Telegraphy Systems Including the Belini-Tosi 
System TCB 274/10’, 1915. BT Archives. 
‘Sedition; Warrants: Warrants Authorising the Production of Letters and 
Telegrams to and from Russia for Inspection HO 144/1684/400430’, 1921. National 
Archives. 
‘Signing Cancellations of Postal Warrants HO 45/25956’, 1928. National Archives. 
‘Special Duties: General Post Office Investigation Branch MEPO 2/1500’, 1919. 
National Archives. 
‘Strike of Telegraphists 1872, POST 30/215’, 1871. BT Archives. 
‘Suppression of Experimental and Private Business Wireless Stations during the 
First World War, Part 1 POST 30/3501’, 1914. BT Archives. 
‘Telegraphs: Interception of Letters in Criminal Case. L.O.O.797 as to Exercise of 
Power by Secretary of State HO 144/164/A42354’, 1886. National Archives. 
‘Telegraphs: Mode of Transmitting Letters Intercepted under Warrant of Secretary 
of State HO 144/203/A47869’, 1887. National Archives. 
‘The National Archive of the UK POST 114/1’. File(s), 1657. British Postal Museum 
and Archive: The Royal Mail Archive. 
 
 321 
Thurloe, John. ‘Thurloe Papers, First Series. Collection of State Letters and Papers 
Relating to Events at Home and Abroad Chiefly in the Time of the Commonwealth 
- Add MS 4155-4159’, 1692. Western Manuscripts, British Library. 
Wallis, John. ‘Letter-Book of John Wallis 1651-1701 - Add MS 32499’, 1701. Western 
Manuscripts, British Library. 
‘Warrants: Listening-in to and Recording of Telephone Conversations under 
Written Authority of Home Secretary  HO 144/20619’, 1937. National Archives. 
‘Warrants: Post Office Warrant for Search of Private Correspondence  HO 
144/674/100653’, 1903. National Archives. 
‘Wireless: Interception by Amateurs on Shortwave POST 33/2905D’, 1931. BT 
Archives. 
 322 
Snowden Archive  
‘Access to the Future’. Snowden Doc Search, 21 June 2013. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/Accesstothefuture2013-06-
21_nsadocs_snowden_doc. 
‘HIMR Data Mining Research Problem Book’, 20 September 2011. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/HIMRDataMiningResearchProblemBo
ok2016-02-02nsadocs. 
‘Operational Legalities - GCHQ’. Snowden Doc Search, 22 June 2015. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/ContentorMetadata%3F2015-09-
25nsadocs. 
‘Preston Architecture - GCHQ’. The Intercept, 5 July 2007. 
https://theintercept.com/document/2016/06/07/preston-architecture/. 
‘Preston Business Processes - GCHQ’. Snowden Doc Search, 8 May 2007. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/PRESTONBusinessProcesses2016-06-
07_nsadocs_snowden_doc. 
SID today (NSA newsletter). ‘Chef’s Choice: SIGINT and the Question of 
Governance’. The Intercept, 5 May 2004. https://theintercept.com/snowden-
sidtoday/. 
———. ‘SIGINT Development: A Network of Discovery Networks’, 11 June 2003. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SIGINTDevelopmentANetworkofDisc
overyNetworks2016-05-16nsadocs. 
‘Special Source Access (Supporting Internet Operations) - GCHQ Presentation’, 
2010. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/SupportingInternetOperations2015-
09-25nsadocs. 
‘Tempora - GCWiki Entry’. Snowden Doc Search, 21 May 2012. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/TEMPORA2014-06-18nsadocs. 
‘XKeyScore - NSA Presentation’. Snowden Doc Search, 25 February 2008. 
https://search.edwardsnowden.com/docs/XKeyScore2013-07-31nsadocs. 
 
 323 
News reports, blogs, press releases, and websites   
‘ABC Case | DuncanCampbell.org’. Accessed 8 September 2017. 
http://www.duncancampbell.org/content/abc-case. 
‘After Legal Claim Filed against GCHQ Hacking, UK Government Rewrite Law to 
Permit GCHQ Hacking’. Privacy International, 15 May 2015. 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/584. 
Armour, Sophie. ‘Liberty Gets Go-Ahead to Challenge Snoopers’ Charter in the 
High Court’. Liberty Human Rights, 30 June 2016. https://www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/news/press-releases-and-statements/liberty-gets-go-ahead-
challenge-snoopers%E2%80%99-charter-high-court. 
Bowcott, Owen. ‘Terrorism Act Incompatible with Human Rights, Court Rules in 
David Miranda Case’. The Guardian, 19 January 2016, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/19/terrorism-act-incompatible-
with-human-rights-court-rules-in-david-miranda-case. 
Burgess, Matt. ‘What Is the IP Act and How Will It Affect You?’ WIRED UK. 
Accessed 19 September 2017. http://www.wired.co.uk/article/ip-bill-law-details-
passed. 
Campbell, Duncan. ‘Big Buzby Is Watching You’. New Statesman, 1 February 1980. 
‘Edward Coleman’. Catholic Online. Accessed 16 September 2017. 
http://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saint_id=3052. 
‘Everything You Need to Know about the “terrifying” Investigatory Powers Bill’. 
Accessed 25 September 2017. https://www.newstatesman.com/science-
tech/2016/10/everything-you-need-know-about-terrifying-investigatory-powers-
bill. 
‘Former GCHQ Legal Director: Journalists’ Communications Not Considered in 
RIPA Drafting’. The Bureau of Investigative Journalism. Accessed 25 September 2017. 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2015-02-09/former-gchq-legal-
director-journalists-communications-not-considered-in-ripa-drafting. 
Gallagher, Ryan. ‘From Radio to Porn, British Spies Track Web Users’ Online 
Identities’. The Intercept. Accessed 10 October 2016. 
 324 
https://theintercept.com/2015/09/25/gchq-radio-porn-spies-track-web-users-
online-identities/. 
———. ‘The Inside Story of How British Spies Hacked Belgium’s Largest Telco’. 
The Intercept. Accessed 16 October 2016. 
https://theintercept.com/2014/12/13/belgacom-hack-gchq-inside-story/. 
———. ‘The Little-Known Company That Enables Worldwide Mass Surveillance’. 
The Intercept. Accessed 16 October 2016. 
https://theintercept.com/2016/10/23/endace-mass-surveillance-gchq-
governments/. 
‘GCHQ Codewords and Abbreviations’. Accessed 10 October 2016. 
http://electrospaces.blogspot.com/p/gchq-nicknames-and-codewords.html. 
Gellman, Barton, and Ashkan Soltani. ‘NSA Infiltrates Links to Yahoo, Google 
Data Centers Worldwide, Snowden Documents Say’. Washington Post, 30 October 
2013, sec. National Security. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-
documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html. 
Harding, Luke. ‘Footage Released of Guardian Editors Destroying Snowden Hard 
Drives’. The Guardian, 31 January 2014, sec. UK news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2014/jan/31/footage-released-
guardian-editors-snowden-hard-drives-gchq. 
‘Hawklaw Intercept “Y” Listening Station (Former), Hawklaw | Buildings at Risk 
Register’. Accessed 4 November 2016. 
http://www.buildingsatrisk.org.uk/details/907213. 
‘How GCHQ Hacked Belgacom’. Infosecurity Magazine, 11 November 2013. 
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/how-gchq-hacked-belgacom/. 
MacAskill, Ewen, Julian Borger, Nick Hopkins, Nick Davies, and James Ball. 
‘GCHQ Taps Fibre-Optic Cables for Secret Access to World’s Communications’. 
The Guardian, 21 June 2013, sec. UK news. 
https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-
communications-nsa. 
Reitman, rainey. ‘3 Years Later, the Snowden Leaks Have Changed How the 
World Sees NSA Surveillance’. Electronic Frontier Foundation, 5 June 2016. 
 325 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/06/3-years-later-snowden-leaks-have-
changed-how-world-sees-nsa-surveillance. 
Rusbridger, Alan, and Ewen MacAskill. ‘Edward Snowden Interview - the Edited 
Transcript’. The Guardian, 18 July 2014, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-snowden-nsa-
whistleblower-interview-transcript. 
Scahill, Jeremy. ‘Gemalto Doesn’t Know What It Doesn’t Know’. The Intercept, 25 
February 2015. https://theintercept.com/2015/02/25/gemalto-doesnt-know-
doesnt-know/. 
Travis, Alan. ‘Tribunal Says EU Judges Should Rule on Legality of UK 
Surveillance Powers’. The Guardian, 8 September 2017, sec. World news. 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/sep/08/snoopers-charter-tribunal-
eu-judges-mass-data-surveillance. 
‘UK Parliament Passes Most Extreme Surveillance Law in UK History’. Privacy 
International. Accessed 19 September 2017. 
https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/1005. 
‘We Defend Freedom - UK Spy Chiefs’. BBC News, 7 November 2013, sec. UK 
Politics. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24847399. 
 
 326 
Cases, legislation, Codes of Practice  
An Act for establishing a General Post Office for all her Majesty’s Dominions, and 
for settling a weekly Sum out of the Revenues thereof, for the Service of the War, 
and other her Majesty’s Occasions., (9 Ann.) C A P. X. (11) § (1710). Justis.com. 
Attorney-General v Edison Telephone Co of London 6 QBD 244 (1880). 
‘Bill of Rights 1689’. UK Parliament. Accessed 26 September 2017. 
https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-
heritage/evolutionofparliament/parliamentaryauthority/revolution/collections1
/collections-glorious-revolution/billofrights/. 
Council for Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (HL 22 22 
November 1984). 
Draft Investigatory Powers Bill, CM 9152 § (2015). 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/473770/Draft_Investigatory_Powers_Bill.pdf. 
‘Interception of Communications Code of Practice’. Home Office, January 2016. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/f
ile/496064/53659_CoP_Communications_Accessible.pdf. 
‘Investigatory Powers Act 2016’. Accessed 25 January 2017. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/section/261/enacted. 
Liberty & Others v The Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
& Others,  
R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex p. Hosenball [1977] 1 WLR 766 
Some Account of the Trial, &c. of Dr. Florence Hensey, Kimber, Edward (ed.) London 
magazine, or, Gentleman's monthly intelligencer, 1747-1783; London27 (Jun 1758): 304-
305. 
IPT/13/77/H (2015). 
Malone v Commissioner for the Metropolitan Police (No.2) [1979] 344 Chancery 
Division. 
Malone v. The United Kingdom (ECtHR 2 August 1984). 
Official Secrets Act 1920. Accessed 19 October 2016. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Geo5/10-11/75/contents. 
 327 
Privacy International v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs 
& Others, IPT/15/110/CH (2016). 
R v Secretary of State for Home Affairs ex p. Hosenball [1977] (n.d.). 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000. Accessed 19 June 2017. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/contents. 
‘Summary in the Matter of IPT/01/62 and IPT/01//77’. Case summary. 
Investigatory Powers Tribunal, 22 January 2003. http://www.ipt-
uk.com/docs/Summary_IPT0162_0177.pdf. 
‘Telegraph Act 1868’. Accessed 31 August 2017. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/31-32/110/contents/enacted. 
‘When to Refuse to Confirm or Deny Information Is Held’. Information 
Commissioners Office, 2013. https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1166/when_to_refuse_to_confirm_or_deny_section_1_f
oia.pdf. 
‘Serious Crime Act 2015’. Accessed 28 September 2017. 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/9/section/44/enacted. 
 328 
Reports and Press Releases  
Anderson, David. ‘A Question of Trust: Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review’. Stationery Office, 2015. 
 ‘Report of the Committee of Privy Councillors Appointed to Inquire into the 
Interception of Communications (the Birkett Report)’, 1957. 
http://www.fipr.org/rip/Birkett.htm. 
Gardiner, Thomas. ‘A General Survey of the Post Office - Add MS 62091’, 1682. 
Western Manuscripts, British Library. 
‘Intercepted Letters’. In Journal of the House of Commons: Volume 2, 1640-1643, 2:883–
84. London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1642. http://www.british-
history.ac.uk/commons-jrnl/vol2/pp883-884. 
Keenan, Bernard. ‘Going “Below the Waterline”: The Paradoxical Regulation of 
Secret Surveillance in the UK’. SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social 
Science Research Network, 1 March 2015. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2583806. 
‘Open Rights Group - Home Office Consultation: Investigatory Powers (Technical 
Capability) Regulations 2017’. Open Rights Group. Accessed 23 May 2017. 
https://www.openrightsgroup.org/ourwork/reports/home-office-consultation:-
investigatory-powers-(technical-capability)-regulations-2017. 
‘Privacy and Security: A Modern and Transparent Framework’. Intelligence and 
Security Committee, 2015. 
http://isc.independent.gov.uk/files/20150312_ISC_P+S+Rpt(web).pdf. 
‘Report from the Secret Committee on the Post-Office’. Secret Committee on the 
Post Office, House of Commons, 1844. 
http://www.gbps.org.uk/information/downloads/files/official-
documents/Report%20from%20the%20Secret%20Committee%20on%20the%20Pos
t-Office%20(1844).pdf 
 ‘Report of the Committee of Privy Counsellors Appointed to Inquire into “D” 
Notice Matters’. London: UK Parliament Prime Minister’s Office, 1967. 
 329 
‘Report of the Interception of Communications Commissioner: Annual Report for 
2015’. IOCCO, 8 September 2016. http://iocco-
uk.info/docs/56850%20HC%20255%20ICCO%20Web%20only.pdf. 
‘Report of the Second Computer Study Group’. NSA Technical Journal 19, no. 1 
(1974): 21–63. 
Report on Cable Censorship during the Great War (1914-1919). London: General Staff, 
War Office, 1920. 
‘Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and 
Commercial Communications (ECHELON Interception System) - Temporary 
Committee on the ECHELON Interception System - A5-0264/2001’. Accessed 17 
October 2016. 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=REPORT&reference=A5-
2001-0264&format=XML&language=EN. 
 330 
Website references  
‘Interception, n.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 22 June 2017. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97583. 
IP2Location. ‘IP Address Ranges by Country’. IP2Location. Accessed 26 September 
2017. http://lite.ip2location.com/ip-address-ranges-by-country. 
‘Joint Intelligence Committee - GOV.UK’. Accessed 12 September 2017. 
https://www.gov.uk/government/groups/joint-intelligence-committee. 
‘Monument, n.’ OED Online. Oxford University Press. Accessed 22 June 2017 
Accessed 9 September 2017. 
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/121852?rskey=wWf7oU&result=1#eid. 
‘The Meerut Conspiracy Trial’. Accessed 25 May 2017. 
https://web.archive.org/web/20080303235605/http://www.wcml.org.uk/intern
at/meerut.htm. 
The National Archives. ‘Home Office Correspondence 1782-1979’. The National 
Archives. Accessed 11 September 2017. 
http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/help-with-your-research/research-
guides/home-office-correspondence-1782-1979/.  
‘The National Technical Assistance Centre | GCHQ Site’. Accessed 8 July 2017. 
https://www.gchq.gov.uk/features/national-technical-assistance-centre. 
‘When a Telephone Conversation Was Actually a Telegram in the Eyes of the 
Law’. BT.com. Accessed 25 May 2017. http://home.bt.com/tech-gadgets/when-a-
telephone-conversation-was-actually-a-telegram-in-the-eyes-of-the-law-
11364121187126. 
 
Film 
Citizenfour. (2014). [DVD] Directed by L. Poitras. Germany: Praxis Films 
 
 
  
 331 
Images  
 
 
  
 332 
 
 
Figure 1: Copy of an interception warrant. Home Office records, 28th April 1792. 
 333 
 
Figure 2: Pressed copy of a cancellation letter, May 1888, referring to warrant from 1887 
 334 
 
Figure 3: Copy of a warrant signed by Asquith, later marked as cancelled, features alphanumeric reference 
number 
 
 335 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The typewriter makes the copybook redundant, March 1899. 
 
 336 
 
 
Figure 5: a draft warrant in handwriting, and its typed copy, both in a tagged file, 29th September 1902 
 337 
 
Figure 6: Copy of an intercepted telegram retrieved from storage for police purposes  
 338 
Figure 7: Copy of typed letter from the Secretary, GPO, 1901  
 339 
 
Figure 8: the first draft telephone warrant, 1st May 1937 
 340 
 
Figure 9: Rejected draft warrant with comments, 14th April 1937 
 341 
 
 
Figure 10: New protocol for standardization of warrants, 21st May 1942, page 1 (page 2 is missing) 
 342 
 
Figure 11: continuation of figure 10, page 3 of new protocol (page 2 missing)  
 
 343 
 
Figure 12: Formatting interception warrants and cards, continuation of figure 10. 
 344 
 
 
Figure 13: Sample warrant S Form 56, March 1942 
 
 345 
 
 
Figure 14 & 15: Pre-printed sample interception card, two-sided, 1942 
 
 
 
 346 
 
Figure 15: Cancellation forms for interception warrants  
 
Figure 16: Feedback on intercepted packets under a warrant, 17 July 1941 
 347 
 Figure 17:  UDAQ interface 
 348 
 
Figure 18: An active Broad Oak selector
 349 
 
Figure 19: the procedure for instigating 'internal' interception
 350 
 
Figure 20: the 'business process' of interception streams 
 
Figure 21: the operational process of interception, beyond the legal framework 
 351 
 
 
Figure 22: the 'legalities table' 
 
 
